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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to answer the question of how Habermas 
"re-thinks" or "reformulates" the concept of rationality and 
rationalization processes. The method is analytical. The early, 
later and most recent works of Habermas are analysed with the aim 
of showing that he approaches the c6ncept of rationality from an 
unusual perspective which has not been discussed in the secondary 
literature. Namely, the perspective of human agency and 
communicative judgment which is gleaned from the work of Arendt. 
Arendt's reconstruction of the Aristotelian concepts of "praxis" 
and "poiesis" is central to the concept of human agency in the 
work of Habermas. Habermas, like Arendt, distinguishes between 
action as a making process and action as a communicative process. 
Throughout his work he attempts to relate these two aspects of 
human agency to the concepts of rationality, knowledge, and 
autonomy. Arendt's reconstruction of Kant's concept of reflective 
judgement is fundamental to Habermas' most recent argument for 
·grounding the concept of rationality in general. Here Habermas 
links Arendt's concept of communicative judgement, men/women's 
capacity for saying "Yes/No" with the accompanying reasons, to 
universal validity claims which are recognized and redeemed 
through dialogue between at least two subjects. Another closely 
related theme which is internal to the concept of human agency 
and which permeates the fabric of Habermas' work is Arendt's 
concept of plurality. The concept of plurality is fundamental to 
the concept of intersubjective recognition and consensus 
formation in Habermas' work. I show how Habermas uses the concept 
of intersubjectivity to clarify his concept of practical 
rationality in his later work and how intersubjective recognition 
is central to his most recent argument for grounding the concept 
of rationality in general. 
Habermas moves beyond the work of Arendt in his efforts to 
appropriate and re-formulate the Enlightenment concept of reason 
in the light of the works of Marx, Freud, Weber, Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Lukacs. The concept of reflection is revised from 
the viewpoint of reflective, communicative judgement. The concept 
of rationality is distinguished from the attitudes which actors 
adopt in apprehending their world. Piaget's decentration thesis 
is shown to be central to the concept of communicative 
rationality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
JURGEN HABERMAS AND THE CONCEPT RATIONALITY AS THE KEY TO A 
CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY 
Jurgen Habermas is a scholar of extraordinary stature. He ranks 
as one of the "great masters" of social theory who has "done more 
than any other contemporary scholar to "bridge the chasm between 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophies" (Giddens 1977:163). As 
Richard Bernstein says, "One cannot help admiring his 
encyclopaedic knowledge, his broad historical perspective, and 
his mastery of current research in philosophy as well as the 
social and political disciplines" (1976:163). Habermas' work, 
is, as is that of most influential scholars, eulogised or 
condemned, dismissed as sophistry or subjected to detailed 
analysis and critique. 
The purpose of the following study is that of ~ontributing to 
the analysis and critique of a unifying theme in Habermas' work, 
namely, the concept of rationality as central to a critical 
theory of society. This study attempts to answer the question 
of how Habermas "re-thinks" or "reformulates" the concept of 
rationality in modern technological society which seems to be 
characterised by utilitarianism, dogmatism and conditioned 
behaviour. The method is analytical. The early, later and most 
recent works of Haberma~ are analysed with the aim of showing 
that he approaches the concept of rationality from an unusual 
perspective which has not been discussed in the secondary 
literature (1). Namely, the perspective of human agency and, 
communicative judgment which is gleaned from the work of Hannah 
Arendt. This perspective is integrated with a vast range of 
insights deriving from the tradition of critical theory in 
general, which needs to be clarified. I approach this tradition 
by briefly discussing the impetus behind Habermas' work. I am 
then able to elaborate on the scope and aims of the study by 
providing a brief overview of the work. As Habermas so aptly 
says, "problems of presentation are not extrinsic to substantive 
problems" (1986:xxxix) 
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The Concept of Reason, Tradition of Critical Theory and the 
Impetus behind the Work of Habermas 
In 1961 Habermas wrote an article entitled "The German Idealism 
of the Jewish Philosophers" for a series of radio programs 
initiated by Thilo Koch (1983:22). In this study Habermas 
invoked Walter Benjamin's ninth thesis on the philosophy of 
history as follows: 
"In it, the dialectic of the enlightenment which, in its 
broken progress dominates the as yet undecided course of 
history, is held fast in the form of an allegorical 
interpretation. Th~ ninth thesis says," (Habermas 1988:34). 
"A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel 
looking as though he is about to move away from something he 
is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is 
open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where 
we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and 
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But 
a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his 
wings ~ith such violence that the angel can no longer close 
them. The storm irresistibly· propels him into the future to 
which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before 
him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress." 
(Benjamin cited in Habermas 1983:34). 
What Habermas has done from his earliest to his most recent work 
is to confront the crisis of modernity captured so vividly in 
Benjamin's ninth thesis. Habermas, in contrast to Benjamin the 
allegorist, has attempted to develop a systematic and critical 
theory of modern society. Central to this endeavour is the 
premise that the light of reason has not been totally exting-
uished despite the "darkness of the times" which the German 
nation in particular, and the nations of the world in general, 
have experienced in 
consistently refused to 
mere idealist dream 
the Twentieth century. Habermas 
accept the thesis that rationality 
to be found in the philosophy of 
has 
is a 
the 
Enlightenment, captured by 
Fichte and Hegel (Habermas 
scholars such as Kant, Schelling, 
1987:310). He has attempted to 
confront the crisis of modernity as have numerous scholars before 
3 
him, such as Max Weber, Georg Lukacs, and the central figures of 
the "Frankfurt School" of critical theory, Theodor Ador'no, Max 
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, by raising the question of 
rationality. Habermas' orientation has been, and continues to 
be, complex and multifaceted. As George Lichtheim said of the 
difficulties involved in an assessment of Habermas' work: 
One 
"[At] an age when 
established control 
made himself master 
most of his colleagues have painfully 
over one corner of the field, he has 
of the whole, in depth and breadth 
alike. Whether he is refuting Popper, dissecting the 
pragmatism of Charles Peirce, delving into the medieval 
antecedents of Schelling's metaphysics, or bringing Marxist 
sociology up to date, there is always the same uncanny 
mastery of the sources joined to an enviable talent for 
clarifying intricate logical puzzles. He seems to have been 
born with a faculty for digesting the toughest kind of 
material and then refashioning it into orderly wholes". 
(Lichtheim cited in Bernstein 1985:1). 
way of approaching the extraordinary depth and breadth of 
Habermas' work is to distil the impetus behind his work. This 
can be gleaned from his study of the impact of the Jewish 
philosophers on the heritage of Western thought. In response to 
Thi lo Koch's suggestion that the contributors to the series 
record their experiences pertinent to the theme addressed, 
Habermas emphasised that he experienced a traumatic break with 
tradition in his formative years. He said: 
"At the age of 15 or 16 I sat before the radio and 
experienced what was being discussed at the Nuremberg 
tribunal; when others instead of being struck silent by the 
ghastliness, began to dispute the justice of the trial, 
procedural questions, and questions of jurisdiction, there 
was the first rupture which still gapes. Certainly it is 
only because I was still sensitive and easily offended that 
I did not close myself to the fact of the collectively 
realized inhumanity in the same measure as the majority of 
my elders (Habermas 1983:41). 
This "rupture which still gapes" meant for young Habermas that 
the immediate past from which he was to take his bearings was in 
disarray. How could one understand why a culture, which nurtured 
the philosophers of the Enlightenment, for whom critical reason 
4 
and the issues of justice, freedom and morality were central, 
became the ground upon which Auschwitz, Dachau, and Buchenwald 
stood? Why did the German nation not resist the "pathological" 
form of society which Hitler and his henchmen inaugurated? These 
questions deeply troubled the young Habermas. Habermas' response 
to this "rupture" was to. immerse himself in the great tradition 
of Western thought. His central concern became that of 
rethinking and appropriating the valuable aspects of the 
tradition of Western thought which had been suppressed and 
distorted during the Nazi era. For Habermas this became an urgent 
and passionate commitment. Reason, freedom, justice and equality 
were not simply theoretical platitudes which were to be explored 
in the ivory tower of academic life, but urgent questions with 
practical implications to be fought for and protected from 
disrepute. No subject matter could bar his commitment to this 
task of coming to grips with what he calls the "heritage of 
Occidental reason" (Habermas 1986:1-06). Habermas had learnt from 
Adorno to approach the primary works of scholars such as Weber~ 
Durkheim, Freud, Parsons, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and 
to "systematically exhaust them" before considering the secondary 
sources (1986:94). Habermas' aim was, and still is, that of 
distiling the heritage of Western reason from whatever he casts 
his attention upon. He avidly studied the classical tradition of 
German and Grecian thought. He had learnt from the Jewish 
scholars who returned to Germany after the war that participatory 
democracy was something to be cherished and nurtured. Habermas 
says: 
"You ask about the influence of Hitlerism on my intellectual 
development and also what possible general significance it 
had. Well all biographical facts have an idiosyncratic 
element. Perhaps I could say that in general that the 
intellectual and cultural provincialism we were plunged ~nto 
by the Nazis was not overcome at a stroke, but relatively 
slowly. The traditions of the Enlightenment and of radical 
modernism did not generally become accepted before the end 
of the fifties. However when they did achieve a 
breakthrough, it was with fewer reservations than at any 
previous time in German history. Incidentally, this 
breakthrough would have been scarcely cbnceivable without 
the outstanding intellectual impact of the last generation 
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of German-Jewish scholars, philosophers and artists who 
returned to Germany after everything was over, either in 
person or through their works and writings .•• We learned that 
the bourgeois constitutional state in its French, American 
or English form is a historical achievement. This is an 
important biographical difference between those who 
experienced what a half hearted bourgeois republic like the 
Weimer Republic can lead to, and those whose political 
consciousness was formed at a later date." (1986:38;75) 
Habermas investigated the historico-philosophical 
underlying the tradition of the constitutional 
presented his assessment of this period of European 
published in 1963. 
dimensions 
states and 
thought in 
Central to "Theory and Practice" which was 
this study is the relationship between the concept of reason (in 
its broadest sense, encompassing the ideals of autonomy, justice 
and responsibility), and public opinion. Here, Habermas agrees 
with Sieyes who points out that: 
"in this gap between the individual insight and majority 
opinion, the practical task falls to the philosopher to 
secure political recognition for reason itself by means of 
his influence on the power of public opinion ••• for only when 
re~son hits its mark everywhere, does it hit it properly, 
for only then will it form the power of public opinion, to 
which one can perhaps ascribe most of those changes which 
are truly advantageous for the peoples". 
(Sieyes cited in Habermas 1963:88). 
Central to the relationship between reason, public opinion and 
the formation of a constitutional state, was the philosophers 
task of stating the "truth" as best as he/she could. Here reason 
became a practical force in the lives of men/women, Habermas 
argues. Another experience which may be seen to inform his work 
was Habermas' distress deriving from the role which Heidegger 
played in the rise of the Nazi state. Habermas was disturbed 
that one of the major philosophers who considered himself to be a 
leader of the "volk'', who participated in major Nazi party 
rallies, simply continued his work at the university, "without 
apology, or regret" after the horrors of the Nazi era were 
exposed (1986:196). Habermas says: 
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"In the case of Heidegger, Schmitt or Junger-who was never a 
Nazi, but an outright anti-semite in the Weimer r-epublic-
there was never a single sentence of regret afterwards. 
There was no apology_or remorse afterwards by any of these 
people. The moral and psychological implic~tion was 
/ 
devastating" (1986:197). 
The break with the past simply did not occur for these scholars. 
The crucial question for Habermas became: What is the 
relationship between personal responsibility, public opinion and 
the philosophical understanding of the concept rationality? How 
does one's critical use of the faculty of reason affect one's 
daily activities? What is the relationship between reason and 
action? How are theory and practice related? He delved into the 
American tradition of pragmatism covered by Dewey, Mead and 
Peirce. The theme which Habermas stresses in relation to the work 
of the American scholars is that of participatory democracy. He 
says of the work of Peirce: 
"It was only later, in the mid sixties, that I became 
familiar with the work of Peirce. Then I discovered that 
there was a missing branch of the young Hegelianism, one 
that led to a more or less radical-democratic humanism. You· 
find this already on a philosophical level in Peirce". 
(1986:193) 
Habermas similarly emphasises democracy when he discusses the 
work of George Herbert Mead and Hannah Arendt. He records that 
the works of Hannoh Arendt, on communicative action and 
participatory democracy and those of Alfred Schutz on the 
"life-world", had a profound impact upon his vision as a student 
(Habermas 1980:129). He says in this regard: 
"It should be no surprise that I, as a student in the field 
of social theory, have learned most from A. Schutz and H. 
Arendt. Let me mention three achievements of ·fundamental 
importance: the reconstruction of an Aristotelian concept of 
"praxis" for political theory, the introduction of an 
Husserlian concept of "life-world" into social theory and 
the rediscovery of Kant's analysis of Urteilskraft or 
Judgement for a theory of rationality" (1980:128). 
Hannah Arendt is responsible for the first and third "fundamental 
\ 
achievements" and Schutz for the introduction of the concept of 
the "life-world" into social theory. 
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Habermas has consistently confronted the tradition of Western 
thought and appropriated what he has considered to be of merit 
to his task of developing a critical theory of modern society. He 
says in this regard, 
"Naturally, one can remain in such traditions only if one 
criticizes and transforms them ••• the traditions that survive 
are only those which change in order to fit new situations" 
(Habermas 1986:97). 
His most recent publication "The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity" (1987) can be seen in this light. Habermas confronts 
the thesis that the Enlightenment concept of reason with its 
ideals of freedom, justice, equality and happiness is an empty 
platitude in modernity. He rejects this thesis by delving into 
the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Hegel, Adorno, Marx, Marcuse, 
Horkheimer, Derrida, Foulcault, Lyotard, Bohme, Weber, Luhmann, 
Benjamin and a host of other scholars. His basic premise is that 
these scholars all respond to the Enlightenment concept of reason 
through their work. His aim is to demarcate the points where the 
responses to this concept of reason and the "reflexive 
self-understanding", of the scholars investigated are erroneous 
(Habermas 1987:32). Scholars such as Lyotard announce the 
collapse of the "Enlightenment project as a whole" and argue that 
the hopes- and ideals of the Enlightenment, have, after the 
horrors of Auschwitz and Stalinism, been destroyed (Habermas 
1985:78-94; 1986:27). Habermas' answer is that it is only from 
the perspective of the ideals, internal to the Enlightenment 
concept of reason, that Fascism and Stalinism are revealed to 
one in their "full horror" (1986:27). 
There is a danger in attempting to reduce the entire 
intellectual project of a scholar to a "psychology of research" 
which is circumscribed by the experiences stemming from 
totalitarian forms of society such as Nazi Germany and Stalinism. 
Habermas has clearly indicated that the impetus behind much of 
his work stems from his experience of the fall of fascism and 
modern forms of thought and action which neglect the basic 
premise of participatory democracy (2). He would, however, be 
sceptical if one attempted to argue that his life's work can only 
be understood from the perspective sketched thus far. The impetus 
behind critical modes of thought is complex and equally part of 
the heritage of Western rationalism. 
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Critiques of the forms of domination, repression, and dogmatism, 
encountered in society can be traced to the basic concept of 
reason held by the ancient philosophers. Critical Theory, one can 
argue, has its roots ~n the Socratic notion of negative reason, 
where the scholar's task is that of saying: "No". As Trent 
Schroyer says: 
"Plato mythically depicts Socrates' "inner voice" (the symbol 
of reason) as always saying no, and while this does not 
exhaust the concept of reason 
function ••• with the Socratic 
shows the basic concept of 
it is clearly its 
method [of dialogue] 
major 
Plato 
reason as a critique of 
conventional mystification which releases a changed praxis 
(action) in the individual's life". 
(1973:15 emphasis in text). 
Critical Theory can be seen as a complex and muliti-faceted body 
of knowledge which is historically rooted in the forms of 
thought and action guiding and expressing the lives of men and 
women. Aspasia and her student Pericles, Diotoma and her student 
Socrates, Plato and his mother Pretictione, Aristotle and his 
countless followers can all be viewed as Critical Theorists. 
Critically oriented forms of reason were temporally suppressed in 
March 415 when Hypatia, a scholar following the Aristotelian 
tradition of practical reason, was brutally murdered for her 
"pagan rationalism" by the fanatical monks of the church of St' 
Cyril(Alic 1986:25-48). Critical forms of thought were preserved 
in the ancient Edessa school which became a major Arab centre of 
Greek thought during the Dark Ages (Alic 1986:34). Critical 
scholars such as Roger Bacon and Peter Abelard criticised the 
Medieval notion of reason which disavowed critical reflection and 
was limited to the description of religious doctrine. These 
critical scholars paved the way for Thomas Aquinas' effort to 
unite Aristotle's concept of practical reason with the concept of 
faith which dominated Medieval thought (Zebel and Schwartz 
1963:200). From the earliest records of humankind, critical 
reason, which disavows forms of domination and suppression, has 
been part of the "taken for granted" of countless scholars. Thus 
the concept of rationality which is central to what Habermas 
names the "heritage of Occidental reason" is oriented toward a 
sustained critique of dogmatism and repression. It encompasses an 
orientation toward freedom from domination and informs the daily 
activities. of men. The basic 
equality and enlightenment 
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premises of freedom, justice, 
circumscribe the concept of 
rationality which Habermas is interested in. He strives to 
develop I a theory of society in which thought and action are 
rationally related. Thus the concept of rationality is for 
Habermas a key to a theory of society which harbours the 
practical intent of facilitating modes of thought and action 
oriented toward freedom from domination. 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 
The "Frankfurt School" of Critical Theory comprises the work of 
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal 
and Friederich Pollok (3). These scholars share with the 
heritage of Western rationalism a concept of reason which is 
inherently critical, or more basically, says "No" to forms of 
repression or dogmatism. Habermas holds that the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School is best captured as a collection of 
diverse, critical essays stemming from each theorist's field of 
interest. From his point of view there was no Critical Theory in 
the sense of a coherent whole. He says in this regard: 
"For me there was no critical theory, no coherent doctrine. 
Adorno wrote critical essays on culture and held seminars on 
Hegel. He made contemporary a certain Marxist background. 
· That was it. Only some clever young people in the late 
sixties discovered early critical theory and made it clearer 
in my mind that a theory of society should be systematic" 
(Habermas 1986:97) 
Habermas argues that it was only in the late 
Frankfurt thinkers were considered as a 
sixties that the 
"school" by the 
"politicised students" and the public at large (1986:49). He 
holds that for Adorno, "Critical Theory meant thinking in 
fragments which he then made into a programme" (Habermas 
1986:49). Adorno wrote critical pieces, notes or fragments on 
music, astrology, aesthetics, and the work of literary fig?res 
such as Kafka, Brecht, and Proust. Central to this form of 
Critical Theory, was the view that critique and the social 
phenomena which were analysed were inseparable from the 
conditions pertaining to content, origin, reception, and 
productipn of the form of life which they reflected. The 
essential point with regard to the concept of rationality, is 
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that the concepts reason, critique and society are 
inter-connected. Thus for the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt 
school, the concept of rationality is never simply stated, but 
is revealed in and through the critical process of systematic 
analysis. Habermas points out that the Frankfurt scholars 
implicitly subscribed to the Enlightenment concept of reason in 
their sociology or theory of society, understood as a form of 
critical reason. He says: 
" ••• critical theory renewed its affirmative moment in its 
relation to the philosophy of the bourgeois epoch. The 
theory of society had to take from the latter the concept of 
reason, without which it lost its normative basis. "Reason" 
wrote Marcuse, in an essay expanding in Horkheimer's 
programmatic delimitation of critical theory in relation to 
traditional theory, "is a fundamental category of 
philosophical thought, the only one by means of which it has 
bound itself to human destiny". 
(Marcuse cited in Haberma~ 1986:231) 
Thus for Habermas and the critical theorists of the Frankfurt 
School, the concept of rationality is central to their endeavour 
as sociologists, to develop a reflective and critical assessment 
of modern society. Habermas however, has always stood apart from 
his mentors, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse in that he learnt 
from Hannah Arendt how important participatory democracy was, and 
still is, to a critical theory of society. He says in this 
regard,· that the "old Frankfurt school never took bourgeois 
democracy very seriously"(1986:98). Habermas holds 
took the aphoristic mode of philosophy to extremes 
that Adorno 
and sought 
refuge in the abstract critique of instrumental reason. He argues 
that this led to three basic weaknesses in the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School which he captures as follows: 
"In the first place, Critical Theory never took the 
theoretical contributions of the social sciences and 
analytic philosophy seri~usly. It never engaged· them 
seriously ~sit should have done. Secondly ••• it made only a 
limited contribution to the empirical analysis of the 
over-complex reality of our society. And finally, it failed 
to give an unambiguous account of its own normative 
foundations, its own status. Adorno denied that it was 
possible to provide a systematic grounding of the concept of 
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reason to which he always implicitly appealed •.. Thi~, 
incidentally is one of the reasons why I have attempted to 
elaborate a theory of communicative action, of action 
oriented toward validity claims." (1986:49) 
Habermas, unlike the Frankfurt scholars, has great respect for 
the tradition of analytical philosophy. He explains that he 
learnt from the work of Carnap, Wittgenstein and Popper that the 
"theory of science and linguistic analysis has set standards of 
rigor which continental philosophy could no longer 
satisfy".(1986:37) 
Adorno and Horkheimer never fully accepted .Habermas's arguments 
for a rational reconsideration of the public sphere in 
"Structural Transformation in the Public Sphere" (1963). Here, 
Habermas emphasised discursive will formation, the public 
formation of opinion through debate. Adorno and Horkheimer's 
work on the "Dialectic of the Enlightenment" disavowed such a 
notion of discursive will formation. Habermas learnt a great deal 
from and developed many of Berkheimer and Adorne's theses but 
the extent to which he can be simply classed as a second 
generation scholar of the "Frankfurt School" of thought is 
debatable. I hold that from his earliest works to his most 
recent, Jurgen Haberma~ can be classed as a phenomenologist 
alongside Hannah Arendt. 
Scope and Aims of the Study: The Concept of Rationality in the 
Work of Jurgen Habermas 
Central to the concept of rationality held by Habermas, is the 
sociological endeavour to articulate a theory of modern society. 
The sociologist asks: What is society? How is modern society to 
be understood and how can the scholars of society contribute to a 
critique of the factors which suppress men/women in the modern 
world? Are the modes of thought and action revealed through the 
critical study of society rational or irrational? The concept of 
rationality then must be seen as internal to the theory of 
society. From his earliest to his most recent work, this question 
of an adequate depiction of society is repeatedly addressed by 
Habermas. I approach these questions through a detailed analysis 
of his primary works published in English. Habermas' thought is 
steeped in the German and Grecian tradition of philosophy, 
classical sociology, psychology and modern philosophy. He draws 
\ 
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from a vast array of sources assuming that the reader is familiar 
with the works referred to. Where pertinent, I digress in order 
to provide the background information necessary for an 
understanding of the issues he is dealing with. 
This study can be roughly divided into two main sections which 
attempt to answer three questions. Firstly one can ask: Why i~ 
the reconstruction of the Aristotelian concept of "praxis" of 
fundamental importance to Social Theory and Habermas' concept of 
rationality in particular? The first three chapters are an answer 
to this question. Secondly one can ask why the rediscovery of 
Kant's analysis of Judgement is fundamental to a theory of 
rationality. Thirdly one can ask how the concept of the 
life-world is related to the concept of rationality. Chapter four 
is an answer to these two questions. I briefly outline each 
chapter in turn. 
Chapter One 
Habermas bases his 
tradition of politics 
interpretation of the classical Greek 
on a perspective gleaned from the work of 
Hannah Arendt. I outline Arendt's unique position in this regard 
in detail. My aim is to trace the origin of the distinctions 
which Habermas makes between the concepts communicative action 
(praxis) and-work (poiesis). These distinctions form the basis 
of his understanding of human agency which has direct bearing on 
the concept of rationality. He builds upon these distinctions 
throughout his work and systematically develops a concept of 
rationality which differs from that of Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse in that he argues for a communicative dimension of human 
rationality. The Frankfurt scholars in contrast limit their 
horizons to the critique of instrumental rationality. 
I view the discussion on the work of Hannah Arendt as crucial to 
this study as a whole. The contribution which Arendt has made 
can be seen as the "neglected heritage of critical theory" since 
it is not dealt with in the secondary literature on Habermas' 
work. I focus on this "neglected heritage" and thereby attempt to 
address the question of the foundation and subsequent development 
of Habermas' concept of rationality. 
I analyse Habermas' assessment of the transition from the 
classical form of community to the modern form of society. The 
work of Aquinas, More, Machiavelli and Hobbes is discussed. 
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Chapter Two 
I address the manner in which Habermas builds on the 
distinctions discussed in chapter one and further develops his 
concept of rationality. This occurs through his critique of the 
works of Max Weber and Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse argues that what 
Weber names rationality is actually domination in disguise. He 
reaches this conclusion by analysing Weber's concept of formal 
rationality. Marcuse calls for the rejection of modern science 
and technology since they are based on formal rationality. 
Habermas responds to this call in a unique manner. He refutes 
Marcuse's rejection of science and technology with the aid of the 
Arendt's work. Habermas then casts the concept of rationality 
into a new framework. I outline Habermas' reformulation of the 
concept rationality and discuss his assessment of the transition 
from traditional to modern society. The concepts rationality and 
rationalization processes are thematic. 
Chapter Three 
Habermas' "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972) is addressed. 
The relationship between the concept rationality, human 
interests, science, reflection and human agency is thematic. I 
briefly outline Habermas' assessment of theoretical rationality 
in the classical tradition. Habermas holds that modern and 
classical scholars adhere to a contemplative stance which 
disavows the connection between knowledge, human interests and 
action. He aims to show that three specific human interests are 
constitutive of knowledge and that they are rooted in three 
fundamental life activities. Namely work, language and power~ 
Corresponding to these three life activities are three forms of 
science which he names the empirical-analytic, historic-
hermeneutic and the critical sciences. I briefly indicate what 
Habermas means by knowledge constitutive interests and how they 
are related to the three forms of science. I show how Habermas 
comes to the conclusion that the empirical-analytic sciences are 
rooted in work, the purposive rational action of the species 
which harbours a fundamental interest in the technical control 
over the external environment. Habermas develops this theme 
through an assessment of the work of Charles Peirce. I then 
analyse the manner in which Habermas comes to the conclusion that 
the historic-hermeneutic sciences are rooted in the 
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pre-scientific realm of ordinary language and harbour a practical 
knowledge constitutive interest in mutual understanding. 
Dilthey's work is addressed. 'Habermas holds a concept of 
intersubjectivity which incorporates the concept of plurality 
deriving from Arendt's work. These concepts are used in his 
critique of Dilthey's view of understanding as a making process. 
For Habermas, understanding is a communicative process. The 
concept of intersubjectivity is central to his concepts of 
communicative action and 
address Habermas's thesis 
communicative rationality. I 
that reason inheres in interest. 
then 
The 
work of Kant, Fichte, Marx and Freud is analysed in order to 
establish the thesis that reason inheres in interest. I conclude 
this chapter by indicating that Habermas uses two logically 
distinct concepts of reflection in order to show that reason 
inheres in interests. Chapter four 
he solves this problem. 
Chapter four 
addresses the manner in which 
/ 
I outline Habermas' view of the life-world which stems, from the 
work of Schutz. Arendt's interpretation of Kant's theory of 
reflective Judgement as communicative judgement is depicted. This 
is fundamental to Habermas' concept of communicative rationality. 
Habermas views Arendt's study of Kant's "Critique of Judgement" 
as the first "approach to the concept of communicative 
raiionality" (Habermas 1980:130). I clarify Habermas' concepts of 
critique and science as rational reconstruction and show how this 
is related to the theory of Universal Pragmatics. I briefly 
sketch the basic elements of his theory of Universal Pragmatics. 
I outline the concept of rationality as depicted in Habermas' 
"The theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society" (1984). Here the relationship between 
knowledge and rationality is thematic. I then deal with the 
manner in which Habermas grounds his concept of communicative 
rationality on Arendt's concept of Communicative Judgement which 
is integrated with his theory of Universal Pragmatics. Habermas' 
critique of the concept of instrumental reason as reification in 
the work of Adorno and Horkheimer is then briefly addressed. 
Chapter five 
I conclude this study of the concept of rationality in the work 
of Jurgen Habermas. 
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1 RATIONALITY AND THE TRANSITION FROM COMMUNITY TO SOCIETY 
1.1 Introduction 
In "Theory and Practice" Habermas states that his goal is to 
develop "a theory of society conceived with a practical intention 
and to delimit its status with respect to theories of different 
origins" (1974:1). The practical intent of his theory is that of 
contributing to the age old struggle for freedom and 
enlightenment from forms of domination and dogmatism. Habermas 
begins this task of developing a critical theory of society 
through a contrast which he draws between the classical tradition 
of politics and modern political science. Aristotle is the 
scholar who is representative of the classical tradition where 
politics and ethics are one and is orientated toward the 
development of a "good and just" way of life. In stark 
contrast, modern political science is categorically separated 
from ethics. Here political scientists strive for a precise 
method of ordering society. Human behaviour becomes the 
"material" for a science of man. The classical notions of 
practical prudence and a virtuous way of life are transformed 
into .technical-administative issues orientated toward the 
material "well-being" and the "safety" of citizens in a well 
regulated society or state. Hobbes is the first representative of 
the modern view of political science, Habermas argues. Behind 
this contrast between the work of Hobbes and Aristotle, lies the 
question of how a form of technical rationality comes to prevail 
in modern society 
ordered" society. 
truth, justice and 
such that men/women strive for a "technically 
Women/men no longer ask after the questions of 
freedom in a public arena but seem to be 
lo6ked into a "technically rational" world in which 
utilitarianism is the order of the day. Rationality is defined 
in terms of "means" and "ends" such that men/women calculate the 
most efficient, effective ways of doing things. Political 
questions pertaining to the "good" and "just" ways of life are 
translated into technical "problems" and are answered by 
"political experts". Modern citizens are no longer afforded the 
conditions under which they can critically asses the technical 
solutions to the problems of the world in which they live. He 
asks how all this comes about. Habermas holds that a 
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"confusion" occurred between technical, practical and theoretical 
forms of reason in the transition from antiquity to modern 
society. 
Influenced by the work of Hannah Arendt and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, he sets out to show how the "confusion" between the 
three concepts of rationality occurred. What I see as relevant 
to the rationality problematic is Habermas appropriation of 
Hannah Arendt's cohcepts of action ("praxis"), work ("poiesis"), 
power, craftsmanship ("techne") and force which she develops in 
her assessment of the classical and modern traditions of 
political thought. Habermas appropriates Arendt's rather than 
Gadamer's interpretation of action ("praxis") and craftsmanship 
("techne") in the classical tradition. Habermas recasts Arendt's 
concepts int~ his own frame of reference. The analysis of the 
transition from the classical form of community to the modern 
concept of society in "Theory and Practice" (1974) is one of the 
most abstract and obtuse works which Habermas has written. This 
may be one of the reasons why this aspect of his work has not 
been systematically analysed in the secondary literature. The 
importance of Arendt's concepts, and view of human agency in 
particular, to Habermas' concept of ration~lity has not been 
debated in the literature as £ar as I am able to ascertain (1). 
This is rather peculiar since Habermas systematically notes his 
debt to Arendt (2). My theses are: 
1.That Arendt's view of human agency forms the ground upon which 
Habermas develops his assessment of the transition from the 
classical concept of community to the modern concept of 
society. 
2.That Arendt's work informs 
break with tradition such 
Habermas' interpretation of the 
that Hobbes' view of political 
science is understood from a viewpoint which differs from that 
of Horkheimer. Here Arendt's concepts of a life of. 
contemplation (vita contemplative) and a life of action (vita 
activa) are decisive for Habermas' interpretation of the break 
with tradition. 
1.2.1 The Neglected Heritage of Critical Theory 
Arendt set out to 
early nineteen 
develop a detailed study of Marxism 
fifties ( Young-Bruehl 1984: 250) ( 3). 
questions she poses are: 
in the 
The 
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Why does Marxism culminate in the horrors of Stalinism? What are 
the totalitarian elements internal to Marxism? Why and how did 
Marx elevate the concept of labour to the noble rank of creative 
human action? (Young Bruehl 1984:278). These questions may be 
seen against the background of Arendt's study on" The Origins of 
Totalitarianism"(1951). In this study Arendt focuses upon the 
concentration camps and the employment of terror which are seen 
as two dimensions of totalitarian forms of government whether in 
the Soviet or Nazi mould (4). Arendt argues that the -internment 
camps of the First World War and those found in Europe were 
different in kind from the Soviet and Nazi form in that the 
latter Totalitarian regimes used the concentration camps in order 
to institutionalize terror. She points out that: 
"Both Nazi and Soviet history provide evidence to demonstrate 
that no totalitarian government can exist without terror and 
no terror can be effective without concentration camps. 
(Arendt cited in Young Bruehl 1984:201). 
She holds that totalitarianism is an "exceptional phenomenon" 
which occurs when there is a turn away from the basic tenets of 
democracy. The annihilation of personal space and time is held to 
be a basic feature of totalitarian forms of government. In the 
concentration camps the inmates are denied the "existential 
conditions for a human life - a present in which to think, a 
space in which to act" (Arendt cited in Young Bruehl 1984:253). 
Her basic question becomes: What are the spatial and temporal 
conditions for human action and freedom? This way of posing the 
question of freedom and action stems from Arendt's philosophical 
training under Jaspers and Heidegger (5). From Jaspers she learnt 
to ask what place (or space) a phenomenon and the concept 
pertaining to the phenomenon holds in the world. A related 
question is: What are the conditions pertaining to the definition 
of the concept? The voice of Kant is operative 
of the "conditions for the po~sibility 
phenomenon. From Heidegger she learnt to 
here in the sense 
of" a particular· 
ask after the 
experiences of time, and in time, at the root of concepts. This 
is the context in which "The Human Condition" (1958), the work 
from which the young Habermas learnt a great deal as a student, 
develops. 
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1.2.2 The Concepts Communicative Action ("praxis"), Work 
("poiesis"), Craftsmanship ("techne"), Power and Force 
In "The Human Condition"(1958) Hannah Arendt investigates the 
various ways in which the concepts communicative action (praxis), 
w6rk ("poiesis"), craftsmanship ("techne"),power and force are 
employed in the transition from antiquity to modernity. Habermas 
says of this endeavour: 
"When H. Arendt reintroduced the venerable distinction 
between poiesis and praxis, she was not primarily interested 
in a renewal of Aristotelian theory. Her immediate intention 
was a systematic, and not a philological one, namely to 
solve those basic conceptual confusions which resulted from 
the specific modern temptation of reducing the political 
practice of citizens to just another kind of instrumental 
action or strategic interaction. The outcome of her critique 
is a concept of action as "praxis" which articulates the 
historical experiences and the normative perspectives of 
what we today call participatory democracy;this concept is 
no less modern, but only more adequate than most 
contemporary action theories deriving from Hobbes, Bentham 
or Marx" (1980:128). 
In the "Human Condition" the activities of men/women are captured 
by the phrase "a life of action" ("vita activa"). This is 
contrasted to "a life of mind or thought" ("vita contemplativa") 
(1958:7). The life of action encompasses three kinds of human 
endeavour, labour, work and action. Arendt states that these 
three activities are 
"fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic 
conditions under which life has been given to man"l1958:8). 
This crucial statement and those which follow directly ~fter it 
are an answer to a decade of questions which Arendt poses to Marx 
and the tradition of political thought. I therefore cite her in 
full. Habermas may be classed as a scholar who has integrated 
these ideas into his horizon to such an extent that they form 
part 'of his "taken for granted"(6). Arendt states that the three 
-
life activities, labour, work and action are: 
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"fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic 
conditions under which life has been given to man. Labor is 
the activity which_corresponds to the biological piocess of 
the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and 
eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced 
and fed into the life process by 'labor. The human condition 
of labor is life itself. Work is the activity which 
corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is 
not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, 
the species ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an 
"artificial" world of things, distinctly different from all 
natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual 
life is housed, while the world itself is meant to outlast 
and transcend them all. The human condition of work is 
worldliness. Action, the only activity that goes on directly 
between men without the intermediary of things or matter 
corresponds to the human condition of ,plurality, to the fact 
that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the 
world ••• Plurality is the condition of human action because we 
are all the same, that is human, in such a way that nobody is 
ever the same as anybody else who ever lived, lives or will 
live. All three activities and their corresponding conditions 
are intimately connected with the most general condition of 
human existence:birth and death, natality and 
mortality". (1958:7-8 emphasis mine) 
The most striking aspect of the concept action is that for Arendt 
action occurs "directly between men without the intermediary of 
things or matter" (Arendt 1958:78). For Arendt, the specific 
human activity captured abstractly as "action" is moral political 
action or "praxis". The key concept which resolves this strange 
notion of action devoid 6f objects is what Arendt calls "the 
space of appearance". This is Arendt's metaphor for the 
"objective" relationships between men/women as political actors, 
women/men as makers of "artifacts" and music and men/women as 
providing for the necessities of life. I discuss the notion of 
the " space of appearance" and the related aspect of 
"objectivity" shortly. In general, Arendt's project is that of 
developing an understanding of politics which places men/women as 
acting beings at it's centre. This requires a clear threefold 
distinction between: 
20 
1. Women/men as doers of deeds and speakers of words. 
2. Men/women as the producers or makers of . useful and 
beautiful objects (artifacts) and musical sounds. 
3. Women/men as providing for the biological necessities of 
life 
1.2.3 Women/Men as Doers of Deeds and Speakers of Words 
Arendt emphasises~ specific linguistic dimension of Aristotle's 
notion of moral political action (praxis). This is in stark 
contrast to the vast majority of interpretations one encounters 
in the literature on Aristotle (7). The·standard interpretations 
of Aristotle's notion of moral political action (praxis) usually 
follow a discussion of the various forms of knowledge or science 
which he distinguishes. For Aristotle, moral political action 
(praxis) is guided by the prudent understanding of what is to be 
done. This occurs through man's capacity for "phronesis" or 
practical reason. Most scholars agree up to this point where 
practical reason asks after the questions of "the good" and "the 
just" ways of life. Here practical reason is inseparable from 
ethics. Political action for Aristotle is an ethical question 
and is seen in terms of his teleological conception of the world. 
Each act involves a telos or end to which it is directed. This is 
where the various interpretations begin to differ. The crucial 
question becomes the interpretation of what, for Aristotle, 
constitutes a human way of life. Some scholars emphasize the 
elements of Aristotle's conception of the soul. Here man's 
humanity is seen to be contingent upon the rational mastership of 
the instinctive aspects of the soul. Hence man as a political 
being is held to be derived from Aristotle's notion of man as a 
rational animal (8). Others emphasise the concept of "choice" as 
distinctive of man's humanity (9). Gadamer argues that the 
concept of "praxis" in Aristotle's work is diffuse, covering both 
the human and the animal realms of life. He says: 
"The original notion of practice(praxis) means the actuation 
of life, a life that is lead in a certain way(bios). Animals 
too have praxis and bios which means a way of life". 
(Gadamer 1984:91) 
For Gadamer the decisive feature which separates animal "praxis" 
from human "praxis" in Aristotle's work is the concept of 
"preference or prior choice ("prohairesis") ••• consciously 
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choosing among the alternatives is the unique and specific 
characteristic of a human being" (Gadamer 1984:91). 
Arendt emphasises that Aristotle's notion of man as political by 
nature ("zoon politikon") only attains its full meaning when it 
is understood in conjunction with his view of man as "a living 
being capable of speech (zoon logon ekon)"(1958:27). She 
stresses that political action for the Greeks occurs in the 
public arena (polis) through public discussion and debate. Those 
who are excluded from the political realm, slaves, women, 
children and barbarians, are seen by Aristotle ~s 
"anue logou", deprived, of cour~e, not of the faculty of 
speech but of a way of life in which speech and only speech 
made sense and where the central concern was to talk with 
each other" (Arendt 1958:29). 
She holds that when Aristotle speaks of man as a political being 
he is not referring ·to man's highest capacity contemplation. 
Contemplation occurs outside the realm of political action "in 
perfect silence", she argues (Arendt 1958:30). This is a unique 
linguistically orientated approach to Aristotle's concept of 
action (praxis) in relation to the concept of human nature (10). 
The aim of this brief comparison is to highlight the fact that 
Arendt self-consciously challenges the prevalent ways of 
approaching Aristotle's work. I invoke Arendt's interpretation of 
Aristotle's _concept of praxis in relation to the polis in the 
assessment of the classic concept of community. This enables one 
to decode Habermas' analysis. I first want to depict Arendt's 
concepts in isolation to those of Aristotle. Arendt introduces 
two concepts, plurality and natality, as the conditions for 
political action (praxis) and thereby develops a concept of 
communicative action. Her aim is to stress the intersubjective 
nature of action. She says: 
"human plurality , the basic condition 
speech, has the twofold character 
distinction." (Arendt 1958:175) 
of both action and 
of equality and 
She then clarifies the. concept of distinctness. Otherness 
accounts in a similar way to Hegel for the multiplicity of 
things. Otherness is that aspect of plurality which enables one, 
in the naming process to say what something is by pointing out 
distinctions. Arendt says: 
22 
"whereas all organic life already shows variations and 
distinctions, even between specimens of the same species. 
But only man can express this distinction and distinguish 
himself, and only he can communicate himself and not merely 
something-thirst or hunger, affection or hostility or fear." 
(Arendt 1958:176 
The crucial aspect of plurality is captured as follows: 
"In man, otherness which he shares with everything that is, 
and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, 
become uniqueness, and plurality is the paradoxical 
plurality of unique beings." (Arendt 1958:176) 
Speech and action are the modes (or the medium as Habermas would 
say) through which plurality is communicatively revealed when 
people come together and reciprocally unite their different 
viewpoints intersubjectively. This view of human plurality is 
essential to Habermas' concept of rationality. Plurality is 
revealed in the manner iri which·men/women insert themselves into 
the world. Arendt's point is that it is only through word and 
deed that men/women insert themselves into the human· world. 
Reality is communicatively created through the insertion of the 
"who" one is into the web of human relations which she calls the 
"space of appearance". The disclosure of the "who" in 
contradistinction to "what" someone is, ones qualities, gifts, 
talents, and short-comings which may be displayed or hidden, is 
implicit in everything one says or does. Thus through acting and 
speaking, one reveals one's unique identity. Arendt says: 
"this insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like 
labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work. It may 
be prompted by the presence of others whose company we may 
wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them;its 
impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world 
when we were born and to which we respond by beginning 
something new ••• to act means to "begin", to take the 
initiative ,to set something in motion." 
(1958:177 emphasis mine) 
Action as the beginning of something new is the actualization of 
the human condition of natality. The birth of every individual 
holds for Arendt the possibility of something new and unpre-
dictable entering the "public realm", 
or the "life-world" in Habermas' 
the "space of appearance", 
language. The "space of 
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appearance" is the public space where deeds and words are seen 
and heard by other fellow human beings. Thus for Arendt, birth is 
the actualization of the human condition of natality and speech 
is the actualization of the human condition of plurality. Through 
speech the unique being is distinguished from others who form the 
intersubjective realm of the "space of appearance". Although an 
act may be perceived in its" brute physical appearance" without 
the verbal accompaniment, it only "becomes relevant through the 
spoken word where the actor and others announce what he does, 
has done and intends to do" (Arendt:1958:179). This concept of 
praxis as communicative action is different in kind to other 
forms of action where speech plays a minor role such as in 
warfare, in mathematics or certain kinds of team work. Arendt 
says: 
"thus, it is true that man's capacity to act ,and especially 
to act in con.cert, is extremely useful for purposes of self-
defence or in pursuit of interests;but if nothing more were 
at stake here than to use action as~ means to~ end, it is 
obvious that the same end could be much more easily attained 
in mute violence, so that action seems a not very efficient 
substitute for violence, just as speech, from the viewpoint 
of sheer utility , seems an awkward substitute for sign 
language... as in . mathematics or other scientific 
disciplines" (1958:179). 
The "space of appearance" may be seen as the realm in-between 
men/women and men/women, and in-between ~/women and objects. 
The central idea behind the notion "space of appearance" is that 
a twofold phenomenon occurs when one acts and speaks in the 
social construction of reality. On the one hand, subjects are 
"objectively" concerned with the world of things. Arendt notes in. 
this regard that the physical world lies between men/women and 
gives rise to: 
"their specific objective worldly interests. These interests 
constitute ,in the word's most literal significance, 
something which "inter-est", which lies betwee9 people and 
therefore can relate and bind them together ••• most words and 
deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition 
to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent" 
(Arendt 1958:182 emphasis mine) 
On the other hand, the disclosure of the agent, is seen as the 
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intangible in-between for which one requires the metaphor of the 
"web of human relations" to capture this aspect of reality. 
Arendt says of this in-between: 
"For all its intangibility, this in-between is no 1ess real 
than the world of things we. visibly have in common ••• The 
basic error of all materialism ••• is to overlook the 
inevitability with which men disclose themselves as 
subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they 
wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, 
material object" (1958:184 emphasis mine). 
Thus, on the basis of the concepts of plurality, natality and the 
space of appearance, Arendt wants to account for: 
1. The "objective" world of things and human relationships which 
occur at this level of analysis. The concept of human 
interests binds people- and things together, and is 
actualized through speech and the production process. 
2. The agent revealing character of intersubjective dialogue as 
the medium through which different perspectives are united. 
Plurality is stressed such that the notion of subjectivity 
held by materialism, which overlooks the disclosure of unique 
individuals through the abstractions such as "species being" 
and "Nature" in Marx; "Spirit" in Hegel are voided (11). 
3. Natality stresses the fact that action is unpredictable and a 
beginning which sets something in motion. This accounts for 
the frailty of human affairs in that any act or word occurs in 
the multipicity of human relationships. The specific act 
becomes boundless through the various reactions and subsequent 
actions of others in the "web of human relations". 
Arendt's concept of power is articulated within this perspective 
of action as a communicative process. She sees power as something 
which formed in and through communicative action. Power is not 
something that is quantifiable like strength and force, she 
argues. Power is understood as something which occurs in and 
through 
disperse. 
follows: 
communicative action and vanishes when the actors 
Arendt captures her specific notion of power as 
"In distinction to strength which is the gift and' 
possession of every man in his isolation against all other 
men, power comes into being only if and when men join 
themselves together for the purpose of action, and it will 
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disappear when for whatever reason, they disperse and 
desert one another. Hence the binding and promising, 
combining and convenanting are the means by which power is 
kept in existence; where and when men succeed in keeping 
intact the power which sprang up between them during the 
course of any particular deed, they are already in the 
process of foundation, of constituting a stable worldly 
structure to house, as it were, their combined power of 
action" (1958:174). 
Power, like action, is boundless. It requires public mechanisms 
like agreements or contracts to keep it in being Arendt holds. 
Thus, for Arendt, power is intersubjectively and communicatively 
constituted. Men/women as political beings then are emphasised 
under the concept of "action". This concept of communicative 
action f~cilitates the establishment of political institutions 
and creates the conditions for remembrance, that is, for 
history. Arendt hence stresses a communicative concept of 
action. 
1.2.4 Men/Women as Producers of Useful and Beautiful Artifacts 
What Aristotle 
the useful and 
calls "poiesis", the production or "making" of 
beautiful, is distinguished from communicative 
action in Arendt's perspective. Here man as producer (homo faber) 
guided by knowledge based upon mastership or skill ("techne") is 
emphasised. Arendt notes that the craftsman creates his object 
with the aid of model or mental image, which is reified and made 
into a design. This notion of "techne"is very different from that 
of Gadamer who emphasises skills which are learnt as rules, 
devoid of the creative element and which can be forgotten as 
easily as they are learnt. Thus Gadamer's interpretation of 
Aristotle's concept "techne" is more akin to the modern concept 
of technique. Arendt deals with the modern production process in 
terms of the means-ends categories. The production process is 
determined by the means-ends categories in the following twofold 
sense. On the one hand the production process comes to an end in 
the thing that is made. The "process disappears in the product 
as Marx said" (Arendt 1958:143). On the other hand, the process 
itself is the means to produce the end. Labour also produces for 
an end, namely consumption. Since the end of labour, the thing to 
· "be consumed, lacks the wor Idly permanence of a piece of work, 
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the end of the process is not determined by the end product but 
rather the exhaustion of labor power, while the products, 
themselves, immediately become means again, means of subsistence 
and reproduction of labor power" (Arendt 1958:143). 
Arendt emphasises that the end of the work process is a durable 
thing while the end of the labour process "disappears" via 
consumption. The artifact is added to the world of things and 
is qualitatively different from the product of labour in that it 
has the property of durability which enables it to remain 
independently in the world. Thus when Marx speaks of men/women 
and their alienation from their products, he was actually 
speaking of the products of work and not labour, Arendt holds. 
She argues for a distinction between labour and work on the 
further grounds that the work process has a definite beginning 
and predictable end while labour, "caught in the cyclical 
movement of the bodies life process, has neither a beginning nor 
an end" (Arendt 1958:143). The repetition inherent in labouring, 
is internal to the process and is compulsory in the sense that" 
one must eat in order to labor and must labor in order to 
eat"(Arendt 1958:143). 
contrast, external 
The repetition of the work process is, in 
to the process itself in that the market 
demand for multiplication is added to the work process itself. 
Here the process is repeated for "reasons outside itself unlike 
the compulsory repetition inherent in laboring "(Arendt 
1958:143). Thus when Marx attempts to capture the reproduction 
of mankind, his usage of the concept of labour is correct in 
that he speaks of the labour process as the mixing with or 
metabolism of man and nature. On the other hand his usage of the 
concept labour for the reification process where a permanent 
object stands opposed to man's nature, is incorrect. He is 
actually using the concept labour but meaning work (12). The 
products of work, Arendt names "human artifact", tables, chairs 
and artworks for example. Human artifacts establish a "measure of 
permanence and durability to the futility of mortal life and the 
fleeting character of human time" (Arendt 1958:81. This is the 
domain of work where reification takes place for Arendt. 
Men/women as creators of artifact are always the destroyers of 
nature. Arendt says that "fabrication, the work of homo faber, 
consists in reification" (1958:139). Men/women as producers can 
only "materialize" objects through destroying the life process 
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within the natural object. For example the tree is transformed 
into the chair only once the natural life process is halted.Work 
(the realm of "poiesis") then is the domain of man/woman the 
maker ("homo faber") of the product, the durable artifact, on the 
basis of knowledge understood as creative and skilful 
craftsmanship (techne"). 
1.2.5 Men/women as Providing for the Biological Necessities of 
Life 
Men/women as part of the ever-recurring life cycle are emphasised 
under the concept of labour. Men/women as labouring animals 
(animal laborans) fall into the domain of labour. Here 
men/women as labouring animals mix with, rather than destroy, or 
reify nature. The condition of labour is life itself. Arendt 
develops an extended discussion of the concept labour in relation 
to the means-ends categories. This analysis is beyond the scope 
of the present study since Habermas focuses upon the concept of 
work rather than labour in his appropriation of Arendt's 
distinction between praxis (action) and 
interrelation of men/women as political 
praxis) and men/women as producers of 
poiesis (work). The 
actors (engaging in 
artifact (engaging in 
"poiesis") and men/women as maintaining the species survival is 
addressed. ihis is the aspect of Arendt's work which is neglected 
in the literature. Like Hegel, Arendt starts off with abstract 
statements about labour, work and action. In the analysis of 
each activity the necessity for the interrelation of concepts 
comes to the fore. The fascinating aspect about Arendt's work is 
that every concept is so tightly interconnected with the next 
that one has to follow the movement of categories carefully. The 
analysis which Arendt traces in "The Human Condition" is that of 
a threefold "reversal" of concepts in the transition from 
antiquity to modernity. Which concepts are accorded first, second 
and the lowest rank in the pre-Socratic, Socratic, Medieval, 
Christian and Modern periods? She asks. Is a life of action 
accorded more esteem or is a contemplative way of life of a 
higher order? The same question is asked of the concepts internal 
to the life of activity itself (work, labour and action). For 
example is labour more highly esteemed in the Christian period 
than work or political action (praxis)? Why and how does the 
"balance" of the human activities_ change? Arendt asks. The 
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depth and breadth of her investigation is certainly, as Hans 
Jonas says, "frightening in its sweep"(1977:27). The discussion 
of Arendt's basic concepts is 
Habermas' depiction of the 
"society" as is shown below. 
essential to an understanding of 
transition from "community" to 
1.3 The Concept Rationality and the Transition from Community 
to Society in Habermas' early work. 
The young Habermas, under the influence of Adorno, develops a 
densely woven tapestry in his depiction of the transition from 
the classical concept of "community" to the modern concept of 
"society". Habermas employs an array of Greek and Latin terms 
to capture important phases in the transition. Some of these 
concepts are clarified, while others are not. The presentation is 
episodic and difficult to follow. Central to his analysis is 
Arendt's concept of power and her interpretation of 
communicative action. The analysis proceeds in four 
follows: 
praxis as 
phases as 
1. Habermas sets up a contrast between the classical tradition of 
politics represented by the work of Aristotle and the "modern" 
tradition of political science represented by the work of 
Thomas Hobbes. He focused on three distinctions between the 
two traditions of politics. Namely: the concept "man's 
nature", the concept "action (praxis)" and forms of reason 
central to each tradition. 
2. Habermas then invokes the work of Thomas Aquinas which is 
seen as a link between the classical tradition of politics and 
modern political science. Aquinas translated the Greek notion 
of "man is political by nature" as "man is social by nature". 
Aquinas hereby reduces the classical notion of the "polis" to 
that of the "household", Habermas argues. Internal to the 
realms of the "polis" and the "household", are the concepts of 
freedom, action, power and domination. Habermas assumes that 
the reader is aware of the differences between these realms 
and uses Greek and Latin terms to capture the differences. The 
emphasis falls on the form of power and freedom internal to 
each realm. I clarify the basic features of the polis and 
household from this perspective through the work of Hannah 
Arendt. Habermas' argument is thus decoded through the work of 
Arendt. 
3. 
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The break with tradition is 
Machiavelli and More who deal 
realms respectively. More and 
work of represented by the 
with the political and social 
through the Machiavelli break 
barrier separating communicative action and work (praxis and 
poiesis), Habermas argues. Political action is understood as a, 
form of strategic means to an end and practical reason, in the 
Aristotelian sense, is reduced to technical reason. Here 
practical reason is screened out of focus in~ pragmatic 
fashion. The emphasis falls upon the forms of power exhibited 
by these two theorists in their depiction of the social and 
political "order". Thus the confusion between practical 
technical and theoretical reason is closely related to the 
concepts of power and domination. 
4. The work of Thomas Hobbes is then discussed in detail. 
Habermas views Hobbes as the scholar who synthesizes the 
social and political realms into unified theory of society 
based upon the premises of rigorous science. Once again the 
concept of rationality is tied to the concept of power. 
Practical reason is reduced to technical reason in a 
scien~ific rather than a pragmatic manner. 
This overview serves to indicate the direction in which 
Habermas's analysis proceeds. It is necessary to follow his logic 
in order to depict the specific concepts which he uses and to 
show how the transition from the classical concept of "community" 
to the modern concept of "society" occurs from his viewpoint. It 
is also necessary to explain essential Greek and Latin terms 
which he uses. The analysis in the first two phases seem to have 
little bearing on the concept rationality, but the import of 
these phases of the analysis lies in the basic concepts which 
form the ground upon which Habermas builds and develops his 
concept of rationality throughout his work. I deal with each 
phase of the analysis in turn. 
1.3.1 A Contrast Between The Classical and Modern Traditions 
1.3.1.1 Man as Political by Nature. 
Habermas points out that the classical tradition of politics is 
continuous with ethics since it incorporates questions pertaining 
to "the good" and "the just" ways of life. In modern political 
science in contrast, morality is strictly separated from legality 
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which is in turn clearly demarcated from politics. For Aristotle, 
he argues, there is no distinction between the ethos of civil 
life and the political constitution which is formulated in terms 
of the customary laws (nomoi). Habermas holds that for Aristotle, 
man is political by nature: 
"Only the politeia makes the citizen capable of a good 
life;and he is altogether a zoon politikon, in the sense 
that he is dependent on the city ,the polis for the 
realization of his human nature.(1974:42) 
Habermas states that for Aristotle, man's human nature is 
actualized through speech (lexis). The order of the" true 
community", he argues, is "anchored in the praxis and lexis of 
free citizens, in the public political life"(Habermas 1974:29). 
Thus Habermas uses the phrase "man is political by nature" ("zoo~ 
politikon") as Arendt does. He does not explain what he means by 
the polis beyond stating that it is defined in "contrast" to the 
household. Aquinas is seen to reduce the "order" 
to that of the household and unclarified terms 
capture this important phase of the transition. 
phrases employed are similar to those of Arendt. 
interpretation of the polis in order to complete 
the classical view of man. When Aristotle states 
of the "polis" 
are used to 
The specific 
I indicate her 
this aspect of 
that man is 
"political by nature", Arendt reads him as articulating the 
specific concrete condition of men/women in the particular period 
in which he, Aristotle, lives. Namely, the conditions which 
distinguish men from slaves, barbarians, women and children. 
Aristotle is referring in this context of man as political by 
nature, (man as "zoon politikon"), to the men insofar as they 
partake of life in the public realm (the polis). The public realm 
(polis) in Greek politics is defined in contrast to the private 
realm of the household (oikos). The household is the domain in 
which the necessities of life are taken care of. Men are released 
into the realm of freedom (polis) as citizens on condition that 
the necessities of life itself, namely sheer survival, are dealt 
with. Thus two realms or ways of life pertain to ancient Greece. 
Firstly, the household consisting of masters, servants, women and 
children where the activities of labour and work secure the 
reproduction of life in the biological sense and the production 
of useful and beautiful objects (artifacts) respectively. The 
household is the realm of labour where men and women are driven 
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into natural association by their needs and wants. The "natural 
community in the household therefore was born of necessity and 
necessity ruled over all activities performed in it" (Arendt 
1958:30). In this domain of master-serf relationships, necessity, 
is a pre-political phenomenon. Force and violence are justified 
as the only means of mastering necessity. Masters force slaves, 
women and children to obey their absolute rule and reify nature 
by creating useful and b~autiful objects (14). Secondly, the 
public realm (the polis) is the sphere where citizens actualize 
their freedom through public debate as equals. Arendt emphasises 
that Aristotle's notion of men as political by "nature"(zoon 
politikon) only attains its full significance when seen in 
conjunction with the definition of man as "a living oeing capable 
of speech (zoon logon ekon)" (1958:27). The conditions in the 
human community for a political way of life, are 
"action (praxis) and speech (lexis) which give rise to the 
realm of human affairs from which everything merely 
necessary or useful is strictly excluded." 
(Arendt 1958:22-25). 
The central idea of praxis, for the Greeks, is that action and 
speech are of the same rank or kind. This means that political 
action takes the form of communication or persuasion in contrast 
to the pre-political modes of ruling, mastering or commanding. 
Habermas accepts Arendt's interpretation of political action and 
its relation to "man's nature" in the work of Aristotle. This is 
further developed in the second sense in which the classical 
tradition is distinguished from political science from Habermas·' 
viewpoint. 
1.3.1.2 The Concept of Praxis. 
Habermas invokes the the concept of praxis: 
"the old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis 
in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had nothing to do 
with techne,the skillful production of artifacts and the 
expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance, 
politics was always directed to the formation and cultivation 
of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not technically. 
For Hobbes, on the other hand, the maxim promulgated by 
Bacon, of scientia propter potentiam, is self-evident: 
mankind owes its greatest advances to technology, an~ above 
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all to the political technique, for the correct establishment 
of the state" (1974:42 emphasis mine). 
Here Habermas indicates what "techne" means. The production of 
"artifacts" grounded on skill. He invokes Arendt's interpretation 
of production or making (poiesis) and the form of knowledge 
(techne) associated with it. What Habermas says is that making 
has nothing to do with political acting. Habermas is moving 
beyond Arendt in that he includes a dimension of practical 
reason, "the formation of character" which is strictly separated 
from "techne", skillful craftsmanship. He contrasts technical 
knowledge of modern political science with practical reason of 
the classical tradition. Practical reason, which informs 
political action, must be seen to proceed pedagogically and not 
technically. The "techne" of the craftsman must not be confused 
with the technology of modern political scientist. Habermas 
emphasises that political action (praxis) proceeds pedagogically 
and not technically, via techniques, as Hobbes holds. This is 
further emphasised in the third sense in which the classical 
tradition is "alien" to modern scholars. 
1.3.1.3 Forms of Knowledge or Reason 
Habermas says that for Aristotle practical reason is different in 
kind from rigorous science (episteme). Practical reason is 
orientated toward ethical questions pertaining to "the virt~ous", 
"the right", "the just" "the good"j and "the excellent". These 
questions are asked in the realm of "praxis" which is contingent 
and variable. Thus rigorous scientific criteria such as "logical 
necessity" and "ontological constancy" do not pertain to 
practical reason in the classical tradition.(Habermas 1971:42). 
Practical Reason entails "phronesis", a form of practical 
prudence which is oriented toward the understanding of concrete 
situations in the daily lives of men. This form of reason can not 
be derived or justified by theory ("Theoria"). Theoretical 
reason in the classical tradition is closely associated with the 
notion of contemplation. "Theoria" is orientated toward the 
eternal or unchangeable cosmos. Rationality is seen to permeate 
the universe which is ordered and harmonious. Through 
contemplation of the cosmos the theorist mimetically brings his 
soul into accord with the rationally ordered cosmos.This occurs 
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when all activity ceases. Thus "Theoria" entails a kind of 
looking or viewing and can never be "made" by the active 
application of mans reason to the particular entity investigated. 
Hobbes, in stark contrast, aims at a rigorous science of politics 
which enables men to produce or make a rationally ordered state. 
1.3.2 Thomas Aquinas and The Reduction of the Political to the 
Social 
Habermas opens his discussion of the work of Thomas Aquinas by 
asking how the classical view of politics is transformed into 
social philosophy. What took place in the interval between the 
concept of community held by Aristotle and the concept of society 
held by Thomas Hobbes? he asks.Habermas states that for 
Aristotle, the polis is the community which is orientated toward 
the virtue of its citizens. The mere association of men through 
private legal contracts for commercial or military ends is not 
the "true community" in the classical sense of the polis, he 
argues. Mere association is what the Romans name the "society" 
("societas"). The polis, he notes, is defined in contrast to 
the household by Aristotle. Habermas does not indicate what the 
household means and how this differs from the polis. He then 
immediately compares the Roman concept of society ("societas") 
with Hobbes's notion of society: 
"Hobbes deals precisely with the natural law construction of 
such a commerce of bourgeois private individuals regulated 
by private law and protected by the sovereignty of the 
state."(1974:47) 
Here Habermas is equating the concept of society held by Hobbes 
with the Roman concept of society ("societas"). In othet wotds 
Hobbes' concept of society is the antithesis of Aristotle's 
concept of community.The social philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is 
then invoked as the link between the views of Hobbes and 
Aristotle in order to explain how this antithesis or reversal of 
concepts comes about. Aquinas 
"no longer understands this community as a genuinely 
political one: surreptitiously the civitas has become the 
societas. Nowhere is the the involuntary remoteness from the 
old politics made visible so clearly as in the literal 
translation of the zoon politikon: homo naturaliter est 
animal sociale"(Habermas 1974:48) 
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Habermas does not clarify these terms. Arendt points out that in 
the transition from the classical concept of community to the 
concept society held by Thomas Aquinas the definition of man's 
nature changes. Thomas Aquinas stresses that "man is social Q.Y 
nature" (Arendt 1958:27). Aquinas elevates the notion "man is 
social by nature" to the fundamental human condition she argues. 
For the Greeks the mere social company of others is not a 
fundamental human characteristic but something men have in common 
with animals. Aquinas compares political rulership with household 
rule: 
"the head of the household, he finds, has some similarity 
to the head of the kingdom, but, he adds, his power is 
not so "perfect" as that of a king." (Arendt 1958:27) 
For the Greeks absolute uncontested rule is understood as a 
pre-political mode of ordering or "managing" the household as 
Aristotle would say. The "order" of the household is based upon 
rulership and domination • In stark contrast the "order" of the 
polis is contingent upon the equality and freedom of it's 
citizens. Equality and freedom are the conditions of felicity 
meaning health, happiness and the practice of goodness which is 
the aim or "telos" of the polis. Aristotle says in this regard: 
"the end of the state is not mere life;it is rather a good 
quality of life.If mere life were the end there might be a 
state of slaves or even a state of animals;but in the world 
as we know it, such a state is impossible because slaves and 
animals do not share in true felicity ••• it ~ not the end of 
the state to provide for alliance for mutual defence against 
all injury or to ease exchange and promote economic 
intercourse" (Aristotle 1958:118:1280b:6 emphasis mine) 
Habermas argues that Aquinas 
polis and the household 
societas"(l974:48). He says: 
reduces the distinction between the 
to the "common denominator of 
"the princeps whose power Thomas was investigating rules as 
a monarch that is in principle in the same manner as the 
paterfamilias as dominus. Dominium now means domination 
mastery pure and simple."(Habermas 1974:48) 
Thus Habermas holds that for Aquinas the power of the political 
leader is in principle equivalent to the absolute rule of the 
head of the household. Habermas views this form of power as 
absolute despotism. He stresses that the criteiion of "order" in 
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the polis is the "political .substance of the citizens 
politically orientated will and consciousness as formed in 
public discussion" (1974:48 emphasis mine). Habermas argues that 
Aquinas "sacrifices" this dimension of the polis whereby citizens 
are empowered to actively participate on a communicative basis in 
the activities of legislation and justice. Thus Habermas 
subscribes to a concept of political power which is 
communicatively formed in the polis through communicative action 
(praxis). This is the concept of power which is central to the 
concept of "praxis" as grounded in language in Arendt's 
interpretation of Aristotle's work. Habermas also subscribes to 
this notion of praxis since he makes the second crucial point: 
"the ordo of the civitas can no longer be anchored in the 
praxis and lexis [speech] of free citizens in public 
political life" (1974:49) 
Habermas holds that Aquinas is no longer able to anchor the 
concept of society in the communicative action of citizens. For 
Aquinas, the basic criterion of social order is not the freedom 
of citizens but rather "peace" and "tranquillity" which is 
achieved through the obedience of subjects to the absolute rule 
of the king or ruler (Habermas 1974:49). Habermas argues that 
the concepts of peace and tranquillity derive from the Christian 
concept of "pax" which actually means "police" or authority. 
~ocial "order~ for Aquinas derives from questions of authority 
and obedience stemming from the Decalogue which provides 
universal and immutable knowledge of modes of conduct. These 
modes of conduct reflect an ethic of status and social rank which 
is codified and hierarchically structured. Habermas holds that 
natural law for Aquinas comprises a form of virtue deriving from 
the Stoic view of an ordered and rational cosmos which is 
interpreted from the viewpoint of Christianity. The questions of 
virtue are answered through the laws of Christianity (The ten 
commandments) and the form "virtue" which this entails serves to 
entrench the stratification of society in a rigorous manner. The 
pivot around which this assessment turns is Habermas' statement 
that "social order" in Aquinas' sense results in the eclipse of 
the classical orientation toward "the good" and "the just" laws 
of governance which in turn are anchored "in the praxis and lexis 
[speech] of free citizens, in public political life" (1974:49). 
The laws governing the daily lives of the Greeks are constituted 
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through debate and rational reflection. This occurs through 
practical reason which is orientated toward mutual understanding 
and prudence. The order of society for Aquinas is not based on 
the freedom of citizens who realize their human nature in the 
polis through communicative action and practical rationality. It 
is based on passive obedience to the lord and master and the laws 
of Christianity. For Habermas this form of "order" is based on 
domination and not freedom. 
In sum: 
It is patent from the specific manner in which he speaks of 
action and craftsmanship, that Habermas relies on Arendt's 
specific and unique interpretation of Aristotle's concept of 
action (praxis) and work ("poeisis"). Gadamer's emphasis on 
"prior choice", as definitive of praxis is not invoked. 
Habermas employs a specific view of praxis such that men as doers 
of deeds and speakers of words are strictly differentiated from 
men as makers of artifacts. The distinction which Arendt makes 
between communicative action and work (praxis and poiesis) is 
thus central to Habermas' interpretation of Aristotle's work. In 
the transition from the Greek tradition to the Christian period, 
the classical concept of "community" is "alien" to the "social 
philosophy" of Aquinas, in the s~nse that political power is no 
longer "formed" communicatively by acting and speaking subjects 
who actualize their freedom in the public realm of the polis 
(Habermas 1974:49). Here passive obedience to the absolute rule 
of the "king" or master is substituted for active participation 
in the public realm, Habermas argues. Habermas' assessment of 
the Christian period is inadequate. Thomas Aquinas develops his 
concept of society within an onto-theological context in terms of 
which he appropriates the natural law of the Greeks and the 
natural right of the Romans. Aquinas integrates natural law and 
right through St. Augustine's concept of divine reason. Divine 
reason.pertains to a personal God who transcends nature. For the 
Stoics, reason is immanent in nature and gives rise to an ordered 
universe. This impersonal concept of rationality is held to be 
the basis of human rationality such that an orderly life is 
possible. Aquinas derives his concept of order from the Stoic 
premise that rationality permeates the cosmos. 
He substitutes the divine reason of a personal God who 
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plans and directs nature derived from the work of St.Augustine, 
for the Stoic notion of a "divine" yet impersonal concept of 
rationality which permeates the cosmos. (Eterovich 1972:30-60). 
Habermas does not adequately clarify these aspects 
concept of society. He merely states that Aquinas 
of Aquinas' 
develops his 
view of natural law through an onto-theological unity between the 
laws of the Stoic cosmos and the laws of Christianity, or the ten 
' 
commandments. He does not clarify these crucial realms beyond 
linking the Decalogue to knowledge which reflects social 
stratification. He does not explain how or why social 
stratification in this sense occurs. Thus his analysis does not 
accord with the minimal requirements of description and 
explanation. Habermas focuses upon the realms of the polis and 
the household. He notes that Aquinas' concept of social "order" 
is analogous to the absolute despotism characteristic of 
household "order". He then indicates that the communicative 
formation of will and consciousness as distinctive of the 
classical Greek tradition is eclipsed in the work of Aquinas. The 
theological dimensions of this conclusion are not dealt with 
beyond mere suggestion. Habermas briefly refers to "peace" and 
"tranquillity" as definitive of social "order" for Aquinas. He 
argues that the concepts of "peace" and "tranquillity" derive 
from the concept of "pax" which means "police" or authority. He 
assumes that in pointing out the derivation of a concept, he is 
explaining the manner in which it is understood by Aquinas. Here 
Habermas confuses explanation with philology. Habermas holds 
that question~ pertaining to quality of governance are eclipsed 
in the work of Aquinas. He also notes that the concept of labour 
is "rehabilitated" in the work of Aquinas. Habermas says: 
"The ordo civitas now embraces labor rehabilitated by 
Christianity, which for the Greeks was a purely apolitical 
magnitude.(1974:48) 
To argue that labour is "rehabilitated" Habermas must assume that 
it is negatively evaluated in the classical tradition. He thus 
agrees with Arendt that labour is excluded from the political 
realm of the polis and that it is negatively evaluated in the 
Greek tradition. He thus implicitly accepts her trichotomous view 
of the human condition. The concept of labour is internal to the 
realm of the household but how it is "rehabilitated" by 
Christianity is not dealt with. The interpretation of the social 
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order through the use of the concepts of peace, tranquillity and 
stratification, in an onto-theological context is suggestive, but 
not demonstrated in an adequate manner. These are probably some 
of the reasons why critics and commentators alike do not deal 
I 
with this phase of the assessment of the classical and Christian 
concept of social "order" Habermas' work. The following basic 
concepts are central to the contrast which Habermas sets up 
between the Classical, Christian and Modern periods when they are 
decoded with the aid of the Arendt's work. 
1. Communicative action (praxis)~ 
2. Communicative formation of power. 
3. Work (poiesis) - the production of artifact on the basis of 
craftsmanshi~ (techne). 
Habermas does not change his basic orientation in this regard but 
develops his concept of rationality upon these concepts. Most 
critics and commentators accept Habermas' distinction between 
communicative action ("praxis") and production (work or 
"poiesis") and assume that they derive directly from the work of 
Aristotle without the mediation of Arendt's work (1). I now 
proceed to the third phase in the analysis. 
1.3.3 The Break With Tradition 
During the Renaissance, vast changes occured in Europe. Martin 
Luther and Henry VIII rejected the papal authority of Rome. The 
New World was discovered along with the telescope which 
revolutionized astronomy. This was the age of Copernicus 
(1473-1543) and G~lileo (1564-1642). The geocentric and 
heliocentric notions of the universe were supplanted by the 
universal consciousness inaugurated by Newton fifty years after 
Descartes' mechanistic cosmology. Man developed his science from 
the viewpoint somewhere in space whereby spatial and terrestrial 
objects were subject to the same universal laws (Arendt 
1958; Koestler 1982). During the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries the Italian city-states were characterized by civil 
strife and the continual threat of foreign invasion (Zebel and 
Schwartz 1960:224). Niccolo Machiavelli was active in the 
diplomatic service in Florence and developed his "art" of 
politics which was recorded in his work "The Prince". Sir Thomas 
More was a jurist and adviser to Henry VIII on constitutional 
matters. He published his major work "Utopia" entailing 
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his view of the rationally ordered society (Habermas 1974:50). 
Machiavelli is the scholar who concentrates upon the political 
realm, Habermas argues. He focuses upon the techniques of 
acquiring and maintaining political power. Habermas indicates the 
orientation of Machiavelli's work as follows: 
"Politics is the art, practiced internally as well as 
externally, of permanent strategies for asserting one's own 
power, an art which can be studied and learned."(1974:50) 
More's task is that of establishing social order with the aid of 
legal "techniques" (Habermas 1974:50). Habermas sets up the 
contours of the argument as follows: 
"Salus publica and bonum commune can no longer be determined 
teleologically. They have become unspecified gaps which 
Machiavelli can fill on the basis of an analysis of the 
Prince's interests, with raison d'etat, while More, on the 
other hand fills them, on the basis of an analysis of the 
interests of the laboring citizens, with an economic order 
of immanent rationality" (1974:50). 
What Habermas is saying here is that the question felicity which 
is the aim or "telos" of the classical notion of community, can 
no longer be posed in a scientific universe. Equality and 
· freedom are the preconditions of the classical concept of 
felicity (health, happiness and the practice of goodness), which 
is why Habermas invokes Salus, the Roman goddess of health, 
happiness and prosperity in this context. More and Machiavelli 
deal with the question of virtue, health and happiness in a 
pragmatic fashion on the grounds of their respective experiences 
in government service. Habermas argues that Machiavelli is the 
scholar of political rationality which is the guiding interest of 
man as a political animal. More is the theorist of economic 
rationality which is the guiding interest of man the labouring 
animal. These scholars no longer ask after the moral conditions 
of a "good iife" but orientate themselves towards: 
"the actual conditions of survival. This practical necessity 
requiring technical solutions marks the beginnings of modern 
social philosophy." (Habermas1974:50) 
Machiavelli and More ask after the the conditions of survival 
within a hostile world. The classical tradition in contrast, is 
orientated towards the conditions of a virtuous way of life. This 
is seen in the context of the cosmos, which for the Greeks, was 
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harmonious and rationally ordered. Habermas says: 
"i~ the theoretically based point of departure of the 
Ancients was how human beings could comply practically with 
the natural order, then the practically assigned point of 
departure of the moderns is how human beings can technically 
master the threatening evils of nature." 
(1974:51 emphasis mine) 
More and Machiavelli do subscribe to a notion of virtue but this 
is defined from the perspective of sheer survival which colours 
the questions of the health, happiness and what Habermas calls 
"betterment" rather than "the good"11974:52). For Machiavelli, 
"human nature" is understood as the war of all against all. 
This "natural evil" is reflected in man's fear of a "violent 
death at the hand of one's neighbour"(Habermas 1974:51). For More 
the "natural evil" is the fear of starvation in the face of ones 
neighbour striving to secure his livelihood. Habermas says: 
"Machiavelli asks: how can the reproduction of life be made 
secure politically? More asks: how can it be made secure 
socially and economically"(1974:51) 
Habermas argues that for both scholars the central question 
becomes that of devising techniques which will ensure man's 
self-preservation. Machiavelli emphasises techniques of acquiring 
and maintaining power. More emphasises techniques of legally 
structuring.the economic realm. Habermas points out that More and 
Machiavelli both attempt to articulate a form of "virtue" which 
ensures the peace, safety, happiness and wealth of all in an 
ordered society. Machiavelli subscribes to the norms of power and 
security which he "promises to men suffering from aggression and 
anxiety"(Habermas 1974:52). More subscribes to the norm of 
abundant wealth and happiness which he "promises to the toil-
worn and overburdened"(Habermas 1974:52). These scholars 
inaugurate a new form of political and social philosophy since 
they extricate those elements which they consider to be "natural 
evils", namely forms of domination, from the empirical life 
context and universalize the "natural evils". The "natural 
evils" are seen to be definitive of mankind. For both scholars, 
the "natural society" or man's "natural" relationships are 
defined as man against man. Thus, for these scholars, man is 
evil by nature. In the classical tradition, in contrast, men are 
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between men are those of equality. The classical notion of 
natural law, is orientated toward practical prudence in terms of 
which individual deviations from the customary laws are debated. 
Through debate each case is evaluated. This entails a form of 
reflection, which is guided by a kind of knowledge named 
"phronesis", or practical reason, which aims at understanding. 
This form of practical reason can never be absolute and static. 
Habermas points out that for Machiavelli, the political realm is 
derived as follows: 
"from the vicissitudes 
isolates the underlying 
of the institutions Machiavelli 
structure of a relationship of 
repression which always remains the same. It is determined 
by the inevitability of aggression and defence, of threats 
and of self assertion, of conquest and defeat, revolt and 
repression, power and impotence. This tension follows 
naturally, as it were, from the potential or actual 
reciprocal applications of force;it gives the new concept of 
the political its meaning."(Habermas 1974:53 emphasis mine) 
Here a communicative concept of power is the standard against 
which the new concept of politics acquires its meaning for 
Habermas. Communicatively formed power is transformed by 
Machiavelli into the application of power which, for Habermas, is 
not power at all but force, since power can only be formed 
communicatively in contrast to force which can be applied. Here 
Habermas is using the concepts of power and force in a similar 
manner to Arendt. Habermas argues that the concept of force 
supplants the communicative concept of power in the social and 
political philosophy (15). By substituting the concept of force 
for what Machiavelli names power, Habermas notes that this 
scholar no longer understands practical reason in the classical 
sense, which is orientated toward prudential understanding. 
Habermas says that in the classical tradition: 
"the issue was legislation to give citizens the possibility 
and power to lead a good life; the positive value of the 
system of authority must prove itself in terms of the virtue 
of its citizens and of the freedom realized in the laws of 
the polis".(Habermas1974:52) 
Machiavelli, in contrast, does not incorporate a concept of 
rational reflection as the essential ingredient of t~e public 
formation of power and the actualization of freedom in the 
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political realm. He eliminates the classical concept of freedom 
from his notion of a rationally ordered society since he argues 
that those who demand freedom, actually "desire to live in 
security" (Habermas 1974:52). The few who are interested in 
freedom 
others" 
"desire to be free in order to obtain 
(Machiavelli cited in'Habermas 1974:52). 
authority over 
This concept of 
"freedom" is very different from the freedom of the classical 
tradition which is based on equality and debate. For Habermas, 
"freedom" in Machiavelli's sense really means the absolute 
freedom in the rational choice of means through which the 
strategist acquires and maintains his position of force. 
Habermas cites the guiding maxim of Machiavelli's orientation as 
follows: 
"The sole aim of the Prince must be to secure his life and 
power. All means which he employs to this end will be 
justified ••• A Prince cannot observe those rules of conduct 
in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often 
forced, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act in 
opposition to good faith, charity, humanity and religion." 
(Machiavelli cited in Habermas 1974:54). 
Thus Machiavelli divorces politics from ethics. He develops 
formal techniques in terms of which the political realm can be 
"rationally ordered". If domination is the underlying interest of 
the "rational" m~n as political animal, Machiavelli's political 
actor can not be rational, because Machiavelli sets out to 
overcome the irrationality of all against all which is the 
basic premise of the chaotic state of nature. The "ordered" 
society is institutionalized to overcome this state of nature. 
The ordered society is achieved through institutionalizing the 
irrational state of nature, since the Prince rules as an absolute 
master who is orientated toward the domination of his subjects 
who obey his absolute rule. Citizens are no longer empowered to 
discuss and reflect upon the laws which they now have to obey. 
Therefore the classical notion of natural law is eclipsed and the 
natural law based upon the "natural evils" of men is 
institutionalized. Domination and not freedom is then the 
criterion of order. Therefore, the rational order which 
Machiavelli strives for is irrational since h~ argues for the 
institutionalization of the irrational state of nature in the 
name of power which actually is force, Habermas argues. He says 
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of Machiavelli's orientation: 
"the removal of one evil [fear of violent death], produces 
another:the 
philosophers 
assume the 
danger of enslavement. Therefore these social 
who define natural evil politically cannot 
Utopian character of those who define it 
economically. Even when they do not wish to forgo a counter-
Utopian form of enhancing life, they still fall prey to 
irrationality: even in Machiavelli virtu assumes the sense 
of a barbaric vitality, the transfigured guise of political 
power per se."(1974:52) 
This "transfigured guise of political power" means for Habermas 
that force or domination supplants the concept of power as 
communicatively formed and legitimated through debate. The notiori 
that the "immanent irrationality" of Machiavelli's political 
animal, as revealed in this critique, is only applicable if one 
rejects Machiavelli's basic premise of man's nature and contrasts 
this with the notion of man's nature held in the classical Greek 
tradition. Thus Habermas' critique is not immanent since he 
presupposes the validity of the classical notion of man's nature. 
If one follows the logic of Machiavelli's argument as outlined by 
Habermas, it does reveal that domination is institutionalised, 
but this then does not automatically mean that the form of 
political action to which Machiavelli subscribes is irrational. 
Habermas shows that the form of rationality here is that of the 
strategist and that it is devoid of morality, but he does not 
clearly demonstrate that Machiavelli's position is irrational as 
he claims. Machiavelli does not claim to be striving for a 
concept of political order based on justice and equality. The 
norms of peace, safety and force are constitutive for 
Machiavelli's rationally ordered society. Habermas equates 
rationality with the conditions of freedom, equality and justice 
and irrationality with the conditions of domination, safety and 
peace. He does show that practical reason in the classical sense 
is eclipsed, but it does not then automatically follow that the 
strategic rationality of Machiavelli's political man is 
irrational. 
Habermas argues that Thomas More reduces the normative sense 
of the classical conception of nattiral law to the static 
underlying concept of economic exploitation. Society is viewed in 
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terms of the fixed compulsion of man against man in competition 
for daily subsistence. More does retain a notion of happiness and 
the Stoic ideal of leisure, but the key thesis which separates 
his perspective from that of the classical tradition is that the 
technically ordered society is accorded priority over the "good 
life". More recommends the abolition of private property in the· 
Utopian state of economic well-being. More's rational social 
order is the Utopia in which men no longer strive to secure their 
sustenance through strife. The state controls the means of 
production which is regulated by the rational selection of legal 
techniques whereby the social realm is "raiionally ordered". 
Habermas holds that More's notion of social order is analogous to 
that of Machiavelli in that the criterion of order is domination. 
Habermas states: 
"Thomas More invalidates the traditional way of posing the 
problem of the constitution by making an analogous point. 
The substance of the relationship of domination which, 
underlying the changing normative orders, always remains the 
same, is conceived by him not in terms of a basic human 
condition which ·cannot be abolished, but in terms of the 
compulsion towards exploitation which is established by 
private property" (1974:54) 
Habermas does not clarify the notion of the "basic human 
condition which cannot be abolished" (1974:54). Here he implies 
that the basic condition of communicative action which is 
orientated toward understanding between men cannot be abolished. 
More is held to emphasise social heteronomy as opposed to the 
validation of the constitution through the public debate among 
equals. For Habermas this form of order is irrational since it 
founded on domination. Once again, the classical notion 
politics is the standard in terms of which this scholars work 
judged. 
1.3.3.1 Machiavelli and More's Concept of Society at the 
Methodological Level of Analysis 
is 
of 
is 
Habermas introduces the methodological level of analysis through 
a comment on Horkheimer's assessment of Machiavelli's work. 
Horkheimer says: 
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"It is the greatness of Machiavelli ••• to have recognized the 
possibility of a science of politics, corresponding in its 
principles to modern physics and psychology and to have 
enunciated its fundamental traits simply and definitely" 
(Horkheimer cited in Habermas 1974:60) 
Habermas disagrees with Horkheimer in that Machiavelli and More 
articulate their theory of. society in a pragmatic fashion. 
Neither of them claim to be practicing the "science of politics", 
Habermas points out. I cite Habermas in full as this is a crucial 
aspect of the analysis. He explains as follows: 
"This interpretation [of Horkheimer) anticipates the 
development that only took place after Machiavelli, insofar 
as for him the skill of acquiring and preserving political 
power results in the transfer of workmanlike techne to a 
domain of praxis till then reserved for phronesis; but this 
still lacks the scientific precision of calculated 
technique. The claim to a foundation of politics on the 
principles contained in the Galilean ideal of science, can 
strictly speaking only be made within the mechanistic 
picture of the world. To be sure, the guiding cognitive 
interest of The Prince and the Utopia had already suggested 
acting in the mode of 
broken through the 
producing. Machiavelli and 
barrier, inviolable in 
More had 
classical 
philos9phy, between praxis and poiesis, - had sought the 
relative certainty of workmanlike-technical knowledge in a 
field till then reserved for the uncertainty and the 
nontransferable character of practical -prudence. However, 
this initiative could not be be carried out radically until 
technical knowledge itself was secured theoretically and not 
pragmatically. In order to attain this another barrier had 
to fall: the superior valuation in the Greco-Christian 
tradition of the vita contemplativa over the vita activa, 
the shutting off of theory from praxis." 
(1974:60 emphasis in text) 
Therefore Arendt's assessment of the life of action (vita 
activa) and life of c.ontemplation (vita contemplativa) is the 
presupposition in terms of which Habermas develops his critique 
of the work of Machiavelli and More. It is also the perspective 
from which he differentiates his position relative to that of 
Horkheimer. I deal with the first aspect of Habermas' 
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response to Horkheimer. The fall of the contemplative way of life 
is dealt with in the following section under the analysis of 
Hobbes' work. Machiavelli and More are the theorists who break 
through the barrier between political action (praxis) and work 
(poiesis) Habermas argues. For Habermas this means that practical 
rationality, as understood from the viewpoint of the classical 
Greek tradition, is reduced to a form of technical rationality 
based on the criteria which define workmanship or skill. 
Political man, as an acting and speaking being (the realm of 
praxis and lexis), with his knowledge of prudential understanding 
(phronesis) of political action is reduced to: Man as the maker 
of artifact, homo faber, with his means-ends rationality in the 
production process (poiesis). The kind of knowledge entailed is 
that of workmanlike skill (techne ). This represents a form of 
technical rationality. Habermas states his position very clearly 
when he says: 
"the guiding cognitive interest of The Prince and the Utopia 
had already suggested "acting in the mode of producing". 
(Arendt cited in Habermas 1974:60) 
Machiavelli. and More no longer speak of action (praxis) as 
Habermas and Arendt understand the term. They subscribe to a mode 
of action which for Arendt and Habermas is akin to "acting in the 
mode of producing" (Habermas 1974:60). This means that the actor 
"makes" his society like a craftsman makes his stool or the 
painter "makes" his picture (16). Machiavelli's "art" of 
politics, Habermas argues, is inconceivable to the Ancients since 
the "material" which Machiavelli aims to shape is human 
behaviour. Habermas names this the "art without precedent in the 
cannon of the traditional arts" (1974:59). Habermas' stance 
against that of Horkheimer is that although Machiavelli and More 
adopt a model of production (work or poiesis) as their model for 
action, this is arrived at pragmatically. The final break with 
tradition in political science only comes about when technical 
knowledge is secured theoretically and not merely pragmatically, 
Habermas points out. In breaking through the barrier between 
communicative action and production, "praxis" and "poiesis", 
Machiavelli and More subscribe to a strategic, production 
orientated, form of human agency. This means that the actor 
rationally selects specific means, legal techniques and 
strategies of force, in order to achieve the end, defined as 
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producing or "making" an ordered and peaceful society. 
form of rational technique results in the eclipse of 
This 
the 
classical form of communicative action based upon practical 
rationality, and the associated norms of equality, justice and 
freedom. Habermas argues that Machiavelli and More subscribe to 
a concept of rationality entailing the workman-like skill of the 
strategist. He holds that this orientation is circumscribed by 
the: 
"absolute freedom in the rational choice of means for the 
purpose of maintaining power in the exceptional state of 
latent civil war, of potential revolt or competing foe". 
(Habermas1974:55) 
The classical concept of practical reason, which is directed 
toward the good, is eclipsed by a form of strategic rationality 
orientated toward domination and heteronomy. Thus the specific 
forms of human agency: namely, a communicative model of human 
action and a work model of human action, deriving from Arendt's 
work, are central to the c~itique of th~ form of rationality 
revealed in the work of Machiavelli and More. I now address the 
last phase of the analysis of transition from the classical 
concept of community to the modern concept of society. 
1~3.4 Thomas Hobbes and the Technically Rational "Ord~r" 
Hobb~s is the scholar who integrates the social and political 
realms on the basis of a view of science facilitated by the 
mechanistic vision of the world. Habermas invokes Arendt's 
assessment of the fall of the classical concept of contemplation 
to capture his interpretation of the final break with the 
classical Greek tradition. An adequate understanding of the 
break with tradition in this sense requires an understanding of 
two reversals in concepts which Arendt analyses. The first is 
the reversal between the life of action and the life of 
contemplation in general. The second is the reversal within the 
life of action composed of the activities of work, labour and 
communicative action. Habermas names the first reversal between 
the life of contemplation and the life of action the theoretical 
justification of technical knowledge. He names the second 
reversal, between man the maker and man the communicative actor, 
the "shutting off of theory from praxis" (Habermas 1974:60). This 
is an aspect of Habermas' work which has not been assessed in 
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the secondary literature as far as I am able to ascertain Cl). In 
a detailed analysis of the reversal between the life of action 
with that of contemplation, Arendt comes to the following 
conclusions: 
!.In the classical tradition contemplation is accorded priority 
over the life of action. Through contemplation the eternal 
truths of the stable universe are revealed to the mind of the 
beholder. Theory ("Theoria") in this context means a kind of 
looking on. Action and speech cease and truth reveals itself 
to the contemplative man/woman of theory. Theory acquires its 
meaning from the Greek conception of the universe. The 
universe is a rationally ordered whole and the philosopher's 
soul is brought into accord with the rationally ordered 
universe through contemplation. Theory (or theoretical reason) 
in this context can not be seen as a mode of grounding the 
practical affairs of man since all deliberation ceases in the 
realm of contemplation. Practical prudence and the active 
_production of artifact are held to pertain to the lower 
faculties of man which, strictly speaking are "theory-free". 
Habermas points out that: 
"For the Ancients the capacity for goal directed activity, 
skill, techne, was knowledge that always pointed toward 
theory as the supreme aim and the highest goal,just as the 
prudence of the reasonable action, phronesis; but they could 
never th·emselves be derived from or justified in terms of 
theory. They remained "lower" cognitive faculties precisely 
for the sake of this self-sufficiency of contemplation. The 
sphere bf action, of doing, the life-world [Leben~welt] of 
human beings and citizens concerned for their preservation 
or their communal life was, in a strict sense, theory-free. 
This only changed when the modern scientific investigation 
of nature set about to pursue theory with the attitude of 
the technician." (1974:61) 
2. The break with tradition results in the eclipse of contem-
plation in the sense of the ancients. Arendt argues that after 
Galileo discovers the telescope, the notion that truth reveals 
itself to the "eyes of the mind" is challenged. The classical 
concept of "Theoria" falls away and truth acquires a new 
criterion. Truth is arrived at through action and not 
contemplation. Men now actively search for truth "behind" 
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appearances and passive contemplation is denigrated. 
3. Arendt argues that modern science does not entail a mere 
reversal of the classical notion of truth as revelation. 
Central to modern science is the "universal corisciousness" 
such that both the earth and the sky are now subject to the 
same astrophysical laws (Arendt 1958:260). Galileo empirically 
demonstrates the theoretical hypothesis that the moving earth 
and planets revolve around the sun to a community of 
scientists. This paves the way for Newtonian astrophysics with 
its universal consciousness which enables men to act upon 
nature as never before. Arendt says of the new science: 
4. 
"For whatever we do today in physics - whether we release 
energy processes that ordinarily go on in the sun, or 
attempt to initiate in the test tube the processes of cosmic 
evolution, or penetrate with the help of telescopes the 
cosmic space to a limit of two and even six billion light' 
years, or build machines for the production and control of 
energies unknown in the household of earthly nature, or 
attain speeds in atomic accelerators which approach the 
speed of light, or produce elements not to be found in 
nature, or disperse radioactive particles, created by us 
through the use of cosmic radiation, on earth we always 
handle nature from a point in the universe outside the 
earth. With out actually standing where Archimedes wished to 
stand (dos moi pou sto), still bound to the earth through 
the human condition, we have found a way to act on the earth 
and within terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it 
from the outside, from the Archimedean point. " (1958:262) 
The central questions of the "what?" and the "why?" of 
scientific knowledge now changes to the "how?" The objects of 
knowledge are no longer eternal and never changing motions of 
the rational order which are revealed to contemplative man, 
but the processes of nature and how they come about. The 
modern experiment answers this question through 
"imitating","making" or "reproducing" the processes of nature 
under experimental conditions. The new criterion of. theory 
then is that one only knows or understands the phenomenon 
studied to the extent that one is able to make or reproduce 
its processes under experimental conditions. Habermas puts 
this as follows: 
/ 
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"from the days of Galileo on, the intention of research 
itself is objectively to attain the skill of "making" the 
processes of nature oneself in the same way as they are 
produced by nature. Theory is measured by its capacity for 
artificially reproducing natural processes. In contrast to 
"epistome" it is designed for application in its very 
structure. Theory thereby gains a new criterion of truth 
(aside from logical consistency) - the certainty of the 
technician: we only know an object insofar as we can make 
it. The certainty of the technician that is distinctive for 
modern scientific knowledge is not to be compared with the 
more relative. certainty of the classical artisan, who 
masters his material by long practice." 
(1974:61 emphasis in text.) 
Habermas holds that Hobbes is the first scholar to study the 
"laws of civil life" on the basis of science such that political 
action can be ascertained with certitude. He holds that once the 
experimental approach is fused with the new concept of theory, 
theory is used as a guide in the technically precise sense of 
imposing "order" upon human affairs. Thus the classical concept 
of practical reason which guides action is supplanted by the 
technical rationality which in Hobbes' case becomes the ground of 
his notion of "rational" n~tural Law. Hobbes radically 
re-interprets natural law in a mechanistic fashion thereby 
deriving what Habermas names "the norms of natural reason from 
the mechanics of natural desire" (Habermas 1974:62). Hobbes 
accepts Machiavelli's basic premises and casts these into a 
mechanistic view of mans human nature. In a similar manner to 
Machiavelli, Hobbes extracts what he considers to be "man's state 
of nature", from the life context in which it is embedded. The 
state of nature, mans evil natural state, is now understood in 
causal mechanistic terms. This mechanistic nature of man, 
consisting of natural processes, causally gives rise to 
"rational" social contracts. His argument is as follows: 
The power of the ruler is premised upon the necessity to enforce 
a system of economic and political contracts. The contracts 
themselves stern from the necessity to secure peace and prosperity 
in a state of nature where men live like beasts in a life and 
death struggle for survival. Hobbes argues that "society" stems 
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from the rational agreements or contracts which men enter into. 
His task then is that of explaining: 
1. Why men enter into contracts. 
2. Why men adhere to contracts once they are enforced. 
3. Why the sovereign is obeyed and not perpetually deposed by the 
evil beasts that he governs. 
Hobbes answers as follows: 
The social contract is derived from men's "natural" reason. 
Natural reason for Hobbes mean~ "reckoning", that is, adding and 
subtracting of consequences within man's mechanistically 
conceived imagination. Man's mechanistically conceived desire 
compels him to produce or make contracts. The contract is then 
the logical outcome of the mechanistic drives which cause man to 
overcome his fear of death at the hand of his neighbour. Thus 
logical necessity and empirical necessity are confused and seen 
to be co-terminus. Habermas says of this circular reasoning: 
"the social contract and the contract of government are no 
longer understood merely as instruments for the 
rationalizing of nature devoid of law;instead their 
rationality, which proceeds from the laws of nature itself, 
is demonstrated. Justice becomes immanent in the nexus of 
causality."(1974:64) 
Hobbes finds himself caught in an equivocal position which 
becomes methodological. He names "natural law" the causal 
connection of man's antisocial instinctive nature prior to the 
contractual establishment of society. He also names "natural law" 
the lawful association between men which is established after 
contracts are institutionalized. Therefore the derivation of the 
"rationally ordered" society which is established by contracts is 
based on equivocation. Hobbes is not able to explain why men 
should agree on a contractual basis to refrain from annihilating 
one another. Man as a speaker of words and communicative actor 
is eclipsed. Practical rationality orientated toward the 
prudential solution of deviations from customary law is 
disregarded. Hobbes prescribes theoretical techniques in terms of 
which the socio-political realm is rationally ordered. The 
certainty of the technician is the mark of this book of rules.· 
Hobbes holds a concept of rationality which is derived from the 
mechanics of natural desire. This concept of rationality can only 
be arrived at if the notion "laws of nature" is understood in an 
• 
52 
equivocal sense. Thus Hobbes' technically rational view of 
society is fallacious. Like Machiavelli and More, Hobbes holds 
that one can make or structure a society in the same manner as 
the craftsman makes his stool. Thus the reflective communicative 
action of the ancients is supplanted by the "technically rational 
expert" who administers and controls the socio-political realm 
with the precision and exactitude of the modern scientist. 
Hobbes adopts the universal consciousness of the physical 
scientist and looks down upon the social and political realms 
which he assumes can be rationally reconstructed with the aid of 
techniques. Hobbes' notion of "rationality" is orientated toward 
the "true" Leviathan or absolute state. The immanent 
"rationality" of the Leviathan represents for Habermas a concept 
of society where men as communicative actors, are reduced to 
irrational beasts, devoid of justice and rational agreements 
between men. Habermas says of Hobbes: 
"in the place of the animal sociale in the Christian-
Aristotelian sense of zoon politikon h~ sets an animal 
politicum in the sense of Machiavelli, in order to show quite 
readily that precisely these rights, especially the right of 
all to everything, as soon as it is applied to a pack of 
"free" and "equal wolves", will have as consequence a state 
in which they mutually tear. and devour each other. This 
subtle playing with venerable attributes reveals the radical 
rethinking of the classical Natural Law, so that it becomes 
the actual absence of all right and justice for the natural 
environment, which lacks positive regulation and rational 
compacts. The conditions under which a community of saints 
was supposed to live, appear, in a diabolical inversion, as 
the conditions under which human beasts live in a continual 
life-and-death struggle" (1974:65 emphasis mine). 
In sum: 
Habermas develops an extensive and highly abstract critique of 
political the classical tradition of politics in relation to 
science. The guiding thread throughout the analysis is the 
specific interpretation of the classical form of practical reason 
which is alien to the social and political theory of More, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes. The classical Grecian concept of 
practical reason entails a form of practical prudence (phronesis) 
which aims at understanding the contingent and variable 
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activities of men. Practical reason is orientated towards a 
virtuous way of life. The cu~toms and laws guiding the lives of 
the Greeks are not fixed rules which have to be accorded with, 
but are open to debate and ratification in the public realm of 
the polis. Practical reason is closely tied to the concept of 
political action and man's nature. Habermas employs Arendt's 
specific and unique linguistic interpretation of praxis as 
communicative action which is actualised in the public realm 
through debate. This view of human agency is in turn closely 
connected to the concept of man's nature. For the Greeks, man is 
by nature a political being, Habermas and Arendt argue. Through 
debate in the political realm man actualizes his political nature 
and rationally reflects upon the laws and customs guiding his 
activities. The classical form of human association or community 
is thus ordered in terms of the concept of practical reason, 
communicative action and the concept of man'~ nature. Habermas 
assesses the transition from the classical concept of community 
to the modern concept society on the basis of these three 
concepts. He holds that the classical concept of practical reason 
is replaced by a technical form of reason which is at first based 
on the pragmatic orientation of More and Machiavelli. Hobbes is 
the scholar who subscribes to a form of technical reason which is 
secured theoretically. Theoretical reason in Hobbes' sense is 
based on a concept of certitude which implies that the "rational 
order" can be made or produced. Rational action is thus 
understood as a form of making. Thus communicative action based 
on speech is reduced to techniques of production. Praxis is 
reduced to work ( poeisis) 
the contemplation of the 
and "Theoria", theoretical reason, 
rationally ordered universe, 
as 
is 
eclipsed. Habermas arrives at these conclusions through invoking 
the distinctions between communicative action (praxis) and 
production (work or poeisis), a contemplative way of life and an 
active way of life, the application of force and the 
communicative formation of power. These distinctions are central 
to Arendt's work and form the basis in terms of which Habermas 
distinguishes between the practical, strategi6 and technical 
forms of rationality in the transition from antiquity to 
modernity. Habermas extends this orientation to the concept of 
rationality in his critique of the work of Max Weber and 
Herbert Marcuse which is the theme of chapter two. 
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2. RATIONALITY AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORK AND INTERACTION 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept rationality as internal tb the theory of society in 
Habermas' early works is clearly presented in the essay 
"Technology and Science as Ideology" (1971:81). Here Habermas 
confronts Max Weber's concept of formal rationality in the light 
of Marcuse's critique of Weber's work. 
In 2.2 Habermas' Approach to the Work of Max Weber, I indicate 
Habermas' approach to the work of Max Weber. 
In 2.3 Max Weber's Concept of Formal Rationality and 
Rationalization Processes, I outline Weber's understanding of 
formal rationality and rationalization processes. Habermas' 
critique of Marcuse's stance with regard to Weber's work requires 
such a retrieval since Habermas assumes that the reader is aware 
of the basic contours of Weber's position (1). 
In 2.4 Habermas' Critique of Formal Rationality as Understood by 
Weber and Marcuse, I assess Habermas' critique of Marcuse's work 
in two stages. Marcuse holds that Weber's concept of formal 
rationality has substantive implications. The key thesis of 
Marcuse's critique is that formal rationality actualizes the 
domination of man by man in the name of rationality. I outline 
Habermas' critique of this aspect of Marcuse's assessment in 
2.4.1 Formal Rationality as Domination. 
In the second stage of the analysis, I focus upon Marcuse's call 
for a new science and technology in order to overcome domination. 
Habermas holds that Marcuse's rejection of science and technology 
is based upon a confusion at the level of the concept 
rationality. I clarify this confusion from Habermas' perspective 
in 2.4.2 The Analogy Between Purposive-Rational Action and The 
Concept Work. Habermas rejects Marcuse's call for a new science 
and technology. He carefully refutes Marcuse's rejection of 
science and technology with the aid of Arendt's work. 
In 2.5 The Concept Rationality and the Transition from 
Traditional to Modern Society, I show how Habermas recasts the 
concept of rationality into a new framework such that the 
rationalization processes which occur in the transition from 
traditional to modern society can be understood. 
55 
2.2 Habermas' Approach to the Work of Max Weber. 
Habermas states that Weber introduced the conc-ept "rationality" 
into social theory in order to clarify the particular forms of 
economic, legal and bureaucratic activity that are unique to 
capitalist society. Without further clarification, Habermas then 
invokes the concept "rationalization" and describes the Weberian 
"rationalization processes" in modern society as follows: 
"Rationalization means fi~st of all, the extension of the 
areas of society subject to the criteria of rational 
decision. Second, social labor is industrialized, with the 
result that criteria of instrumental action also penetrate 
into other areas of life (urbanization of the mode of life, 
technification of transport and communication), both trends 
exemplify the type of purposive-rational action, which refers 
to either the organization of means or choice between 
alternatives ••••• the progressive "rationalization" of society 
is linked to the institutionalization of scientific and 
technical development. To the extent that technology and 
science permeate social institutions and thus transform them, 
old legitimations are destroyed. The secularization and 
disenchantment of action-orienting worldviews of a cultural 
tradition as a whole, is the obverse of the "growing 
"rationality" of social action". (1971:81) 
In this condensed overview of Weber's concept rationalization, 
Habermas orientates (1) himself towards: 
1. The mean-ends dimensions of purposive rational action. 
2. The "link" between rationalization processes and the thesis 
of the disenchantment of the cultural tradition. 
In order to understand Habermas' critique and reformulation of 
Weber's concept of purposive rational action and rationalization 
processes, it is necessary to briefly indicate what Weber means 
by these concepts (2). 
2.3 Max Weber's Concept of Formal Rationality and 
Rationalization Processes 
Weber's concept of formal, purposive rational action can be 
schematized in two related senses: 
1. In terms of the means-ends orientation to rational action. 
2. In terms of the means-end schema of rationalization processes 
0 
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as this applies to what is "peculiar and specific" about the 
social order of capitalist society. 
2.3.1 The Means-Ends orientation to Rational Action. 
Weber's depiction of rational action refers to four ways in which 
action may be determined. Traditional action is determined by 
habits. Affectual action is determined by feelings or emotions. 
Value-rational ("Wertrational") action is determined by the 
conscious belief in the "intrinsic value" of acting in a 
particular manner (Brubaker 1984:50). Purposive-rational 
action("zweckrational") is determined by conscious reasoning in 
terms of means and ends. Purposive-rational action entails the 
conscious and deliberate attempts of the actor to achieve 
specific ends via appropriate means. The conscious or deliberate 
orientation to action is the decisive element in Weber's 
depiction of these forms of action (3). To the extent that action 
is conscious or deliberate, it is seen as rational action. 
Action determined solely by feeling, affect, or habit is held to 
be non-rational. Thus value rational and purposive- rational 
actions are located at the rational pole of the continuum and 
affectual and traditional action lie at non-rational pole of the 
continuum. Purposive-rational action is orientated towards the 
rational choice of means which are directed toward ends which in 
turn are rationally chosen in the light of possible consequences 
which follow from this choice. Ends in the sense of ultimate 
life values are not rationally determinable. This is the area of 
Weber's work where the distinctions are somewhat confused and 
require an understanding of his concept of disenchantment and his 
position on value free social science. I briefly indicate these 
dimensions of the concept rationality and the rationalization 
processes in capitalist society. 
2.3.2 The Means-End Schema of Formal Rationalization as it 
applies to what is "Peculiar and Specific" about the 
Social Order of Capitalist Society 
Weber states in "Science As A Vocation" that: 
"the fate of our times is characterized 
and intellectualization and, above 
"Disenchantment of the world"(l974:155) 
With the rise of modern science, which 
by rationalization 
all, by the 
Weber often calls 
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"intellectualization", the world is "disenchanted" since magical 
and religious orders are supplanted by an order which, as a 
"causal mechanism", is amenable to "technical" mastery and 
calculation (Weber 1974:139,350 ). The technical m~stery of the 
world occurs through technical rational action. Purposive 
rational action, entailing the following essential tenets, is 
seen by Weber as technical rational action. 
1. The rational choice of means based upon technical knowledge 
derived from modern mathematics and experimentation. 
2. Determined only by the criterion of calculability. 
3. The end is clearly specified. 
4. All considerations of resources and cost are excluded. 
5. Answering the question "how" and dealing with processes of 
action which are applicable once a fixed end has been 
specified. 
A concrete example may be the construction of an aircraft to 
combat the "Mig 23" irrespective of the cost in terms of 
materials and ultimate destruction of life. Scientific knowledge 
does not answer the questions "why?";"what are we doing?";"to 
what end ?" when the end is a value. This narrow form of 
purposive rational action named technical rationality is held to 
be "objective"in the scientific sense. What Weber means in this 
context is that modern science is the "objective standard" in 
terms of which technical rationality can be judged. The 
technician uses scientific knowledge of means and ends, where the 
end is not a value but~ goal, "build x" or "design y", in his 
technically rational mode of action. Technological rationality 
enables the actor to answer the question "how" do I build or 
design the "Mig24"? Here the end, build a "Mig 24",is clearly 
specified. When the actor asks- ought I, from a moral point of 
view, to build a "Mig 24"? he is not able to answer from the 
viewpoint of formal rationality. Weber adopts a neo-Kantian 
position on the "oughts" of social inquiry. For Kant, reason is 
able to discover "truths" via the math~matical sciences, in the 
phenomenal world. In stark contrast, the noumenal realm of 
human values and beliefs, is not rationally determinable in the 
sense of yielding truths to the reasoning actor. Thus formal or 
"pure" reason is limited to the realm of "facts" in the 
phenomenal realm while 
autonomy and freedom. 
the noumenal is the domain of individual 
Individuals choose and creatively 
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constitute values or ideals to guide their lives. Weber sees the 
world as a disenchanted sequence of meaningless "facts" which are 
subject to prediction and calculation of modern scientific and 
bureaucratic man. The broader conception of purposive rational 
action pertains to the rational choice of both means and ends 
within a configuration of available resources. As soon as the 
elements of cost and scarce resources are considered, the actor 
adopts an economic stance. Formal rationality is viewed as the 
rational choice of means and ends where the ends are formally 
considered in terms of the probable and predictable outcome of 
action. Although it is difficult to concretize Weber's concept 
of technological rationality, devoid of the economic 
consideration of means and ends, Weber's emphasis upon 
technological rationality is pervasive. It is seen in conjunction 
with the broader concept of purposive rational action. For Weber, 
rationalization means the progressive penetration of formal 
purposive-rationality into spheres of life such as the economic, 
judicial, administrative, and scholastic realms. Formal 
rationalization occurs through an orientation to efficiency, 
calculability, predictability and the consideration of people and 
objects as means to an end in the various spheres of life 
activities. Rationalization in this sense is characterized as the 
rationalization of the external environment. Rationalization of 
the internal environment or personality via Puritan worldly 
asceticism is another.essential aspect of what is specific and 
peculiar to the modern order. On the basis of the work of Richard 
Baxter, the representative of Puritan asceticism, Weber distils 
four factors which determine internal rationalization. 
1. Labour is viewed as an "approved ascetic technique", as a 
means of answering the "calling" of God. Weber stresses that 
for the Puritan, 
"this calling is not, as it was for the Lutheran, a fati to 
which he must submit and which he must make the best of, but 
God's commandment to the individual to work for the divine 
glory. This seemingly subtle difference had far reaching 
psychological consequences, and became connected with a 
further development of the providential interpretation of the 
economic order which began in scholasticism." (1971:160) 
Weber points out that the division of labour and occupations in 
society was understood by Thomas Aquinas as a 
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"direct consequence of the divine ~cheme of things. But the 
places assigned to each man in this cosmos follow ex causis 
naturalibus and are fortuitous (contingent in the Scholastic 
terminology). The differentiation of men into classes and 
occupations established through historical dev~lopment 
became for Luther, as we have seen, a direct result of the 
divine will. The perseverance of the individual in the place 
and within the limits which God had assigned to him was a 
religious duty •••• hence the world had to be accepted as it 
was, and this alone could be made a religious duty." 
(1971:160) 
In the Puritan view, in contrast, the providential nature of 
economic life takes on a differnent emphasis 
"True to the Puritan tendency to pragmatic interpretations, 
the providential purpose of the division of labour is to be 
known by its fruits. On this point Baxter expresses himself 
in terms which more than once recall Adam Smith's well-known 
apotheosis of the division of labour. The specialization of 
occupations leads, since it makes the development of skill 
possible, to a quantitative and qualitative improvement in 
production, and thus serves the the common good, which is 
identical with the good of the greatest number. So far the 
motivation is purely utilitarian, and is closely related to 
the customary view-point of much of the secular literature 
of the time." (Weber 1971:161) 
Weber explains that the Puritan's approach to the concept of 
labour is differentiated from the secular in that Baxter points 
out that the achievements. of men are merely incidental and 
irregular if they are viewed "outside of a well-marked calling" 
(1971:161). Weber concludes as follows: 
""and he [the specialist worker] will carry out his work in 
order while another remains in constant confusion, and his 
business knows neither time nor place ••. therefore is a 
' 
certain calling the best for everyone"" (Baxter cited in 
Weber 1971:161). "Irregular work, which the ordinary 
labourer is often forced to accept, is often unavailable, 
but always an unwelcome state of transition. A man without a 
calling thus lacks a systematic, methodological character 
which is, as we have seen, demanded by worldly asceticism" 
(1971:161 emphasis mine) 
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Through hard and continuous work the "Glory of God" is 
secured. "Unwillingness to work, is symptomatic of the lack 
of grace"(Weber 1971:159). Labour as a calling then becomes 
"characteristic" of the worker (Weber 1971:179). The notion of 
a calling is premised upon the tenet of a systematic and 
methodical orientation to life. Thus the Puritan demands not 
only labour but "rational labour in a calling" (Weber 
1971:162). The methodical orientation to labour entails 
planning such that activities are ordered via fixed rules and 
routines. Thus the activity of labour is formalized and 
rationally organized. 
2. The spontaneous and mystical elements in religious and daily 
life activities are denigrated. The rational orientation 
toward life activities in this context means that all 
emotional, spontaneous and mystical factors which motivate 
action are excluded from man's rational orientation to life. 
3. Consumption, especially of luxuries, is restricted. Emphasis 
upon labour and restricted consumption results in,acquisition 
of wealth as a consequence of the rationality of the "calling". 
Thus comes to the fore the aesthetic compulsion to save and 
re-invest money. This is a prerequisite for the development of 
capitalism in conjunction with the "calling" or "vocational" 
orientation to work. 
Weber notes that the religious roots of this orientation, in the 
sense of an intensive search for the "Kingdom of God gradually 
pass over into sombre economic virtue; ••• giving way to 
utilitarian worldliness" (1971:176)(4). Internal rationalization 
occurs to the extent that the elements of the Puritan asceticism 
permeates the personal orientation of actors. It is only when 
the elements of external and internal rationalization come 
together in the Western world that capitalism can develop. Weber 
depicts the specific and peculiar development of occidental 
reason as being complex and permeating the various social 
institutions at different phases in history (1971:77;1968:1400). 
Therefore the notion of a one-dimensional logic of historical 
"rationalization" for Weber is not supported by his work when 
contextualized {5). On the other hand the" Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism"(1971) documents the coming together, as 
it were, of the rationalization processes into a constellation 
named Occidental Rationality. Thus rationalization processes 
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which are originally contingent and unique conjoin into a complex 
constellation characterised by formal-rational modes of action, 
the formal-rational constitution of knowledge and personality 
which characterises the "fatefulness" of the modern order. The 
fatefulness of the modern order for Weber derives from the 
permeation of purposive rational modes of action and particularly 
technical rationality into most spheres of life. As the 
"bureaucratic machine" becomes increasingly dependent on 
scientifically grounded technology, economic, political, 
military, artistic and religious~ forms of life are transformed 
into an "iron cage" of formal-rational spheres of action from 
which there is no escape. Thus the effective and predictable 
control of man over man and man over nature becomes for Weber the 
epigraph of modernity. He captures this as follows: 
"no one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or 
whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely 
new prophets will'arise, or there will be a great rebirth of 
old ideas and ideals, or if neither, mechanized 
petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive 
self-importance .• " (Weber 1971:182) 
2.4 Habermas' Critique of Formal Rationality as Understood by 
Weber- and Marcuse 
2.4.1 Formal Rationality as Domination 
Marcuse's critique of Weber's concept of formal rationality 
covers three related domains. Firstly he rejects the "iron cage" 
as the "fate" of modernity. For Marcuse, the fatefulness of the 
modern order is seen as a fate that can be overcome. Marcuse 
states that 
"any scientific analysis that is not committed to this 
possibility is pledged, not to reason, but to the reason of 
the established domination". (Marc~se 1968:215) 
Secondly, he rejects the conception of "value-free" social 
science. Thirdly he argues that a new form of political 
domination is internal to the concept of formal rationality. 
Habermas focuses upon the concept of formal rationality and it's 
relation to the notion of domination in his assessment of 
Marcuse's work. He opens his immanent critique by stating that 
for Marcuse formal rationality has specific substantive 
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implications. Namely: 
1.That what Weber names "rationalization" denotes not 
rationality but rather a specific form of political domination 
in the guise of rationality. Marcuse defines domination as 
follows: 
"Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and 
purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them 
are prescribed to him and performed by him as something 
I 
prescribed. Domination can be exercised by men, by nature, 
by things-it can also be internal, exercised by the 
individual on himself." (Marcuse 1970:165) 
Weber's formal rationality entails efficient systems of action 
with fixed aims in specified situations. These systems of 
action are established in a technically correct manner through 
the choice of strategies and the application of techniques. 
Habermas and Marcuse point out that critical reflection on the 
social interests which determine choices are disavowed in 
these efficient systems of action. Habermas notes that the 
efficient procedures devoid of critical reflection upon 
interests underlying the procedures, constitutes not 
rationality in the positive sense, but rather domination for 
Marcuse. As I note under 2.3, for Weber, the formal 
rationality of choice between various means is guided by 
scientific procedures and not "social interests" (6). 
2.Formal rationality extends to "relations of possible technical 
control" and hence exhibits a 
domination of men over nature 
men. (Habermas 1971:82) 
form of action which implies 
and the domination of men over 
3.The very structure of purposive-rational action is an exercise 
of control. Thus the rationalization process whereby formal 
rationality permeates the various spheres of life may be seen 
as the institutionalization not of rationality but of an 
unacknowledged form of domination in the name of rationality. 
Habermas then focuses upon the unacknowledged institution-
alization of domination in the forces and relations of 
production as seen by Marcuse. Habermas explains that with the 
advance in science and technology, progress in the forces of 
production exhibits a paradox. On the one hand, the 
unprecedented advance in modes of production implies that a 
great potential exists for the provision of the basic needs of 
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mankind. On the other hand, these very technological advances 
become the basis for the new form of political legitimation which 
subject individuals to the bureaucratic machine, as Weber would 
say. Thus the existing relations of production come to be seen as 
technically necessary and rational in and of themselves. Marcuse 
argues that the "renunciations and burdens·placed on individuals 
seem more and more unnecessary and irrational" when viewed from 
the perspective of the potential release from surplus repression 
implied in the technological progress of the modes of production 
(Habermas 1971:83) (7). Marcuse argues that a certain amount of 
repression is necessary in society to provide for the necessities 
of life. Surplus repression occurs when additional controls are 
forced upon individuals through institutions of domination. 
Habermas captures this process as follows: 
"In Marcuse's judgement, the objectively superfluous 
repression can be recognized in the "intensified subjection 
of individuals to the enormous apparatus of production and 
distribution, in the deprivatization of free time, in the 
almost indistinguishable fusion of constructive and 
destructive social labor"(Marcuse cited in Habermas 
1971:83). "Paradoxically, however, this repression can 
disappear from the consciousness of the population because 
the legitimation of domination has assumed a new character: 
it refers to the constantly increasing productivity and 
domination of nature which keeps individuals ••• living in 
increasing comfort" (1971:83) 
The famous statement made by Habermas in this regard is that 
formal rationality in Weber's sense now "shows its Janus face" 
(1971:83). What he means is that reason is no longer the 
critical standard in terms of which the forces and relations of 
production can be shown directly to exhibit relations of 
inequality and oppression. On the contrary, "rationality" becomes 
the "apologetic standard" through which the relations of 
production are justified (Habermas 1971:83). Marcuse's 
conclusions are cited as follows: 
"the very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. 
Not only the application of technology but technology itself 
is domination (of nature 
calculated, calculating 
interests of domination 
and men) - methodical, scientific, 
control. Specific purposes and 
are not foisted upon technology 
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"subsequently" from the outside; they enter the very 
construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is 
always a historical social project: in it is projected what 
a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and 
things. Such a "purpose" of domination is "substantive" and 
to this extent belongs to the very form of technical 
reason." (Marcuse cited in Habermas 1971:82) 
Marcuse comes to the conclusion that technological reason is an 
"historical project", and that in the framework of formal reason, 
man and nature are conceived as objects of scientific domination 
in an a priori fashion. What he means is that a technology which 
is structur~d toward the "rational" control of men and things is 
only possible if the assumption is made that man is a "thing" or 
object to be controlled and dominated. To the critical theorist 
who views men as creative actors. who are capable of making their 
own history with will and consciousness, as Marx would have said, 
this form of science and it~ technological implications is 
unacceptable. Marcuse therefore calls for a new science and a 
new form of technology based upon the attitudes of partnership 
and equality. Habermas says of this: 
"The transcendental framework within which nature would be 
made the object of a new experience would no longer be a 
functional system of instrumental action. The viewpoint of 
possible technical control would be replaced by one of 
preserving, fostering, and releasing the potentialities of 
nature."(1971:86) 
Habermas does not accept this "romantic" rejection of science and 
technology (1971:86). He argues that the idea of a "new" science 
and technology stems from the "promise, familiar in Jewish and 
Protestant mysticism, of the resurrection of fallen nature" 
(Habermas 1971:86). He sees this theme to have permeated the 
thought not only of Schelling but also that of Marx of the Paris 
Manuscripts, of Bloch's philosophy and "in reflected forms, 
directs the secret hopes of Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor W. Adorno."(Habermas 1971:86). It is at this point that 
view of human 
of Marcuse's 
agency which is presupposed in Habermas' critique 
position, is on the verge of emerging. Some 
is necessary though before my thesis can be 
clarify this crucial aspect of the analysis in 
clarification 
demonstrated. I 
two steps. First I indicate how Habermas draws an analogy between 
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purposive rational action and the concept work (poeisis). 
Secondly, I show how Habermas recasts the entire investigation of 
,the concepts rationality and rationalization processes into the 
concepts of work and communicative action, such that he can 
articulate a concept of rationality which: 
1. Avoids the utopian demand for a "new" science ahd technology. 
2. Rejects the traditional Marxist understanding of the relations 
and forces of production in the sense of the base 
superstructure model. 
2.4.2 The Analogy Between Purposive-Rational Action and The 
Concept Work 
Habermas opens his critique of Marcuse's notion that technology 
is an "historical project" grounded upon the concept of purposive 
, rational action by stating that: 
"an alternative New Science would have to include the 
definition of a New Technology. This is a sobering 
consideration because technology, if based at all on a 
"proj~ct", can only be traced back to a project of the 
human species as a whole and not one that could be 
historically surpassed."(1971:87 emphasis mine) 
Drawing 6n the work of Arnold Gehl~n, Habermas argues that there 
is an immanent connection between technology and purposive 
rational-action. For Gehlen, Habermas points out, the logic of' 
technologica'l development is analogous to the logic of purposive 
rational action. The basic argument is that if one understands 
the "behavioural system regulated by its own results, as the 
conjunction of rational decision and instrumental action", the 
history of technology can be reconstructed ~s the "step-by-step 
objectification of the elements" of rational decision and 
instrumental action (Habermas 1971:87). Habermas qualifies this 
idea by explaining that technological development lends itself to 
being interpreted, 
"as though the human species had 
components of the behavioural system 
taken the elementary 
of purposive-rational 
action, which are primarily rooted in the human organism, 
and projected them one after another onto the plane of 
technical instruments, thereby unburdening itself of the. 
corresponding functions" (1971:87 emphasis mine) 
He explains that, for Gehlen, the first stage in the history of 
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technology may be seen as the "augmentation" and "replacement" of 
the "human motor functions (hands and legs)"(1971:87). What 
Habermas means is that the tool, machine and the vehicle are the 
technological analogues of man's motor functions. Machines 
replace the functions of the hand and foot. These functions are 
objectified or embodied in the machine which functions in a 
manner which augments and replaces the motor functions of the 
human organism. The next stage in the development of technology 
is that of energy production ( analogous to the energy production 
of the human body) followed by sensory functions(eyes, ears and 
skin) and finally the functions of the "governing centre"(the 
brain). This aspect of his work is not at all clear. What the 
analogue between the human body and energy production is, is open 
to speculation. The functions of the brain and "governing 
• centres" are suggestive of computer technology but Habermas does 
not elaborate further (8). In the next paragraph, and subsequent 
development of the critique, Habermas ignores the biological 
analogy in the sense of the parallels between the functions of 
the organism and technology. He seems to require an idea of the 
human condition as it has developed to the present, and the idea 
that technology is analogous to the logic of purposive rational 
action. Habermas then directly invokes the concept of work which 
can be viewed as logically analogous to purposive rational action 
He equates the basic idea of Gehlen that technology is logically 
analogous to purposive rational action with Arendt's concept of 
work. For Arendt, the work process can also be understood in 
terms of human purposiveness. "The products of homo faber", 
Arendt argues, are "realized in a step-by-step fashion which have 
a willed beginning and a definite end, they assume the character 
of automatism"(1953:151). Habermas states his view as follows: 
"Technological development thus follows a logic that 
corresponds to the structure of purposive-rational action 
regulated by its own results, which is in fact the structure 
of work. Realizing this, it is impossible to envisage how, 
as long as the organization of human nature does not change 
and as long as we have to achieve self-preservation through 
social labor with the aid of means that substitute for work, 
we could renounce technology, more particularly our 
technology, in favour of a qualitatively different one." 
(1971:87 emphasis mine) 
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I regard this citation as fundamental to the thesis that Habermas 
is refuting Marcuse's call for a new science and technology on 
the grounds of the Arendt's work. Habermas can only claim that 
purposive-rational action "corresponds" to the logic of work if 
he assumes that the distinction which Arendt makes between the 
concepts ·labour, work and communicative action are correct. For 
Arendt the decisive error which Marx makes is to argue that one 
can achieve "freedom" or human autonomy through the dialect of 
labour. As I note in chapter one, Arendt indicates that Marx does 
not distinguish between the concepts of labour and work. Arendt's 
point is that labour, work and communicative action are 
activities which are fundamental to the human condition. She 
argues that man engages in all three activities and priority 
cannot be accorded to one over and above the other. The life of 
action 
merely 
must be seen in 
in the isolated 
the interrelation of concepts and not 
abstragt form in which she initially 
presents them. For example Arendt states: 
"If the animal laborans [man the lab6urer] needs the help of 
homo faber [man the worker] to ease his labor and remove his 
pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, 
acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his 
highest capacity [the reification process at its highest 
level] 'that is the help of the artist, of poets and 
historiographers, of monument builders or writers, because 
without them the only product of their activity, the story 
they enact and tell would not survive at all". 
(1958:173 emphasis mine) 
Habermas can only argue that 
"it is impossible to envisage how,_ as long as the 
organization of human nature does not change and as long as 
we have to achieve self-preservation through social labor 
with the aid of means that substitute for work, we could 
renounce technology, more particularly our technology, in 
favour of a qualitatively different one," (1971:87) 
if he is in agreement with Arendt. Habermas does not call for 
the liberation of man from the bondage of labour. This is an 
orientation which is overlooked by commentators and critics of 
Habermas' work. Mc earthy, in his detailed and authoritative 
analysis of Habermas' work, interprets this citation as follows: 
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"Habermas' own view is that while the specific historical 
forms of science and technology depend on institutional 
arrangements that are variable, their basic structures are 
grounded in the very nature of purposive rational action. As 
long as this does not change, as long as human beings have 
to seek their own self preservation and emancipation from 
material necessity through labor aided by means that substi-
tute for work, there can be no more humane replacement for 
scientific-technical progress. Technology if based at all 
on a historical project, can only be traced back to a 
project of the human species as a whole, and not one that 
can be surpassed." (1978:22 emphasis mine) 
Habermas is by no means calling for the "emancipation of men 
from material necessity through labour aided by means that 
substitute for work" as Mc earthy claims. This is precisely 
Arendt's critique of the absurdities theorists speak of when they 
adhere to the concept of labour in the Marxist paradigm. For 
Arendt and Habermas it is absurd to see the concept of labour as 
a means of "emancipating men from material necessity." There can 
be no such activity which "emancipates" mankind from material 
necessity except perhaps mans mortality which means that man is 
no longer subject to the necessities of life. Habermas says of 
this logic that Arendt's work corrects the "productivist 
aberrations" which stem from such arguments (1980:129). Habermas 
very carefully says "as long as we have to achieve 
self-preservation through social labor with the aid of means that 
substitute for work", technology cannot be renounced (1971:87). 
The emphasis falls on self-preservation and not on emancipation 
through the concept of labour with the aid of means that 
substitute for work. Habermas can only formulate this 
problematic in this manner in stark contrast to the traditional 
Marxist notion of labour as the magical concept leading to 
freedom, if he subscribes to Arendt's viewpoint. Therefore the 
concept of labour is for Habermas, the condition for the 
possibility of LIFE of the human species and not the condition 
for the possibility of freedom or emancipation. From this it 
follows that if men as labourers need the aid of men the makers, 
the rationality of making as it is presently known, cannot be 
renounced as it is grounded in the human condition of the present 
historical development of the species. The specific manner in 
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which the concept of work is invoked is very 
manner in which Arendt uses the concept work 
similar to the 
( 9 ) • Since the 
concept of work in turn is the basic condition of worldliness, 
and the artifact which is the product of man the maker is the 
MEANS whereby worldliness is constituted, the logic in terms of 
which this process occurs, namely the means-ends logic of the 
reification process, cannot be renounced. For Habermas the logic 
of reification is the logic of work which in turn is the logic of 
purposive-rational action in the realm of the work process. This 
logic encompasses the means-ends schema of technological reason. 
Therefore as long as the organisation of human nature does not 
change, technology as it is known at present, cannot be renounced 
in the name of an historical project which surpasses the human 
condition in some utopian beyond. Human freedom for.Arendt and 
Habermas is located not in the realm of the biological life 
cycle, the domain of labour. Nor is freedom located in the realm 
of reification, the domain of work. The concept of freedom is 
articulated in the realm of communicative action, the domain of 
communicatively formed rather than imposed power. Therefore 
Habermas calls for the limitation of the concept purposive 
rational action to its domain of reification. What he objects to 
is the· permeation of purposive-rational action (the reification 
process) into all spheres of life, particularly the realm of 
communication between human subjects. In other words what 
Habermas objects to is the universalization of purposive 
rationality as the only form of rationality in the modern world. 
For Habermas communicative action, and the form of rationality 
this form of human agency entails, is central to the human 
condition as known at present. I formulate these distinctions in 
an unorthodox manner in order to highlight the specific concepts 
and what they mean for Habermas when they are seen in the context 
of Arendt's work. I now return to the logic of the immanent 
critique. Habermas holds that Marcuse confuses the political 
content of purposive-ration! action with the call for a new 
science and technology which in fact is a call for a new 
"attitude" towards nature. He states this position as follows. 
"instead of treating nature as the object of possible 
technical control, we can encounter her as an opposing 
partner in a possible interaction. We can seek out a 
fraternal rather than an exploited nature ••• be this as it 
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may, the achievements of technology, which are indispensable 
as such, could surely not be substituted for an awakened 
nature." (Habermas 1971:88 emphasis mine ) 
Habermas explains that the alternative "project" of nature in 
fact refers to an alternative structure of action, namely 
symbolic or communicative interaction which is different in kind 
to the logic of purposive. rational action. He makes this 
crucial point as follows: 
"This means, however, that the two projects are projections 
of work and language i.e. projects of the human species as 
a whole and not of an individual epoch, a specific class or 
a surpassable situation."(1971:88) 
To argue that Marcuse has confused the logic of purposive 
rational action (work) at the substantive level of a specific 
class or epoch, with the logic of communicative action (an 
alternative structure of action), clearly indicates that Habermas 
must embrace Arendt's trichotomous depiction of the human 
condition if he sees these "structures of action" as operating as 
historical "proj~cts" of the species as a whole. He says that 
Marcuse "seems to doubt whether it is meaningful to relativize as 
a "project, the rationality of science and technolo~y."(1971:88). 
Habermas explains that in many passages of "One-dimensional Man", 
Marcuse speaks of revolutionising technological rationality in a 
manner which means a change in the institutional framework such 
that the governing values are changed while the structure of 
progress in and of itself remains the same. Therefore the 
direction of progress is new in the sense that it is seen in 
terms of fostering, preserving and releasing the potential of 
nature, but the "standard of rationality would remain the 
same."(Habermas 1971:89) What Habermas is saying can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Marcuse sees in the concept purposive rationality, a form of 
domination which must be overcome. This form of domination is 
internal to the very structure of modern science and 
technology. 
2. Therefore what is needed is a new form of science and 
technology which is not directed toward the domination of m~n 
and nature. 
3. The present form of science and its- technological reason 
entails the unprecedented progress in material development.In 
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other words the forces of production have advanced 
dramatically in the modern world. 
4.rTherefore the present forces of production can be harnessed to 
unburden men of the surplus repression they presently 
experience through a change in "attitude" with regard to the 
manner in which technology is used. This implies that the 
present form of technological reason is only irrational to the 
extent that surplus repression is maintained. 
5. If the last two points are seen in isolation of the first two, 
Marcuse is calling only for a change in "attitude" but leaves 
the concept of rationality as it stands. 
6. Therefore Marcuse obscures the substantive content of 
purposive rational action entailed in points one and two with 
the attitudes he prescribes for the "new science", which he in 
fact doubts. 
This assessment of the internal logic of Marcuse's position 
highlights Habermas' intent. Habermas holds that a distinction 
must be made at the level of the concepts of human agency and 
rationality and not at the level of attitudes towards nature. 
The logic of science and technology is analogous to the logic of 
work (poiesis), Habermas argues. Here purposive rational action, 
encompassing the means-ends schema, entails the step by step 
actualization or "objectification of the elements" of rational 
decision and instrumental action (Habermas 1971:87). Thus, if 
the organisation of human nature does not change, the standard of 
rationality at this level of analysis remains the same. Habermas 
can only argue that a one-dimensional concept of rationality 
pervades Marcuse's work, if he (Habermas), has discovered another 
concept of rationality which goes beyond the mere change in the 
"attitudes" directing purposive rational action. Arendt's three 
dimensional assessment of the human condition furnishes Habermas 
with a concept of communicative action grounded in language 
rather than work. The rationality of communicative modes of 
action is the new dimension of the concept rationality which 
Habermas is to clarify. On this basis Habermas can scrutinize 
Marcuse's notion of the new science to see whether he ·in fact 
distinguishes between "communication with nature" on the grounds 
of communicative action or work. Habermas comes to the 
conclusion that the concept of purposive rationality, 
encompassing the form of human agencr captured by the concept 
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work, pervades Marcuse's "monistic" view of modern reason. A 
change in attitude based upon new values rather than a 
distinction at the level of the concept of rationality is.called 
for by Marcuse, Habermas argues. One may object, with 
justification, that Habermas distorts Marcuse's position since 
the erotic and sensuous elements of the "new" science are totally 
ignored(lO). I do not discuss this aspect of Marcuse's work as 
my aim is to follow Habermas' logic and to clarify his 
reformulation of the concept rationality. The fundamental idea. 
which pervades Habermas' work from this point onwards is that the 
concept rationality can be reformulated in terms of the work 
(poiesis) I communicative action (praxis) distinction deriving 
from the work of Arendt. 
2.5 The Concept Rationality and the transition from Traditional 
to Modern Society. 
Habermas argues that both Marcuse and Weber fail in their 
attempts to capture the progressive rationalization of society. 
He states that through the concept rationalization, Weber 
"attempted to grasp the repercussions of scientific societies 
engaged in modernization"(Habermas 1971:90). In this endeavour, 
Weber shares an inter~st guiding the work of the classical social 
theorists 8abermas argues. Habermas holds that the classical 
social theorists use paired concepts such as status and contract, 
mechanical and organic solidarity, traditional and bureaucratic 
authority, in their attempts to explain the institutional 
changes which occur in the transition from traditional to modern 
society. Habermas notes that even Parsons' pairs of value 
orientations: 
"affectivity versus affective neutrality, particularism 
versus universalism, ascription versus 
diffuseness versus specificity,"(1971:91) 
achievement, 
imply an orientation towards the articulation of the historical 
changes which occur in the institutions of society on its way to 
modernization. Habermas sees in this abstract theory of value 
orientations of Parsons, the change in attitudes which occur in 
the transition to modernity. He links the work of Parson with 
that of Weber as follows: 
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"Subsystems of purposive-rational action do indeed demand 
orientation to the postpone~ent of gratification, universal 
norms, individual achievement and active mastery, and 
specific and analytic relationships, rather than the 
opposite orientations." (Habermas 1971:91) 
Habermas says that he intends to reformulate what Weber names 
rationalization such that he moves beyond the subjective approach 
implicit in the work of Weber and Parsons and by implication 
·Marcuse, who also is shown to focus his attention upon the 
changes in "attitude" necessary for the new science. 
The first step in the reformulation of the concept rationality 
is Habermas' statement that a "fundamental distinction" must be 
made between the concepts work and.interaction. This distinction 
is crucial to an understanding of Habermas' concept of 
rationality and its subsequent modification in the later works. 
The basis of the distinction lies in the integration of the 
concepts which are central to Arendt's view of human agency with 
sociological theory. The concepts employed are as follows: 
1. The concept work (poiesis): 
with work, the skillful 
The form of knowledge associated 
production of artifact, is now 
understood from the modern viewpoint of the philosophy of 
science and is integrated with the Weberian ideal typical 
concept of purposive rational action with its means ends 
schema. 
2. The concept of communicative action which is actualized 
through language and occurs in the web of human 
relationships: Language is seen as the medium through which 
communicative action is intersubjectivity constituted. This 
view of human agency is integrated with the sociological 
theory dealing with social roles, norms and sanctions. 
Habermas states that: 
"By "work" or purposive-rational action I understand either 
instrumental action or rational choice or their 
conjunction" (1971:91 emphasis in the text). 
He clarifies each concept in turn. "Purposive-rational action 
realizes defined goals under given conditions" (1971:92). 
Instrumental action 
which are derived 
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is held to be governed by 
from empirical knowledge. 
technical rules 
This form of 
knowledge implies "conditional predictions" about physical and 
social events which are observed by the researcher. Predictions 
of observable events can be proven to be correct or incorrect. 
"Instrumental action organizes means that are appropriate or 
, 
inappropriate according to criteria of an effective control of 
reality."(Habermas 1971:92) 
Rational choice is "governed" by "strategies" which are derived 
from analytic knowledge. This is the domain of strategic action 
which is rational in the sense that rational choices are made in 
the selection of means to achieve ends. Habermas stresses that 
implicit in the rational choice of means are deductions made from 
rules of "preference" which stem from value systems and "decision 
procedures". What he means is that the rational choice in the 
strategic sense is not purely analytical. Thus "strategic action 
depends only on the correct evaluation of possible alternative 
choices, which results from calculation supplemented by values 
and maxims"(1971:90). The concept work then covers both 
instrumental action and strategic action which are seen as 
purposve-rational modes of action. 
The concept interaction is introduced as follows:. 
"By -interaction, on the other hand I understand 
communicative action, symbolic interaction. It is governed 
by binding consensual norms, which define reciprocal 
expectations about behaviour and which must be understood 
and recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social 
norms are enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is 
objectified in ordinary language communication"(l971:92) 
Here, for the first time, Habermas is implicitly introducing a 
concept of subjectivity which includes the concept of plurality. 
He says that communicative action is governed by norms which a.re 
"understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects". This 
implies the. notion of plurality which becomes explicit in his 
later work which I deal with in chapter three. Habermas is now 
able to distinguish between the domains of truth and 
understanding 
Invoking the 
which pertain to these two realms respectively. 
concept validity, Habermas says of the realms of 
purposive-rational action and interaction: 
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"While the validity of technical rules and strategies 
depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct 
propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only 
in the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding of 
intentions and secured by the general recognition of 
obligations."(1971:92) 
Thus questions of truth fall into the realm of purposive-rational 
action which is guided by analytic and empirical knowledge. 
Questions of understanding and by implication those of meaning 
fall into the realm of interaction. Habermas then focuses upon 
the consequences which follow from the violation of the rules 
pertaining to the two spheres of action. In the realm of 
purposive rational action the violation of technical rules and 
strategies, results in behaviour which is classed as 
incompetent. Habermas says: 
"Incompetent 
rules or 
through 
behaviour, which violates valid technical 
strategies, is 
lack of success; 
condemned per 
"punishment" is 
se 
speak, into its rebuff by reality."(1971:92) 
' 
to failure 
built, so to 
Thus, at the level of instrumental action, the carpenter who 
violates the technical rules of production and produces a 
two-legged stool as Arendt says in this regard, is seen as 
incompetent and is "punished", when the stool falls over. This 
"rebuff" is "built into the reality." Another rebuff of reality 
is the displacement of the incompetent worker by one who obeys 
the technical rules of producing stools in the workshop. 
At the .level of strategically rational action, the commander 
who fails in his strategy of defeating the enemy is labelled as 
incompetent and suffers the consequences. Habermas holds that 
the rules of purposive rational action equip actors with skills 
(11). This is contrasted at the level of interaction where the 
violation of consensual norms is seen as deviant behaviour rather 
than incompetence. Social sanctions are invoked as the 
consequence of deviant behaviour. One of the interesting examples 
of this in critical theory is the scapegoating phenomenon which 
occurs when the "scapegoat" is subjected to ridicule when he 
transgresses accepted norms of behaviour in social settings. 
Habermas continues his reformulation as follows: 
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"Learned rules of purposive rational a6tion supply us with 
skills, internalized norms with personality structures. 
Skills put us in a position to solve problems; motivations 
allow us to follow norms."(1971:92) 
On the basis of these distinctions, Habermas now indicates what 
he mean~ by the concept society. For Habermas, the "institutional 
framework" of a society consists of norms which guide symbolic 
interaction. Within this system of symbolic relations are what he 
calls subsystems such as the economy and the "state apparatus" in 
which purposive 
institutionalized. 
rational "sets of action" are primarily 
(Habermas 1971:93). These subsystems are 
family and the kinship contrasted with subsystems such as the 
structures in which moral, interactive rules predominate. 
Habermas is emphasizing the relative pre-dominance of purposive 
rational modes of action over the interactive mode in some 
subsystems (the economy and the state) in contrast to other 
subsystems (the family). He certainly is not attempting to state 
that the two realms of action, purposive rational and 
interactive, as institutionalized in society, are mutually 
exclusive (12). Habermas states his position as follows: 
"I shall distinguish generally at the analytic level between 
(1) the institutional framework of a society or the socio-
cultural life-world and (2) the subsystems of purposive-
ratio~al action that are "embedded"in it. Insofar as actions 
are determined by the inst1tutional framework they are both 
guided and enforced by norms. Insofar as they are determined 
by subsystems of purposive-rational action, they conform to 
patterns of instrumental or strategic action. Of course, 
only institutionalization can guarantee that such action 
will in fact follow definite technical rules and expected 
strategies with adequate probability" (1971:94) 
On the basis of these distinctions, Habermas now reformulates 
Weber's concept 
analysis lies the 
from traditional 
of "rationalization processes." Behind this 
question: How does one explain the transition 
to modern society? Internal to his specific 
notion of traditional society is the idea of classing societies 
in terms of 
dimension of 
their level of "civilization". 
rationalization processes 
Thus an evolutionary 
can be articulated. 
Habermas says that the criterion of "civilization" represents "a 
specific stage in the evolution of the species" (1971:94). 
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Traditional society is characterized as differing from mdre 
"primitive" social formations on the following grounds. 
1. Traditional society denotes systems which meet the criteria 
of civilizations. Civilizations are seen as being established 
on the basis of a relatively developed technology, the 
division of labour and social ~reduction processes such that a 
surplus, beyond the satisfaction of elementary needs is 
produced (13). 
He says of traditional societies: 
"they owe their existence to the solution of the problem that 
first arises with the production of a surplus product, 
namely, of how to distribute wealth and labour both 
unequally and yet legitimately according to criteria other 
than those generated by a kinship system"(l971:94) 
2. Traditional society in this sense entails the centralization 
of power in the form of an organized state as opposed to 
tribal organization. 
3. Traditional Society is divided into socio-economic classes 
since the distribution of social obligation and reward is 
contingent upon class position and not kinship status. 
4. A centralized world-view is prevalent ("myth, complex 
religion") in terms of which political power is legitimated. 
Habermas qualifies this last point as follows: 
"the prevalence of a central world view (myth, complex 
religion) to the end of legitimating political power (thus 
converting power into authority)." (1971:94 emphasis mine) 
Habermas argues that traditional societies tolerate a limited 
degree of technological innovation. He states that pre-capitalist 
mode of production, pre-industrial technology and pre-modern 
science, in traditional society, exhibits a particular 
relationship between the institutional framework and the 
subsystems of purposive rational action. Central to traditional 
society, is an institutional framework which is grounded upon the 
cultural tradition made up of mythical, religious and 
metaphysical interpretations of reality. These world views are 
accepted as authoritative and are not questioned by the majority 
of the citizens. Habermas invokes the concept of rationality as 
follows: 
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"despite considerable progress, these subsystems, developing 
out of the system of social labor, and its stock of 
accumulated technically exploitable knowledge, never reached 
a measure of extension after which their "rationality" would 
have become a threat to the authority of the cultural 
traditions that legitimate political power." (1971:95) 
Traditional societies are thus limited to specific forms of 
rationality. Habermas holds that traditional societies exist as 
long as subsystems of purposive-rational action are confined or 
limited by the "superior rationality" of the cultural tradition. 
In this context, the validity of the intersubjectively shared 
tradition, which legitimates the authority structure of society, 
is not questioned. 
Capitalism, in contrast, is seen by Habermas as the first mode 
of production in history whereby the subsystems of purposive 
rational action are institutionalized such that innovation or 
progress is endemic. A "reversal" of the superiority criterion 
occurs. Habermas says: 
"The capitalist mode of production can be comprehended as a 
mechanism that guarantees the permanent expansion of sub-
systems of purposive-rational action and thereby overturns 
the traditionalist "superiority" of the institutional 
framework to the the forces of production."(1971:96) 
In this framework the principles of "universallj valid 
rationality" in the form of technical or strategic means-end 
relations assumes the criterion of superiority (Habermas 
1971:96). The decisive feature in this 
is that the validity of the cultural 
period of "civilization" 
tradition is called into 
question. Habermas holds that he is developing an understanding 
of capitalist society at~ different level of analysis to Marx. 
His main point is that it is not merely the dynamic of the forces 
and relations of production which bring about the institutional 
changes, but that the structures of legitimation change. The 
decisive concepts from Hahermas' viewpoint are what he names the 
subsystems of purposive-rational action and their relation to the 
communicative rationality of the institutional framework as a 
whole. What he says is that the traditional world views operate 
at the level of the logic of interaction contexts. They are seen 
to answer the questions pertaining to "men's collective existence 
and individual life history,; (1971:96). Their themes are the 
79 
classical questions of "freedom" 
"oppression", "happiness" and 
"illness" and "death" (Habermas 
and "justice", "violence" and 
"gratification", "poverty", 
1971:96). The rationality of 
these "language games" which are characteristic of communicative 
action, comes into direct conflict with the rationality of the 
means-ends relations of instrumental and strategic action "at the 
threshold of modernity" (Habermas 1971:96). He says: 
"as soon as this confroritation can arise, the end of 
traditional society is in sight:the traditional form of 
legitimation breaks down." (Habermas 1971:96) 
Habermas hastens to add that not only does this legitimation 
problem occur, but that capitalism solves it. The legitimation of 
domination in the modern society now derives from the "base of 
social labour" and not from the "lofty heights of cultural 
tradition"(l971:97). What Habermas means is that the unequal 
distribution of wealth in traditional society rests on the 
institutionalization of social force. Tradition legitimates the 
inequality such that it is accepted without question.(14) 
In the early phase of modern society, legitimation stems not from 
tradition, but from the rationality of the market where the 
notion of "just exchange" is the new legitimating category. 
Habermas makes the crucial statement that the capitalist mode of 
production has two "roqts". 
1. An economic mechanism is established such that the subsystems 
of purposive rational action are permanently expanded. 
2. Political legitimation occurs on the basis of economics such 
that the political system can be adapted to the "new 
requisites of rationality" brought about by the developing 
subsystems of purposive-rational action. (Habermas 1971:94) 
He sees this process of adaptation as the "rationalization 
process" which Weber attempts to capture. Now, Habermas argues, 
one can speak of a dual rationalization process. Habermas makes a 
distinction between rationalization "from below" and 
rationalization "from above". 
2.5.1 Rationalization from Below: 
Through the term "rationalization from below", Habermas wants to 
account for 
0
the permeation of the subsystems of purposive-
rational action into the institutional framework of society. At 
this level of analysis he employs the term "society" in the sense 
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of the institutional "framework" or sociocultural life-world in 
which the subsystems of purposive rational 
Once he has established that capitalist 
action are embedded. 
mode of production 
necessitates a subsystem of purposive-rational action in which 
progress and innovation are endemic, he can argue that pressure 
for adaptation becomes endemic. Thus the pressure from "below" 
for the rationalization of society becomes operative as soon as 
the capitalist mode of production is institutionalized through 
the establishment of the the domestic market a~d the labour power 
necessary for this process. The "why's" of this aspect of the 
analysis are not stated. Habermas then must accept Marx's 
explanation of this process. Marx holds that the institutions ·of 
society are modified by the new relations which are entered into 
as soon as the forces of production develop. The necessary 
connection between the relations and forces of production is the 
nexus in terms of which change is articulated for Marx. Habermas 
assumes that by describing the characteristics of rationalization 
he is accounting for the transition. He merely states that once 
the exchange market and the necessary labour power are "institut-
ionalized", adaptation pressure begins. The subsystem of 
purposive rational action becomes fully operative, and through 
its "endemic progress", traditional structures are increasingly 
subordiriated to the conditions of instrumental and strategic 
rationality. Thus instrumental and strategic rationality 
permeate the organization of labour, trade, communication 
systems, legal systems, financial and administrative systems, 
education and family structures. Habermas calls this the 
"urbanization of the form of life" (1971:98). He argues that 
"subcultures are generated which train the individual to "switch 
over at any moment from an interaction context to 
purposive-rational action"(1971:98). This is a variation on the 
Weberian theme that "ideas" function like "switchmen" and 
determine the tracks along which action is propelled~ Habermas 
suggests that training becomes the catalyst which enable men to 
change from communicative rationality to purposive rational 
action. This theme is not developed beyond the level of 
suggestion. The discussion of rationalization from below is 
highly plausible but he does not provide the explanatory links 
between the two periods. The detailed description of traditional 
society and liberal capitalism stand opposed to one another in 
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terms of their characteristics which are translated into the 
language of rationality. Habermas does not indicate why the leap 
from traditional society to liberal capitalism itself occurs. 
2.5.2 Rationalization From Above 
For Habermas rationalization from below co-incides with pressure 
toward rationalization which comes from above. Rationalization 
from above derives from the dual nature of "secularization" as 
outlined by Weber. Firstly, traditional world views lose their 
validity as myth, public religion, and customary ritual, since: 
"they are reshaped into subjective belief systems and ethics 
which ensure the private cogency of modern value-
orientations (the Protestant ethic)" (Habermas 1971:99) 
Secondly, when traditional world-views lose their validity, they 
are transformed into 
"constructions which criticize tradition and reorganize the 
released material of tradition according to the principles 
of formal law and the exchange of equivalents (rationalist 
natural law)" (Habermas 1971:99) 
Thus traditional forms of legitimation are replaced by new ones. 
These new forms of legitimation are seen to emerge from the 
critique of dogmatic interpretations of the world and "claim a 
scientific character" (Habermas 1971:99). Habermas notes that the 
mechanistic worldview of the seventeenth century becomes the 
basis upon which natural law is reconstructed. The revolutions 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries then occur. This is 
the particular constellation upon which Marx develops his 
critique of ideology as a critique of political economy. Habermas 
argues that liberal capitalism is transformed into welfare 
capitalism in modernity and that the traditional Marxist concepts 
of the base and superstructure are no longer applicable. In 
welfare capitalism, the state intervenes directly in the economy 
in order to secure its stability. Through the various fiscal and 
monetary controls, the "free market" is "stabilized". Research 
and technology progressively become interdependent. Habermas 
argues that the science~ become the "leading productive force" 
(Habermas 1971:100). With the advent of large scale industry, 
science, technology and industrial utilization of technological 
knowledge mutually interpenetrate. Industrial research is linked 
to research under government contract, which promotes scientific 
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and technical progress in the military sector. From there, 
information flows back to the civilian sectors of production. 
Thus technology and science become leading productive forces. 
Both tendencies, the direct intervention of the state in the 
economy and science and technology as leading productive forces, 
result in a changed constellation between the institutional 
framework and the subsystems of purposive-rational action. Thus 
the traditional Marxist notion that the super-structure is a 
mere epiphenomenon, dependent on the economic "laws" of the 
underlying economic base no longer holds. Habermas argues that 
the key to deciphering these new structures lies in Marcuse's 
\notion that technology and science are the loci of legitimation 
processes. Habermas says, 
"The root ideology of just exchange which Marx unmasked 
collapsed in practice. The form of capital utilization 
through private ownership could only be maintained by the 
government corrective of a social and economic policy that 
stabalized the business cycle. The institutional framework 
of society was repoliticized."(1971:101) 
The direct form o~ legitimation which pertains to traditional 
society reappears. But the traditions have been "disempowered", 
thus a substitute is required. Science and technology fulfil this 
function. The state is orientated toward the elimination of 
dysfunctions in the system. Politics becomes the realm through 
which technical solutions to problems are sought while the 
classical form 
of the "good" 
development. 
"Old-style 
of practical reason, orientated toward questions 
are no longer thematic. Habermas says of this 
politics was forced, merely through its 
traditional form of legitimation, to define itself in 
relation to practical goals: the "good life" was 
interpreted in a context defined by the interaction 
relations. The same still held for the ideology of 
bourgeois society. The substitute programme prevailing 
today, in contrast, is aimed exclusively at the functioning 
of a manipulated system. It eliminates practical questions 
and therewith precludes discussion about the adoption of 
standards; the latter could only emerge from democratic 
decision- making process." (1971:103) 
The solution of technical problems in the modern world is not 
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dependent upon public discussion but rather the advice of 
technical experts. Thus science, technology, research and public 
administration fuse into an interlocking system developing 
formalized and specialized languages which are not open to public 
reflection and critique. Habermas echos Arendt in 
stating that the public realm in modernity loses 
this context 
its political 
function as practical questions are translated into technical 
ones. Once again the realm of communicative action and practical 
rationality is held to be reduced to the realm of technical 
rationality which is the theme of chapter one. Once scientific 
and technical progress are institutionalized, they assume a form 
in which "men lose consciousness of the dualism of work and 
interaction", Habermas argues. (Habermas 1971:105). Here Habermas 
introduces the famous "technocracy thesis" which expands upon the 
basic idea that science and technology becomes the new ideology 
which legitimates the new form of politics. Briefly, the basic 
contours of this thesis are as follows. "Social interests" 
determine the direction of technical progress. Habermas does not 
say what he means by social interests but in the context of the 
discussion, he equates social with economic as he does in the 
earlier work on More and Hobbes (15). These interests co-incide 
with the interests in maintaining the system as a whole. The 
quasi-autonomous progress of Science and Technology becomes the 
independent variable in terms of which economic progress depends. 
Thus the social system appears to be determined by. the logic of 
scientific-technical progress. Technical "experts" replace 
citizens in the decision making functions which are translated 
into technical problems. The "depoliticization" of citizens is 
legitimated on the grounds of science and technology. Habermas 
says: 
"when this semblance has taken root effectively, then 
propaganda can refer to the role of technology and science 
in order to explain and legitimate why in modern societies 
the process of democratic decision-making about practical 
problems lose its function and "must" be replaced by 
plebiscitary decisions about alternative sets of leaders of 
administrative personnel."(1971:105) 
For Habermas an important aspect of this process is that the new 
ideology suppresses the traditional framework of interaction 
based on communicative action. The institutional framework of 
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society is progressively 
technology such that 
rationalized in terms of 
behavioural controls and 
science and 
technical 
recommendations are accorded priority over custom and morality in 
a disenchanted world. Action is reduced to conditioned behaviour. 
For Habermas, the "moral realization of the normative order is a 
function of communicative action" which is orientated to 
intersubjectively shared cultural meaning premised upon the 
internalization of values(1971:106). The normative order in this 
sense asks after questions of justice, equality, freedom and I 
democracy. In the most advanced industrial societies, behavioural 
controls are determined o~ the basis of a stimulus response 
model. Artificially produced stimuli, particularly in the realm 
of "subjective freedom" (electoral, consumer and leisure 
behaviour) displace norms and values deriving from 
intersubjective expectations and interpretations based upon 
reflection. Habermas makes the interesting point that 
"sociopsychologically, the era is typified le~s by the 
authoritarian personality than by the destructuring of the 
super-ego "(1971:107). Here Habermas is implicitly criticizing 
Adorno and Horkheimer with his dual concept of purposive or 
instrumental 
suggesting 
towards the 
rationality and communicative rationality. He is 
that communicative rationality, which is orientated 
normative realm is "urbanized" ,"colonised" and 
suppressed, by forms of purposive rationality. Thus the 
super-ego, which develops through socialization processes, via 
communicative rationality is "destructured" .by purposive or 
instrumental forms of rationality. Meaning is progressively 
eroded and utilitarianism, which is based upon a "means-ends" 
form of reason, is the order of the day. This can be deciphered 
at the level of rational planning. Rationalization at the level 
of urban planning follows the logic of systems analysis. 
Habermas notes of this planned reconstruction of society, that 
systems theorists apply the abstract model of cybernetics to the 
real life context in order to organise reality. Habermas objects 
to this systems approach toward the reconstruction of society. 
The planning imperatives of .capitalist and bureaucratic socialist 
systems follow the same logic, Habermas holds. Namely, the 
exclusive focus upon one dimension of rationality, purposive-
_r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l __ a_c_t_i_o_n_a_n_d __ a_d_a_p_t_i_v_e _ b_e_h_a_v_i_o_u_r. Habe rmas extends the 
implications of this form of reasoning to its logical conclusion. 
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He notes that the technocratic consciousness of bureaucratic 
socialism and modern systems planning, can only be achieved at 
the cost of closing off the dimension of interaction which is 
mediated by 'ordinary language. He sees the future repertoire of 
control techniques as expanding_ at various levels. Drawing from 
Herman Kahn's fifty most probable technical innovations over the 
next thirty years, he notes for example: 
30. New techniques of surveillance, monitoring and controlling 
individuals and organizations. 
33. New and more reliable techniques for the "educational" 
control of individuals both privately and publicly through 
propaganda and sophistic~ted technical media. 
34. Practical application of electronics to stimulate and 
control the functioning of the human brain. 
39. New drugs "controlling fatigue, relaxation, alertness, mood 
and ]ersonality". (Habermas 1971:117) 
42. New genetic and control procedures. 
This is a projection of the possible future toward which the 
behavioural system is progressing when it is detached from the 
normative system of communicative interaction. Habermas stresses 
that he is not stating that this projection is being fulfilled 
but that these are the logical implications of the technocratic 
consciousness. He is here pointing toward the negative utopia 
implicit in the assumptions ·of science and technology as 
ideology. His aim is to indicate against this background that two 
concepts of rationalization must be distinguished. The purposive-
rational dimensions of scientific progress has already resulted 
in the reorganization of social institutions. Habermas sees in 
this development a potential for liberation, if and only if, 
rationalization at the level of the productive forces does not 
replace rationalization at the level of the institutional 
framework of society or what he names the life-world. He now 
casts the concept rationalization of the institutional framework 
into a positive mould. Habermas holds that: 
"Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework 
can occur only in the medium of symbolic interaction 
itself, that is through removing restrictions on 
communication"(1971:118) 
Habermas calls for a form of communicative action which clearly 
shows his development of the concept of praxis deriving from 
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Arendt's work. Namely the public and unrestricted discussion of 
the implications of the subsystems of purposive- rational action 
upon the daily lives of citizens. Citizens in turn orientate 
their lives through the norms and values which are ratified 
through public debate and reflection. Habermas says of this 
public realm: 
"Such communication at all levels of political and 
repoliticized decision-making processes is the only medium 
in which anything like "rationalization" is possible." 
(1971:119 emphasis mine) 
Habermas points out, three dimensions of this rationalization 
process. The rationalization of social norms would result in the 
decrease in repression: 
1. At the level of personality structure~ such that "ambivalence 
in ~he face of role conflict" is tolerated at a higher or 
"above average" degree. (Habermas 1971:119) 
2. There would be a decrease in the degree of rigidity at the 
level of the presentation of self in everyday life. 
3. Action would be judged in terms of norms which have been 
reflectively arrived at. 
Habermas is attempting to point towards an orientation which aims 
at the "emancipation and progressive individuation" of men in 
the modern age (Habermas 1971:119). His main point is that 
although the progress in the productive forces entails a vast 
potential, it is essential that members of society be empowered 
to choose the direction and limits to which this potential is 
put. Thus rationalization at the level of purposive rational 
action need not permeate the entire fabric of society producing 
Weber's "iron cage" as the "fate" of modernity. Habermas says of 
communicative rationalization, 
"Rationalization measured by changes in these dimensions 
does not lead to the rationalization of purposive-rational 
sub- systems, to an increase in technical control over 
objectified processes of nature and society. It does not 
lead per se to the better functioning of social systems, but 
would furnish the 'members of society with the opportunity 
for further emancipation and progressive individuation. The. 
growth of the productive forces is riot the same as the 
intention of the "good life". It can at best serve it". 
(1971:119) 
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Habermas hastily adds that these questions cannot be answered in 
advance through an alternative Utopia. He is merely pointing out 
that rationalization of the life-world is different in kind to 
the rationalization of the realm of work. Habermas' central 
theme is that the imperatives of the systems theory and Marxism 
which focus solely on the concept of work or purposive rational 
action is to be combated. He makes this point as follows: 
"According to this idea the institutional framework of 
society -which previously was rooted in a different type of 
action-would now, in a fundamental reversal, be absorbed by 
the subsystems of purposive rational action, which were 
( 
embedded in it." (1971:106) 
This is the most widely misinterpreted aspect of Habermas' work. 
Habermas does not say that the institutional framework is totally 
absorbed by the imperatives of purposive-rat~onal action 
as Benhabib, Jean Cohen, David Held and Anthony Giddens would 
have him say. He is here pointing out the implications of a 
process which is developing but is by no means total. Habermas' 
strategy is to decipher the rationalization processes and to 
point out the implications of this logic if carried to its 
conclusions. He does not say once and for all that society is 
totally rationalized along instrumental lines as his mentors 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, claim. In fact, critical theory 
would not even be possible in such a world since social theorists 
who are part of the very phenomenon which they investigate would 
be so integrated into the "man-machine" system of instrumental 
rationality that all action would be reduced to conditioned 
stimuli and responses. Critical thought and judgement would no 
longer be possible. The young, Habermas states quite clearly that 
"IF this occurred, old regions of consciousness developed 
in ordinary-language communication would of necessity 
completely dry up"(Habermas 1971:118 emphasis mine) 
Habermas does not say that the realm of communicative action has 
dried !!E• Habermas continues this line of reasoning by pointing 
out that the depoliticization of the population, which is 
legitimated through the technocratic consciousness, represents 
at the same time "men's self-obj~ctification" on the basis of the 
concept of purposive-rational action and behavioural adaptation. 
Thus men come to view one another not as equal communicative 
partners establishing their relative identities through mutual 
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dialogue, but as "objects" or "things" to be strategically 
manipulated like any other object in the scientized world devoid 
of cultural significance, through the categories of purposive 
rational action. Habermas sees the ideological "nucleus" of this 
progressive permeation of purposive rational action into the 
institutional framework of society as the "elimination of the 
distinction between the practical and technical" forms of 
rationality (Habermas 1971:113). The crucial point which he makes 
is that this ideology "reflects but does not objectively account 
for the new and systems of purposive-rational action that have 
taken on a life of their own." (Habermas 1971:113). Arendt's 
work now comes to Habermas' aid in presenting the key to 
deciphering this new constellation in a manner which moves beyond 
that of his mentors, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. Habermas 
casts this problem complex into a new frame of reference which I 
read as a masterful development of Arendt's work. This is how he 
presents the new "objective" orientation open to a critical 
theorist: 
"The new ideology consequently violates an interest grounded 
in one of the two fundamental conditions of our cultural 
existence: in language or more precisely, in the form of 
socialization and individuation determined by communication 
in ordinary language. This interest extends to the 
maintenance of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding as 
well as to the creation of communication without domination. 
The technocratic consciousness makes this practical interest 
disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our power 
of technical control. Thus the reflection that the new 
ideology calls for must penetrate beyond the level of 
particular class interests to disclose the fundamental 
interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of 
self-constitution."(Habermas 1971:113) 
This lengthy citation reveals the extent of Habermas' acceptance 
of Arendt's work. He here clearly argues for a new orientation 
which investigates the relationship between the human condition 
as such and the "interests" grounded in this condition. The 
manner in which Habermas presents this orientation bespeaks his 
acceptance of Arendt's argument that communicative action is one 
of the funQamental conditions of life. Habermas' premise is that 
communicative action can be reformulated at another level of 
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analysis such that the rationality of communicative action and 
the interest structure to which it is related can be clearly 
presented. The traditional idea of practical reason asking after 
the questions of "the good" and "the just" is then cast into a 
modern framework which does not attempt, as Hegel does, to heal 
the wounds of the sundered ethical totality in the never-never 
land of the Idea or Reason in the idealist sense. Habermas 
clearly rejects this orientation since he says that the 
technocratic consciousness reflects "not the sundering of the 
ethical situation but the repression of ethics as such as a 
category of life"(Habermas 1971:112 emphasis mine ). Habermas, 
contrary to. Hegel, does not argue for a single all inclusive 
concept of reason which heals the wounds of the sundered 
totality. He indicates that the suppressed, but ever present 
communicative action which is a fundamental condition for the 
possibility of the human condition as it is known at present, can 
be revealed at a level of analysis where the two forms of 
rational action can be clearly located in their respective 
realms. He also aims to show how the two realms of action and 
rationality are interrelated since they are both fundamental 
conditions of mankind as such. 
is then clearly separated from 
and scientific reason which 
rational action. For Habermas 
The realm of communicative reason 
the modern questions of technical 
follow the logic of purposive 
the latter form of rationality 
cannot be renounced, as he points out in his critique of 
Marcus~'s work. Thus Habermas calls for the further deciphering 
of the confusions which occur in modernity between practical, 
technical and theoretical reason at another level of analysis. 
Namely, through an investigation of the interest structur~s of 
the human condition as such. This is the theme of chapter three 
where I approach Habermas' concept of rationality at the level of 
the interest structures of the human condition. 
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3 RATIONALITY, HUMAN INTERESTS AND SCIENCE 
3.1 Introduction 
The conclusion Habermas reaches in re-formulating the concept 
rationality beyond the "subjective" approach of Weber, Parsons 
and Marcuse, is that the rationality problematic can be d~veloped 
at another level of analysis. The new level of analysis moves 
beyond particular class interests and clarifies the "fundamental 
interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of 
self-constitution"(1971:113). This is the theme Habermas takes up 
in his controversial "Knowledge and Human Interests"(l972) (1). 
My aim in this chapter is to investigate the relationship between 
the concept of rationality and human interests, reflection and 
science. 
In 3.2 Knowledge and Human Interests, A General Perspective, I 
outline Habermas' view of theoretical reason in classical Greek 
tradition in relation to the views of Husserl and Schelling. 
Habermas holds that modern scholars adhere to the contemplative 
stance of the classical tradition of theory which disavows the 
connection between knowledge, human interests and action (2). He 
aims to show that three specific human interests are 
constitutive of knowledge and that they are rooted in three 
fundamental life activities. Namely, work, language and power. 
Corresponding to these three life activities are three forms of 
science which he names the Empirical-Analytic, the Historic~ 
Hermeneutic and the Critical Sciences. 
In 3.3 The Knowledge-Constitutive Interests and Three Modes of 
Social Organization: Work, Language and Power, I briefly indicate 
what Habermas means by knowledge constitutive interests and how 
they are related to the three forms of science. 
In 3.4 Rationality and the Technical Cognitive 
Empirical-Analytic Science, I show how Habermas 
conclusion that the empirical-analytic sciences 
Interest of the 
comes to the 
are rooted in 
work, the purposive rational action of the species which harbours 
a knowledge-constitutive interest in the technical control over 
the external environment. 
In 3.5 Rationality and the PracticalCognitive Interest of the 
Historic-Herneheutic sciences, I analyse Habermas' thesis that 
the historic-hermeneutic sciences are rooted in the 
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pre-scientific realm of ordinary language, entail a concept of 
practical reason and harbour a practical knowledge- constitutive 
interest in mutual understanding. 
In 3.6 Rationality and the Emancipatory Cognitive Interest of 
the Critical Sciences, I address Habermas's thesis that reason 
inheres in interest. If this can be shown to be valid, 
rationality cannot be seen as a mere "attitude" which actors 
adopt or reject, Habermas argues. Habermas holds that the self-
generation of the species cannot be adequately captured through 
the idealism of Kant and Fichte or the reductionism of scientific 
Marxism. Through a critique of these scholars work, he aims at 
recastin~ the concepts of reflection, interest; and reason into 
a new framework which unites the concept of !ationality with 
men/women's 
dogmatism. 
interest in emancipation from domination and 
3.2 Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective 
3.2.1 Theoretical Reason as Contemplation and A Way of Life 
Habermas assesses Husserl's thesis that modern science is in a 
crisis situation. For Husserl, the European sciences are in 
"crisis" because scholars are no longer able to orientate 
themselves toward a "thoughtful and enlightened mode of life" 
which he holds is the mark of the classical conception of theory 
(Habermas 1972:302)(3). Habermas enlarges on Husserl's call for a 
return to the classical conception of theory by invoking 
Schelling's view. For Schelling, the modern "fear of speculation" 
results in an orientation which accords priority to practical 
reason over and above the theoretical reason (1972:302). This 
entails a superficial approach to theory and a shallowness in 
action, Schelling argues. Schelling calls for the study of 
theoretical reason which immediately acquaints ineri with "Ideas". 
Schelling's premise is that "only Ideas provide action with 
energy and ethical significance" (Schelling cited in Habermas 
1972:301). For Schelling, the only form of knowledge that is 
genuinely ~ble to orientate action, is: 
"knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests and 
is based on Ideas-in other words, knowledge that has taken 
a theoretical attitude." (Habermas 1972:301) 
Habermas thus sets up th~ parameters of the discussion by 
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focusing on Schelling's and Husserl's view that only "true 
theory", devoid of human interests, is able to orientate action 
and that "true theory" must be seen as a "way of life" for the 
scholar. He then carefully explains his own view of theory in the 
classical tradition. He points out that the concept, "Theoria" 
had religious roots. "Theoros", Habermas explains, was the Greek 
delegate who attended public festivals and celebrations in 
honour of the Gods. Through "looking on he abandons himself to 
the sacred events" (Habermas 1972:301). Habermas does not explain 
this point. I interpret it in a manner which is in keeping with 
the subsequent development of his argument. "Abandonment" may be 
seen as the first function which "Theoria" served prior to the 
philosophy of the Socratic period. Here "Theoria" was used to 
organise the 
whole such 
sacred myths, stories 
that the incidents 
and rituals into a coherent 
which befell men could be 
meaningfully interpreted in terms of violation or adherence to 
the will of the Gods which guided the universe. For the Socratic 
tradition, in stark contrast to the Pre-Socratic tradition, the 
myths and stories were held to be mere conviction or opinion 
("doxa") which the philosopher was to rise above. The universe 
was viewed as a rationally ordered whole which was unchangeable 
and eternal. I return to the sequence of Habermas' argument. 
-Habermas holds that in the classical Greek tradition "Theoria" 
means contemplation of the cosmos. In this form, theory: 
"already presupposed the demarcation between Being and time 
that is the foundation of ontology ••• it reserves to logos a 
realm of Being purged of inconstancy and uncertainty and 
leaves to doxa the realm of the mutable and perishable." 
(1972:301) (4) 
Through the process of contemplation the philosopher brought his 
soul into accord with the rational motion of the cosmos. This 
occurred through mimesis whereby the philosopher reproduced the 
order and harmony of nature and music within himself. Thus 
"theory enters the conduct of life" and the philosopher "forms 
himself through mimesis" or imitation. (Habermas 1972:302). The 
crucial point which Habermas makes is that the philosophers 
"banished" the gods and demons of the Pre-Socratic tradition to 
the realm of the human soul and a new concept of theory emerged. 
He says: 
93 
"Philosophy domesticated them and banished them to the soul 
as internalized demons. If from this point of view we regard 
the drives and affects that enmesh man in the empirical 
interests of his inconstant and contingent activity, then the 
attitude of pure theory, which promises purification from 
these very affects, takes on a new meaning: disinterested 
contemplation then obviously signifies emancipation. The 
release of knowledge from interests was not supposed to 
purify theory from the obfuscations of subjectivity but 
inversely to provide the subject with ecstatic purification 
from the passions ••• the new stage of emancipation is that 
catharsis· is now no longer attained through mystery cults but 
established in the will of the individuals themselves through 
theory." (1972:307 emphasis mine) 
Central to this interpretation are two points. Firstly, Habermas 
argues that classical contemplation was "disinterested" and 
secondly, that it signified "emancipation." One way of 
interpreting these claims is to compare Habermas' position on the 
concept of theory with that of Gadamer and Arendt. Gadamer would 
object to the thesis that theory in the classical tradition was a 
form of "disinterested 
holds that there was a 
looking on" as Habermas puts it. Gadamer 
continuity between the sacred and the 
philosophical concept "Theoria". _For Gadamer, "Theoria" meant a 
particular form of participation in the sacred events. This was 
not the neutral observation of some "splendid demonstration or 
show, but rather a real being present" (Gadamer 1981:18). 
Gadamer says: 
"the rationality of being, ••• is not first and foremost a 
property of human consciousness but of being itself, which is 
the whole in such a way and appears as the whole in such a 
way that human reason is far more appropriately thought of as 
part of this rationality instead of as the self-consciousness 
that knows itself over and against an external totality." 
(1981:18) 
For Gadamer "Theoria" carried the connotation of man's active 
participation in the unity of the rationally ordered cosmos. He 
rejects the opposition between consciouses and the external 
totality. He discusses emancipation in his assessment of 
practical and not theoretical reason (5). Arendt captures the 
concept "Theoria" as follows: 
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"The philosophers experience of the eternal, which to Plato 
was arrheton ("unspeakable"), and to Aristotle anue 
logou("without word"), and which later was conceptualized in 
the paradoxical nunc stans ("the standing now"), can occur 
only outside the realm of human affairs' and outside the 
plurality of men, as we know from the Cave parable in 
Plato's Republic, where the philosopher having liberated 
himself from the fetters that bond him to his fellow men 
leaves the cave in perfect "singularity", as it were, 
neither accompanied nor followed by others. Politically 
speaking, if to die is the same as "to cease to be among 
men", the experience of the eternal is a kind of death, and 
the only thing that separates it from real death is that it 
is not final because no living creature can endure it for 
any length of time. And this is precisely what separates the 
vita contemplativa from the vita activa in medieval thought. 
Yet it is decisive that the experience of the eternal, in 
contradistinction to that of the immortal, has no 
correspondence with and cannot be transformed into any 
activity whatsoever since even the activity of thought, 
which goes on within one's self by means of words, is 
obviously not only inadequate to render it but would 
interrupt and ruin the experience itself. Theoria or 
"contemplation" is the word given to the experience of the 
eternal." (1958:20 emphasis mine) 
The experience of the cosmos was seen ~s "speechless wonder" 
which occurred in "perfect silence" from which-action and speech 
were excluded (Arendt 1958:20). Arendt holds that the 
contemplative way of life in the classical tradition entailed 
emancipation from the worldly affairs. Thus freedom for the Greek 
philosopher, as philosopher, and not as a citizen in the polis, 
meant the cessation of action and speech such that the 
rationality of the cosmos could be revealed to man. Habermas 
introduces a specific interpretation of the concept of theory, as 
contemplation, in the classical tradition. Namely one which· is in 
accord with that of Arendt such that he can point not only to the 
exclusion of action from contemplation, but he goes a step 
further and links the concept of action to the concept interest. 
For Habermas, contemplation or theory in the classical tradition 
meant the exclusion of men's interest in action. Emancipation was 
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achieved in a dual sense. Firstly, the subject was emancipated 
from the external will of gods and demons of the pre-Socratic 
era. The subject emancipated himself from the "gods and demos", 
which were internalized in the psyche and were hence controllable 
by man. Secondly, the philosopher was emancipated from the 
irritating influence of the human interest in action since 
contemplation could only occur when action ceased. This view of 
"Theoria" as contemplation is unique and is a rejection of the 
interpretation of "Theoria" held by scholars such as Gadamer, 
Schelling, Husserl and Mc earthy (6). The concept of "Theoria" as 
contemplation of the cosmos is based on the pre-supposition that 
the life of contemplation was defined in contrast to a life of 
action. Like Arendt, Habermas views the theoretical endeavour 
from a perspective which asks after the question of human action 
and the possibilities for emancipation from forms of thought and 
action which harbour dogmatism and domination (7). 
3.2.2 The Three Forms of Science in Relation to Theory as 
Contemplation. 
Habermas compares the classical notion of theory with modern 
forms of theory. He categorises modern theory into three basic 
modes of inquiry. 
1. The empirical-analytic sciences include the natural and social 
sciences which aim at producing nomological knowledge. 
2. The historical-hermeneutic sciences include the humanities, 
historical and social sciences which are orientated toward 
interpretation and understanding in the study of cultural 
tradition. 
3. The critical sciences encompass critical social theory, 
psychoanalysis and philosophy as critique. Critique as 
initiated by Kant and developed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel 
are examples of what Habermas names the critical sciences in 
the philosophical form. 
Habermas argues that the empirical-analytic sciences develop in a 
manner which "automatically generates continuity with the 
beginnings of philosophical thought" (1972:303). This bold and 
provocative statement is clarified as follows. Both traditions 
entail: 
1. An orientation, "the theoretical attitude", which frees the 
scholar from the "irritating influence" of man's interest in 
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action (Habermas 1972:303). 
intention of describing 2."The cosmological 
theoretically in its 
(Habermas 1972:303) 
lawlike order, just as it 
the universe 
is." 
The historic-hermeneutic are similar to the empirical-analyt-ic 
sciences in that they adhere to the methodological orientation of 
the "theoretical attitude" which frees the scholar from the 
irritating influences of man's interest in action, Habermas 
argues. He then addresses Husserl's attempt to revive this 
"theoretical attitude" of "theory as a way of life". Habermas 
argues as follows: 
He accepts Husserl's charge of "objectivism" levelled at the 
sciences where the object domain appears as "a universe of facts 
whose lawlike connection can be grasped descriptively" (Habermas 
1972:304). "Objectivism" is an app~oach which disregards the 
social constitution of the "facts". Habermas holds that: 
"knowledge of the the apparently objective world of facts has 
its basis in the pre-scientific world. The possible objects 
of scientific analysis are constituted a priori in the self 
evidence of our primary life-world." (1972:304) 
Husserl's aim was to purify the theoretical endeavour from the 
subjective interests deriving from the life-world thus achieving 
"true theory" purged of subjectivtty. His "rigorous contemplative 
stance "brackets" or screens out human interests, Habermas argues 
(1972:304). Husserl did not realize that objectivism is to be 
found in the classical tradition of theory. Habermas holds that 
it is only on the basis of ontological distinctions that the 
classical tradition is able to: 
"take cognizance of a self-subsistent world purged of demons. 
At the same time, the illusion of pure theory served as a 
protection against regression to an earlier stage that had 
been surpassed. Had it been possible to detect that the 
identity of pure Being was an objectivistic illusion, ego 
identity would not have been able to take place. The 
repression of interest appertained to this interest itself." 
(1972:37) 
Thus the two most influential theses of the classical tradition, 
namely: 
"the theoretical attitude and the ontological assumption 
of the self-subsistent world appear in a connection which 
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they explicitly prohibit: the connection of knowledge with 
human interests." (Habermas1972:307). 
In sum: 
Habermas presents a unique interpretation of the classical 
conception of theoretical reason. "Theoria" is shown to disavow 
the human interests in action. This stems from a particular 
interpretation of theory as contemplation of the cosmos which is 
similar to that of Arendt and is in conflict with that of 
Gadamer. The key to classical contemplation for Habermas is that 
the interest in action and emancipation was suppressed through 
the objectivistic illusion of a rationally ordered cosmos. Ego 
identity was secured through this illusion of an ordered and 
rational cosmos. It was only on this basis that the ego identity 
of the philosopher could be maintained in a form which did not 
regress to the earlier mode where the will 6f external gods and 
demons had to be complied with. Habermas articulates a 
particular concept of emancipation in the classical tradition 
such that the rational philosopher was · emancipated from the 
gods and demons through likening his soul to the rationality of 
the cosmos when action ceased. But this form of rationality was 
only attainable on the basis of a human interest in emancipation 
which was suppressed since the interests deriving from the 
life-world were supposed to be irritating factors which 
distracted the philosopher from acquiring knowledge of the 
rational cosmos in the first place. This specific interpretation 
of the classical concept of theory as contemplation permeates the 
fabric of '!-Knowledge and Human Interests" and forms the backdrop 
against which various scholars work is assessed. Habermas refers 
to the "contemplativ~ stance" or the "theoretical attitude" in 
his critique of various scholars work. He holds that scholars 
are guilty of the objectivism when the "contemplative stance" or 
"theoretical attitude" is adhered to. He says: 
"we shall designate as objectivistic an attitude that 
naively correlates theoretical propositions with matters of 
fact. This attitude presumes that the relations between 
empirical variables represented in theoretical propositions 
are self-existent. At the same time, it suppresses the 
transcendental frame-work that is the precondition of the 
meaning of the validity of such propositions. As soon as 
these statements are understood in relation to the prior 
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frame of reference to which they are affixed, ihe 
objectivistic illusion dissolves and makes visible the 
knowledge constitutive interest." (1972:308) 
I now explain what the fundamental human interests are. How they 
are grounded and in the pre-scientific realm of the life-world 
and how they are related to the concepts of rati6nality, 
reflection and knowledge. 
3.3 The Knowledge-Constitutive Interests and Three Modes of 
Social Organization: Work, Language and Power 
3.3.1 The Concept Interest in Habermas' Work 
The concept interest in "Knowledge and Human Interests" is 
understood in the German sense of "inter~esse" meaning "the 
in-between". One way of looking at interests in this sense is the 
manner in which Arendt speaks of human interests. She invokes 
this concept as follows: 
"Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed 
toward them, and they retain their agent revealing capacity 
even if their content is exclusively objective, concerned 
with the matters of the world of things in which men move, 
which physically lies between them and out of which arise 
their specific objective worldly interests. These interests 
constitute, in the word'§ most literal significance, 
something inter-est which lies between people and therefore 
can relate and bind them together." (1958:182 emphasis mine) 
The concept of interests in Habermas' work is not to be viewed as 
a subjective attribute of men. Habermas attempts to clarify the 
interests in Arendt's sense of the in-between which bind people· 
and things together. Habermas develops an investigation of human 
interests as "in-between" human agency, and forms of science or 
knowledge(8). He asks: How are the concepts of purposive rational 
action and communicative rationality tied to the kinds of 
knowledge or science humans produce? Habermas says: 
"knowledge-constitutive interests take form in the medium of 
work, language and power" (Habermas 1972:313). 
I approach this thesis by briefly indicating what the three 
knowledge constitutive interests are, and the forms of science in 
which they are located. 
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3.3.2 The Three Forms of Science in Relation to the Cognitive 
Interests. 
Habermas argues that there are three basic kinds of science. The 
empirical-analytic, the historic-hermeneutic and the critical 
sciences. For each kind of science, there is a corresponding 
cognitive interest. The empirical-analytic sciences, entail a 
technical cognitive interest. This is understood as a technical 
interest in the prediction and control of the environment. The 
historic-hermeneutic sciences incorporate a practical cognitive 
interest understood as the practical interest in understanding. 
The critical sciences incorporate an emancipatory cognitive 
interest understood as an interest in freedom. The interests are 
knowledge-constitutive in that they determine what are accepted 
as the objects of enquiry, the fundamental categories and methods 
of establishing and testing propositions, and the range of 
application pertinent to each kind of science. Habermas notes of 
the knowledge-constitutive interests that they are not to be seen 
as mere irritating influences of subjective cognition, but that 
"they themselves determine the aspect under which reality can 
be objectified and thus made accessible to experience to 
begin with. They are, the conditions which are necessary in 
order that subjects capable of speech and action may have 
experience which can lay claim to objectivity" (1974:9) 
The cognitive interests as the conditions for the possibility of 
objective experience then have a transcendental status. Habermas 
argues that the cognitive interests are basic in that they are 
are rooted in the natural history of the human species. The 
specific manner in which the objectivity of reality is appre-
hended originates in the interest structures of the species that 
is linked in "it roots" to a definite mode of social 
organization. Habermas says: 
"these viewpoints [the three 
specific kind of knowledge 
structure of a species that 
forms of science and their 
originate in the interest 
is linked in its roots to a 
definite means of social organization: work, language and 
power. The human species secures its existence in the 
systems of social labour and self-assertion through 
violence, through tradition-bound social life in ordinary 
language communication, and with the aid of ego identities 
that at every level of individuation, reconsolidate the 
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consciousness of the individual to the norms of the group. 
Accordingly the interests constitutive of knowledge are 
linked to the functions of an ego that adapts itself to its 
external conditions through learning processes, is initiated 
into the communication system of the social life-world by 
means of self-formative processes, and constructs an 
identity in the conflict between the instinctual aims and 
social constraints."(1972:313) 
Now Habermas has to say that the knowledge constitutive interests 
are "quasi-trancendental" because they are not rooted in a 
transcendental subject or consciousness in the Kantian sense but 
in the human species which reproduces itself through the three 
activities of work, language and power. The notion of a natural 
species which reproduces itself is the "quasi" or naturalistic 
aspect of the argument. The interests then must be seen as the 
"in-between" or "mediating" between knowledge and the 
reproduction of the life of the species. This location of the 
knowledge constitutive interests in one of the three modes of· 
social existence (work, language or power) is crucial to the 
internal structure of the complex and detailed analysis which 
Habermas develops in "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972). 
Once this basic framework is in the foreground in conjunction 
with the cr.itique of the classical concept of theory, the concept 
of rationality and its relation to the forms of science and 
knowledge-constitutive interests can become thematic •. I analyse 
each form of science in turn with an emphasis upon the concept of 
rationality. 
3.4 Rationality and the Technical Cognitive Interest of the 
Empirical-Analytic Sciences 
3.4.1 Empirical-Analytic Science and the work of Peirce 
Habermas says of the natural sciences: 
"scientific progress does not only motivate us psychologi-
cally to take science seriously as an exemplary form of 
knowledge, it is itself the exemplary feature of science. 
The intersubjectively acknowledged cognitive progress of the 
theoretical natural sciences is also the systematic feature 
which distinguishes modern science from other categories of 
knowledge." (1972:91 emphasis mine) 
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In following the intricacies of Peirce's work, Habermas attempts 
to understand the logic of inquiry which leads to the progress of 
the empirical-analytic sciences. He aims to show how the 
empirical-analytic sciences are rooted in one of the modes of 
social existence (work, language or power) and how this is 
related to the progress of this form of science. He argues that 
the work of Peirce is superior to that of Mach and Comte who do 
not reflect upon conditions for the possibility of scientific 
knowledge (9). Peirce asks this famous Kantian question starting 
from the assumption that scientific progress is institutionalized 
through a methodology which is shared by the community of 
scientists. Closely related to this insight is the idea that the 
scientific endeavour is a process which generates, intersub-
jectively held beliefs which are not infallible but subject to 
confirmation and refutation by the community of scientists and 
the "resistance of reality". Habermas finds in Peirce a_"kindred 
spirit" in that science, for Peirce, is a kind of action or 
conduct. Peirce holds that the methodology of empirical-analytic 
science is a system of procedures which are required for a 
certain kind of human activity. Habermas focuses on the three 
forms of inference: deduction, induction and abduction comprising 
method of inquiry internal to science as an activity. Abduction 
and induction are the dimensions.of the method of inquiry which 
propel science forward.through the discovery of new hypotheses 
which are confirmed in the objective life context of purposive 
rational action (work) (10). The three forms of inference may be 
seen as rules which settle opinions, reduce uncertainty, and 
facilitate the acquisition of stable beliefs.· Peirce names this 
the "fixation of belief" (Habermas 1972:119). These functions 
occur in the specifiable objective context of purposive rational 
action, Habermas argues. Pierce states that: 
"belief consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to 
adopt the formula believed in as a guide to action;the 
essence of belief is the establishment of habit;and 
different beliefs are distinguished by different modes of 
action to which they give rise". 
(Peirce cited in Habermas 1972:113) 
The method of inquiry can be concretized through the following 
example. The cancer researcher believes that: 
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1. Abnormal cell division occurs because the chromosomes in the 
cell release chemical "x" when the cells divide. 
2. Chemical "x" 18 not recognized by the body as a foreign 
substance and hence the auto immune system does not react to 
destroy substance "x" • 
3. Injections of substance "m" into the body will destroy 
substance "x" and abnormal cell division will cease. 
On the basis of these beliefs the scientist acts by injecting 
substance "m" into the body of the rat and abnormal cell division 
ceases. Belief, as Peirce argues, consists in being prepared to 
adopt the formula or hypothesis as a guide for action. Thus on 
the basis of purposive rational action the belief that substance 
"m" is a cure for cancer is established (fixation of belief). 
The hypothesis that substance "m" will destroy substance "x" 
derives from a long process of abductive and inductive reasoning 
and purposive action in which substances "a" to "l" are each 
attempted in turn and in combination in numerous experiments 
prior to the discovery of substance "m". Habermas understands 
this process in the following manner. The belief is held to be 
unproblematic as long as the action which it guides does not fail 
in reality (the cancer cells are destroyed by substance "m"). As 
soon as action is rendered uncertain by the "resistance of 
reality, doubt arises with regard. to the orientation that guides 
behaviour" (Habermas 1972:120). Thus the validity of the belief 
is doubted. This doubt motivates the scientist to find new 
beliefs which will establish behavioural certainty. For Habermas 
"the results of synthetic reasoning have a function only in 
the behavioural system of this purposive rational, 
feedback-controlled, and habitual behaviour. The beliefs 
define the realm of future behaviour that the actor has 
under control." (1972:120 emphasis mine) 
Valid beliefs are universalised and become technical 
recommendations in terms of which scientists predict and control 
the external environment. This prediction and technical control 
over the environment is not understood as a subjective "attitude" 
of the scientist. The interest in prediction and control is seen 
to be "rooted" in one of the fundamental conditions of human 
existence, namely, work. For Habermas, work means purposive-
rational or instrumental action. He says: 
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"by "work" or purposive-rational action I 
instrumental action or rational 
conjunction." (1971:91 emphasis in text.) 
understand either 
choice or their 
The "quasi-trancendental" interest in technical prediction and 
control of nature serves to locate the concept instrumental 
action and instrumental rationality in the realm of empirical-
analytic forms of objectifying reality. The technical interest in 
the control and prediction of reality has nothing to do with the 
denunciation of 
occurs through 
this form of rationality. 
the adaptation of the ego 
Scientific progress 
to the external 
environment through learning processes which are rooted in one of 
the three modes of human existence, namely, work. For Habermas, 
Marcuse's attempt at disavowing the form of knowledge based on 
instrumental rationality amounts to disavowing one of the 
fundamental conditions of human survival. Habermas casts what he 
considers to be valuable in Peirce's work into a framework where 
the concept of purposive rationality is linked to the interest in 
technical control of the environment which is the condition for 
the possibility of a specific mode of inquiry which propels 
technical scientific knowledge forward. Habermas calls this the 
cognitive progress in the realm of the empirical-analytic 
sciences. This is one of the most widely misunderstood aspects of 
his work. Habermas is not saying that the only kind of knowledge 
of natuie which is "legitimate~ is that of the empirical-analytic 
sciences. He accepts that alternative approaches to 
possible and desirable. What he does say is that 
nature are 
scientific 
progress is contingent upon man's purposive rational action which 
is one of the forms of human agency which secures the survival of 
the species. I now briefly note Habermas's critique of Peirce's 
work which prepares the ground for the analysis of the practical 
cognitive interest. 
3.4.2 The Contemplative Stance in Empirical-Analytic Science 
Habermas argues that Peirce does not consistently adhere to the 
transcendental orientation. In the passages where Peirce attempts 
to articulate the relationship between the universal laws and the 
particular occurrences he ignores his transcendental approach and 
adopts a contemplative stance, Habermas argues. Here Peirce 
contemplatively understands the laws as "facts" existing in 
reality. Habermas holds that here scientific progress is 
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contingent upon "theoretical curiosity" which Peirce calls the 
"Gnostic instinct" (Habermas 1972:133). He invokes numerous 
examples of the contemplative stance in Peirce's work at the 
meta-theoretical level of analysis. He concludes that Peirce is 
not able to articulate a concept of the community of scientists 
adequately. Habermas emphasises that Peirce does not realize that 
the ground for consensus on meta-theoretical questions is not 
the purposive rationality of the isolated individual which is 
universalized, but rather the communicative rationality of 
intersubjectivity. The method of inquiry serves to establish 
monological relations between statements. One can think and act 
instrumentally on the basis of this monological mode of 
rationality, but not enter into a dialogue required for 
intersubjective communication. Habermas puts this as follows: 
"It is possible to think in syllogisms, but not to conduct a 
dialogue in them. I can use syllogistic reasoning to yield 
arguments for a discussion, but I cannot argue 
syllogistically with another. Insofar as the the employment 
of symbols is constitutive for the behavioural system of 
instrumental action, the use of language involved is 
monological." (1972:137) 
Communication between investigators requires the use of language 
which moves beyond the limitations of the technical control over 
"objectified natural processes", he argues (1972:137). Habermas 
states that the communicative use of language occurs in the 
symbolic communication between subjects who "reciprocally know 
and recognize each other as unmistakable individuals"(1972:137). 
Here he incorporates Arendt's concept of plurality in his 
understanding of intersubjectivity (11). Communicative action is 
a "system of reference" which can not be reduced to the framework 
of instrumental action (1971:137). This is discernible, he h9lds, 
when one investigates the concept of self in Peirce's work. For 
Peirce self-conciousness is understood from the framework of 
behavioural feedback. The example Habermas uses to display the 
limitations of Peirce's concept of public consensus is that of 
the child who, on being told that a stove is "hot", only becomes 
conscious of this fact when he touches the stove. Peirce argues 
that it is only through the feedback of behaviour that the child 
develops self-consciousness. Habermas objects to the limitation 
of self-consciousness to the level of universally 
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"true" statements about reality in the context of behavioural 
feedback. He holds that Peirce's concept of communication amounts 
to "subsuming consciousness under the general intellect of all 
true propositions about reality" (Habermas 1971:138). This is "in 
principle mute subjection to a public monologue" which each 
individual "can reproduce for himself", he argues (1972:138). 
Habermas points out that dialogue develops on a different basis 
through the reciprocal 
"recognition of subjects who identify one another under the 
category of selfhood and at the same time maintain 
themselves in their non-identity" (1972:138 emphasis mine) 
Habermas is basing his critique of Peirce's work on the concept 
of plurality derived from Arendt's work. I indicate in chapter 
one that for Arendt, plurality is a condition for communicative 
action. She emphasises the agent revealing character of 
inter-subjectivity which unites different perspectives through 
dialogue. When these two positions are compared, it is patent 
that Habermas understands intersubjectivity in the same manner as 
Arendt although he does not invoke the concept plurality itself. 
In sum: 
Habermas argues that Peirce, in contrast to scholars like Mach 
and Comte, asks the Kantian question: What are the conditions for 
the possibility of knowledge? Peirce differs from Kant in that 
the conditions are not rooted in the transcendental consciousness 
in general, but in the logic of inquiry. Habermas casts Peirce's 
logic of inquiry into a framework which encompasses a technical 
interest in control and prediction. This technical interest 
mediates between the transcendental function of the logic of 
inquiry and the pre-scientific realm of work (purposive rational 
action). The concepts, purposive-rationality or i~strumental 
rationality, which Habermas uses interchangeably, are located in 
the empirical-analytic sciences such that scientific progress is 
understood as man's adaptation to and of external reality. At the 
same time man's purposive-rational control over 
is constitutive of a specific form of knowledge 
the environment 
of the external 
environment. Thus the concept of purposive rationality cannot be 
viewed as a subjective "attitude" which the scientist merely 
adopts or rejects. At the meta-theoretical level of analysis, 
Peirce is not able to account for the formation of consensus 
between the community of scientists since his framework is 
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limited behavioural feedback in terms of which self-consciousness 
is understood. Dialogue, which is essential for the formation of 
consensus, is "beyond the bounds" of Peirce's logic of enquiry, 
as Strawson would say. Habermas holds that a concept of 
intersubjectivity which accounts for the mutual recognition of 
individuals as unique speaking and acting beings, is the basis of 
dialogue in which consensus formation can take place. This 
concept of intersubjectivity encompasses the concept of plurality 
as the condition for the possibility of communicative action. It 
derives from Arendt's work where intersubjectivity unites 
different perspectives of unique individuals through dialogue. 
Habermas argues that the rationality of the empirical-analytic 
sciences presuppose the communicative rationality of concrete and 
unique individuals. This does not mean that Habermas is 
denigrating the empirical-analytic sciences. In so far as 
instrumental rationality contributes to the p~ogress of the 
natural sciences on the basis of its monological language, he 
holds that this mode of science is "exempl~ry". On the other hand 
when the empirical-analytic sciences are universalized as the 
only "legitimate" form of knowledge or paradigm pertaining to the 
understanding of reality, he objects. Habermas attempts to locate 
the form of rationality internal to the empirical-analytic 
science and attempts to indicate it's limits, as Kant would 
argue. Habermas holds that two concepts of rationality are 
necessary for the understanding of the empirical-analytic 
sciences, communicative rationality and instrumental rationality. 
Neither can be accorded priority over the other since he arguis 
that the logic of inquiry depends on instrumental or purposive 
rationality while the communication between scientists requires 
communicative rationality for consensus formation. Scientific 
progress then occurs through instrumental and communicative 
rationality. Thus one concept of rationality cannot be subsumed 
under the other. I now discuss the historic hermeneutic sciences, 
where communicative rationality, which is orientated toward 
understanding, is dealt with in more detail. 
3.5 Rationality and the Practical Cognitive Interest of the 
Historic-Hernene~tic sciences 
Habermas holds that the historic-hermeneutic sciences are 
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constituted by a practical knowledge-constitutive interest in 
mutual understanding (12). He clarifies this thesis through an 
interpretation of the work of Dilthey (13). He opens the 
discussion by stating that the realm of mutual understanding 
which is presupposed by the, "participants in the process of 
inquiry," in the empirical-~nalytic sciences, "is claimed by the 
cultural sciences (Gesteswissenschaften) as their authentic 
realm" of investigation (Habermas 1972:140). For Habermas, the 
pre-scientific realm of the cultural life context is formed at 
the level of intersubjectivity, which the empirical-analytic 
sciences are not able to account for within the framework of the 
logic of inquiry limited to purposive rational action. If this 
interpretation is valid, he argues, the question arises as to 
' 
whether the historic- hermeneutic sciences proceed within a 
different methodological framework and are constituted by a 
different cognitive interest. He states that 
"Dilthey, however, sees the immediate transcendental-logical 
difference between the orientations of the natural and 
cultural sciences not in two different forms of 
objectivation but in the degree of objectivation 
itself." (1972:142) 
For Dilthey, the difference between the methodologies of two 
sciences thus entails a difference 
kind of objectification. Habermas 
in the degree rather than the 
argues that for Dilthey, the 
objectification process is a 
is the key to his interest 
fo·rm of making ( "poiesis II). This 
in Dilthey's work. This aspect of 
Habermas' work has not been analysed in the secondary literature 
as far as I am aware. Most critics focus on the Gadamer/Habermas 
debates on hermeneutics and briefly mention Dilthey's work in the 
introductory statements noting his empathic model of 
understanding (14). The interesting factor in this regard rs that 
Habermas develops an extensive analysis of Dilthey's work after 
reading Gadamer's "Truth and Method"(l975) (15). He thus chooses 
to focus on the work of Dilthey. He appropriates aspects of 
Dilthey's work in order to show that understanding is a 
communicative rather than a making process. 
3.5.1 Dilthey's View of Understanding as a Making Process 
Dilthey's view of the historic-hermeneutic sciences 
by comparing it with the empirical-analytic sciences. 
is depicted 
The key to 
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Dilthey's approach to the methodology of the sciences is the 
concept of experience, Habermas argues. The empirical-analytic 
sciences are seen to gain control over the physical world through 
the study of its "laws". The "laws" are only arrived at if the 
experiential character of men's impressions of nature, such as 
the feelings of joy or connection with nature, are not 
considered. The abstract apprehension of nature in terms of 
relations of space, time, mass and motion is accorded priority in 
the methodology of the empirical-analytic sciences. Within the 
frame of reference in which nature is objectified as something 
which is controllable via its "laws", individual biography and 
historically shaped experience is excluded. The knowing subject 
is not totally excluded in this process however. Objectified 
nature, for Dilthey, is the product of the active ego who 
intervenes in the physical environment "through instrumental 
action" (Habermas 1972:142). Habermas substantiates this 
interpretation through a citation from Dilthey's work: 
"We gain control over the physical world through the study 
of its laws... The resistance of external objects, 
intervening in them by hand, and their measurability make 
possible experimentation and the application of mathematics 
for the natural scientist. Hence the uniform components of 
experience as discovered in observation and experiment can 
here be ordered in accordance with mathematical- mechanical 
means of construction" (Dilthey cited in Habermas1972:143) 
In the objectification process, the attitudes of the scientist, 
understood as the degree of experience permissible in the 
respective sciences, result in different "configurations of 
experience and theory" in the two sciences (Habermas 1971:14i). 
With regard to the empirical-analytic sciences the phenomena 
objectified acquire meaning for the scientist through the 
hypotheses or thought constructs. Thus models are created such 
that possible connections between entities are inferred and 
regularities in the manifold of nature can be explained in terms 
of "laws". In the historic-hermeneutic sciences, the level of 
theory and data are not separated in this manner. Concepts and 
theoretical "designs are not so much artificial products as 
mimetic reconstructions", Habermas points out (1972:144 emphasis 
mine). For Dilthey, the phenomena to be understood, for example 
texts, social institutions, mores, and art works are products 
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which have already been constituted by the creative activity of 
men located in the history of mankind in general. Dilthey calls 
these phenomena "objectifications" of "objective spirit"(16). 
Understanding in the historic-hermeneutic sciences for Dilthey 
entails the reproduction of meaning expressed in the 
objectifications of the past and present generations of subjects. 
The crucial point of the analysis is reached where Habermas 
states that, for Dilthey, theory and concepts are vehicles along 
which understanding, as a production or making process occurs. 
The empirical-analytic sciences terminate in "artificial 
products" seen as 
laws through 
a corpus of theories 
which the scientist 
historic-hermeneutic 
comprising statements of 
controls the external 
environment. The 
"transposition" or re-producing 
generations, into the experiential 
researcher. Habermas agrees with 
sciences aim at 
of 
the 
past 
individual 
objectifications 
realm of the 
Dilthey that the social 
scientist encounters symbolically pre-structured reality which is 
to be understood. He objects to Dilthey's view that 
understanding is a form of making (poiesis) or re-producing the 
the meanings objectified in the products of the past. There are 
two versions of this methodology in Dilthey's work. The first 
entails the act of understanding the life expressions in terms of 
transposition. This is the "empathy" view of understanding which 
Dilthey is usually associated with. In the process of 
understanding, the scientist transposes himself into the foreign 
experience and re-experiences or re-lives the experience 
objectified in the phenomenon studied. Habermas' critique of 
this form of understanding is interesting in that he emphasises 
the monological character of this process. In other words, he 
does not merely question the difficulties associated with a 
methodology of psychological empathy. He sees Dilthey's error to 
lie at a deeper level of conceiving the understanding process as 
the solitary act of the researcher who re-makes (poiesis) the 
meanings objectified in the products of the past. Habermas holds 
that this is the model of understanding which Dilthey never 
overcomes. The second version of understanding as a making 
process comes to the fore in Dilthey's later works. Dilthey 
replaces the empathy theory with a philosophy of reflection. The 
particular model of reflection which he adopts is described by 
Habermas as follows: 
• 
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"Dilthey borrows from the philosophy of reflection the model 
that underlies the methodological connection of experience, 
expression and understanding. The life of mind consists in 
externalizing itself in objectivations and at the same time 
returning to itself in the reflection of its 
externalizations. The history of mankind is integrated into 
the self-formative process of mind."(1972:147) 
He explains that this model of reflection is used by scholars 
such as Vico and Marx to justify their philosophies of history. 
It is based on the presupposition that the historical life 
context is the "work" of a collective singular subject. Here the 
demiurge-like "mankind" produces or makes externality, which 
Dilthey names "objective spirit" ( the historical life context in 
general). The act of understanding occurs through "minds 
reflective relation to its own objectifications", ~he purposes, 
values, customs, and historical life context in general in which 
the "active mind congeals" (Habermas 1971:149). He cites Dilthey: 
"Thus the concept of cultural science is determined, 
according to the range of phenomena that it comprises, by 
the objectivation of life in the external world. The mind 
only understands what it has created. Nature, the object of 
natural science, encompasses that reality which is brought 
about independently of the active mind ••• The first condition 
of the possibility of historical science is that I myself am 
a historical being - that he who studies history is the same 
as he who makes history". 
(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:149) 
This model of objectification and subsequent appropriation of the 
products of past objectifications through reflection, is still a 
model of understanding as a ma~ing process, Habermas argues. 
3.5.2 Understanding as a Communicative Process 
Habermas holds that hermeneutic understanding is the 
methodologically developed form of understanding oneself and 
others. This thesis is established as follows~ He invokes 
Dilthey's three forms of elementary life expressions: linguistic 
expression, actions and experiential expressions in orde~ to 
establish hermeneutics as a dialogical rather than the monolo-
logical process of re-making, as Dilthey holds. For Dilthey, 
linguistic expressions can be completely divorced from the 
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concrete life context. In this sense they imply "no reference to 
the particularities of the life in which they originated" 
(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:163). Here hermeneutic 
interpretation is not required since the statements serve as 
"vehicles" through which information travels. An example of this 
is calculus. There is no dialogue between the receivers and 
senders of information in this context. Dilthey says: 
"judgement is identical in the one who states it and the one 
who understands. Like a vehicle, it goes unaltered from the 
possession of him who states it to the possession of him who 
understands it."(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:163) 
Here linguistic expressions are independent of the communicative 
situation of specific persons and times, 'Habermas argues. 
Understanding is then monological. For example the statement 
E=mc 2 is understood by scientists around the globe in an 
identical fashion. Only "pure" statements in this sense can be 
completely understood Habermas holds (17). Where linguistic 
expressions are linked to the concrete life context, their role 
in a dialogic relation becomes important. He explains that 
"the "vehicle" is no longer external to the content of the 
expression. Complete understanding is impeded, because 
there is no longer general agreement about an unchanging 
meaning" (Habermas 1972:164. ). 
What he means is that where linguistic expressions are linked to 
the life context, theory and data or content, c~n not be 
separated. Where theory and data are linked, the expression is 
not transmitted from sender to receiver in a monological fashion 
and understood in an identical manner as in the expression 
E=mc 2 • For Dilthey, linguistic expressions which are linked to 
the life context contain symbolic meanings which are not patent 
in the manifest expression. Hemeneutics serves to decipher the 
alien or unknown aspects in the expressions and hence lies 
between the familiar and the alien. Habermas elaborates by 
invoking the example of the "gap" which lies between the life 
context and one's attempts to express aspects of daily life in 
language. There is always a gap between what one expresses about 
a phenomenon in daily life and the meaning this expression 
conveys to other individuals. One enters into a dialogue with 
another person in order to ensure that the latter understands 
what is meant. The gap between what is said and what is meant is 
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bridged by communication. The 
facilitated b_y meanings which 
language but are also expressed 
process 
are not 
of understanding 
only objectified 
18 
in 
in actions. Habermas says that 
Dilthey's second category of life expressions, actions, can be 
understood as intentional actions which are subject to the norms 
through which the subject orientates himself. Here Habermas is 
moving beyond Dilthey by casting his second form of life 
expression, action, into a specific interpretation of 
communicative action. This stems from the earlier work discussed 
in chapter two where I point out that Habermas reformulates 
Weber's formal concept of rationality by saying that a 
"fundamental" distinction must be made between purposive rational 
action (work or poiesis) and interaction or praxis. The specific 
definition of the latter concept is important in this context. 
He says: 
"By interaction, on the other hand I understand communicative 
action, symbolic interaction. It is governed by binding 
consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectations about 
behaviour and which must be understood and recognized by at 
least two acting subjects. Social norms are enforced through 
sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in ordinary 
language communication". (Habermas 1971:92 emphasis mine.) 
-Habermas invokes this aspect of the distinction between work 
("poiesis") and communicative action ("praxis"), to reformulate 
Dilthey's concept of understanding. He then says that 
communicative action and linguistic communication are analogous 
in that meaning is objectified in language and in communicative 
action. Meanings which are objectified in actions can be 
translated into sentences in ordinary language. Conversely, the 
meanings which are objectified in sentences can be translated 
into actions. He makes the crucial connection between these two 
realms as follows: 
"symbolic interaction is as much a form of representation as 
is linguistic communication. There appear to be meanings 
which can be translated from one medium into the other.This 
convertibility of the meanings of sentences into actions and 
of actions into sentences makes possible reciprocal 
interpretations." (Habermas 19872:165 emphasis mine) 
Habermas holds that both types of life expression require 
interpretation since the meanings objectified in action and 
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linguistic expression are never totally apparent in themselves. 
The subject who acts in accordance with social norms in society 
cannot express himself directly in these actions any more than he 
can express himself directly in ordinary language. This stems 
from the fact that the unique life history of the subject cannot 
be fully transposed into either form of lif~ expression. There is 
always a residue of meaning which is not manifest or stated 
directly iri linguistic expressions and communicative actions. 
Habermas then invokes Dilthey's third form of life expression, 
the experiential expressions, which unites the dimension between 
the ego and its linguistic and translinguistic objectifications. 
The experiential expressions capture the realm of expression 
which encompasses the responses of the human body. Here the range 
of expressions such as gesture, facial expression, laughing and 
blushing are indicators of unstated intentions. The experiential 
expressions cannot be completely interpreted into sentences or 
actions. Habermas invokes Dilthey to express what he calls the 
"cognitive content" of these expressions: 
"expression can contain more of what goes on in the mind 
than what can be revealed by any act of introspection •••• At 
the same time, however, it is in the nature of the 
experiential expression that the relation between it and the 
mental content it expresses can be the basis of 
understanding only with reservations. It is not judged true 
or false, but ungenuine or genuine. For here dissimulation, 
lying and deception interrupt the relation between 
expression and the mental content it expresses". 
(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:167 emphasis in text) 
He casts this insight of Dilthey into the sociological notion of 
role taking. He says the experiential expressions may be seen as 
indicators of the role that the subject takes or pretends to take 
within the context of action and dialogue. Habermas 
capture the identity of the individual which he says, 
wants to 
"does not manifest itself immediately in the general 
categories or general norms of its life expressions and only 
communicates itself indirectly within them." (1972:167) 
This is the realm of latent meaning which is indicated by the 
experiential expressions. The experiential expressions connect 
the word and act in that they can indicate how seriously 
something is meant and whether the communicating subject is 
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deceiving himself or others in the communication process. 
Habermas then discusses the pre-scientific realm of the everyday 
life context. He states that 
"communication in ordinary language is never isolated from 
habitual interactions and attendant or intermittent 
experiential expressions. Mutual understanding about 
linguistic symbols is subject to permanent control through 
the actual occurrence of actions expected in a given 
context and these in turn can be interpreted through 
linguistic communication if there is a disturbance of 
consensus" (Habermas 1972:168). 
Here Habermas is employing the reformulated life expression, 
action. Communicative action is understood as a process of 
interaction based on reciprocal expectations about behaviour. 
These expectations occur in the 
The meanings in the two realms 
and ordinary language, can be 
practice of daily life activity. 
of daily life activity, of action 
translated into one another. The 
actual occurrence of actions either confirms expectations or does 
not confirm expectations. In the latter case doubt sets in and 
the meaning of the action can be translated into the medium of 
language with the attendant spontaneous flow of life expressions 
indicating the latent meanings. Thus mutual understanding is 
subject to "permanent control". He links this process with the 
practical knowledge-constitutive interest in mutual understanding 
by citing Dilthey as follows: 
"understanding first arises in the interests of practical 
life. Here people are dependent on intercourse with one 
another. They must make themselves understandable to one 
another. One must know what the other wants. 
elementary forms of understanding come into being." 
(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:174) 
Thus the 
Here Dilthey realizes that the understanding process is rooted in 
the pre-scientific realm of mans practical interest in mutual 
understanding. This elementary form of understanding, Habermas 
points out, is developed methodologically by Dilthey. The 
knowledge-constitutive interest in practical life activities is 
also evident at the higher level of analysis captured by the 
foreign-language interpreter. In interpreting a foreign language, 
the greater the distance between the scientist and the life 
context under investigation, the more frequently uncertainty 
arises. Attempts are made to 
realms. The starting point 
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overcome the distance between these 
is the normal structure of life 
expression and mental content expressed in it. Where contra-
dictions occur between what is already known and the progressing 
understanding process, the scientist recollects "cases in which 
the normal relation between life expression and the inner did not 
occur" (Dilthey cited in Habermas1972:174). This brings to the 
fore the various forms of latent meaning. The expressive realm of 
life experiences aids the scientist in making a decision about 
his doubt. Habermas then uses his interpretation of the 
empirical-analytic sciences and argues that the two forms of 
inquiry are analogous. Both forms of inquiry are embedded in 
"systems of action". Both forms of inquiry display a relationship 
between a disturbed routine or habitual behaviour. "Both aim at 
the elimination of doubt and the re-establishment of 
unproblematic modes of behaviour" (1972:175). In the case of the 
empirical-analytic sciences 'the criterion of doubt is the failure 
of feedback-controlled purposive rational action. In the case of 
hermeneutics, 
"it is the disturbance of consensus, that is the non-
agreement of reciprocal expectations between at least two 
acting subjects" (Habermas 1972:175). 
The empirical-analyic sciences aim at technical recommendations. 
The historic-hermeneutic sciences aim at interpreting the life 
expressions which cannot be understood and hence "block the 
mutuality of behavioural expectations" (Habermas 1972:176). The 
experiment may be seen as a refined or methodologically developed 
form of the pragmatic rules of instrumental action. Hermeneutics 
may be seen as the methodologically developed form of 
interpretive ~ctivities in daily life. The hermeneutic sciences 
are rooted in interactions, what Habermas calls the communicative 
action (praxis) which is mediated by ordinary language. The 
empirical-analytic sciences are rooted in the behavioural system 
of purposive rational action (work or poiesis). Both forms of 
science are "governed by cognitive interests rooted in the life 
contexts of communicative and instrumental action" respectively 
(Habermas 1972:176). Habermas further compares the two forms of 
inquiry as follows: 
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"While the empirical analytic methods aim at disclosing and 
comprehending reality under the transcendental viewpoint of 
possible technical control, hermeneutic methods aim at 
maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in 
ordinary language communication and in action according to 
norms. In its very structure the hermeneutic understanding 
is designed to guarantee, within the cultural traditions, 
the possible action-orientating self-understanding of 
individuals and groups as well reciprocal understanding 
between different individuals and groups. It makes possible 
the form of unconstrained consensus and the type of open 
intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends" 
(1972:176). 
He emphasises that communication flows in two dimensions. 
Firstly in the vertical direction of individual life history and 
the collective tradition to which the individual belongs. 
Secondly in the horizontal direction between the traditions of 
different groups, individuals and cultures. A crucial factor is 
now introduced. Habermas says that when these communication flows 
break down, and the condition of inter-subjectivity no longer 
holds, 
"mutual understanding is "either rigidified or falls apart, a 
condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as 
elementary as the complementary condition of the success of 
instrumental action:namely the possibility of unconstrained 
agreement and non-violent recognition."(Habermas 1972:176) 
Habermas holds that a condition of human survival, namely the 
"possibility of unconstrained agreement and mutual non-violent 
recognition" is a presupposition of communicative action in the 
practice of daily living. Thus the knowledge-constitutive 
interest in the historic-hermenetic sciences is a "practical" 
interest. He distinguishes the practical from the technical 
cognitive interest in that the former is not directed at the 
comprehension of an objectified reality as Dilthey holds, but at 
the 
This 
"maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual under-
standing, within whose horizon reality can first appear as 
something." (Habermas 1972:176 emphasis mine.) 
"practical life relation", Habermas says, is discernible 
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not only 
cultural 
cultural 
at the hermeneutic level of analysis but 
tradition itself (1972:176). He points 
also in the 
out that the 
sciences originate 
jurisprudence, the classical 
public debates of the citizens 
cultural disciplines 
in the categories of Roman 
tradition of politics, and the 
in the ancient city-states. The 
"did not develop out of the crafts [the realm of poiesis 
and other professions in which technical knowledge is 
required, but rather out of the professional realms of 
action that require practical wisdom" (Habermas 1972:176) 
The classical concept of practical reason is understood by 
Aristotle as practical or ethical know-how. This form of 
rationality is orientated to the question of the "good" and 
virtuous way of life and is based on man's capacity for practical 
deliberation and wisdom. The point that Habermas is making in 
this context is that the rationality of mutual understanding 
cannot be derived as Dilthey thinks, from the notion of making 
or production 
craftsmanship. 
(poiesis) internal to the classical tradition of 
Habermas points out that the cultural sciences 
derive from the realm of communicative action (praxis) with its 
orientation to practical wisdom and deliberation. Practical 
reason entails moral practical action understood as the 
communicative establishment of law and justice. This is not the 
act of making or re-making the norms, values and the general 
content of natural law, like a craftsman makes a stool. Once 
again the distinctions made by Arendt between the concepts 
"poiesis" and "praxis" as discussed in chapter one, are thematic. 
Habermas further explains that the practical cognitive interest 
is fundamental to the cultural sciences and "action-orienting 
self-understanding" of the nineteenth century educated public 
(1972:177). Historiography and philology are held to determine 
the direction of the cultural sciences through the manner in 
which tradition is appropriated "in the practical consciousness 
of the educated bourgeois strata" (Habermas 1972:177). In other 
words the concept of rationality, (the self-understanding of the 
Enlightenment thinkers), of the nineteenth century bourgeois, 
which Habermas is invoking in a non derogatory fashion here, 
entails a practical orientation to life in wh1ch the ideals of 
autonomy, justice, truth, equality, happiness and responsibility 
are central. This practical orientation of the Enlightenment 
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concept of reason forms the ground upon which tradition is 
appropriated and the categories of the cultural sciences develop 
in modernity, he argues. Habermas then develops a critique of 
Dilthey's view of objective science. He holds that Dilthey 
disavows the practical interest in understanding through his 
adherence to the contemplative notion of theory. 
3.5.3. The Contemplative Stance in Historic-Hermeneutic Science 
Habermas points out that Dilthey discovers the practical ground 
of hermene~tics and then, instead of embracing his discovery, 
shies away from it fearing that the goal of "objective", 
scientific hermeneutics is threatened by the practical interest 
deriving from the life-context. Dilthey discerns a conflict 
between "science" and "life" and disavows the practical interest. 
Habermas argues that Dilthey emphasises a contemplative notion of 
theory in his attempts to capture hermeneutics as a "scientific" 
and "objective" discipline. He says as he leads up to the 
rejection of Dilthey's contemplative stance: 
"hermeneutic understanding ties the interpreter to the role 
of a partner in a dialogue such that at least two subjects 
communicate in a language that allows them to share, that is 
to make communicable through intersubjectivity valid 
symbols, what is absolutely _unsharable and individual. Only 
this model of participation in communication learned in 
interaction can explain the specific achievement of 
hermeneutics" (1972:179 emphasis mine) 
Habermas is invoking the interpretation of intersubjectivity 
encompassing the notion of plurality. He stresses the uniqueness 
of each individual while at the same time linking individuals in 
communication or dialogue which takes place in ordinary language 
that binds them together. He then immediately says of Dilthey 
that he never abandons the "contrary model of empathy" of the 
solitary reproduction,_ re-experiencing, or re-making, model of 
hermeneutics (Habermas 1972:80). This derives, Habermas says, 
from his contemplative view of theory. What troubles Habermas in 
the context of Dilthey's hermeneutics is that the contemplative 
stance reveals that Dilthey treats the subjects as identical 
copies of one another in the interpretation process. Habermas 
says: 
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"Dilthey links the possible objectivity of knowledge in the 
cultural sciences to the condition of virtual simultaneity • 
... simultaneity fulfils the same function as repeatability 
of experiments in the natural sciences:the interchange-
ability of the cognitive subject is guaranteed"(1972:182) 
Subjects are viewed as exact carbon copies of one another in 
their "perfect singularity" as Aiendt would say. The possibility 
for communicative human action, communicative rationality and 
communicatively formed freedom is eclipsed. For Habermas, the 
rationality of communicative action is determined by the 
possibility that unique subjects can communicatively co-ordinate 
their plans of action, reveal and legitimate their intentions 
communicatively, thus facilitating the survival of the species in 
a non violent manner. Dilthey, like Peirce, cannot free himself 
from the contemplative notion of theory despite his Kantian 
orientation, Habermas argues (1972:180-186). Re-experiencing or 
re-making the the meanings of the past, objectified in the 
entities studied, is achieved for Dilthey when the scientist 
adheres to the goal of scientific objectivity. Objective 
knowledge is achieved through the elimination of the interfering 
influence of practical cognitive interest. Habermas says that, 
for Dilthey, this tradition of contemplative theory is so strong 
that he reduces the experiential realm of the individual 
researcher to that of an uninvolved observer who then submerges 
himself into the "stream of life" and "allows the pleasurable 
identification of everyone with everyone else" (1972:181). For 
Habermas hermeneutic understanding is objective when the 
researcher learns through the appropriation of the alien 
objectifications to understand himself at the same time. He sees 
Dilthey as eliminating this aspect of self-reflection which he 
does discover in the hermeneutics of the foreign-language 
interpreter. Dilthey adheres to the "selfless universality" which 
characterises the model of re-making the objectifications of the 
past. Thus Dilthey is not able to articulate the self-reflection 
of the subject within the confines of his historic-hermeneutic 
science. He emphasises the notion of the impartial researcher who 
sheds his prejudices and submerges himself in the stream of life 
to copy or re-make the objectifications of the past. For Habermas 
the understanding of tradition and the self rooted in tradition, 
must incorporate a critique of tradition. Both scholars hold 
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that the pre-scientific realm of ordinary language is the locus 
in terms of which hermeneutics is developed. Habermas points out 
that "language is also a medium of domination and social power;it 
serves to legitimate relations of organized force" (1977:360). He 
concludes that Dilthey limits hermeneutics to the mere 
repetition or copying of the objectifications of past. Thus a 
"depth hermeneutics" which is orientated to the critique of 
domination and encompasses the self-reflection of the subject, is 
required. This issue is dealt with in the reflective and critical 
sciences guided by the knowledge-constitutive interest in 
emancipation which is rooted in the life context of power. 
3. 6 Rationality and the Emancipatory Cognitive Inter-est of 
the The Critical Sciences 
The emancipatory interest of the critical sciences is clarified 
through a concept of rationality which Habermas appropriates from 
the tradition of the Enlightenment. The motto of the 
Enlightenment for Kant is: "Have courage to 
reasonl"(Kant 1963:3). Habermas holds that the 
use your own 
dissolution of 
dogmatism and error derives from more than mere rational insight. 
He says: 
"more precisely, reason itself draws its life from the 
courage to be rational, the sapere aude, that Kant elevated 
to a motto of his reply to the question; what is 
enlightenment? Reason will attain power over dogmatism 
incarnate only because it has incorporated the will to 
reason in its own interest." (Habermas 1974:257) 
He argues that the Enlightenment concept of reason "which defends 
itself against dogmatism is committed reason"(Habermas 1974:258). 
He invokes the Enlightenment concept of committed reason and says 
of the emancipatory interest: 
"In self-reflection knowledge fbr the sake of knowledge 
attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and 
responsibility. The emancipatory cognitive interest aims at 
the pursuit of reflection as such ••• in the power of self 
reflection, knowledge and interest are one." 
(Habermas 1972:314 emphasis mine) 
Habermas appropriates the interest in autonomy and responsibility 
of committed reason which he never abandons from this point 
onwards. The keys to the emancipatory cognitive interest lie in: 
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1. The appropriation of Kant's thesis that a "pure" interest in 
reason, whereby reason itself entails an interest in the 
achievement of freedom and responsibility, is necessary to 
account for the morality of rational men. 
2. A critique of the manner in which Kant attempts to explain the 
pure interest in reason through comparing his work with that 
of Fichte. Fichte holds that interest inheres in practical 
reason. 
3. The reversal of the Fichtean insight so that reason inheres in 
interest. Habermas reformulates Fichte's insight in the light 
of Freud's "depth hermeneutics" which he views as an example 
of critical science. Habermas hereby aims to show that reason 
inheres in interest. If reason inheres in interest, the 
cognitive interests cannot be misunderstood since they are 
then rational themselves and are not mere "attitudes" which 
are appended to mans purposive and communicative action. 
I deal with the emancipatory interest and the concept of 
rationality from this perspective. Habermas sets up the 
parameters of the discussion as follows. Peirce and Dilthey both 
"discover the roots" of the knowledge constitutive interests, but 
they refrain from reflecting on the implications of these 
discoveries (Habermas 1971:197). Thus the history of the species 
conceived as a self-formative process eludes them. Marx and Hegel 
do reflect _on this self-formative process, but in the light of 
the unprecedented progress of 
simple appropriation of this 
metaphysics in the case of 
"materialistic scientism" in 
the empirical-analytic sciences, a 
work is viewed as a regression to 
Hegel and to what Habermas names 
the case of Marx. I deal with this 
charge against Hegel arid briefly explain the charge against Marx 
once the Fichtean critique of Kant's work is dealt with. For 
Hegel self-formative processes of the species and the individual 
occurs through "phenomenological reflection". Phenomenolgical 
reflection entails the genesis of critical consciousness (or 
reflective consciousness) as it develops through the successive 
stages of knowledge from sense certainty to absolute knowledge or 
reason. Habermas rejects Hegel's totalizing "movement" of reason 
which gathers all the forms of knowledge within itself in it's 
march toward absolute reason. He points out that Hegel's conc~pt 
of absolute reason is his normative pre-supposition which does 
not enable him to characterise the empirical-analytic and 
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historic-hermeneutic sciences as valid forms of knowledge. 
Habermas states his view in this regard as follows: 
"Hegel arrives at a concept of speculative scientific 
knowledge. In relation to this norm, sciences which proceed 
methodologically, whether of nature or mind, can only prove 
themselves to be limitations to absolute knowledge and 
discredit themselves. The paradoxical result of an ambiguous 
radicalization of the critique of knowledge is not an 
enlightened position of philosophy with regard to science, 
the relation of philosophy to science completely disappears 
from discussion." (1972:24) 
Here philosophy as a critical science robs the methodological 
sciences of their legitimacy as independent sciences. The forms 
of rationality internal to these sciences are then eclipsed by 
the movement of absolute reason. The actual fact of empirical-
analytic scientific progress, "unmasks this [Hegel'~] claim, 
however misunderstood, as bare fiction". (Habermas 1972:24). 
Habermas holds that on the one hand, a legitimate path between 
the positions of Hegel and Marx is that taken by Dilthey and 
Peirce. The limits of the concepts of rationality entailed in the 
empirical-analytical and historic- hermeneutic sciences can then 
be charted without denying the legitimacy of each form of 
rationality internal to the these sciences respectively. On the 
other hand however, had Dilthey and Peirce reflected on the 
self-formative process of the species, they would have discovered 
the emancipatory experience of reflection. He says: 
"methodically it [the experience of reflection] leads to a 
stand-point from which the identity of reason with the will 
to reason freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge for 
the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in 
autonomy and responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection 
knows itself as a movement of emancipation. Reason is at 
the same time subject to the interest in reason. We say that 
it obeys the congnitive interest, which aims at the pursuit 
of reflection." (Habermas 1972:198) 
Dilthey and Pierce do not discover this unity between knowledge 
and interest since they do not conceive of the processes of 
inquiry as entailing the process of self-reflection. Habermas 
argues that the concept, cognitive interest, is validated if it 
can be shown that reason inheres in the emancipatory interest. 
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He points out that the technical and practical interests cannot 
be misunderstood if they are viewed in conjunction with the 
emancipatory interest of rational reflection. What Habermas means 
here is that if the scientist reflects on the process of self-
formation of the species, then the instrumental rationality and 
the practical rationality internal to· the two forms of science 
respectively, are revealed as being central to men's interest in 
freeing themselves from the forces of nature and the power 
structures which inhibit men's capacity to understand one another 
and themselves. The concept of an interest in reason comes to 
the fore in Kant's work. Fichte, he goes on to say, is the first 
scholar to develop this concept of "emancipatory interest as 
inherent in acting reason" since he accords priority to practical 
rationality over and above theoretical reason (Habermas 
1972:198). I briefly indicate how Habermas comes to this 
conclusion. 
3.6.1 ~rom the Pure Interest in Reason to the Emancipatory 
Interest Inherent in Practical Rationality 
Kant distinguishes between interest in general, pure interest and 
empirical interest. Interest in general refers to the pleasure 
associated with the existence of an object or an action. Pure 
interest is seen as an interest in action. The empirical interest 
is named the "pathological interest in the object of the action" 
(Kant cited in Habermas 1972:199). The pathological interests in 
what is regarded as useful arise from the needs of men. This is 
crucial to his denigration of utilitarianism where the rational 
action of men is understood as a means to an end. For Kant, the 
pathological interest of reason can never lead to morality or the 
actions associated with the "good". The pure interest in "the 
good", on the other hand, awakens a need in men to act in 
accordance with the "good". The pure interest masters the faculty 
of desire for Kant, while the pathological interests stimulate 
the faculty of desire. Habermas says that the sensual 
inclinations may be seen as "habitualized desire" while the 
intellectual inclinations, which for Kant are free of the senses 
or the sensual, are formed by "pure interest as a permanent 
attitude" (1972:199). I now digress using John Kemp's (1968) 
study of Kant's work as a guide. This is necessary in order to 
provide the context in which the forms of interest, which 
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The realm of desire for Kant is not Habermas is invoking, occur. 
co-terminus with the realm of reason, since actions which are 
feelings means the heteronomy of the 
freedom and rationality. The will of 
determined by desires or 
will and the surrender of 
man is "free" if it accords with ihe laws of practical reason, 
from which desire and contingency are excluded. The laws of 
practical reason can be understood as follows. Kant distinguishes 
between subjective and objective practical principles. A 
practical principle is subjective when an actor regards the 
principle as applying only to himself. An example of a practical 
principle in the subjective sense is: "Whenever I see a chance of 
improving my wealth, without risk, I take it". A practical 
principle which is valid for all rational men is objective. An 
example of a practical principle in the objective sense is: 
"Whenever one sees another human being in distress one ought to 
help him/her." The objective practical principles are named laws 
and all rational men direct their will toward the fulfilment of 
the objective laws of practical reason. The practical principles 
of reason are expressed in the categorical or unconditioned 
imperatives which are ends in themselves. For example, "you ought 
never to tell lies" is a categorical imperative. Here there is no 
way of evading the command of practical reason since it is an end 
in itself. The hypothetical imperative in contrast is 
conditional. For example, "if you want to become a surgeon, you 
must work hard in order to pass your exams". Here the command of 
reason can be evaded if the end is given up. Thus the laws of 
practical reason are seen as categorical and are ends in 
themselves. As Hannah Arendt says of Kant, the "end in itself" is 
his solution to the perpetual chain of means and ends of man the 
user, who he despises. Hence his characterization of the 
empirical interests as "pathological". He states that everything 
in nature is determined by laws, but that only man as a "rational 
being, has the power to act in accordance with principles and -
only so has he a will" (K_ant cited in Kemp 1968:58). Kant's aim 
in the Critique.of Practical Reason is to show how reason can 
determine the will. If this is not possible, morality would be 
nothing more than a mere illusion since men would then be subject 
to the laws of empirical causality and questions surrounding the 
"oughts" of action would be irrelevant. The question of an 
"ought" arises if man has a choice between acting in accordance 
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with his desires and acting in accordance with a moral law, or 
the laws of practical reason. For Kant the moral laws are the 
laws of freedom. The laws of nature pertain to the realm of 
necessity and hence imply heteronomy of the will if man~-s will is 
governed by the laws nature or natural desires. If men's actions 
do not fall under the laws of practical reason, morality is 
eclipsed. I return to the sequence of the critique. Habermas 
focuses on the function which the concept, pure interest, 
performs in Kant's philosophy. Kant asks: How is freedom 
possible? He holds that freedom is only possible if the will 
accords with the laws of practical reason from which contingency 
and desire are excluded. He asks: What then motivates men, who 
are subject to desires, to act according to the laws of practical 
reason? For example, why should a man be inclined to always help 
people in distress or never to tell lies? Here the concept of 
interest comes into play. Habermas notes that for Kant, interests 
in general refer to the pleasure that is connected to th~ 
existence of an object or an action. In order to account for 
man's inclination to act according to the laws of practical 
reason as opposed to desire, a feeling of pleasure must derive 
from acting according to the laws of pract'.ical reason. Kant 
J 
therefore posits a pure interest of reason such that the feeling 
of pleasure is instilled in the will and the laws of morality can 
be accorded with. He says: 
"In order to want that for which reason prescribes an ought 
exclusively to rational beings affected by the senses, a 
faculty of reason is required that can instil a feeling of 
pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty, one that 
thus has causality that can determine the senses in 
accordance with its principles. But it is entirely 
impossible to comprehend, that is to make comprehensible a 
priori, how a mere thought that in itself contains nothing 
sensual can produce a sensation of pleasure or pain." 
(Kant cited in Habermas 1972:200) 
Here reason itself is the locus of an interest in the achievement 
of autonomy and responsibility. He views this as a form of 
causality internal to reason. This form of causality "instils a 
feeling of pleasure in the fulfilment of a duty", where duty is 
understood as a law of practical reason (Kant cited in Habermas 
1972:200). Therefore a form of causality is introduced into 
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reason itself which produces an effect in experience, namely the 
pleasu~e in the fulfilment of a duty. Kant says: 
"This [causality], 
cause and effect 
however, cannot 
such as that 
P!Ovide any relation of 
between two objects of 
experience. Yet here pure reason is to be the cause, by 
means of mere Ideas (which supply absolutely no object for 
experience), of and effect [that is, of pleasure in the 
fulfilment of duty] that occurs in experience. Thus it is 
entirely impossible for us humans to explain how and why the 
universality of the maxim as law, and thus morality, 
interests us. (Kant cited in Habermas 1972:201) 
Man's pure interest in the good awakens the need to act in 
accordance with the laws of practical reason, but the specific 
form of causality which then inheres in the faculty of reason, is 
inexplicable. Kant holds that the intellectual inclinations are 
free from the sensual and are formed by pure interest as a 
permanent attitude but the "why'~" and "how's" of this process 
are a mystery. All that can be said is that rational men can be 
sure, that in acting according to the laws of practical reason, 
a feeling of pleasure is experienced after the act has occurred. 
On the basis of the pure interest of reason, with its my~terious 
connection to the laws of practical reason, man is held to be 
responsible for his actions. Kant asks: 
"How can reason, without other motives taken from elsewhere, 
be practical by itself? That is, how can the mere principle 
of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws ••• 
provide a motive for itself without any material (object) of 
the will in which one might take a prior interest? How can 
it bring about an interest that would be purely moral? In 
other words, how can pure reason be practical? All human 
reason is entirely incapable of explaining this, and all 
labor to find an explanation of it is in vain" 
(Kant cited in Habermas 1972:202). 
Habermas embraces Kant's basic 
will to be rational, namely 
responsibility. The basic 
tenet that reason encompasses a 
the will to achieve autonomy and 
question is how does one unite 
practical and theoretical reason in an adequate fashion? Fichte, 
attempts to solve this perplexing problem, but this is achieved 
at the cost of "reducing nature to the posit of an absolute ego" 
(Habermas 1972:210) (18). Fichte, Habermas argues, overcomes 
• 
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Kant's dichotomy between practical and theoretical reason. He 
does this by according primacy to practical reason. Theoretical 
reason is then dependent on the practical intention of the 
subject who strives for his autonomy. This can be briefly stated 
as follows. 
objects or 
understands 
For Fichte, dogmatism is viewed as men's fixation on 
things. He views a form of consciousness which 
itself as a product of things, as a product of 
nature, as enslaved. As Habermas notes: 
"The principle of the dogmatist is belief in things for their 
own sake;that is, indirect belief in their own self, which 
is dispersed, and supported only by objects." 
(Fichte cited in Habermas 1972:205). 
Fichte explains that: 
" ••• some who have not yet elevated themselves from the full 
feeling of their freedom and absolute self-subsistence, find 
themselves only in the representation of things. They have 
that sort of self-consciousness which is dispersed and 
immersed in objects and can be gleaned only from their 
manifold. Their image is visible to them only through 
things as in a mirror. When the latter are taken from them, 
their self disappears at the same time. For their own sake, 
they cannot abandon the belief in the independence of 
things; for it is only in things that they themselves exist. 
They have really become all that they are through the 
external world". (Fichte cited in Habermas 1972:207) 
The idealist concept of reason, held by Fichte, encompasses an 
c 
interest in autonomy and responsibility. Namely, the will to free 
the self from the "natural consciousness" with its dependence on 
things. Thus the will to raise the self from the dependence of 
things is understood as the will to achieve freedom. From this 
position Fichte argues for a concept of practical reason 
entailing an interest in the achievement of autonomy. Here 
autonomy is only achieved through the act of self-reflection in 
which the subject understands himself as the source of 
consciousness and enlightened knowledge of reality. Thus the 
interest of 
constitutive 
dogmatism and 
reason in the achievement of autonomy is 
of knowledge and rational action as opposed to 
enslavement. Habermas explains that Kant secretly 
develops his concept of practical reason from the viewpoint of 
theoretical reason. This can be discerned from the manner in 
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which the interest of reason is depicted. Kant asks how a mere 
thought can produce a sensation ·of pleasure or pain; and how the 
form of causality, internal to reason, is t~ be understood. These 
dilemmas are avoided by Fichte since practical reason is 
accorded priority over theoretical reason. Now the practical 
interest of reason, in the achievement of autonomy, "belongs to 
reason itself", namely to practical reason as the model in terms 
of which theoretical reason is understood (Habermas1972:208). 
Here the ego, interested in his autonomy, 
from dogmatism through self-reflection 
realizes his autonomy 
and action. Habermas 
says: 
For 
"Fichte identifies the work of practical reason in the 
activities of theoretical reason, and terms their point of 
unity intellectual intuition:the intellectual intuition 
dealt with by the doctrine of knowledge is not at all a 
matter of being but one of action, and Kant does not even 
mention it ••• Self-reflection is at once intuition and 
emancipation, 
dependence. 
analytically 
comprehension 
The dogmatism 
and practically 
and liberation from dogmatic 
that reason undoes both 
is false consciousness:error 
and unfree existence in particular. Only the ego that 
apprehends itself in intellectual intuition as self-positing 
subject obtains autonomy. The dogmatist, on the contrary, 
because he cannot summon up the force to carry out 
self-reflection, lives in dispersal as a dependent subject 
that is not only determined by objects but is itself made 
into a thing. He leads an unfree existence, because he does 
not become 
Dogma.tism 
incapacity" 
Fichte, the 
conscious of his self-reflecting self-activity. 
is equally a moral lack and a theoretical 
(1972:208). 
kind of philosophy one chooses, is directly 
related to the kind of person one is. He rejects the notion that 
philosophy is simply a set of attitudes which one can retain or 
discard in an ad hoc manner. He says: 
"For a philosophical system is not a pile of junk that could 
be discarded or retained at our whim;rather, it is in~pired 
by the soul of the man who possesses it. A character who is 
lax by nature or that has been.prostrated and bent by mental 
servitude, learned luxury, and vanity will never elevate 
itself to idealism" (Fichte cited in Habermas 1971:209) 
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Habermas holds that here Fichte is emphasising the unity of 
theoretical and practical reason. The extent to which the man's 
interest in emancipation, and the degree to which man's 
self-reflective processes develop, in turn determine the degree 
of actual autonomy achieved and level of philosophical 
understanding acquired (Habermas 1972:209). For Habermas Fichte's 
"unity of reason and the interested employment of reason 
conflicts with the contemplative concept of knowledge"(Habermas 
1972:209). He stresses that in Fichte's notion of 
self-reflection, the interest which inheres in reason loses its 
"secondary character"as a mere attitude which is apperided to 
cognition. Kant in contrast to Fichte, holds that the 
intellectual inclinations are formed by pure interest as a 
"permanent attitude". Men act according to the laws of practical 
reason and pleasure is experienced after the act has occurred. 
For Fichte, the interest of.reason is constitutive of knowing 
and acting since the interest inherent in reason, precedes 
knowledge and is realized in knowledge and action. Habermas holds 
that the self-formative process of the species cannot be 
conceived as the absolute movement of reflection since the 
conditions under which the human species constitutes itself are 
not only those conditions circumscribed by reflection. The 
self-formative processes of the species are not unconditioned as 
Fichte holds, but on the contrary, are contingent on the 
conditions of intersubjective interaction of unique individuals 
on the one hand, and on the conditions of "material exchange" 
with an environment which is technically controllable on the 
other. Therefore: 
"Reason's interest in emancipation, which is invested in the 
self-formative process of the species and permeates the 
movement of reflection, aims at realizing theses conditions 
of symbolic interaction and instrumental action;and to this 
extent, it assumes the restricted form of the practical and 
technical cognitive interests" (Habermas 1972:211). 
What Habermas means is that the emancipatory interest' is 
partially realised in the empirical and hermeneutic sciences 
through mans attempts to free himself from the forces of nature 
and constrained communication. I now discuss the last aspect of 
the concept reflection and interest. 
I 
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3.6.2 From Interest Inherent in Reason to Reason Inhering in 
Interest 
Habermas develops the thesis that reason inheres in interest by 
integrating Freud's work with his critique of Marx's work. The 
contours of the argument are as follows: 
1. Habermas holds that Marx reduces the self-generative process 
of the human species to the framework of instrumental action 
(work). Marx is then not able to account for the communicative 
dimension of action which is central to Habermas' work. 
2. Freud's work can be interpr~ted as entailing_~ c6ncept of 
communicative action which is related to the concepts of 
power and ideology through the concept of self~reflection. 
Habermas aims at integrating this interpretation of Freud's 
work with that of Marx so that both dimensions of the 
rationality complex, namely work and interaction, can be 
developed at the level of the emancipatory interest. 
I now deal with these dimensions of science as critique. 
3.6.2.1 Habermas' critique of Marxism as a Science 
Habermas accepts Arendt's basic premise. that Marx uses the 
concepts labor and work in an ambiguous fashion and that when,he 
speaks of labour in the sense of the objectification process he 
really means work (19). Habermas.focuses on the level of analysis 
where Marx ·employs the concept of labour, understood as work, to 
account for self-generative process of the species (20). He 
makes a distinction between the empirical level of analysis and 
the historico-philosophical levels of analysis in his critique of 
Marx's work (21). He stresses that at the historico-philosophical 
level of analysis Marx reduces commu?icative action (praxis) to 
productive labor or work (poiesis) (22). I focus on this level of 
analysis since Habermas is investigating scientific Marxism in 
this context. Habermas's assessment of Marx's critical science 
unfolds as follows: Marx understands the self-formative process 
of the species as contingent upon the conditions of nature. 
Habermas says that for Marx: 
"The subject of world constitution is not th~ transcendental 
consciousness in general but the concrete human species, 
which reproduces its life under natural conditions. That 
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this process, 
processes of 
constitution 
"material exchange", takes the form of 
social labor derives from the physical 
of this natural being and constants of its 
natural environment."(1972:27) 
Marx holds that the human species develops historically and is 
thus not an a-historical absolute like Fichte's concept of the 
absolute ego. Habermas points out that the concept of labour is 
a fundamental category for Marx since it is held to be a 
condition for the possibility of human existence. Marx says that 
labour: 
"is a condition of human existence that is independent of all 
forms of society, a perpetual necessity of nature in order 
to mediate the material exchange between man and na~ure, in 
other words, human life ••• Labor is above all a process 
between man and nature, a process in which man through his 
own action mediates, regulates and controls his material 
exchange with nature. He confronts the substance of nature 
itself as a natural power. He sets in motion the natural 
forces belonging to his corporeal being, that is his arms 
and legs, head and hand, in order to appropriate nature in a 
form usable for his own life." 
(Marx cited in Habermas 1972:27-28) 
Habermas says of the concept of labour: 
"Labor, or work, is not only a fundamental category of human 
existenc~ but also an epistemological category. The system 
of objective activities creates the factual conditions of 
possible reproduction of social life and at the same time 
the transcendental conditions of the possible objectivity of 
objects of experience." (1972:28 emphasis mine). 
Here the concept of labour, understood as work, is seen to have 
an epistemological dimension in that not only does it function as 
the fundamental category for the possibility of human life, but 
it is also the fundamental category for the possibility of 
objective knowledge. Habermas explains that the "system of 
objective activities" for Marx, is the work or purposive r~tional 
action qf man the tool-maker (23). This system of activities 
encompasses the factual conditions for the possibility of the 
reproduction of human life. At the same time it entails a 
specific form of science, a science which is based on work or 
instrumental action. Habermas holds that although Marx 
I 
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"established the science of man in the form of critique and 
not as a naturaJ science, he continually tended to classify 
it with the natural sciences. He considered unnecessary an 
epistemological justification of social theory ••• In order to 
prove the scientific character of his analysis, Marx 
repeatedly made uses of its analogy to the natural sciences. 
He never gives evidence of having revised his early 
intention, according to which the science of man was to form 
a unity with the natural sciences" (1972:45-46) 
The view of man as a tool making animal is the basic dimension in 
terms of which action and the apprehension of the world is 
understood for Marx at the historico-philosophical level of 
analysis. Man the language user has no place in the apprehension 
of the world in this form of science. As Habermas says: 
"Marx does not actually explicate the .interrelationship of 
interaction and labour, but instead, under the unspecified 
title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other, namely 
communicative action to instrumental action ••• the 
productive activity which regulates the material exchange of 
the human species with its natural environ~ent, becomes the 
paradigm for the generation of all the categories, 
everything is resolved into the self movement of 
production". (1974:168-169) 
Habermas provides numerous examples to demonstrate that the 
paradigm of production assumes this reductionist function. For 
example, moral relationships are understood in terms of the 
paradigm of production. The conflicts between men are always 
about the organization and the appropriation of products. The 
conflicting parties are always defined by their position in the 
production process as conflicting classes. The dialectic of 
morality entails the continual antagonism between classes. The 
dialectical advance, occurs through 'what Marx calls the 
"causality of fate." The causality of fate is directly tied to 
the categories of production. Overcoming the conflict is relative 
to the development of the forces of production and the 
institutionalized level of mastery over nature, captured by 
Habermas as the level of: 
1.Empirical-analytic knowledge with its instrumental and 
technical form of rationality. 
2.The level of necessary labour for the production process. 
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Haberrnas states that these categories of production determine 
the entire dialectic of morality. The moral relationship is 
understood as a complex of: 
1.The necessary amount of repression which is institutionalized 
for the specific development of the forces of production and 
2. The superfluous repression deriving from the unequal distri-
bution of wealth which is legitimated through repressive norms 
which are institutionalized. 
Empirical analytic knowledge with it's technical interest in the 
control of nature, developed by man the tool-making animal, is a 
force of production in Marx's work, Haberrnas notes. The 
"causality of fate" is set in motion by the ruling class who 
maintain the superfluous repression thereby suppressing the 
interests and needs of the dominated class. The dominated class 
become the revolutionary class, as the forces of production 
develop historically. As technical knowledge progresses in the 
history of man, the production process is progressively 
mechanized. For Marx: 
"the course of scientific-technical progress is marked by the 
epochal innovations through which the functional elements of 
the ~ehavioural systems of instrumental action are 
reproduced step by step at the level of machines." 
(Haberrnas 1972:55) 
As technology develops and the labour process is eased by 
machines, the revolutionary class realize that they are subject 
to superfluous repression. The ruling class suffer their "just 
fate" through revolution (Haberrnas1972:58). The dominated class 
overthrow their masters and become the new ruling class 
themselves as long as economic scarcity prevails. Through the 
"causality of fate", the revolutionary class overcome their 
oppressors and automatically establish a new "injustice" of 
class rule, since they become the new dominating class. The 
important point which Haberrnas makes is that the dialectic of 
moral life repeats itself, 
"until the materialist spell that is cast upon the 
reproduction of social life, the biblical curse of the 
necessary labor is broken technologically. Even then the 
dialectic of moral life does not automatically come to rest. 
But the inducement by which it is henceforth kept in motion 
assumes a new quality. It now sterns not from scarcity, but 
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rather only from the masochistic gratification of a form of 
domination that impedes taming the struggle for existence, 
which is objectively possible, and puts off uncoercive 
interaction on the basis of communication free from 
domination. This domination is then reproduced only for its 
own sake." (1972:58 emphasis mine.) 
Habermas argues that emancipation then becomes the emancipation 
of men from the necessary labour. The labour process "assumes a 
new quality" whereby the mastery of external nature, through 
technological reason is institutionalized and the communicative 
formation of freedom through the medium of dialogue is eclipsed. 
Thus the dimension of the self-formative processes of the species 
encompassing the practical rationality of communicative action, 
is eclipsed in the paradigm of production. Habermas stresses 
this form of "emancipation" in Marx's science, by stating that: 
"the self-generative act of the human species is complete as 
soon as the social subject has emancipated itself from 
necessary labor, and so to speak takes its place alongside 
scientized production" (1972:48) 
Another example of this emphasis in Habermas's assessment is 
the following: 
"Here it is from the methodological perspective that we are 
interested in this conception of the transformation of the 
labor process into a scientific process that would bring 
mans "material exchange" with nature under the control of a 
human species totally emancipated from necessary labor. A 
science of man developed from this point of view would have 
to construct the history of the species as a synthesis 
through social labor - and only through labor.It would make 
true the fiction of the early Marx that the natural science 
subsumes the science of man just as much as the latter 
subsumes the former." (Habermas 1972:50 emphasis mine) 
to Marx's 
lead to 
Habermas focuses upon those elements internal 
historico-philosophical level of analysis which 
deterministic Marxism.He presses the argument to its logical 
conclusion and finds ample evidence in Marx's writings which he 
cites extensively to substantiate his claim that Marx reduces the 
self-generation of the species to the technical rationality of 
man the tool-making animal. Thus Habermas is serious in this 
assessment of the "scientific" Marx and is quite prepared to face 
135 
the wrath of Marxist scholars in this regard. His basic premise 
is that.the concept of labour which is used to account for human 
agency at the historico- philosophical level of analysis is not 
able to account for the communicative dimension of social life 
and the communicative achievement of freedom. Emancipation for 
Marx is depicted as freedom from necessary labour. Marx holds 
that, in the realm of freedom, the science of man and the science 
of nature (natural science) are one. This is the "materialistic 
scientism" that I refer to in 3.6 which Habermas rejects. 
Habermas is not entering into mere polemics here. The import of 
this critique, is that "materialistic scientism" is embraced by 
scholars such as Louis Althusser who are denigrated by the 
critical theorists as llapologists for Leninism" (Schroyer 
1973:129). Habermas holds that instrumental rationality is 
universalized in this paradigm of production. He stresses that 
this is the logical outcome of the "scientistic" or reductionist 
forms of Marxism as subscribed to by scholars such as Engels, 
Lenin, Burkharin and Stalin. This science then legitimates the 
technocratic management of society. The reflective aspect of the 
self-generation of the species is subordinated to the 
technocratic demands of the management "experts".Habermas points 
out that this mechanistic disavowal of critical reflection is 
also to be found in the "critical science" of Lukacs who reduces 
the communicative dimensions of practical reason to the demands 
of the technocratic communist party (1974:34-35). These 
"productivist aberrations", as Habermas names these conclusions 
in his recent work, stem from Marx's notion of human agency and 
reflection which is reduced to work (Habermas 1980:129). 
Habermas holds that Marx understands the process of reflection 
according to the "model of production" or "poiesis" (Habermas 
1972:44). Marx then deludes himself about the nature of 
reflection when he reduces it to the model of making, since 
reflection is reduced to instrumental action. Habermas expands 
on this point as follows: 
"Marx reduces the process of reflection to the.level of 
instrumental action.By reducing the self-positing of the 
absolute ego to the more tangible productive activity of. the 
species, he eliminates reflection as such as a motive force 
of history even though he retains the framework of the 
philosophy of reflection." (1972:44) 
I. 
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Thus the realm of communicative action encompassing practical 
reason based upon critical reflection is seen to be reduced to 
the realm of instrumental action entailing purposive-
rationality. For Habermas, the "self-generative" process of the 
species encompasses concrete individuals who reproduce the 
material conditions of life through the transformation of the 
material world and reflect upon and change their social 
institutions through communicative action. I now analyse the 
manner in which Habermas attempts to substantiate this thesis 
through his integration of the work of Marx and Freud. 
3.6.2.2 Rationality as Inhering in Interest 
In the context of his work on the historic-hermeneutic sciences, 
Habermas stresses that when communication breaks down, and the 
condition of intersubjectivity no longer holds, 
"mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, a 
condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as 
elementary as the complementary condition of the success of 
instrumental action: namely the possibility of uncons.trained 
agreement and non-violent recognition." (1972:176) 
Freud investigates the reflective processes which serve to 
restore the "rigidified" or disturbed forms of communication of 
individuals suffering from neuroses, Habermas argues. He points 
out that the "depth hermeneutics" of Freud deals with "texts" 
which indicate the self deceptions of the author or patient. 
These "texts" document "latent content" which derives from the 
patient's form of life which is inaccessible to him and yet is 
part of his self from which he is alienated (Habermas 1972:218). 
This form of alienation is revealed in the daily life of the 
subject as neurotic symptoms which disrupt the language game of 
normal communication, comprising speech, action and non-verbal 
expression.The disruption of communication is expressed at the 
level of speech as "obsessive thoughts", at the level of actions 
as "repetition compulsions" and at the level of expression as 
"hysterical body symptoms" (Habermas 1972:219).Thus the phenomena 
which Dilthey deals with are accepted as "normal" forms of 
communication and those which Freud deals with are classed as 
distorted or "pathological" forms of communication. The faulty 
texts comprise repressed needs and intentional aspects of 
behaviour which have become privatized.These privatized modes of 
I 
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communication are severed from publicly accepted forms of 
communication. The analyst and patient aim at deciphering the 
distorted form of communication such that the patient is able to 
overcome his alienation.This occurs in the therapeutic situation 
where the analyst and the patient enter into a dialogic 
relationship. Through a process of self-reflection the patient 
aims at overcoming his alienation.Self-reflection is viewed as a 
self formative process whereby the patient and analyst decode the 
distorted communication and the patient re-appropriates the 
alienated or estranged aspects of his self in the process. This 
brief sketch of Habermas' interpretation of Freud's work at the 
level of psychoanalysis, is a reference point for his 
interpretation of Freud's work at the level of "civilization". 
For Freud "civilization" is the means whereby men elevate 
themselves above the animal conditions of existence. This occurs 
through the family where instinctual, aggressive and libidinous 
impulses are transformed into socially accepted modes of 
behaviour. What Marx names society, Freud name~ "civilization" 
which is understood as a system of self-preservation. This system 
serves two functions, namely, the self-assertion of men against 
the forces of nature and the organization of social 
relationships. Habermas holds that Freud, in an analogous fashion 
to Marx, distinguishes between the technical mastery over nature 
(forces of production) and the institutional framework of society 
(relations of production.). Marx, according to Haber~as, depicts 
the institutional frame-work of society as the realm in which 
interests are regulated. Here interests are a direct function of 
the system of social labour for Marx. They are regulated through 
the distribution of rewards and obligations which are rooted ·in 
relations of force stemming from the "distorted class structure" 
in society.(Habermas 1972:276). Freud understands the 
institutional framework not in terms of interests, but rather in 
terms of the repression of instinctual impulses. In the system of 
self-preservation repression is universally imposed independently 
of the class specific distribution of goods. The important point 
here is that the reality which the ego faces, which makes his 
instinctual impulses appear as dangerous, is the system of 
self-preservation (society) which is represented by the 
parents.The authority of the parents is internalized as the 
super-ego of the individual. The basis of the society for Freud 
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is also economic since he argues that: 
"the motive of society is in the last resort an economic one; 
since it does not posses enough provisions to keep its 
members alive unless they work, it must restrict the numbers 
and divert their energies from sexual activity to work.It is 
faced, in short, by the eternal, primaeval exigencies of 
life, which are with us 
(Freud cited in Habermas 
Habermas points out that if 
to this day". 
1972:275). 
the basic conflict between th~ 
instinctual demands and the functions of self-preservation are 
defined by the conditions of material labour and economic 
scarcity, then the "renunciations it imposes are a historically 
variable factor" (Habermas 1972:275). Habermas then makes an 
interesting claim. As the technological control over the external 
environment is extended, the "pressure of reality decreases" and 
"the weaker becomes the prohibition of instincts compelled by the 
system of self-preservation" (Habermas 1972:275). Thus the ego 
becomes correspondingly stronger as does man's capacity to master 
denial rationally. Here Habermas is very carefully pointing out 
the potential for the rational development of social structures. 
He contrasts the potential for the rational development of social 
structures by individuals with strong ego's with it's 
obverse. Namely, when the pressure of reality is overpowering and 
ego strength is weak, instinctual renunciation occurs through 
affective forces rooted in the unconscious. The species then 
develop collective solutions, illusions or ideologies which 
compensate for the renunciations imposed by the system of 
self-preservation. These collective solutions resemble neurotic 
solutions to renunciation at the individual level of analysis.The 
analogue is repetition compulsion at the individual level of 
analysis, and rigid, unifo~m behaviour, which is removed from 
public criticism, at the societal level of analysis. For Freud 
the conflict between the instinctual demands of men in society as 
a whole and the repression of these demands through the system of 
self- preservation, also sustains a specific form of social 
labour. Freud locates what Marx calls social labour in the 
institutional frame work of society. Here the purposive rational 
action of man the tool-making animal is seen to be embedded in 
the system of communicative action. Habermas holds that 
purposive rational action must be seen as a sub-system of 
I 
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the broader system of communicative action.The system of 
self-preservation sustains the forms of repression stemming from 
the sub-system of social labour, namely, the regulation and 
distribution of wealth. Thus two kinds of repression come into 
focus. 
1. The general and necessary form of repression required for 
the self-preservation of the species as a whole which is 
contingent upon the totality of economic resources. 
2. The class specific form of repression which derives from the 
manner in which the goods are distributed and the manner in 
which the control over nature is organized. 
The difference between the actual amount of institutionally 
demanded repression and the degree of necessary repression is 
then a measure of the objectively superfluous repression. Thus 
Habermas shows that a two dimensional analysis of forms of 
repression is necessary. The interesting question is: How are 
the relationships of repression or force understood? Habermas 
points out that although the web of relationships named 
communicative action serve the needs of the system of social 
labour, it must also be stabilized, since under the pressure of 
reality, not all needs can be accommodated. "Unacceptable" needs 
are channelled through the unconscious of men and are subject to 
the affective forces of the unconscious. The logic of the 
argument is as follows.The linguistically expressed needs 
(motives and sexual desires) may or may not be in accord with the 
prevailing norms of a society.If the linguistically expressed 
needs are not acceptable, they are disavowed by the social norms 
of a particular society, which the individual has internalized 
through the socialization processes. Disavowed needs are 
channelled through the unconscious and re-expressed in forms of 
substitute gratification which are socially, or more precisely, 
normatively acceptable. Thus linguistically interpreted needs 
which may be legitimate are suppressed by the normative 
structures of a society and are excluded from public discussion. 
The institutional framework of society therefore consists of 
compulsory norms, which not only sanction needs, but also 
redirect, transform and suppress them. Hence this form of 
repression is not direct but rather indirect and occurs through 
the unconscious structures of the ego. The redirected motives 
then become forces which dominate the consciousness of men and 
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indirectly legitimate existing norms.Habermas understands the 
force of social norms to be analogous to the force of neuroses, 
in that they function as defence mechanisms which enforce 
substitute gratification for legitimate needs and desires of men 
which are screened out of public discussion.This produces rigid 
and strictly circumscribed forms of behaviour in society.The 
analogue of this is the repetition compulsion patterns of 
behaviour in neuroses at the individual level of analysis.In both 
cases the subjects are under the control of the unconscious and 
hence are estranged (alienated) from themselves. At the level of 
society, actors are subject to norms which have become 
institutionally fixed and opaque. Thus, normative structures 
are institutions of force and may be seen as distorted 
communication structures. Therefore force is rooted in a form of 
distorted communication. This masterful depiction of the concept 
force is further clarified in terms of Freud's notion of 
"illusions". Freud calls world-views, ideals ~nd value systems 
the "mental assets of civilization" or "illusions" which defend 
civilization from the aggressive and destructive forces of man's 
instinctual nature which are in conflict with the system of self-
preservation. These collective fantasies provide substitute 
gratification for the renunciation of instinctive drives.Aspects 
of the illusory structures are developed into rationalizations of 
the existing. social order. These forms of rationalization are 
not open to public criticism since they are based upon the 
defense mechanisms of the unconscious and represent distorted 
forms of communication. Habermas and Freud stress that the 
illusions are not necessarily false as are delusions.The 
illusions contain the wishes, desires and hopes of men which may 
or may not be realizable in a given society at a specific point 
in time. Illusions harbour utopian content and as Habermas says: 
"if technological development opens up the objective 
possibility of reducing socially necessary repression below 
the level of institutionally demanded repression, this 
utopian content can be freed from its fusion with the 
delusory, ideological components of the culture that have 
been fashioned into legitimations of authority and be 
converted into a critique of the power structures that have 
become historically obsolete" (1972:280) 
Thus the potential for the replacement of the "affective" basis 
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of man's "obedience to civilization by a rational one, of 
providing a rational basis for the precepts of civilization" is 
indicated (Freud cited in Habermas 1972:280). The aim then for· 
Habermas is the transformation of the institutional frameworks of 
society which harbour repressive norms. Habermas sees this as the 
organization of society in terms of 
"the principle that the validity of every norm of political 
consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in 
communication free of domination" (1972:283). 
The central question is: How is this critique of power structures 
to be to be understood? It is only at the methodological level 
of analysis that this form of critique can be clarified 
adequately, Habermas holds. He argues as follows: The empirical 
analytic sciences entail a process of inquiry which is organized 
in the transcendental framework of instrumental action such that 
nature is seen to be an object of knowledge from the viewpoint of 
possible technical control. The processes of inquiry of the 
historic-hermeneutic sciences develop in the transcendental 
framework of communicative action, such that the explication of 
meaning in society becomes visible from the viewpoint of mutual 
understanding between unique acting and speaking human beings. 
These two sciences are held to be methodologically developed 
0 
forms of everyday life rooted in the life activities of work and 
communicative action 
constitutive interest, 
respectively. The concept, knowledge 
is employed such that interest mediates, 
or is the 
activities 
possible 
directly 
dialogue. 
"in-between", connecting 
to forms of knowledge 
(23). In psychotherapy, 
tied to the conditions 
These are: 
identifiable forms of life 
which make these activities 
the process of inquiry is 
of the psychotherapeutic 
1. A pre-requisite for therapy is the patient's interest in 
freeing himself from alienation. The analogue of therapy at 
the societal level of analysis is critique. 
2. The patient is expected to take responsibility for the 
distorted communication since it is part of his self. 
3. The analyst assumes the role of an active partner in the 
dialogue. The contemplative stance is hence disavowed. The 
analogue of the therapeutic dialogue is the communicative 
action at the societal level of analysis. 
4. An essential feature of the dialogue is the Socratic question 
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and answering process whereby the patient affirms or rejects the 
interpretation as it progresses. 
These conditions are viewed by Habermas as being "transcendental 
in so far as they estabJish the meaning of the validity of the 
psychoanalytic interpretations" (Habermas 1972:287). What he 
means is that the conditions of the therapeutic dialogue are the 
conditions which make the psychoanalytic theory possible, and 
place limits on it. At the same time these conditions are 
"objective insofar as they make possible the factual treatm~nt 
of pathological phenomena" (Habermas 1972:287). He says that: 
"the analytic resolution of distorted communication that 
determines behavioural compulsion and false consciousness is 
at once both theory and therapy" (Habermas 1972:287). 
Reflection is internal to therapy as a condition for the 
possibility of emancipation from alienation and as a condition of 
the kind of theory called psycho-analysis. Through self-
reflection, the subject achieves self-enlightenment. Here 
self-reflection is co-terminus with an interest in knowledge 
which is at the same time an interest in the emancipation from 
the force which causes self-estrangement. Habermas holds that the 
psychoanalytic situation demonstrates the unity between 
"intuition and emancipation, insight and liberation from dogmatic 
dependence, and of reason and the interested of employment of 
reason developed by Fichte in the concept self-reflection." 
(Habermas 1972:287). In the context of psychoanalysis, 
self-reflection is no longer the act of the absolute ego, but 
occurs in the demonstrable life context of communication captured 
by the dialogue which ensues between therapist and patient and is 
"forced into being by pathology" (Habermas 1972:287). Habermas 
goes on to say, 
"if we comprehend the cognitive capacity and critical power 
of reason as deriving from the self-constitution of the 
human species, under contingent conditions, then it is 
reason which inheres in interest. Freud encounters this 
unity of peason and interest in the situation in which the 
physician's Socratic questioning can aid a sick person's 
self-reflection only under pathological compulsion and the 
corresponding interest in abolishing this compulsion" 
(1972:287 emphasis mine). 
He holds that Freud discovers that reason is inherent in 
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interest in the dialogic situation between patient and therapist. 
The psychotherapeutic dialogue facilitates self-reflection if the 
patient has an interest in abolishing the distorted form of 
communication which dominates his life. Freud also investigates 
the "pathology" of society as a whole. Institutions of authority 
and cultural tradition are the historically variable solutions to 
the conflict between man's "impulse potentials" and the 
historical "conditions of collective self-preservations" 
(Habermas 1972:288). Habermas understands these solutions as 
"pathological" since they derive from the forces which channel 
the linguistically interpreted needs into substitute forms of 
gratification. Habermas says in this regard: 
"But just as in the clinical situation, so in society, 
pathological compulsion itself is accompanied by an interest 
in its abolition." (1972:288) 
He likens the societal form of "pathology" to the individual form 
of pathology arguing that they are both forms of distorted 
communication.The suffering inherent in these forms of pathology 
are accompanied by an interest in overcoming suffering through 
enlightenment. Technological development which results in the 
reduction of the renunciations imposed by the system of 
self-preservation enhances the potential for self-reflection, but 
it is only through the reflective process itself that 
emancipation can occur. He then says that mans rational interest 
in the realization of emancipation "inclines" men: 
"toward critical-revolutionary but tentative realization of 
the major illusions of humanity, in which repressed motives 
have been elaborated into fantasies of hope" 
(Habermas 1972:288 emphasis mine) 
Behind this cautious depiction lurks the Enlightenment ideals of 
autonomy and responsibility. Habermas is struggling for a way to 
express the actualization of emancipation. He does not want to 
sanction violence of any sort. Individuals decide upon what they 
consider to be t'he better or "good" and through dialogue, 
establish "enlightened" modes of regulating their world.This 
occurs through the rational mastery of desire which is achieved 
through ego-strength which is released when the pressure for 
self-preservation is reduced as the sciences progress. 
Rigidified forms of life (relations of force and illusion) are 
undermined by technological progress.These rigidified forms of 
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life are only "overcome" through the release of a rational 
potential which is harboured by illusion and the ego strength of 
men. Habermas holds that man's "interest in self-preservation, 
proceeds in accordance with the interest of reason" (1972:288). 
This interest in self-preservation is very carefully spelled out 
as being directly contingent upon the specific historical forms 
of life activity rooted in specific historical conditions, 
namely, the relative development of work, language and power. 
Thus the interest in self-preservation cannot be simply 
understood as any form of self-preservation which aims at 
survival. Under specific cultural conditions the actors interpret 
what a "good" form of life is. Habermas holds that the notion of 
a "good life" 
life. This can 
is determined by what individuals count as a good 
neither be an "essence" which holds for all time 
or a simple convention, but is the result of a specific 
"fantasy". He holds that the collective fantasies of men are 
produced in an exact manner such that "they correspond to the 
fundamental interest in a form of emancipation which is 
objectively possible under given manipulable conditions" 
(Habermas 1972:289). The interest in self-preservation takes the 
form of an interest of reason as long as men sustain their lives 
through work and communicative action, and are subject to 
instinctual renunciation. Habermas states that under the, 
"pathological compulsion of deformed communication, the 
interest in self-preservation necessarily takes the form of 
the interest of reason, which only develops through critique 
and confirms itself through the practical consequences of 
critique." (Habermas 1972:289 emphasis mine) 
Habermas holds that since the reproduction of the species occurs 
through work and communicative action, the interest in self-
preservation is actualized in work and communicative action. The 
body of knowledge built up by the empirical-analytic and 
historic-hermeneutic sciences, are rooted in work and interaction 
through the concept of interest. He then says, that since the 
interest in self-preservation takes the form of an 
reason, the knowledge constitutive interests must 
Habermas states: 
interest of 
be rational. 
"the knowledge constitutive-interests that determine the 
conditions of objectivity of the validity of statements are 
rational themselves, so that the meaning of knowledge and 
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thus the criterion of its autonomy as well, cannot be 
accounted for without recourse to a connection with interest 
in general". (1972:289) 
This interest in general is the fundamental emancipatory interest 
of mankind which is directed at forces of repression and 
domination. Habermas holds that the sciences are the rational 
pursuits of men striving for emancipation.Thus for Habermas, the 
empirical analytic and historic-hermeneutic sciences are the 
rational attempts of men to emancipate themselves from the 
forces of nature and the factors which impede open and 
undistorted forms of communication. The self-generation of the 
species then, is powered by the dynamic of reflection and the 
development of the natural sciences.In other words, as the 
natural sciences progress, through men's attempts to emancipate 
themselves from the forces of nature, there is an advance in 
technological knowledge.The renunciations imposed upon men 
decrease, and through critique, men unmask the normative 
structures which have become "obsolete".Thus the potential for 
attempting to actualize the basic ideals of justice, freedom and 
equality which are contained in the collective fantasies of men 
at specific historical points in time comes into the foreground. 
What is actualized, Habermas will not say, since this depends on 
the specific forms of work and communicative action at specific 
historical periods. What men count as the "good" is contingent 
upon the relative development of work and communicative action 
and the emancipatory interest in general. In this interpretation 
of the sef-generation of the species the concept of freedom is 
closely connected to the notion of the rational mastery of 
desire.Men rationally constitute new social structures 
attempts to rid themselves of the shackles of 
in their 
dogmatism 
encapsulated in cultural tradition, world views,_ and power 
structures perpetuating force.This takes the form of rationally 
re-stucturing the normative structures of society on the basis 
of communicative action and communicative rationality which 
occurs non-violently through dialogue. 
In sum: 
Habermas embraces the central premise of the 
scholars who hold that reason encompasses the 
rational. This dimension of reason is understood as 
free the self from dogmatism and domination. 
Enlightenment 
will to be 
the will to 
The crucial 
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question for Habermas becomes that of articulating this will to 
achieve autonomy and responsibility in a non-idealistic fashion. 
Central to this question are the concepts of reflection and 
interests. The major flaw in this work, lies in the concept of 
reflection and its relation to the concept of self-preservation, 
reason, knowledge and interests. Habermas fuses two logically 
distinct concepts of reflection in "Knowledge and Human 
Interests." (Bernstein 1976:209). This results in an ambiguity in 
his understanding of reflection and self-reflection. The first 
concept of reflection employed in the work derives from the 
Kantian understanding of reflection in the sense of reflection on 
the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. What Kant 
understands by crit~gue must be seen as the process whereby: 
"reason can self-reflexively come to grasp the universal and 
necessary conditions for the very possibility of theoretical 
knowledge, practical reason and teleological and aesthetic 
judgement." (Bernstein 1985:12) 
Habermas uses the concept of reflection in a similar manner in 
that he asks after the conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge. He develops a quasi-trancendental argument through the 
work of Peirce and Dilthey such that the conditions for the 
possibility of knowledge are no longer rooted in the trancenden-
dental ego but are understood as the human interests which 
mediate between forms of human agency (purposive rational and 
communicative action) and the forms of scientific inquiry. This 
is the knowledge constitutive sense of reflection central to 
Habermas' concepts of the empirical-analytic and historic-
hermeneutic sciences which incorporate the concepts of 
instrumental and communicative rationality respectively. The 
second concept of reflection pertains to critical self-reflection 
in the sense of freeing the subject from forms of repression or 
force. Here critique is understood as entailing a concept of 
reflection in the sense of emancipatory self-reflection. Kant and 
Fichte also subscribe to this form of reflection when they hold 
that enlightenment means the achievement of autonomy and 
responsibility through the use of ones reason. This form of 
reflection is the emancipatory self-reflective sense in which men 
employ their reason. Habermas does not clearly distinguish 
between these two forms of reflection. He fuses these two 
concepts of reflection in his articulation of the emancipatory 
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interest such that the knowledge constitutive interests can be 
called "rational interests". Rationality is then held to inhere 
in the emancipatory interest which pertains to all three 
sciences. For Habermas the technical cognitive interest of the 
empirical-analytic sciences is understood as an interest in 
emancipation from the forces of nature. The practical cognitive 
interest of the historic-hermeneutic sciences is an interest in 
emancipation from the forms of repressive communication 
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structures which impede mutual communication between actors. The 
"fusion" between the two distinct forms of reflection then is 
deliberate and essential to the argument. Habermas holds that it 
is only from the perspective of the emancipatory cognitive 
interest that the forms of rationality internal to the sciences 
can be viewed as being central to mans survival and not mere 
"attitudes" which may be adopted or rejected. The crucial 
question then becomes whether the fusion between the two concepts 
of reflection is illicit. The answer is yes in a qualified sense. 
Firstly, Habermas unites these two concepts of reflection through 
the concept of self-preservation. He argues that the system of 
self-preservation serves two functions. Namely: The 
self-assertion of men against the forces of nature and the 
organisation of social relationships. At the methodological level 
of analysis, he invokes self-preservation as an "interest in 
self-preservation" which he holds takes the form of an interest 
of reason. He does not explain why the concept of 
self-preservation 
implies, but does 
becomes an interest in self-preservation. He 
not clearly show, that the emancipatory 
interest is then co-terminus with the interest in 
self-preservation. Secondly, he presupposes, and does riot 
adequately explain, the dialogic nature of communicative action 
required for the emancipatory form of self-reflection. Habermas 
does not return to the conditions of knowledge and action, theory 
and practice, at the societal level of analysis to clarify the 
societal equivalent of the therapeutic discourse. The only 
indication which he gives of the therapeutic dialogue or critique 
in the form of emancipation at the level of society is 
"the principle that the validity of every norm of political 
consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in 
communication free of domination" (Habermas 1972:283) 
Habermas re-casts Freud and Marx's concepts of civilization and 
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society into his own framework of communicative action and 
purposive rational action. He develops a sophisticated argument 
depicting the institutional framework of society as a distorted 
communication structure. He displays the concept of force through 
a re-interpretation of repression and renunciation where needs 
and motives are linguistically reinterpreted through the 
normative structures. He indicates that the potential for the 
rational mastery of desire is released with scientific advance. 
He invokes the Freudian concept of rationalization in the sense 
of a defence mechanism, which from Habermas' perspective is a 
pathological form of rationality in that rationalization in this 
sense it is a form of distorted communication. He does not spell 
out just what communicative action and communicative rationality 
in the non-pathological form at the level of scientific critique 
entail. He immediately moves to the methodological level of 
analysis and invokes the conditions of therapeutic dialogue which 
are the conditions for the possibility of emancipatory 
self-reflection. He does not clearly show what this then means 
in terms of norms, consensus formation and communication free of 
domination. What 
underlying the 
then is the communicative form 
equivalent of 
emancipatory critique ? 
the therapeutic dialogue? 
What 
What 
of rationality 
is the societal 
is the societal 
equivalent of the Socratic question and answering process which 
occurs at the psychoanalytic level of analysis? What motivates 
actors to enter into communicative dialogue such that the 
"precepts" of society can be established in a rational manner? L 
hold that these are the questions which Habermas attempts to 
answer in his subsequent work. In "Knowledge and Human Interests" 
Habermas provides numerous indicators such as the suffering which 
occurs at both levels of analysis, the illusions which harbour 
the emancipatory ideals of autonomy and responsibility but this 
is hardly an adequate answer to the questions asked above. 
Habermas is certainly not advocating some sort of mass 
psychotherapy. The psychoanalytic model of emancipatory dialogue 
is a heuristic device at the methodological level of analysis 
which he uses in his efforts to break through the difficulties 
associated with the concept of reflection and its relation to 
rationality, interest, knowledge and human agency. These 
difficulties are displayed in the context of the critiques of the 
Kantian, Fichtean and Hegelian concepts of reason and Marx's" 
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reduction of reflection to the paradigm of production. The 
entire endeavour of showing that rationality is not a mere 
"attitude", which actors adopt or reject, rests on the argument 
that reason inheres in interest. The crucial point is reached 
where Habermas argues that Freud discovers this unity between 
interest and rationality in the Socratic question and answering 
process in therapeutic dialogue. Habermas does not however, 
explain what the analogue of this process is at the societal 
level of analysis. He avoids this question through a cautious 
argument which stresses that emancipation is contingent upon 
historically specifi? levels of work (purposive rational action), 
communicative action and the potential for the rational mastery 
of desire. Thus Habermas is not able to substantiate his thesis 
that reason inheres in interest at the societal level of 
analysis. His emancipatory cognitive interest is trapped in a 
philosophy of reflection at a methodological level of analysis 
circumscribed by a concept of reflection deriving from 
psychotherapy. Numerous scholars have reacted in various ways to 
the manner in which Habermas employs the concept of reflection 
in "Knowledge and Human Interests" (24). Habermas also comments 
on the difficulties surrounding the concept of reflection as soon 
as the· work is published. He responds to this issue by 
distinguishing between self-reflection in the sense of critique 
and self-reflection in the sense of universally oriented rational 
rec9nstruction. This develops the context of an extensive and 
detailed study of the genetic epistemology, linguistic~, 
argumentation theory, Marxism, phenomenology and Arendt's view of 
communicative judgement. Habermas hereby extends the rationality 
problematic. I analyse this process in the next chapter. , 
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4. COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY, LIFE-WORLD AND JUDGEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Albrecht Wellmer names Habermas' work subsequent to "Knowledge 
and Human Interests", the "linguistic turn in critical theory" 
(1977:231). This "linguistic turn" can be seen as a change in 
focus from the philosophy of consciousness, in terms of which the 
concept of rationality is articulated, to the philosophy of 
language as the new medium through which the concept rationality 
is further clarified. Influenced by the work of Chomsky, Austin 
and Searle in linguistics and speech act theory respectively, 
Habermas develops a theory which he calls "Universal Pragmatics". 
"Universal Pragmatics" is an inquiry into the foundations of the 
"communicative competence" of acting and speaking individuals in 
general. Behind these theories expressed in a highly abstract 
series of studies in genetic epistemoiogy, linguistics, and the 
argumentation theory of Toulmin and Klein lie two related 
questions. Firstly, Habermas asks in the language of genetic 
epistemology and the "modes of production" developed by Marx, 
after the evolution of mankind and the forms of society central 
to the history of man (1). He masterfully weaves together speech 
act theory, aspects of Piaget's genetic epistemology and Dobert 
and Oevermann's studies on the evolution of religion, world views 
and identity formation. He investigates the homologies between 
ego identity, group identity and the evolution of world views. 
Secondly, Habermas asks the specific question of how 
intersubjective understanding and communicative action occurs and 
to what extent this can be shown to be a rational process. He 
names this endeavour "science as rational reconstruction" 
(Habermas 1974:22). Before I clarify the concepts I mentioned 
above, I want to provide a perspective from which this abstract 
work of the past fifteen years can be can be viewed. 
In 4.2 The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and 
The Life-World, I discuss aspects of Arendt's work which 
Habermas says are fundamental to his concepts of communicative 
action and communicative rationality. Namely, her concepts of 
judgement and action comprising three elements: 
1. Plurality as essential to the concept of subjectivity. 
2. Language as a medium for the co-ordinating' of action. 
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3. Natality as revealing the free will of actors. 
Habermas views Arendt's study of Kant's "Critique of Judgement" 
as the first "approach to the concept of communicative 
rationality" (Habermas 1980:130). I deal with the three aspects 
of the concept of action deriving from the Arendt's work. Then I 
outline Habermas' view of the life-world which is based upon the 
work of Alfred Schutz. Thereafter I briefly discuss aspects of 
Arendt's interpretation of judgement and clarify its relation to 
the concepts of meaning and understanding. 
In 4.3 The Foundations of Critical Theory, I clarify Habermas' 
concepts of critique, reflection and science as rational 
reconstruction. I briefly sketch the basic elements of the theory 
of "Universal Pragmatics". I then outline the concept of 
rationality in relation to the theory of "Universal Pragmatics", 
Judgement and the Life-World. I show how Habermas grounds his 
concept of communicative rationality in communicative Judgement. 
In 4.4 Rationalization as Reification, Habermas' critique of 
the work Adorno and Horkheimer on Instrumental Reason is briefly 
addressed. 
My reason for proceeding from the Life-world and Judgement to the 
abstract theory of "Universal Pragmatics" is that the former is a 
perspective from which the abstract studies can be viewed. When 
this perspective is not in focus, the theory of "Universal 
Pragmatics" seems to reflect a turn away from the work presented 
in the previous chapters of this study. One of the prevalent 
misconceptions which characterizes the secondary literature on 
Habermas' work, is that Habermas is pre-occupied with abstract 
theory and the attempts to unite theory and praxis, which is a 
an important theme of the early work, has faded into the 
background. A vast body of secondary literature has now built up 
around various aspects of Habermas' work. This has resulted in a 
dense thicket of abstract analysis and critique, such that the 
impetus behind the "linguistic turn" is obscured. Habermas is 
partly to blame for this as he has published his extensive 
investigations into linguistics, cognitive/moral development, 
systems theory, identity formation, and studies on Parsons, 
Adorno and Horkheimer as separate papers. The overall picture of 
what he is attempting to achieve is thus obscured. I view t~e 
discussion of the life-world and judgement as a bridge between 
the earlier work and the most recent development of the concept 
I 
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rationality. The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement 
and Life-World is one way of locating the impetus behind the 
abstract investigations published thus far. Habermas does not 
clearly spell out what he means by the concept of the life-world 
in the first volume of "The Theory of Communicative Action: 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society"(1984), but he relies 
on it in his discussion of the concept rationality. In the second 
volume of this vast study, "The theory of Communicative 
Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason"(1987), the concept 
of the life-world is integrated with the work of Mead, Durkheim 
and Arendt. The central concept, the life-world, and its import 
to critical theory and the concept of rationality, is overlaid 
with extensive detail deriving from the work of these scholars 
respectively. By discussing the insights gleaned from Arendt and 
Schutz in isolation, the links between the linguistic theory and 
the reformulated concept of rationality and rationalization 
processes can be shown more clearly~ The feature which 
characterizes Habermas' discussion of other scholars work is that 
his approach is not that of pure exegesis. His own concepts are 
tightly interwoven with those of the scholars which he discusses. 
This is particularly evident in his approach to the work of 
Peirce, Dilthey, Marx, Freud, Piaget, Adorno, Horkheimer, Schutz 
and Arendt. 
4.2 The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and 
The Life-World 
In an address which he presents at the New School of Social 
Research entitled, "On The German-Jewish Heritage", Habermas 
spells out his debt to Hannah Arendt and Alfred Schutz(1980 ). He 
notes that as a student he learned the most from these two 
scholars and that he continues to learn from their work. Habermas 
discusses "three achievements of fundamental importance" stemming 
from the work of Arendt and Schutz (1980:128). Namely: 
1. "The reconstruction of an Aristotelian concept of "praxis" 
for political theory" (Habermas 1980:128). 
2. The "rediscovery of Kant's analysis of Urteilskraft or 
Judgement for a theory of rationality" (Habermas 1980:128). 
3. The "introduction of an Husserlian concept of "life-world" 
into social theory" (Habermas 1980:128). 
153 
Habermas counters the prevalent misconception that the work of 
Hannah Arendt is outdated or insignificant to critical theory. 
He says that he 
"learned from 
communicative 
Hannah Arendt 
action; what 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-
how to approach the theory of 
I cannot see, is that this 
approach should be in contradiction to a critical theory of 
society. I rather see in it a sharp analytical instrument 
for saving the Marxist tradition from its own productivist 
aberrations."(Habermas emphasis mine 1980:129) 
Habermas regards Arendt's intent in "The Human Condition" as a 
systematic analysis of the concept of action ("praxis") which 
obviates the reduction of practical action to instrumental or 
strategic action. He outlines three important dimensions of her 
concept of action, which I regard as central to his view of 
communicative rationality. Namely, her stress upon human 
plurality, the symbolic nature of the web of human relationships 
and human natality. I deal with each dimension in turn. 
4.2.1 Plurality as Central to the Concept of Subjectivity 
Habermas says of Arendt's concept of plurality: 
"plurality concentrates on intersubjectivity of acting in 
concert, where the multiple perspectives of participants who 
occupy inevitably different standpoints, are reciprocally 
connected. The unifying power of intersubjectivity preserves 
the plurality of individual perspectives; even in the case 
of violent repression intersubjectivity cannot be replaced 
by a higher order of subjectivity."(1980:128 emphasis mine) 
The concept of plurality is implicit in Habermas' critique of 
Dilthey's view of understanding and is the ground upon which the 
concept of practical rationality stands in the earlier work, as I 
point out in chapter three. In the context of the address, 
Habermas explicitly draws attention to the concept of plurality. 
He holds that a concept of subjectivity which incorporates the 
concept of plurality enables one to account for the multiplicity 
of individual perspectives which are intersubjectively united 
when actors attempt to co-ordinate their activities. This 
particular concept of subjectivity is fundamental to Habermas' 
concepts of communicative action and communicative rationality. 
4.2.2 Language as a Medium for Co-ordinating Action 
Habermas reads Arendt's articulation of the "web of human 
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relations" as operating through "language as the mechanism for 
co-ordinating the concert of different actions" (1980:128 
emphasis in text). He explains: 
. "In communication, individuals appear as unique beings; at 
the same time they must recognize one another as finally 
equal in their responsibility, that is in their capacity to 
say "Yes" and "No". As long as people talk to each other 
with the intention of reaching a consensus the very idea of 
a common understanding, built into speech, grounds claims 
for a radical equality which might be suspended for the 
time being but not stifled forever."(1980:128) 
In this condensed citation, Habermas is integrating Arendt's view 
of judgement with his view of communicative action which aims at 
understanding and consensus formation, as I indicate in chapter 
three, in the work on the historic-hermeneutic sciences. In the 
context of the address, Habermas is fusing the concept of 
communicative understanding developed thus far, with aspects of 
Arendt's view of judgement. Namely, the concepts of 
responsibility, equality and the "Yes/No" response of the judging 
communicative actor. When Arendt speaks of the web of human 
relationships in the "Human Condition", the concept of judgement 
is not-used in this manner. It is developed in this sense in her 
"Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy" (1970). When the 
concept judgement is briefly mentioned in the "Human Condition", 
it is invoked in relation to the concepts of man and not in terms 
of the web of relationships (1958). Arendt stresses the 
revelatory character of the web of relationships in the "Human 
Condition". Namely, the revelation of "who" one is through ones 
speech and action. Here the concept of plurality is thematic and 
not the concept of judgement. It is thus necessary to retrieve 
Arendt's view of judgement and its relation to the understanding 
process, in order to: 
!.Clarify her view of judgement which Habermas appropriates. 
2. Clarify what Habermas means by: individuals are equal in 
their capacity to say "Yes and No" and how this is related to 
responsibility and equality. 
These aspects of communicative action permeate the fabric of 
Habermas' "The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society" (1984) and are internal to the 
conc'ept of communicative rationality. I first want to indicate 
• 
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the last aspect in this important sequence of argument and then 
move on to the concept of the life-world before I clarify the 
interpretation of judgement in isolation. 
4.2.3 Natality as revealing the free will of actors 
Habermas points out that the third feature of Arendt's concept of 
action, natality, focuses upon the actors free will. He says that 
for Arendt, 
"The birth of every individual is the promise of a new 
beginning; to act means to be able to seize an initiative 
and to do the unanticipated. It is this innovative potential 
which makes the domain of praxis vulnerable and dependent on 
protective institutions. Only when they originate through 
the power of common convictions of those who act in concert, 
these institutions take the form of a constitution of 
liberty and liberty can be maintained only as long as 
political institutions in turn 
unimpaired intersubjectivity from 
generated power springs"(1980:128) 
protect 
which a 
that source of 
communicatively 
In this citation Habermas is making a number of important 
connections. Firstly, he indicates that the concept of power is 
located in the realm of communicative action (praxis) and not in 
the realm of social labour (praxis) as Marx thought. The realm of 
work for Habermas is the locus of instrumental rationality. Man 
with his monological knowledge, the empirical analytic sciences, 
is clearly separated from the concept of man the speaker with his 
dialogical form of knowledge, the historic-hermeneutic sciences. 
These distinctions can also be clarified in terms of the concept 
of subjectivity. The realm of subject-object (external nature) 
relations is understood by Habermas to entail instrumental 
rationality such that nature is brought under the control of men. 
Men free themselves from the arbitrary forces of nature (eg a 
malaria epidemic) and ensure species survival through the 
development of a body of knowledge which is constituted through 
the interest in technical control and purposive-rational or 
instrumental action. The subject-subject relations of men 
communicating with men through speech and actions, are un.derstood 
to exhibit communicative rationality orientated toward mutual 
understanding. In so far as men act strategically, they employ a 
means-ends kind of rationality which in Habermas' view means 
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instrumental, or more precisely, the strategic rationality of 
social action. Here men view others as objects, and 
communication, directed towards mutual understanding, does not 
occur. In the context of the address, Habermas is pointing out a 
concept of power which is integral to his concept of 
communicative rationality. The focus falls upon communicative 
action and understanding. Habermas locates power in the realm of 
communicative action and explains that power and 
intersubjectivity are closely related. He holds that liberty can 
only be maintained by institutions which "protect" its "source". 
Namely, the mutual, non-repressive, modes of understanding 
between ~ubjects captured by the phrase "unimpaired 
intersubjectivity", through which power is communicatively 
generated. Thus the concepts of power, intersubjectivity and 
liberty are all located in the realm of communicative action and 
can be viewed as a modern version of man's free will. Habermas 
embraces this aspect of Arendt's view of natality. This is 
central to the entire shift in orientation from the philosophy of 
consciousness to the philosophy of language. Habermas can now 
argue that if language is a universal phenomenon of mankind, and 
universal modes of understanding and reaching consensus are 
rooted in language itself, then the potential for the formation 
of "more just" institutions can be based upon praxis as a 
communicative rather than making process. The rationalization of 
the realm of communicative action can then be positively depicted 
as the extent to which the source of unimpaired intersubjectivity 
is institutionalized. Habermas is very cautious in this regard in 
that he does not simply want to point toward a rationally 
organized utopian "never-never land". He indicates the potential 
for rationalization in this sense. 
In Habermas' recent debate with Anthony Giddens he marshals 
the specific concept of power, indicated in the address, to 
counter Giddens' objection to the location of the concept of 
power in the realm of communicative action (praxis). Habermas' 
answer to Giddens makes sense from the perspective of the 
address. He explains that he agrees with Arendt in that 
"communicatively shared convictions" are the source of legitimate 
power an.d that the "communicative practice of everyday life in 
the life-world as a generator of power that is acknowledged 
without coercion" (1982:269). The basic issue of locating the 
• • 
• 
I 
• 
• 
• 
I 
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concept of power in the· realm of communicative action is the 
crucial point in this context. The nub of the matter is that this 
is the first explicit indication that for Habermas power is 
something which is communicatively "formed" through communicative 
action (2). 
The second important aspect of this citation is that Habermas 
is also locating the concept autonomy in the realm of 
communicative action through the concept of intersubjectivity. He 
names this the "constitution of liberty" which occurs through the 
"protection" of the unimpaired intersubjectivity of communicative 
action • 
In sum: 
With regard to the achievements of Arendt, Habermas focuses on 
the issues central to the the tradition of the Enlightenment • 
Namely, the concepts of responsibility, "radical equality" and 
the free will of men. These concepts are no longer argued for 
through the labyrinths of the philosophy of reflection which mark 
his "Knowledge and Human Interests". They are stated simply as 
being aspects of intersubjectivity and communicative action and 
are entailed in the catch phrase: "normative perspective of 
unimpaired intersubjectivity" (1980:130). Language is stated as 
the "mechanism" through which communicative actions are 
co-ordinated. An important premise is that men/women's capacity 
for judgement as a communicative actor is held to be internal to 
the realm of "unimpaired intersubjectivity". Habermas holds that 
"as long as people talk to each other with the intention of 
reaching a consensus" which is the aim of communicative action, 
claims to equality, cannot he repressed forever (1980:128). Here 
he is very simply invoking men/women's "intent" in communicative 
action. He writes 
"Again and again this claim [to reason] is silenced, and yet 
in fantasies and deeds it develops a stubbornly transcending 
power, because it is renewed with each act of unconstrained 
understanding, with each moment of living together in 
solidarity, of sucessful individuation, and of saving 
emancipation." (Habermas 1982:221) 
The practical intent of communicative action, of reaching a 
consensus, holds for Habermas a claim to the Enlightenment 
concept of reason. The Enlightenment's ideals of autonomy, 
equality and responsibility are internal to the concept of 
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unimpaired intersubjectivity. ,The concept of the life-world and 
its relation to the concept of unimpaired intersubjectivity will 
now be briefly discussed. 
4.2.4 The Life-World and Unimpaired· Intersubjectivity 
Habermas says that Arendt is interested in the "normative 
question" of how the space of appearance "should be institution-
alised as a public domain" (1980:129). He holds that Schutz is 
the social scientist who focuses on the "descriptive question" of 
how the "space of appearance", now equated with the "horizon of 
everyday life", actually works (1980:129). Habermas points out 
that Schutz spent a lifetime wrestling with the problem of 
adequately analysing the life-world, the "taken for granted". For 
Schutz the life-world is "conceived as the unexamined ground of 
everyday praxis", Habermas argues (1980:129) Seen through the 
lens of Habermas' concept of communicative action, the concept of 
the life-world is described as follows: 
"In communicative action participants can co-ordinate their 
different plans only on condition that they reach a common 
definition of the situation with which they have to cope. 
They offer different interpretations and try to come to an 
agreement. In these interpretive achievements each actor 
draws from a common stock of knowledge which is provided by 
the cultural tradition shared with others. It is this 
background knowledge which represents the context of the 
life-world, and in which any communicative action is 
embedded. Now the crucial question is:in what sense are we 
entitled to consider these background assumptions and 
practices of everyday communication to be knowledge?" 
(Habermas 1980:129) 
Habermas points out that there are two important aspects of the 
life-world and the communicative action which is embedded in the 
it. On the one hand, from the perspective of communicative 
actors, the life-world is understood as the body of background 
_knowledge which functions at the level of implicit self-evidence. 
This implicit form of knowledge is taken for granted and accepted 
without question or validation 
of men who act in concert. 
processes in the daily activities 
On the other hand, one of the 
essential features of knowledge is that it 
• 
I 
-
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"maintains an internal relationship to validity-claims and 
and criticism that it thus can become problematic, those 
very background assumptions do not have this basic property 
of knowledge. What is beyond any doubt appears as if it 
never could become problematic;it can only break 
down."(1980:129) 
What Habermas is attempting to do is to highlight the paradoxical 
nature of the life-world. On the one hand, background knowledge 
which one employs in daily life, functions in the form of 
self-evidence or implicit "know-how" and is paradigmatic for what 
one "knows with certainty" (Habermas 1980:129). On the other hand 
this domain of self-evidence can not be characterised as "true 
knowledge" because its specific form of "certainty" is prevented 
from even entering the domain where its validity is intentionally 
questioned, and consciously accepted or rejected. Habermas 
explains that it is only under the contingent pressure of a 
"problematical" situation, that relevant pieces of background 
knowledge come into the foreground and are consciously questioned 
and open to dispute. He illustrates the relation between the 
taken for granted and a "problematical" situation when says: 
"Only an earthquake makes us aware of what we all the time took 
for granted about the safety of the ground"( 1980:130). Habermas 
emphasises the "elemental" nature of the process whereby aspects 
of the taken for granted are released from the realm of the 
implicit background knowledge into the realm of the foreground 
where knowledge claims are explicitly expressed and questioned. 
He points out that the whole life-world is not thematic when 
one particular, objective problem forces the taken for granted 
out of its encapsulation in the cultural traditions, social 
institutions, skills and competences. Background-knowledge only 
becomes known explicitly when "piece by piece" it is released 
into the foreground and is converted into the "semantic contents 
of the speech of those who act in concert." (Habermas 1980:130). 
Habermas holds that there are important methodological 
consequences which follow from the paradoxical nature of the 
life-world. He elaborates saying that cultural tradition, social 
integration and socialization processes are three different 
aspects of the "symbolic reproduction of the life-world which is 
channelled through the medium of communicative action" 
1980:130). For Habermas the life-world consists of 
(Habermas 
cultural 
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tradition, norms, subjective experiences, and individual skills. 
He indicates that not only culture but also the institutional 
orders and personality structures are basic components of the 
life-world. These phenomena are constituted through the 
communicative actions of social subjects. Habermas points out 
that in dealing with the question of the symbolic reproduction of 
the life-world, social scientists are faced with the task of 
dealing with the taken for granted. He holds that one method of 
inquiry into the taken for granted, is that of rational 
reconstruction, which is mainly practiced by philosophers. He 
notes that rational reconstruction is the attempt to reconstruct 
the "pre-theoretical, 
(Habermas 1980:130). 
implicit know-how, of competent subjects" 
Schutz notes that the social scientist has 
to "make empirical use of the philosophical method" (Habermas 
1980:130). What Schutz does not realize, Habermas argues, is 
that access to the life-world is not simply contingent upon the 
social scientists choice of method or attitude toward the object 
domain. The realm of the taken for granted is not at the 
disposal of the social scientist since he is located within it 
himself. Hence he is also subject to the pre-scientific, taken 
for granted knowledge of which he is not aware. Access to this 
realm, for Habermas, is contingent upon the objective threats to 
the symbolic reproduction of this sphere. He argues that since 
the symbolic reproduction of the life world depends on 
communicative action, today there is an objective threat to the 
symbolic reproduction of the life-world. Hence social scientists 
do have access to the life-world. He states his position in this 
regard as follows: 
"Today there is such a threat; it stems from the ever more 
pervasive process of 
from the increasing 
istrative subsystems 
commodification and bureaucratization, 
autonomy of the economic and admin-
which confront the life-world with 
imperatives of instrumental rationality, and thereby not 
only undermine traditional forms of life but impinge on the 
very communicative infrastructure of these spheres where men 
still have to act in concert." (1980:130) 
This is a new version of the "urbanization" of the institutional 
framework of society by instrumental reason which comes to the 
fore in the early essay "Science and technology as Ideology" 
which I discuss in chapter two. In the earlier work, Habermas 
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argues that sub-systems of purposive rational action permeate 
the life-world, which is invoked, but not clarified beyond the 
brief statement that it is part of the "institutional framework" 
of society. This vague concept of the life-world informs his 
early work. The crucial point which Habermas makes in this 
condensed and important discussion of the fundamental 
achievements of Arendt and Schutz, and which I hold has not been 
realised by his critics and commentators to date, is as follows: 
"I do not think though that we can succeed in analysing the 
reification of the life-world, which is so visible today, 
unless we rely on a normative perspective originating from 
within it. In contrast to A. Schutz, H. Arendt did have such 
a perspective with the idea of an unimpaired 
intersubjectivity." (1980:130 emphasis mine.) 
Habermas then immediately invokes Arendt's intention to come to 
terms with the faculty of judgement. He says: 
"She intended to explain that faculty of Urteilskraft or 
judgement which she regarded as the core of rational 
orientations in Vita Activa. H. Arendt wanted to elaborate 
the moral and political implications of that specific 
""enlargement of mind"" which according to Kant enabled men 
to judge. It is accomplished by ""comparing our judgements 
with the possible rather than the actual judgements of 
others, and putting ourselves in the place of any other man 
••• Critical thinking makes the others present and thus moves 
potentiality into a space which is public, open to all 
sides"" [Arendt cited in Habermas 1980:130]. "This is a 
first approach to a concept of communicative rationality 
which is built into speech and action." 
(Habermas 1980:130 emphasis mine). 
Habermas draws a comparison between the work of Arendt and George 
Herbert Mead in this context. He holds that Arendt's interp-
retation of Kant's "Critique of Judgement" and that Mead's 
interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason" converge 
"in a project of an ethics of communication which connects 
practical reason to the idea of a universal discourse" 
(Habermas 1980:131) 
This is Habermas' endeavour. For Habermas, the link between 
theoretical and practical reason is judgement. Once this 
perspective is in view, the theory of Universal Pragmatics and 
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communicative competence can be seen in a new light. The decisive 
questions pertaining -to the validation of this hypothesis are: 
How is man's capacity for judgement related to the concept of 
communicative rationality? What is the function of judgement in 
Habermas' theory of communicative action and rationality? I hold 
that the theory of Universal Pragmatics serves as the basic 
criterion in terms of which men judge for Habermas. Habermas may 
be seen to be asking: What are the conditions for the possibility 
of rational modes of judgement? How does man's capacity for 
judgement develop at the level of the evolution of mankind? These 
are the questions underlying his investigations into speech act 
theory which culminate in what he calls the communicative 
"competencies of actors". I deal with Arendt's interpretation of 
judgement first and then outline the basic concepts of "Universal 
Pragmatics" and "communicative competence". I then show how 
Babermas' theory of Universal Pragmatics and the concept of 
judgement are related. I hold that it is only from the viewpoint 
of what I name, The Perspective of Communicative Action, 
Judgement and Life-World, that these connections can be, made. 
Arendt's interpretation of mans capacity for judgement, and its 
relation to the theories of Universa~ Pragmatics and 
Communicative Competence, is not discussed in the secondary 
literature on Habermas' work, as far as I am aware. I aim to make 
the relationship between this aspect of Arendt's work and theory 
of Universal Pragmatics explicit. At the same time, the concepts 
of communicative action and communicative rationality are further 
clarified. 
4.2.5 Judgement, Understanding and Meaning in the work of 
Arendt 
According to Ronald Beiner, the editor of the "Kant Lect~res", 
there are two distinct versions of Arendt's interpretation of the 
"Critique of Judgement" (1982: viii). Namely, judgement from the 
viewpoint of a life of action (vita activa) and judgement from 
the viewpoint of a life of contemplation (vita contemplativa). I 
do not accept the latter version. Habermas would also reject the 
latter interpretation since he retrieves her view of judgement 
from the Life of Mind (vita c6ntemplativa), and the lectures on 
Kant, and calls it the "core of rational orientations in the Vita 
Activa" (Habermas 1980:130). Given Habermas' rejection of the 
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contemplative stance toward theory as I indicate in chapter 
three, his interpretation of judgement as the "rational core" of 
a life of action is understandable. I discuss the aspects of 
Arendt's interpretation of Kant's view of judgment which I hold 
are important to Habermas' endeavour in the rationality 
problematic. The important aspects are the relationship between 
judgement, understanding, meaning, reflection and what I name the 
"Yes/No" aspect of judgement (3). 
4.2.5.1 Communicative Judgement, Understanding and Meaning 
Ronald Beiner clarifies the relationship between judgement, 
meaning and understanding in Arendt's work. He points out that 
for Arendt, understanding is the process whereby men come to 
reconcile themselves with the world in which they live. Arendt 
holds that "the result of understanding is meaning" which is 
generated through the procesi of living and reconciling oneself 
to ones actions and sufferings (Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:94). 
This activity becomes problematical in a century in which 
totalitarianism comes to the fore. Beiner cites Arendt as 
follows: 
"But confronted with 
suddenly discover the 
the horror of totalitarianism, we 
fact that we have lost our tools of 
understanding. Our quest for meaning is at the same time 
prompted and frustrated by our inability to originate 
meaning."(Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:94) 
Arendt is referring to the horrors of the Nazi era which she 
lived through. She was requested to report on the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann in 1961. She views Eichmann as an example of a man 
whose capacity for thought and judgement had atrophied since he 
was unable to distinguish between good and evil. This prompted 
her to develop an extensive investigation into the question of 
judgement. She comes to the conclusion that Eichmann cannot be 
dismissed as a "subhuman creature" as Jaspers thought. She holds 
that judgement can only function where those judged are neither 
"beasts or angels" but men who live.and act in society. (Arendt 
cited in Beiner 1982:96). She states the epigraph of modernity as 
follows: 
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"no one has the right to judge somebody else. What public 
opinion permits us to judge 
or whole groups of people 
short, something so general 
and even to condemn are trends, 
- the larger the better - in 
that distinctions can no longer 
be made, names no longer named. Thus we find, for instance a 
flourishing of theories of collective guilt or collective 
innocence of entire peoples. All these cliches have in 
common that they make judgement superfluous and that to 
utter them is devoid of all risk. This goes with the 
reluctance everywhere to make judgements in terms of 
individual moral responsibility." (Arendt 1982:99) 
The atrophy of man's capacity for judgement is precisely what 
made Eichmann's activities possible in the first place, she 
argues. Arendt views the crisis of totalitarianism as a crisis in 
understanding which is co-terminus with a crisis in judgement. 
Judgement and understanding are held to be so closely related 
that "one must describe both as the subsumption of something 
particular under a general rule"(Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:95). 
The basic issue for Arendt is that there are no general rules in 
terms of which one can take ones bearings. In a manner similar to 
Max Weber, she describes a disenchanted world in which 
traditional norms and values have become empty and man's basic 
common sense seems to have atrophied. She holds that under 
conditions such as these, when the sources of meaning appear to 
have dried up, judgement comes into its own. She invokes 
Augustine's concept of natality, and explains that Augustine, 
when confronted with a similar crisis of meaning, discovered the 
hope of a new beginning. The essence of action then becomes that 
of making a new beginning and understanding for Arendt becomes 
the 
"other side of action, namely that form of cognition, in 
distinction from many others, by which acting men (and not 
men who are engaged in contemplating some progressive or 
doomed course of history) eventually can come to terms with 
what irrevocably happened and can be reconciled with what 
unavoidably exists." (1982:96 emphasis mine ) 
Judgement comes into its own since the understanding process is 
intimately related to man's capacity for imagination. Through the 
creative potential of the imagination men are able to distance 
themselves from those facts which are close at hand and provide 
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the space in which understanding can function. Imagination 
allows for both proximity and distance so that judgements can be 
made. For Arendt the imagination prepares the particular for the 
"operation of reflection" which "is ·the actual activity of 
judging something" (Arendt 1982:68). Thus the particular is made 
immediately present to one's inner sense so that it can be be 
judged. The "example", in the "Critique of Judgement", fulfils 
a similar function to the "schema" in Kant's "Critique of Pure 
Reason". Arendt develops a communicative interpretation of 
Kant's work to explain the function of the "example" in the 
judging process. She proceeds as follows: Kant's greatest 
discovery is the role the imagination plays in the cognitive 
faculties of man. His basic premise is that the faculty of 
imagination "provides schemata for cognition and examples for 
judgement" (Arendt 1982:80). For Kant, there are two aspects of 
experience and knowledge. Namely intuition (sensibility) and 
concepts (understanding). Arendt explains that the "intuition 
always gives us something particular; the concept makes this 
particular known to us" (Arendt 1982:80). For example, if one 
says "this book", it is as though the intuition says "this" and 
the understanding adds "book". The "this" pertains to a specific 
entity or item, while "book" identifies the item and makes the 
object communicable. Arendt asks: How do the two faculties come 
together? Kant's answer is that the synthesis of the manifold 
occurs through the imagination which unites the elements into a 
certain content. This synthetic unity occurs through the image or 
"schema" which the imagination provides "for the concept". Thus, 
for Kant, the imagination is the "faculty of synthesis in 
general" (Arendt 1982:81). Arendt holds that without the 
"schema", one would not be able to recognize anything in the 
manifold of things since everything would be a "this". The 
important aspect which she wants to stress is that particulars 
are communicable. She asks, what makes particulars communicable? 
The answer is that in perceiving a particular entity everyone has 
a schema of the entity in their "mind's eye" as it were. This 
schema is then characteristic of many particulars. The schemata 
which each person holds are the products of the synthetic 
imagination. No schema can be brought to the fore in and of 
itself. All agreement and disagreements must then pre-suppose 
that the communicators are speaking about the same thing, such 
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that we who are many, come "together on something that is the 
same for all" (Arendt 1982:83). This interpretation of Kant's 
work in a communicative frame of reference is extended in the 
analysis of reflective judgement, as follows: Arendt highlights 
the fact that determinate judgements subsume a particular under a 
general rule, while reflective judgement in contrast, "derives 
the rule from the particular" (1982:83). Thiough the schema, one 
perceives a universal in the particular, Arendt argues. Through 
the example, in reflective judgement one rises from the 
particular to the universal. This requires an enlargement of 
mind or as Arendt puts it an "enlarged mentality." Exemplary 
validity is achieved through the appropriate choice of the 
example. Arendt asks after the standards of the operation of 
reflection, and Kant's answer, she points out, is that of 
"approbation and disapprobation~ (Arendt 1982:69). In other words 
the formal declaration of approval or disapproval, the "Yes/ No" 
response of the subject. The criterion of judgement is its 
communicability and the standard of judgement is common sense. 
' Arendt follows Kant in her understanding of common sense as 
"community sense". This community sense is never private since 
one· judges as a member of a cornmuni ty. This requires an "enlarged 
mentality" whereby one's imagination and representative thinking 
enables one to "think in the place of everybody else", Arendt 
argues (1982:69). Judgements are made public. Through a process 
of "wooing" the consent of others, one strives for an agreement 
or validation through public debate. 
In sum: 
Judgements come into their own under conditions of crisis. 
Through the creative ability of the imagination one is able to 
raise the particular to the anticipated universal or general 
opinion of mankind and say "Yes" or "No" to the opinion 
expressed. The formal declaration of approval is validated to 
the extent to which it can be publicly discussed and argued for, 
through present~ng reasons for the "Yes/No" response to the 
example. One can only "woo" or "court" the agreement of others, 
Arendt argues. Here understanding and judgement are co-terminus 
and one creates meaning in a utilitarian world. Arendt holds that 
without judgment in terms of which the world is rendered 
intelligible, 
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"the space of appearance would simply collapse. For it is by 
constantly pronouncing judgements that we are able to make 
sense of the world and ourselves. If we forfeited our 
faculty of judgement, through love or diffidence, we would 
be sure to lose our bearings in the world" 
(Arendt 1982:101) 
The power of judgement for Arendt is grounded on the potential 
I 
agreement between communicators. The dialogue, central to 
reflective judgment, is understood as an anticipated 
communication with others with whom one must ultimately come to 
an agreement. Opinion and judgement are held to be the most 
important rational faculties of man which have been neglected in 
philosophical and political thought, she notes. Habermas refines 
these ideas into a formal understanding of communicative ethics. 
These schematic aspects of Arendt's -work can be seen to inform 
his approach to modernity and the question of communicative 
rationality. I address the manner in which Habermas re-formulates 
the concept of rationality now that the Perspective of Action, 
Judgement and Life-World are in focus. 
4.3 The Foundations of Critical Theory 
4.3.1 Critique, Reflection~and Science as Rational 
Reconstruction 
In response to Rudiger Bubner's critique 
reflection in "Knowledge and Human 
distinguishes between: 
of the concepts of 
Intere~ts", Habermas 
"self-reflection in the sense of critique and self-
reflection in the sense of universalistically orientated 
rational reconstruction.(1982:229) 
"Universalistically orientat~d rational reconstructions", pertain 
to the reflection upon universal and anonymous systems of rules 
which are implicit or pre-supposed to be operative in the daily 
. 
activities of men,· Habermas explains. The reconstr~ctive 
sciences explicate the implicit "know-how" or "deep structures" 
which are the conditions for the possibility of life activities. 
In contrast to transcendental philosophy, the reconstructive 
sciences are based on the premise that the anonymous rule systems 
are not a-historical, but evolve in the vertical and horizontal 
direction in the self-formative processes of the human species. 
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The self-formative processes are understood as learning processes 
which develop in the evolution of mankind. The reconstructive 
sciences as the investigation into the possibility of universal 
rules below surface structures~ is the interest domain of 
numerous social scientists. Scholars such as Von Humboldt, 
Chomsky, Levi- Strauss and Piaget hold that there are universals, 
or more princely deep structures underlying linguistic, cultural 
and cognitive phenomena, respectively. Habermas orientates 
himself to these sciences. He indicates that rational 
reconstruction is different in kind from the transcendental 
orientation of Apel where the experience and logical deduction 
are clearly separated. Habermas holds that Piaget and Chomsky in 
contrast to Apel, demonstrate that there is a close relation 
between formal and empirical analysis. He notes that if one 
renounces the idea of a transcendental subject, constitutive of 
knowledge, it is more appropriate to speak of deep and surface 
structures. This is the sense in which the systems of rules are 
understood. Habermas defines rational reconstruction as follows: 
"Rational reconstructions ••• deal with anonymous rule systems 
which any subjects whatsoever can comply with insofar as 
they have acquired the corresponding competence with 
respect to these rules"( 1971:23) 
The rule competence is understood as a developmental learning 
process which subjects acquire as they mature at the individual 
level of analysis and develop collectively on the societal level 
of analysis. Habermas embarks upon an extensive and complex 
research programme of science as rational reconstruction on three 
levels of analysis. Influenced by the work of Ryle, Chomsky, 
Piaget, Strawson, Austin, Searle, Frege and Alston, Habermas 
develops a general theory of communicative action in linguistic 
terms named Universal Pragmatics. Universal Pragmatics aims at 
explicating the "universal conditions of possible understanding" 
(Habermas 1972:1976). The theory of Universal Pragmatics serves 
as a foundation upon which the next level of analysis, a general 
theory of socialization, stands. This is understood as the 
investigation into the acquisition of "communicative competence" 
at the level of ego and moral development. Once again the work of 
Piaget is thematic. Piaget and Kohlberg, the substantive 
scholars of genetic epistemology and moral 
interpreted in terms of the notion 
development, are 
of "unimpaired 
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intersubjectivity" in the theory of communicative competence. In 
"Knowledge and Human Interests", Habermas relied on a concept of 
ego strength as a counterpart to the progress in the empirical 
analytical sciences. He argued that as the sciences advance, 
surplus repression is potentially reduced, and if the ego is 
strong, the potential for the rational constitution of normative 
structures is released. Through the critique of oppressive norms 
and traditions, men attempt to actualise the ideals of justice, 
freedom, equality and happiness. This normative aspect of 
reflective critique is indicated in the early work but is not 
clarified beyond the level of suggestion. In the theory of 
communicative competence, Habermas 
normative basis of critical theory. 
as critique 
sets out to clarify this 
He holds that if reflection 
"accepts as its task the explanation of a systematically 
distorted communication, then it must have mastery of the 
idea of undistorted communication" (Habermas 1980:328). 
Thus reflection in the sense of critique is 
unmasking 
rational 
distorted forms 
reconstruction 
of communication. 
orientated towards 
Reflection as 
the normative aims at clarifying 
foundation to which reflection as critique appeals in this 
process·. Habermas points out that if the ideal of undistorted 
identity formation and moral development can be rationally 
reconstructed, this 
"normative content can then be incorporated in the empirical 
theories and the proposed reconstruction of this content 
can be opened up to indirect testing "(1979:73). 
He holds that moral development and identity formation encompass 
their own "inner logic" which is not reducible to the logic of 
the paradigm of production as Marx thought. At this level of 
analysis rational reconstruction asks after the conditions for 
the possibility of unimpaired intersubjectivity. The work of 
Piaget, Kohlberg and Ryle is appropriated from this perspective 
of unimpaired intersubjectivity. The third level of analysis is 
that of a reconstruction of historical materialism as a theory 
of social evolution. Habermas makes a startling claim in this 
context that rational reconstruction means 
"taking a theory apart and then putting it back together 
again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal 
which it has set for itself" ( 1979:96). 
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What this amounts to is a description of the "homologies" which 
pertain between ego development and the evolution of world-views; 
"homologies" between ego identity and "social-identity". The 
guiding thread in this analysis is the question of 
intersubjective understanding. Social evolution is described as a 
learning process which occurs through the underlying rules of 
competence in two dimensions. Namely the cognitive/technical and 
the moral/practical forms of rationality which are embodied in 
institutions and social structures pertaining to these spheres. 
The goal which Marx set himself was that of explicating the 
dynamic of change. Habermas indicates quite clearly that he is 
merely describing a possible research strategy through the use of 
homologous sets of information. 
the developmental logic of 
This investigation is limited to 
normative structures which are 
described. The dynamics of social change in Marx's sense is not 
dealt with. The definition of rational reconstruction in this 
case is then defective since it does not "attain the goal which 
it has set for itself" (Habermas 1976:96). 
The key· to the extensive and complex sets of rational 
reconstructions is the theory of Universal Pragmatics. For 
Habermas, Universal Pragmatics is the normativ~ foundation of 
critical theory. I now briefly indicate the central concepts of 
Universal Pragmatics. Habermas says: 
"What raises us out of nature is the o~ly thing whose nature 
we can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and 
responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence 
expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and 
unconstrained consensus" ( 1972:314). 
The goal of Universal Pragmatics is that of explicating the 
universal conditions for the possibility of unconstrained 
consensus. Habermas understands speech as a form of action, as 
"doing things in saying something", thus once again according 
priority to human action over contemplation (Austin cited in 
Habermas 1976:156). He defines a speech act as the the smallest 
unit or utterance which is comprehens~ble to at least two actors 
in communication with one another. Universal Pragmatics is the 
reconstruction of the rules which adult speakers master -
implicitly in utterances. In the speech act speakers 
automatically establish an interpersonal relationship with one 
another on the basis of four universal validity claims which can 
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be redeemed. The four validity claims are: 
1. Comprehensibility: The speaker "must" chose a comprehensible 
utterance such that speaker and listener are able to 
understand one another. When an obtuse expression is employed 
the intent is not understanding but rather deception. For 
Habermas, deceptive or manipulative modes of communication are 
parasitic upon the implicit assumption of communication 
orientated toward understanding. Thus the speaker in a 
deceptive form of communication, oriented to strategic 
success, pre-supposes that the listener is orientated toward 
the goal of understanding when the distorted form of 
communication is initiated. 
2. Propositional Truth: The speaker must communicate a true 
utterance. 
3. Truthfulness of Intent: The speaker must express his 
intentions in an authentic manner such that the listener can 
believe him and mutual trust is established. 
4. Normative Rightness: The speaker must choose an utterance 
which is appropriate to the communicatively recognized 
normative background. 
When any one of these implicit claims to vaiidity are not 
operative consensus breaks down, and the conditions for the 
possibility of understanding and _meaning are abrogated. Habermas 
connects the concepts of understanding and meaning through 
validity claims as follows: 
"Universal Pragmatics can be understood as semantic 
analysis. But it is distinguished from other theories of 
meaning in that the meanings of linguistic expressions are 
relevant only insofar as they contribute to speech acts 
that satisfy the validity claims of truth, truthfulness 
and normative rightness ( 1979:31) 
Thus one can only understand the meaning of a speech act to the 
extent that the implicit claims to validity: truth, truthfulness 
and normative rightness, are operative. Actors in turn are 
accorded with communicative competence to the extent that they 
employ these implicit validity claims. The breakdown of consensus 
is redeemed in a special form of communication named "discourse" 
where all extraneous motives, except that of the co-operative 
search for truth, are excluded. Habermas holds that through the 
process of argumentation, reasons are given for the acceptance 
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or rejection of a particular validity claim. Thus consensus 
formation has a rational basis in the discourse situation. Here 
the presupposition is that "the structure of the communication 
excludes all force 
(Habermas 1984:25). 
except 
This is 
"ideal speech situation" 
the force 
the first 
which is 
of the better argument" 
pre-supposition of the 
applicable to theoretical 
and practical discourse. In theoretical discourse, "rationally 
motivated" consensus is striven for through the discursive 
redemption of the validity claim to truth (Habermas 1884:25). In 
practical discourse, normativ·e claims are the focus of rational 
deliberation. The ideal speech situation encompasses four 
conditions which facilitate a "rationally motivated consensus" 
which is arrived at if the argument is continued for long enough. 
The four conditions of the ideal speech situation are: 
1. Each speaker must have an equal opportunity in the initiation 
and continuation of the discourse. 
2. Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to participate in 
the discourse via the distribution of chances to challenge, 
justify and discuss the issue at hand. 
These two conditions are called the conditions of symmetry. 
3. Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to express 
intentions, feelings, needs and wishes. 
4. Each speaker must assume responsibility for commitments made 
in the discourse and expect others to be accountable for 
their positions. 
Conditions three and four are the conditions of reciprocity. Thus 
the Enlightenment ideals of equality and responsibility are built 
into the theory of Universal Pragmatics via the ideal speech 
situation. I now analyse the concept of rationality in relat~on 
to the theory of Universal Pragmatics, Judgement and life-world. 
4.3.2 The Concept Rationality in Relation to the Theory of 
Universal Pragmatics, Judgement and Life-World 
4.3.2.1 The Concept Communicative Rationality in Abstract Form 
Habermas opens his account of the concept of rationality in "The 
Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society" (1984) by indicating its relat~on to the concept of 
knowledge. He states that when one uses the expression "rational" 
one assumes that there is a close connection between knowledge 
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and rationality. Knowledge is viewed as having a propositional 
structure and is presented in the form of statements. He assumes 
this minimal definition of knowledge. He demonstrates the 
relationship between the concept rationality and two forms of 
knowledge usage. He compares a cognitive-instrumental concept of 
rationality with communicative concept of rationality. The 
cognitive-instrumentalist concept of rationality pertains to the 
descriptive employment of knowledge, and the communicative 
concept of rationality pertains to a communicative and reflective 
use of knowledge. If one assesses teleological forms of action, 
the cognitive concept of rationality represents a form of 
rationality pertaining to the means and ends of action. If one 
assumes a communicative stance, the concept of communicative 
rationality is based on the conditions for the possibility of 
unconstrained consensus, Habermas argues. These two approaches to 
action, action as a means to an end and communicative action 
orientated toward unconstrained consensus, then have a direct 
bearing on the concept of rationality as follows: Assuming two 
subjects, A and B, have at their disposal an identical stock of 
knowledge. A uses his knowledge in communicative manner and B 
uses his knowledge in a instrumental manner. In communication 
with at least one other subject, A makes an assertion, p. Here 
the relationship between the utterance and the facts constitute 
the conditions for the possibility of an understanding between 
participants about events which occur in the world. The utterance 
is constituted as rational only insofar as: 
1. The speaker raises a validity claim, "it is true that p", 
with regard to his utterance. 
2. The speaker substantiates the claim to the validity of his 
utterance with reasons. 
B, the isolated actor, selects a means that he regards, on the 
basis qf his belief p, is suitable to achieve an end or effect. 
Here the relationship between the rule of action and the fact 
constitutes the conditions for the possibility of an intervention 
in the world. The rationality of the action is constituted by a 
plan which implies the truth of p. In the communicative case, the 
assertion is named rational only if the actor satisfies the 
necessary conditions for the goal of reaching understanding about 
something in the world. The goal-directed action of B is named 
rational only if the actor satisfies the "conditions for 
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realizing his intention to intervene successfully in the 
world" (Habermas 1984:11). What Habermas is attempting to 
highlight is that the same kind of knowledge can be used in two 
different ways and exhibits two different forms of rationality. 
Communicative rationality and cognitive-instrumental rationality. 
Cognitive-instrumental rationality has an internal "telos" which 
is the instrumental mastery of the external environment. 
Communicative rationality aims at communicative understanding 
about a world shared with others. The instrumentalist assumes 
that the world is "the sum total of what is the case"(Habermas 
1984:11). This assumption enables the instrumentalist to specify 
the rules of action which in turn constitute the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of a rational intervention in the 
world. The communicative actor assumes a reflective orientation 
since he "reflects on the fact that those who behave rationally 
must themselves presuppose an objective world." (Habermas 
1984:11). The communicative actor asks after the conditions 
under which the objective world is constituted by acting and 
speaking members of a community. In this case the abstract notion 
of an "objective world" is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of reaching understanding among communicative actors 
about 
"what takes place in the world or is to be effected in 
it. Through this communicative practice they assure 
themselves at the same time of their common life-relations, 
of an intersubjectively shared life-world. This lifeworld 
is bounded by the totality of interpretations pre-supposed 
by the members as background knowledge. To elucidate the 
concept of rationality the phenomenologist must then 
examine the conditions for communicatively achieved 
consensus: he must analyse what Melvin Pollner calls, with 
reference to Alfred Schutz, mundane reasoning." 
(Habermas 1984:13) 
Habermas cites Poll~er who adopts a phenomenological rather than 
a descriptive approach to the concept of rationali~y. The mundane 
reasoner, Pollner explains, functions within a life-world shared 
with others. The community of actors orientate themselves toward 
a world which is held to be constant, known and knowable in 
common with others. This enables actors to ask questions of a 
specific kind of which the "prototypical representative is: "How 
175 
come, he sees it and you do not?" (Pollner cited in Habermas 
1986:13). Habermas points out that the phenomenologist adopts a 
communicative stance and that in this model, 
"rational expressions have the character of meaningful 
actions, intelligible in their context, through which the 
actor relates to something in the objective world. The 
conditions of validity of symbolic expressions refer to a 
background knowledge intersubjectively shared by the 
communication community." (1986:13) 
Here Habermas introduces a concept of reflection which he has 
such difficulty with in "Knowledge and Human Interests", in a 
simple and direct manner. He merely states that the 
phenomenologist reflects upon the notion of an objective world 
and that the realist takes it for granted that the world is a 
totality of facts which exist in reality. Reflection is now 
simply stated as a pre-supposition of the phenomenologist. 
Habermas points out that the realist is limited to the conditions 
of devising means and ends which are then the conditions of 
rational action which "have the character of goal-directed, 
feedback-controlled intervention in the world of existing states 
of affairs" (1984:12). Here Habermas is making use of the 
concept of instrumental rationality which he develops in 
"Knowledge and Human Interests" under the investigation of 
Peirce's work. He equates this concept of instrumental 
rationality with the "realist's" orientation. The interest, 
constitutive of knowledge, is ignored in this new analysis of the 
concept instrumental rationality. Habermas points out that for 
the realist, the concept "rational", can only be appended to 
statements about states of affairs. This approach to knowledge 
usage results in a "figurative" concept of rationality. For 
example the realist speaks of the "rationality of the simulated 
response; the rationality of the systems change in state; 
rationality of boundary maintenance" (Habermas 1984:12). This 
"figurative" use of the concept rationality is avoided through a 
phenomenological approach. The conditions for the possibility of 
rational action are then.not reduced to mere attributes which the 
scientist appends to statements about phenomena studied. Habermas 
holds that the concept rationality, attributed to the actions of 
a subject, can be grounded through the subject, who provides his 
reasons for his actions' under "suitable conditions" (1984:13). 
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For Habermas, the concept rationality is grounded in the 
discourse situation. Central to the notion of grounding, is the 
theory of argumentation in which the theory of judgement, in 
Arendt's sense, is located. I first want to develop Habermas' 
concept of communicative rationality in isolation from the 
details of the argumentation theory. The concepts of 
responsibility and autonomy need to be located along the way 
before the grounding question can be dealt with more fully. I 
return to the sequence of the argument. Habermas_points out that 
the cognitive-instrumental concept of rationality can be 
accommodated in a broader communications concept of rationality. 
The subject can view the world from the perspective of the 
manipulation of things and events, on the one hand, and from 
man's "capacity for reaching intersubjective understanding about 
things and events", on the other hand (1984:15). He invokes 
Piaget's notion of a decentered orientation to the world and the 
self. Habermas points out that the contrast between a decentered 
and monological approach to the world is clearly visible when one 
attempts to employ a traditional realist model to accommodate 
concepts like autonomy and responsibility in the depiction of 
rational action. The argument proceeds as follows: "Only 
responsible persons can behave rationally" (Habermas 1984:14). 
From the perspective of monological intervention in the world, 
rationality is measured in terms of the success of goal directed 
intervention in the manipulable world. Here the only criterion of 
responsibility and rationality is the choice of means among 
alternatives in order to control the environment. This screens 
out the concept of rationality which is measured in terms of 
success in reaching understanding. From the decentered 
perspective of communicative action, only persons who orientate 
their actions in terms of intersubjectively recognized validity 
claims, claims to truth, truthfulness, comprehensibility and 
normative rightness, are held to be responsible. From the 
communicative or phenomenological perspective, two different 
concepts of autonomy and responsibility are thematic. These 
concepts can in turn be co-ordinated with the two concepts of 
rationality. Cognitive-instrumental rationality can be viewed as 
realizing a form of autonomy, or more precisely, independence 
from the contingencies of the external environment. Here the 
actor's self-assertion against the forces of the external nature 
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increases to the extent that he behaves rationally in a goal 
directed fashion. Thus the increase in cognitive-instrumental 
rationality results in an increase in autonomy of a specific 
kind. An increase in communicative rationality on the other hand 
results in a form of autonomy where the scope for 
"unconstrained coordination of action and the consensual 
resolution of conflicts" is increased. (Habermas 1984:15). When 
the coginitive-instrumental concept of rationality is included 
into the broader perspective of communicative action, the actor 
can be seen to be behaving rationally not only in terms of the 
success of his means-ends relations with regard to external 
nature, but ~lso in terms of his intersubjective relations with 
other actors. The communicative actor puts forward an assertion 
in terms of his means-ends orientation. This is then vindicated 
through discussion and the necessary evidence is supplied to 
ground his cognitive-instrumental action. From the communicative 
perspective a second aspect of his rational action, namely the 
normative, also becomes thematic. He acts in cognitive-
instrumental fashion within a given social context of the 
life-world, and hence is also following established norms of 
action and is able "when criticized, to justify his action by 
explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate 
expectations." (Habermas 1984:15). From the communicative 
perspective, cognitive-instrumental action is only held to be 
rational and responsible action when both dimensions of action, 
the normative and empirical, are vindicated through debate and 
feedback from reality. Habermas is here clearly indicating that 
norms are subject to rational grounding through the process of 
discussion, where reasons supporting the legitimacy/illegitimacy 
of social norms become thematic. Habermas hastens to point out 
that one calls another rational when he makes his desires, 
intentions, needs and feelings known, since he is then able to 
"reassure critics in regard to the revealed experience and by 
drawing practical conclusions from it and behaving consistently 
thereafter" (1984:15). Normatively regtilated action and the 
expressive modes of self-presentation are then also constitutive 
of the concept of communicative rationality, Habermas argues. 
Here the world that the subject relates to is not that of the 
external environment but rather his own subjective world and the 
social world which he shares with others. Habermas argues that 
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expressions are meaningful and can be seen as rational to the 
extent that they are connected with the criticizable validity 
claims which pertain not only to facts, but to norms and 
subjective experiences as well. He emphasises that the 
"possibility of· intersubjective recognition of criticizable 
validity claims is constitutive for their rationality too" 
(1984:16). He draws the threads of the forms of action together 
and says: 
"actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations 
and also evaluative expressions, supplement constative 
speech acts in constituting a communicative practice, which 
against the background of a life-world, is orientated to 
achieving, sustaining and renewing consensus - and indeed a 
consensus which rests on the intersubjective recognition of 
criticizable validity claims. The rationality inherent in 
this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively 
achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons" 
(Habermas 1984:17 emphasis in text.) 
The crucial question then is: How are these reasons grounded? 
Habermas' answer is that the final "court of appeal" is the 
theory of argumentation (1974:17). He makes this crucial point as 
follows: 
"the rationality proper to the communicative practice of 
everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a 
court of appeal that makes it possible to continue 
communicative action with other means when disagreements can 
no longer be repaired with every-day routines and yet are 
not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force. 
For this reason I believe that the concept of communicative 
rationality, which refers to an unclarified systematic 
interconnection of universal validity claims, can be 
adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of 
argumentation" (1984:18 emphasis mine.) 
The theory of argumentation is based upon the communicative 
theory of Judgement. I now show how Habermas achieves this. 
4.3.2.2 Communicative Rationality in Relation To Communicative 
Judgement 
Through the theory of 
systematically relating the 
argumentation, Habermas aims at 
concept of communicative rationality 
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to the universal validity claims developed in the theory of 
Universal Pragmatics. In the final analysis this amounts to an 
interpretation of argumentation as a form of communicative 
judgement. The contours of the argument are as follows: 
Habermas understands the argumentation process as a special form 
of "speech-action" in which the participants raise validity 
claims which are contested, and then attempt to vindicate them 
through argument (Habermas 1984:18). Central to this process is 
the premise that the "strength" of the argument is an indication 
of the "soundness" of the reasons posed (1984:19). Habermas holds 
that the "strength" of the argument can be judged by the extent 
to which it convinces the participants with regard to the 
contested validity claim raised. The rationality of the 
participants is also judged from this background via the manner 
in which they respond. Those who are "deaf" to the argument and 
answer in a dogmatic fashion are judged as being unable to deal 
with the argumentation process in a rational manner. Those who 
behave rationally in this context exhibit a "willingness to 
expose themselves to criticism", present reasons for their 
position on a particular validity claim, and learn from mistakes 
made (Habermas 1984:18). Habermas indicates the relationship 
between learning and grounding as follows: 
"The concept of grounding is interwoven with that of 
learning. Argumentation plays an important role in learning 
processes as well. Thus we call a person rational who, in 
the cognitive-instrumental sphere, expresses reasonable 
opinions and acts efficiently; but this rationality remains 
accidental if it is not coupled with the ability to learn 
from mistakes, from the refutation of hypotheses and from 
the failure of interventions." (1984:18 emphasis in text) 
Grounding for Habermas is never absolute but pre-supposes a 
thesis of fallibility which he learnt from Peirce and Popper. 
Thus the reasons presented in the argumentation process are 
always open to correction. This is tied to learning processes in 
the argument situation and to the feedback from interventions in 
the world (4). The argumentation process takes place in the 
discourse situation. Habermas distinguishes between theoretical 
former truth claims are thematic and practical discourse. In the 
and in the latter claims to normative rightness are thematic. 
the conditions stipulated in the Argumentation occurs under 
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"ideal speech" situation in which the conditions of symmetry and 
recipro~ity pertain (5). Through the conditions of symmetry and 
reciprocity, the ideals of equality and responsibility are 
built into the discourse situation as the conditions under which 
arguments ~ake place. In his discussion of practical or moral 
discourse, Habermas sharply distinguishes between norms and 
values. He argues one can speak of the universal norms of 
mankind in general. The universal norms which he subscribes to 
are truth, justice, equality, autonomy, responsibility and" 
happiness. Values on the other hand are held to be culturally 
specific and are then not accepted as pertaining to all men in 
general. Habermas states his position with regard to norms and 
values as follows: 
"cultural values do not appear with a claim to universality, 
as do norms of action. At most, values are candidates for 
interpretations under which a circle of those affected can, 
if occasion arises, describe and normatively regulate a 
common interest. The circle of intersubjective recognition 
that forms around cultural values does not yet in any way 
imply a claim that they would meet with general assent. For 
this reason arguments that serve to justify standards of 
value do not satisfy the conditions of discourse."( 1984:20) 
Only norms fulfil the conditions of argumentation in the 
discourse situation since Universal Pragmatics is orientat~d 
toward the implicit rule competencies which all subjects 
possess. Thus universal norms can be systematically related to 
universal conditions of communicative competence if a thesis of 
general or universal interest is stipulated. Norms of action are 
understood at this level of analysis as pertaining to the 
"general" or "common interests" of mankind as such (Habermas 
1984:20). Values fall under arguments which are called "aesthetic 
criticism". Habermas argues that aesthetic forms of criticism 
pertaining to art, literature, and music for example, entail 
reasons which 
"guide perception and render the authenticity of the work so 
evident that this aesthetic experience can itself become a 
rational basis for accepting the corresponding standards of 
value" (1984:20). 
He holds that aesthetic criticism thus encompasses a form of 
aesthetic rationality (6). Habermas then develops a critique of 
• 
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the work of Steven Toulmin and Wolfgang Klein on argumentation 
theory in order to point out the weaknesses of their positions 
and to provide ~ c6ntrast against which his grounding of 
communicative rationality can be seen. Klein's work is·read as an 
empiricist approach to argumentation which is limited to 
description. Toulmin adopts an historico-philosophical approach. 
Klein's work exhibits the following errors, Habermas argues: 
!.Klein adopts the perspective of an observer who describes but 
does not judge the reasons presented in arguments. Thus one 
argument is just as good as the next. The "strength" of the 
argument in Habermas' sense is then not taken into account. 
2.Klein limits the validity of arguments to propositional truth 
and causal regularity. The concept of rationality is confused 
with the concept of causality. Habermas invokes his own concept 
of consensus formation and the achievement of rationally 
motivated agreement as an alternative to Klein's position. 
3. Klein's theory lacks a concept of rationality which is able 
to account for the difference between what is valid "for 
them", the participants in an argument, and what is valid "for 
us", the social scientists studying argumentation processes, 
Habermas argues (1984:35). 
4. Klein 
the 
times" 
limits his work to 
questionable are 
(Habermas 1984:28) 
relativism in which "the valid and 
thus relative to persons and 
Habermas' conclusions with regard to Toulmin's theory of 
argumentation are as follows: 
1.Toulmin's theory of argumentation is superior to that of Klein 
in that he depicts a "plurality of validity claims" which occur 
in different "fields" of social endeavour (Habermas 1984:31). 
The fields investigated are medicine, art, science, politics 
and law. 
2.Toulmin does not distinguish between the logical and empirical 
levels of analysis. Therefore he is unable to distinguish 
between the conditions for the possibility of discursively 
redeeming validity claims and the empirical occurrences of 
claims to validity. Toulmin realizes that forms of rationality 
must be judged by the researcher but he is not able to 
articulate this adequately. He argues for an "impartial 
stand-point of rational judgement" (Habermas 1984:35). Toulmin 
realizes that this stand-point cannot be arbitrary. He adopts 
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a Hegelian notion of absolute reason as a synthetic concept of 
rationality underlying argumentation. Habermas calls this-an 
attempt to achieve a form of "conceptually appropriating the 
human species collective enterprise of reason, as Hegel did for 
the Phenomenology" (Habermas 1984:34). He does not realize that 
the thesis of a "universal audience" would remedy this error, 
Habermas points out (Habermas 1984:36). 
3.Toulmin attempts to understand the discursive redemption of 
validity claims in the various fields which he assesses. The 
forms of argument in these fields are explained in terms of the 
functions which they perform in each field. Toulmin is not able 
to relate the different forms of argument into a unified theory 
of argumentation. He thus depicts collection of different 
forms of argument, despite his Hegelian intentions. 
Habermas holds that both of these theories of argumentation are 
limited to the mean-ends or instrumental concept of rationality. 
The theme which runs through Habermas' critique of these two 
theories of argumentation is that of judgement. The researcher is 
required to judge in order to distinguish the "strength" of 
arguments. This then enables him to indicate which arguments are 
rationally binding. An approach which is able to articulate the 
participant/observer perspectives is suggested by Habermas. Both 
scholars fail to articulate a universal and its relation to the 
particular. The second theme is that of a means-ends form of 
rationality which both scholars display in their understanding of 
the rationality internal to arguments. Thus a communicative 
concept of rationality is not considered in these theories of 
argumentation. The third theme is that of a "universal audience" 
which neither scholars include in their frame of reference. 
Habermas does not appropriate any aspects of these ·scholars' 
work. He introduces his view of argumentation by saying: 
"A considerable burden of proof is placed upon the theory of 
argumentation; it has to be in a position to specify a 
system of validity claims" (1984:38) 
He then grounds his concept of communicative rationality in the 
"system of validity" claims as follows: 
1. A validity claim, with regard to an utterance, is raised by a 
speaker in communication with a listener. 
2. Normally this occurs implicitly 
3. In uttering a sentence, the speaker raises a validity claim, 
' I 
• 
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which, if it is made explicit, can be seen to take one of the 
the following forms: 
"It is true that "p" ••• "p" represents a proposition. 
"It is right that "a" ••. "a" represents a description of action 
"I mean what I say when I here and now utter "s" •••• 
"s" represents a first person sentence (Habermas 1984:38). 
4. Thus "a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion 
that the conditions for the validity o{ an utterance are 
fulfilled" (1984:38 emphasis in text). What he means is that 
a validity claim (the particular) can be seen as an utterance 
(speech act). When it's underlying form is made explicit, it 
can be seen to accord with the universal conditions for the 
validity of utterances which he spells out in the theory of 
Universal Pragmatics. 
truth; truthfulness 
These 
of 
conditions are: propositional 
intent, comprehensibility and 
normative rightness. Thus, whenever a validity claim is 
rais~d, it implicitly or explicitly takes the form of: xis 
'true; y is right; bis what I intend by zr I mean x1 , x 2 
and x 3 when I say X~ He points out in the theory of 
Universal Pragmatics that when these implicit claims to 
validity are not operative, consensus breaks down and the 
conditions for the possibility of understanding and meaning 
are abrogated. 
5. Habermas connects the universal forms of validity claims to 
Arendt' s communications theory of Judgement. He s_tresses that 
when a validity claim is implicitly or explicitly raised, the 
listener, ONLY has the choice of accepting, rejecting or 
leaving the validity claim "undecided for the time 
being"(Habermas 1984:38). The "permissible reactions [in the 
argumentation processes] then are taking a "Yes" or "No" 
position or abstaining"(Habermas 1984:38 emphasis mine). Here 
Habermas is linking the conditions for the possibility of 
communicative action with one of the "standards" of 
reflective judgement. Namely, that of "approbation and 
disapprobation" (Arendt 1982:69). In other words the formal 
declaration of approval or disapproval, the "Yes/No" responses 
of subjects participating in communicative judgement, are the 
only permissible reactions open to communicators in 
argumentation, Habermas holds. Thus the formal declaration of 
approval or disapproval, which Arendt sees as a standard 
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of Kant's view of reflective judgement, is a central tenet of 
Habermas' argument for grounding communicative rationality. 
6. He then goes on to explain that not every "Yes/No" response 
can be viewed as taking a position on a validity claim.If one 
names "imperatives, normatively unauthorized demands, then 
a "Yes/No" response on such demands amounts to either 
complying with, or refusing to comply with, the will of 
anotherfl (1984:38). Habermas holds that "Yes/No" responses to 
imperatives are arbitrary choices and reactions to power 
claims. "Yes/No" response to validity claims, means for 
Habermas, that the 
"hearer says "Yes" or "No" to a criticizable expression and 
does so in the light of reasons or grounds; such.positions 
are the expression of insight or understanding." 
(1984:38 emphasis in text). 
Here Habermas, like Arendt, unites communicative judgement 
with the concept of understanding. Thus if one judges, one 
takes a "Yes/No" stance on a claims to truth, truthfulness of 
intent,- comprehensibility and normative rightness, which are 
implicit in utterances, and one does so in the light of 
reasons .• These judgments reveal one's capacity for 
understanding and communicative rationality. This is the 
"core" of Habermas' concept of communicative rationality. 
Internal to the notion that one reveals ones understanding and 
communicative rationality through communicative judgement, are 
two important connections which Habermas makes between 
communicative judgement and the 'theory of Universal 
Pragmatics. The first connection is at the level of learning 
and knowledge and the second is at the level of meaning and 
understanding. 
4.3.2.3 Communicative Judgement, Universal Pragmatics, 
Learning and Knowledge 
Arendt points out that anothe_r standard of judgement is common 
sense or opinion and that the criterion of judgement is 
communicability. Communicability requires an "enlarged mentality" 
such that one "think~ in the place of everybody else." (AFendt 
1982:69). Through the process of "wooing" the consent of others 
validation is striven for. Habermas argues that: 
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"arguments are the means by which intersubjective 
recognition of a proponent's hypothetically raised 
validity claim can be brought about and opinion thereby 
transformed into knowledge." (1984:24 emphasis mine) 
Habermas, in contrast to Arendt, aims at cogent arguments which 
are supported by reasons. He thus moves beyond the level of 
opinion in his appropriation of this aspect of communicative 
judgement. He connects the two central premises, universal 
validity claims and the "Yes/No" stance which hearers and 
speakers must take on validity claims, to two concepts, learning 
and knowledge. He holds that "grounding is interwoven with 
learning" (1984:18). The concept of rationality remains 
arbitrary if intersubjective recognition of opinions and 
hypotheses does not occur. Intersubjective recognition is as 
essential to Habermas' concept of communicative rationality as 
the recognition which occurs between master and serf in Hegel's 
dialectic of consciousness. There is a fundamental difference 
between the concept of recognition held by Hegel in comparison to 
the concept of recognition held by Habermas. Habermas' 
concept of intersubjective recognition 
reflective communicative judgement. 
is understood in terms of 
Hegel's concept of 
recognition is understood as reflective consciousness. For Hegel 
and the tradition of philosophy ranging from Descartes to 
Husserl and from Feuerbach to Adorno, the philosophy of 
reflection stems from the model of the self. Reflection is 
understood in terms of a solitary self which reflects upon 
itself; as one consciousness facing another consciousness and as 
one consciousness facing nature and re-appropriating and 
actively transforming nature (Benhabib 1984:242-243). Benhabib, 
following Habermas, calls this tradition the philosophy of 
consciousness. Habermas initiates a paradigm shift from 
philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of language. 
this 
The 
emphasis changes from a focus upon consciousness and the various 
attempts to depict reflective consciousness to a focus upon 
communicative action. Habermas employs· the philosophy of language 
to clarify his view of action understood as speech-acts or 
utterances. The approach changes from a focus which proceeds 
from the consciousness of an active self facing the consciousness 
of anther self and the inter-consciousness of men in general, to 
that which proceeds from my utterances to your utterances and the 
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validity of these speach-acts. For Habermas reflective, 
communicative judgement is the crucial concept in terms of the 
recognition of valid speech-acts is achieved. I return to the 
sequence of the discussion on grounding. The notion of 
intersubjective recognition in the argumentation process serves 
to raise mere opinion to knowledge which is discursively redeemed 
in the discourse situation. Discourses, for Habermas, are the 
medium in which controversial validity claims are made thematic. 
Thus the cognitive-instrumental rationality of scientists is 
grounded when controversial statements are subjected to 
discussion whereby the claims to the truth of statements are 
ratified and recognized as valid by the communicators. Consensus 
can "in principle" be achieved if the discussion is continued for 
long enough. The voice of Peirce is palpable here. Habermas 
realizes that this is an "ideal proviso" but he holds that it is 
one which is not arbitrary and is rooted in the very nature of 
communicative rationality which aims at understanding. Thus 
Habermas sharpens Arendt's criterion of judgement, 
communicability, and its standard, opinion, through the concept 
of intersubjective recognition. The communicability of statements 
are no longer arbitrary as in the case of Arendt's "opinion", but 
are raised to the level of learning and knowledge which for 
Habermas are vital factors in the evolution of mankind. From this 
perspective the extensive and abstract studies on Piaget's work 
in genetic epistemology and Kohlberg's work on moral development, 
can be seen to address the following question: How does mans 
capacity for reflective, communicative judgement and hence 
communicative rationality, develop in the horizontal and vertical 
directions in the self-formative processes of the species? From 
Piaget, Habermas appropriates the "decentering" thesis which is 
employed to account for the "structurally described levels of 
learning ability" (Habermas 1984:68). Habermas emphasises that 
for Piaget the stages of cognitive development are not 
understood as changes in content, but rather in ~erms of changes 
in the "systems of basic concepts" (Habermas 1984:68). The 
decentering of cognition develops as the child gradually matures 
from an egocentric relation to the environment in general, toward 
a differentiated and reflective capacity for dealing with the 
physical world of nature, the social world of subject-subject 
relations and the inner world of the self. Central to Piaget's 
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thesis of the decentration from egocentric reasoning to 
socio-centric reasoning is the concept of communicability (Piaget 
1977:87). Piaget, following the work of Bleuler, distinguishes 
between "two fundamental modes of thinking, directed or 
intelligent thought and undirected or autistic thought" 
(1977:84). Directed thought is held to be, 
"conscious i.e. it pursues an aim which is present to the 
mind of the thinker; it is intelligent, which means that it 
is adapted to reality and tries to influence it; it admits 
of being true or false (empirically and logically true), and 
it can be communicated in language. Autistic thought is 
subconscious, which means that the aims which it pursues and 
the problems it tries to solve are not present in 
consciousness; it is not adapted to r~ality, but creates for 
itself a dream world of the imagination; it tends, not to 
establish truths, but to satisfy desires, and it remains 
strictly individual and incommunicable as such by means of 
language. It works chiefly by images and in order to 
express itself, it has recourse to indirect methods, evoking 
of symbols and myths the feeling by which it is lead." 
(Piaget 1977:85 emphasis mine) 
Piaget explains that egocentric thought is an intermediary form 
of childhood reasoning between autism and the adult form of 
"intelligence" captured in the citation above. Egocentric reason 
may then be defined as a form of reason which is directed since 
it aims to "adapt itself to reality b~t does n<?'t,_ communicate 
itself as such" (Piaget 1977:87). Piaget argues for the gradual 
construction of systems of concepts and hence the conditions for 
the possibility of the communicability of thought and action," as 
the child matures through socialization processe~ and encounters 
with the environment in which she is located. Namely, the 
environment of physical natur~, that of subject-subject relations 
and that of the self. These three realms are at first not 
differentiated and form a totality from within which the maturing 
child gradually emerges through the active construction of 
herself and her relations to the environment (7). Habermas points 
out that Piaget: 
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"follows this development of intelligence in connection with 
the construction of the external and internal universes; 
there gradually emerges a demarcation through the 
construction of the universe of objects and of the internal 
world of the subject".(Piaget cited in Habermas (1984:69) 
"The growing child works out for himself equiprimordially, the 
concepts of the external and internal worlds in dealing 
practically with objects and himself. Piaget ~lso draws 
distinction between dealing with physical objects and dealing 
with social objects, that is reciprocal action between a 
subject and objects and reciprocal action between a subject 
and other subjects. Correspondingly the external universe is 
differentiated into a world of perceptible and manipulable 
objects on the one hand and the world of normatively 
regulated interpersonal relations on the other". 
(Habermas 1984:69) 
For Piaget contact with the physical world is established through 
instrumental action, Habermas argues. Contact with the external 
world of nature through instrumental action, mediates the 
"constructive acquisition of the system of intellectual norms" 
while interaction with other subjects facilitates the 
constructive "acquisition of socially recognized norms" (Habermas 
1984:69). Habermas further .indicates that the learning 
mechanisms of accommodation and assimilation, function through 
these forms of action in a specific manner: 
"if reciprocal actions between subject and object modify 
both, it is a fortiori evident that every reciprocal action 
between individual subjects mutually modifies them. Every 
social relation is thus a totality in itself which creates 
new properties while transforming the indiv~dual in his 
mental structure" (Piaget cited in Habermas 1984:69) 
What Habermas is saying here is that for Piaget, cognitive 
development is not understood as the construction of the external 
and social universes in the sense of a dualistic ontology, which 
juxtaposes a sphere of empirical facts to a sphere of values. To 
the contrary, the decentering process is seen as the 
"construction" of a "referential system" (Habermas 1984:69). This 
system of reference means that demarcation between three "worlds"· 
or re~lms occurs. Namely: the objective, the social and the 
subjective worlds. These categories are not ontological but 
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rather referential ones: they refer to the objective world of 
facts which are regulated by a system of intellectual norms, the 
subject-subject realm of normatively regulated intersubjective 
action and the subjective world 
' 
Habermas holds that it is only 
reference system of the three 
of the self's inner experiences. 
to the extent that the formal 
worlds is differentiated that 
communicative actors can form a reflective concept of "world" and 
thus gain "access to the world through the medium of common 
interpretive efforts, in the sense of a cooperative negotiation 
of situation definitions" (1984:69). He explains that ego can 
consider how certain 
"facts (what he regards as legitimate as existing states of 
affairs, in the objective world) or certain normative 
expectations what he regards as legitimate· elements of a 
common social knowledge) look from the perspective of 
another, that is as elements of alter's subjective world ••• 
The function of the formal world concepts, however, is to 
prevent the stock of what is common from dissolving in the 
stream of subjectivities repeatedly reflected in one 
another. They make it possible to adopt a common 
perspective of a third person. Every action oriented toward 
reaching understanding can be conceived as part of a 
cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation 
definitions that are intersubjectively recognized.(1984:70) 
Habermas is here linking.the system of reference understood as 
the differentiation of the three realms of world relations, to 
his concept of communicative action which aims at understanding. 
The concept of intersubjective recognition serves to link these 
domains. Thus the system of reference is the locus in terms of 
which participants then reach agreement as to what is regarded as 
a fact, a valid norm and a subjective experience. Habermas is 
then able to introduce his concept of the life-world since 
participants are held to come to an understanding from within the 
horizon of the life-world. The life-world is the "source of 
situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as 
unproblematic" (Habermas 1984:70). It is only when aspects of the 
life-world are released from the taken for granted through 
becoming problematical that the discursive redemption of validity 
claims becomes thematic. Habermas argues that the life-world also 
"stores the the interpretive work of previous generations" and is 
I 
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to the continual risk 
with every "actual 
of disagreement which 
process of reaching 
the "counterweight" 
comes to -the fore 
understanding; for communicative actors can achieve an 
understanding only by way of taking yes/n~ positions on 
criticizable validity claims."(1984:70). Thus the decentration 
thesis appropriated from the work of Piaget is integrated with 
the Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and 
Life-world. 
From Kohlberg, Habermas learns that only adults are able to 
enga~e in reflective judgement and reach the stage of 
postconventional morality or the "enlarged mentality" which 
Arendt speaks of (8). This is named the "sixth" stage on the 
scale of moral development by Kohlberg. Adults who do reach this 
stage of morality are able to invoke ethical principles which 
appeal to "logical comprehensiveness, universality and 
consistency", Habermas stresses (1979:80). These principles are 
abstract and ethical and not concrete moral rules such as the ten 
commandments (9). Habermas points out that: 
"these are universal principles of justice, of the 
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for 
the dignity of human beings as individual persons. 
(1979:80 emphasis in text). 
He holds that Kohlberg's analysis represents a monological 
approach. He stipulates a seventh stage of moral development in 
which communicative competence in reflective judgement, requiring 
a universal orientation, is necessary to correct this error. He 
states of his own orientation, 
"the principle of justification of norms is no longer the 
monologically applicable principle of generalizability but 
the communally followed procedure of redeeming normative 
~alidity claims discursively." (1979:90) 
This highly abbreviated analysis does not do justice to the 
detail of the discussion of Piaget's and Kohlberg's work but 
serves to indicate an alternative perspective, namely the 
Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and Life-world, 
from which these studies can be viewed. I now deal with the 
second important connection between the communicative judgement 
and universal pragmatics. 
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4.3.2.4 Communicative Judgement, Universal 
and Understanding 
Pragmatics, Meaning 
Closely related to the question of communicability is Arendt's 
thesis of representative thinking. One judges as a member of a 
community and 
faults Toulmin 
this requires 
and Klein 
an "enlarged mentality". Habermas 
in that their understanding of 
argumentation requires the thesis of a "universal audience" such 
that judgements can be made whereby one thinks "in the place of 
everybody else" as Arendt says (Arendt 1982:69). This capacity 
for -representative thinking, whereby the viewpoints of others 
are brought into dialogue with ones own and are raised to the 
universal stand-point of mankind, is sharpened and developed in 
Habermas' view of understanding and its relation to meaning and 
communicative rationality. Habermas introduces the thesis that a 
modern understanding of the world makes a claim to universality, 
through an assessment of the rationality debates which are 
conducted between Winch, Lukes, Macintyre and Horton. Habermas 
views the question of understanding and meaning in the 
rationality debates from the perspective of the theory of 
Universal Pragmatics and Communicative Judgment. The contours of 
the argument are as follows: Habermas holds that one can 
_µnderstand the meaning of communicative action in an alien 
community because it is rooted in the "context of action 
orientated toward reaching understanding" (1984:115). The 
interpreter observes the activities of the subjects in the alien 
community. She notes the conditions under which symbolic 
expressions are accepted as valid by the participants and when 
the validity claims associated with symbolic expressions are 
criticized and rejected. She also notes when plans of action are 
coordinated on the basis of consensus formation and when the 
coordination of action does not occur, but "falls apart due to 
lack of consensus" (Habermas 1984:115). Habermas comes to the 
following conclusion: 
"Thus the interpreter cannot become clear about the semantic 
content of an expression independently of the action contexts 
in which the participants react to the expression in question 
with "yes" or a "no" or an abstention." (1984:115) 
The researcher cannot understand the "Yes/No" positions taken if 
she does not clarify, for herself, the underlying reasons which 
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motivate the participants to take their particular stance. 
Habermas holds that: 
" ••• agreements and disagreements, insofar as they are 
judged in the light of reciprocally raised validity claims 
and are not merely caused by external factors, are based 
on reasons which the participants supposedly or actually 
have at their disposal. These reasons (most often 
implicit) form the axis around which the processes of 
reaching understanding revolve." (1984:115) 
If the interpreter, in attempting to understand, must "bring to 
mind" the reasons which the participants put forward in 
legitimating their actions under claims to validity, then she is 
also drawn into the process of judging validity claims. She 
judges (says "Yes/No") claims to: the truth of propositions, the 
rightness of the utterances with regard to the normative 
contexts and to claims as to the truthfulness of the expressed 
intentions. This derives from the fact that reasons cannot be 
validated from the perspective of the isolated observer since 
they in turn require a "Yes/No" response of the participant, 
Habermas argues. He holds that an interpreter is not able to 
understand what a reason is if she does not reconstruct it in 
conjunction with its claim to validity. This can only occur in 
the communicative context in which the subjects and the 
researcher validate the claims raised via reasons. For Habermas 
one is only able to understand reasons and hence their meaning to 
the extent that one understands why they are sound. This leads to 
the strong thesis that "the description of reasons demands 
evaluation" (Habermas 1984:116). Mc earthy objects to this 
thesis that the concepts of meaning and understanding are tied. to 
the concept of reflective judgement in Habermas' concept of 
communicative- rationality. McCarthy argues that one can abstain 
from judgement and still understand the reasons presented (Mc 
earthy 1985:204). Habermas' reply to McCarthy is that in the 
domain of meaning, he (Habermas), holds the.view that: 
"we understand a literally meant speech act when we know 
the conditions under which it could be accepted as valid 
by a hearer. This pragmatically extended version of truth 
conditional semantics is supported by the fact that we 
connect the execution of speech acts to various validity 
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claims: claims to the truth of propositions (or the 
existential presuppositions of the propositional contents), 
claims to the rightness of an utterance (with respect to 
the normative contexts), and claims with respect to 
the truthfulness of the expressed intention."(1985 (c):203) 
He says that the realms of "their", the actor's explanations, ~re 
brought into accord with "our", the researcher's explanations, 
through the universal pragmatic notion of universal discourse 
(1985(c):209). For Habermas, universal discourse is implicit in 
the communicative aim of reaching understanding and meaning for 
all men in general (Habermas 1985(c):204). He holds that the 
stance of putting off a judgement or abstaining, implies that one 
does not really understand the meaning of different perspectives 
since one only understands through saying "Yes or No" to 
different perspectives relative to the "universal attitude" of 
I 
mankind in general. Thus for Habermas, communicative rationality 
and the concept meaning, are tied to the judging process in which 
the formal "Yes/No" response is made in the light of the four 
universal conditions for the possibility of unconstrained 
consensus. Namely the claims to truth, truthfulness, normative 
rightness and comprehensibility. Like Arendt, Habermas holds that 
the meaning is the result of understanding. Communicative action 
aims at the actualization of understanding and meaning. The 
communicative rationality of communicative action is grounded 
when a "Yes/No" response to determinate speech-acts are made in a 
given context and are judged in the light of the universal 
validity claims underlying these speech acts. Thus the universal 
and the particular are united in a single theory which overcomes 
relativism and concept of 
the argumentation theory 
concretize this point. 
instrumental rationality internal to 
of Klein and Toulmin. I briefly 
Individual claims to validity on 
particular speech-acts, such as "this book is green"; "substance 
"m" destroys cancer cells", or "you ought to visit granny more 
often" exhibit their duality in that they are individual and 
universal at the same time. They are individual in that they are 
specific claims made in specific contexts. They are universal in 
that underlying each speech-act, is a universal claim to 
validity; its truth, truthfulness, normative rightness, and 
comprehensibility. Speech-acts can thus be be judged, 
(declaration of "Yes/No") in terms of the four universal validity 
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claims in the discourse situation. In discourse, only the search 
for truth is operative and communicative rationality is then 
grounded through intersubjective recognition of validity claims. 
Learning takes place through the confirmation and refutation of 
speech-acts and opinion is transformed into knowledge. What 
grounding actually means can only be ascertained from the 
conditions for discursively redeeming validity claims, Habermas 
stresses. Grounding can be concretized as follows. When a speech 
act such as "this book is green" or "substance "m" destroys 
cancer cells" is discursively redeemed under all the conditions 
discussed in detail above, one can say that these are descriptive 
speach-acts which are "true". Hence "grounding" establishes a 
"state of affairs" through communicative reason, encompassing the 
discussion and validation of empirical evidence which is at first 
classed as mere opinion. Through reflective judgement, the 
communicators say "Yes" or "No" to the evidence presented, which 
also includes the "feedback from reality", and opinions are 
raised to the level of knowledge when the claims to validity are 
mutually recognized. The validation process occurs in 
theoretical discourse. Habermas holds that actors adopt an 
objectivating attitude toward the external world of nature in 
this case. An objectivating attitude is that of manipulating or 
observing things or events in the natural or social world. The 
pertinent concept pf rationality in the case of the manipulation 
of objects is cognitive-instrumental rationality. 
In subject-subject relations, where one subject treats another 
as a means to an end, the objectivating attitude and cognitive-
strategic rationality are operative. The form of knowledge which 
develops is the progress in science and technology in the case of 
cognitive instrumental rationality and social technology in the 
case of cognitive strategic rationality. Thus the concept 
rationality is carefully distinguished from the attitude which 
actors adopt towards the environment. The examples, "you ought to 
visit granny more often" or "you ought to employ more female 
doctors" are normative speech-acts. Grounding of these 
speech-acts establishes legitimate norms of action. Here norms 
invoked with a claim to validity are validated through the 
reflective judgement of communicators. The form of argumentation 
in which this takes place is named practical discourse and the 
pertinent concept of rationality is moral-practical rationality. 
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Actors adopt a norm-conformative attitude toward the social world 
of subJect-subject relations and the form of knowledge which is 
produced in this realm is formal law and moral-practical 
knowledge. Grounding expressive speech-acts establish 
communicatively "rational presentations of self" (Habermas 
1984:39). This occurs in a form of argumentation named 
therapeutic critique. This form of argumentation is modelled on 
the psycho-therapeutic situation. Habermas holds that the subject 
in psychotherapy learns to adopt a reflective attitude toward 
"his own expressive manifestations" (1984:20). The concept 
"rational" then applies to the behaviour of a person who strives 
and is able to free himself from illusions based upon 
self-deception. Habermas points out that 
"Here we are dealing with the expressions of ones' own 
desires and inclinations, feelings and moods, 
with a claim to truthfulness and sincerity. 
situations an actor has good reasons to 
which appear 
In many 
conceal his 
experiences from others 
is interacting about his 
he is not raising a 
simulating one while 
or to mislead someone with whom he 
"true" 
claim to 
behaving 
experiences. In such cases 
truthfulness but at most 
strategically". (1984:21) 
Expressions in this sense 
they are insincere and 
"intended results as more 
cannot be objectively criticized since 
"are to be judged" in terms of the 
or less effective" (Habermas 1984:21). 
Habermas emphasises that expressive "manifestations" are judged 
on the basis of their claim to sincerity and truthfulness in 
communication which aims at reaching understanding. Thus the 
subject who systematically "deceives himself about himself" 
behaves in an irrational manner. Anyone who 1s able to emancipate 
him/herself from this form of irrationality: 
"possesses not only the rationality of a subject who is 
competent to judge facts and who acts in a purposive 
rational way, who is morally judicious and practically 
reliable, who evaluates with sensitivity and is 
aesthetically open-minded, he also possesses the power to 
behave reflectively in relation to his subjectivity and to 
see through the irrational limitations to which his 
cognitive, moral-practical, and aesthetic-practical 
expressions are subject" (Habermas 1984:21) 
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Habermas says that the therapeutic dialogue situation does not 
fulfil the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity central to the 
discourse situation. He holds that the conditions of discourse 
"can only be satisfied after the therapy has been successful" and 
thus names argumentation in which forms of systematic self-
deception are addressed, "Therapeutic Critique" (1984:21). 
He distinguishes the realm of expressive speech acts, in the 
sense of self-deception, from the rational interpretation of 
needs and desires. He holds that actors can adopt a reflective 
attitude in the light of "culturally established standards of 
value through which feelings and desires .are interpreted" 
(1984:21). Cultural values do not encompass claims to universal 
validity as do norms and hence arguments or more precisely, forms 
of criticism pertaining to music, art and literature for 
example, do not fulfil the conditions of discourse. Habermas 
names these arguments Aesthetic Critique. The redemption of 
claims to value are based upon reasons. He says: 
"in aesthetic criticism grounds or reasons serve to guide 
perception and make the authenticity of a work so evident 
that this aesthetic experience can itself become a rational 
motive for accepting the corresponding standards on value". 
(1984:20) (7). 
Actors adopt an expressive attitude toward the realm of music, 
art and literature in which validity claims with regard to the 
adequacy of standards of value are reflected upon and redeemed. 
The pertinent concept of rationality which is grounded in 
aesthetic forms of criticism is named Aesthetic-Practical 
Rationality. 
The grounding of interpretive processes are also accommodated in 
this theory. Habermas holds that the interpreter who reflects 
upon linguistic rules and modes of presentation, in order to 
achieve understanding, acts in a rational manner. The 
comprehensibility or "well-formedness" of symbolic expressions 
are addressed in this case. The interpreter behaves in an 
irrational manner when he dogmatically applies his own symbolic 
means of expression in this situation. Habermas names the 
argumentation process in which comprehensibility is a claim to 
validity Explicative Discourse. 
Thus one theory is able to account for the communicative 
rationality of speech-acts in general and unite context dependent 
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speech acts to universal claims to validity. The concepts 
discussed thus far can be summarised as shown in Figure 1: 
Rationality Complexes. 
Figure 1: Rationality Complexes 
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Central to Habermas' work are three rationality complexes. The 
Cognitive-Instrumental, Moral-Practical and Aesthetic-Practical 
forms of rationality. Corresponding to these complexes are three 
systems of reference: The objective, social and subjective 
"worlds". Actors cin adopt three basic attitudes in reference to 
these "worlds": the objectivating, norm-conformative and 
expressive attitudes. To the extent that actors adopt the three 
basic attitudes, an increase in rationality and accumulation of 
knowledge develops in the corresponding realms respectively. For 
example, to the extent that actors adopt an objectivating 
attitude toward the world of nature and other subjects, 
Cognitive-Instrumental rationalization occurs and the 
accumulation of a stock of scientific and technological knowledge 
develops. Habermas argues that the differentiation of the realms 
of science, ethics and aesthetics in modernity is accompanied by 
the institutionalization of knowledge pertaining to these realms 
in the academic institutions, research institutes, the various 
professions, judicial administrative systems and the institutions 
which facilitate the production and critique of autonomous art. 
To the extent that this process occurs, the discursive redemption 
of validity claims pertinent to each realm is opened up to the 
potential for rational grounding through argumentation processes. 
Figure 1 is a summary of concepts discussed under the complex 
concept of communicative rationality. Habermas employs these 
concepts in his assessment of rationalization as reification in 
the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Lukacs. 
4.4 Rationalization as Reification 
Habermas introduces his critique of the 
Horkheimer by stating that a change 
work of Adorno and 
in paradigm, from a 
teleological model of human action to a communicative model of 
action, is required so that the rationalization of society can be 
adequately captured. He says: 
"The rationalization of society would then no longer mean the 
a diffusion of purposive rational-action and the transform-
ation of domains of communicative action into subsystems of 
purposive rational action. The point of reference becomes 
instead the potential for rationality found in the validity 
basis of speech. This potential is never completely stilled, 
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but can be activated at different levels, depending on the 
the degree of rationalization of knowledge incorporated into 
world views. Inasmuch as social actions are coordinated 
through reaching understanding, the formal conditions of 
rationally motivated agreement specify how participant's 
relations to one another can be rationalized. As a general 
principle, they count as rational to the extent that the 
yes/no decisions that carry a given consensus issues from the 
interpretive processes of the participants themselves. 
Correspondingly, a life-world can be regarded as rationalized 
to the extent that it permits interactions that are not 
guided by normatively ascribed agreement but - directly or 
indirectly by communicatively achieved understanding." 
(1984:340 emphasis mine.) 
Here Habermas is casting his concept of rationalization into the 
new framework of Communicative Action, Communicative Judgement 
and the Life-World. He invokes the concept communicative 
rationality, as outlined in this chapter indicating the potential 
for the rationalization of society. He aims to show that the 
location of the concept of rationality and rationalization 
processes in his new framework obviates the error of 
understanding rationality as an "attitude" or orientation to 
action. Habermas argues for a clear distinction between the 
concept of rationality and the basic attitudes which actors 
assume in apprehending their three "worlds" and the forms of 
knowledge pertinent to the decentered orientation to reality. He 
holds that although Adorno and Horkheimer develop a radical 
critique of formal (Instrumental) rationality, in Weber's sense, 
they adhere to the premise that rationality is an attitude toward 
action. The reception of the Weberian concept of formal 
rationality in the work of the Adorno and Horkheimer, is 
influenced by Lukacs' view of the rationalization process as a 
process of reification. Habermas holds that the concept, 
reification, in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Lukacs, is 
understood as a "category of the philosophy consciousness: it was 
discerned in the attitudes and modes of behaviour of 
individuals." (1986:380). Habermas' critique unfolds in three 
phases. In the first phase of the critique, he compares the 
concept of rationalization held by Weber with that of Horkheimer. 
He focuses upon their respective "diagnoses of the times" which 
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is circumscribed by two theses: 
1. The.thesis of the loss of meaning in a disenchanted world. 
2. The thesis of the loss of freedom in modern society. 
He then discusses Lukacs' concept of reification. 
In the last phase of the critique, Habermas assesses 
Horkheimer's view of rationalization as reification. 
analyse each phase in turn. I do not deal with the 
Adorno and 
I briefly 
issue as to 
whether Habermas' interpretation of these scholar's work is 
cogent in the sense of strict exegesis since this is not his 
intent (10). 
4.4.1 Max Weber and Max Horkheimer's Diagnosis of the Times. 
Habermas ignores the work of Horkheimer prior to 1940. He states 
that the "Eclipse of Reason" which is a "systematic summing up" 
of the position reached by Adorno and Horkheimer in the 
"Dialectic of the Enlightenment", is his focus of attention 
(1984:347) (11). He points out for Horkheimer and Weber "formal 
rationality underlies our contemporary culture" (1984:345). 
Habermas argues that formal rationality in Weber's sense: 
1. Enables men to act in a calculable manner. 
2. Enables men to calculate or determine the efficacy of means 
thus facilitating instrumental action. 
3. Enables men to indicate the "correctness" of the selection 
of means in their strategic interaction with other subjects. 
Thus formal rationality is circumscribed by the attitudes of 
calculability and efficacy in the "determination" of the 
correct means to achieve ends (Habermas 1984:345). Here Habermas 
focuses upon subjective attitudes and the means-ends schema in 
terms of which the concept of formal rationality is understood. 
He says that Weber differentiates between the "subjective 
preferences" of formal rationality and the "substantive" 
appraisal of the values underlying the "subjective preferences" 
(Habermas 1984:345). He argues that here Weber merely addresses 
the question of the orientations to action which are "determined 
by cognitive-instrumental rationality without regard to the 
standards of morality .or aesthetically practical rationality" 
(Habermas 1984:345). Thus the concepts of practical rationality 
and aesthetic rationality which Habermas is able to incorporate 
in his concept communicative rationality are not considered by 
Weber in his view of formal rationality which characterises the 
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modern capitalist society. Weber emphasises that an increase in 
formal rationality occurs when the spheres of "scientifically 
organized learning processes" are differentiated from the spheres 
of "cognitive value" orientations in modernity (Habermas 
1984:345). Here Habermas is employing the decentration thesis to 
indicate that a differentiation occurs between the realms of fact 
and value in a modern, disenchanted world. Extended chains of 
means-ends modes of action can then be systematically appraised 
under the "validity aspects of truth and efficacy and improved 
upon in the sense of formal rationality" (Habermas 1984:345). 
Thus ·to the extent that cognitive-instrumental rationality 
orientates action and is institutionalized, an increase in formal 
rationality occurs in capitalist society for Weber. 
Horkheimer in contrast, stresses the loss in rationality which 
occurs when actions are "judged, planned and justified only under 
cognitive aspects", Habermas explains (1984:345). He 
objects to a concept of reason understood as the mere regulation 
between means and ends of human action. Horkheimer says that 
"When the idea of reason was conceived, it was intended to 
achieve more than the mere regulation between means and 
ends; it was regarded as the instrument for understanding 
the ends, for determining them." 
(Horkheimer cited in Habermas 1984:345 emphasis in text) 
Horkheimer is seen to appropriate a view of "understanding" 
deriving from the work of Kant in terms of which the "subject 
knows and acts in accordance with technical imperatives." 
(Habermas 1984:345). Thus Horkheimer's view of understanding is 
rooted in the Kantian tradition in which the subject uses his 
consciousness as a tool to "determine" ends. 
communicative process whereby unique 
Understanding as a 
individuals reveal 
themselves and their plans of action in a situation of dialogue 
is not considered by Horkheimer. Man the tool making animal, 
apprehending the world on the grounds of work, or purposive 
rationality is thematic in Horkheimer's work. For Habermas 
imperatives are "normatively unauthorised demands" and a "Yes/No" 
response to .these demands means that the actor is subject to the 
will of another. Horkheimer's subject then acts on the basis of a 
form of rationality which is an arbitrary reaction to power 
claims. Here the concept of rationality is implicitly grounded in 
domination of man over man and the communicative redemption of 
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validity claims is eclipsed. 
For Weber and Horkheimer the disenchantment of cosmological/ 
metaphysical world views is brought about by the permeation of 
formal rationality into all spheres of life. The unity of "the 
good", "the true" and "the beautiful" which circumscribes 
cosmological/metaphysical world views is fragmented in modernity. 
Horkheimer names the unity of reason deriving from the 
ontological thinking where the human world is held to be part of 
the cosmological order~ "objective reason" (Habermas 1984:345). 
Formal or instrumental reason is called "subjective reason" and 
it is directed toward the calculation of means and ends directing 
behaviour rather than addressing the universal· concepts of 
mankind. Horkheimer holds that "objective reason", 
"did not focus on the coordination of behaviour and aim, but 
on concepts,- however mythological they may seem to us today 
- on the idea of the greatest good, on the problem of human 
destiny, and on the way of realization of ultimate goals 
(sic) •••• The philosophical systems of objective reason 
implied the conviction that an all-embracing or fundamental 
structure of being could be discovered and a conception of 
human destination derived from it." 
(Horkheimer cited in Habermas 1984:346) 
In a disenchanted world, questions of scientific truth are 
separated from questions of morality and beauty. Science is 
distinguished from morality and art. Horkheimer emphasises that 
one can no longer speak of aesthetic and moral rationality since 
these realms have lost their immanent claim to objective 
validity and "objective reason". The metaphysical/religious 
realms are "subjectivized" in the form of rigid dogma, tradition 
and subjective belief. Objective reason is no longer able to 
provide a unified meaning to life since it is undermined by the 
formal reason of science, th~ realm of calculable and predictable 
"facts" divorced from values. Meaning, which derives from values, 
is eroded by the permeation of instrumental reason into the 
institutional realms of life. Instrumental reason becomes the 
tool for the self-preservation of self-interested men/women, 
Horkheimer argues. Habermas holds that Horkheimer and Weber 
agree on the fundamental aspects of their diagnosis of the 
times: 
1. The credibility of religious and metaphysical worldviews are 
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undermined by the rationalization processes. The Enlightenment 
which initiated the critique of ancient theology and ontology 
is irreversible. 
2. Modernity is characterised by the differentiation of culture 
into the spheres of science, art and morality. Faith is 
privatized while art and morality are divorced from "claims to 
propositional truth" (Habermas 1984:350). Science in the form 
of purposive-rational action "forfeits its ·relation to 
communicative practice" (Habermas 1984:350). Here Habermas is 
invoking his own view of praxis, as communicative action. He 
says that moral-practical reason is seen to be eclipsed in 
modernity by Horkheimer and Weber. 
3. Subjective reason (instrumental reason) is understood as a 
tool for self-preservation in a world in which actors 
orientate themselves towards irreconcilable "gods and demons". 
(Habermas 1984:350). This form of reason is no longer able to 
"bestow" meaning but threatens the "unity of the life-world 
and therewith the integration of society" (H~bermas 1984:350). 
Here Habermas invokes his concept of the life-world to 
indicate that social integration is endangered by instrumental 
reason. 
Weber and Horkheimer derive the thesis of the loss of freedom in 
modernity, from the Protestant ethic of asceticism. They argue 
that the ethic of a methodical and purposive-rational orientation 
to life permeates the institutional framework of society. To the 
extent that the economic, administrative, judicial and scientific 
realms are "rationalized" individuals increasingly find 
themselves to be locked into an "administered world" as Adorno 
puts it. Habermas states that "Adorne's formula of an 
administered world is an equivalent for Weber's vision of an 
"iron cage"" (1984:351). This loss of freedom for Weber and the 
Frankfurt scholars, stems from the sub-system of purposive 
rationality which permeates the life-world, Habermas argues. 
Although Weber and Horkheimer conceive of the loss of freedom 
from the perspective of action and psycho-analytic theory 
respectively, both scholars hold a view of modernity in which 
moral-pratical rationality-is eclipsed, Habermas concludes. 
4.4.2 Lukacs' Concept of Reification 
Habermas holds that Lukacs uses the concept of reification to 
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sever Weber's analysis of 
"societal rationalization from its a action-theoretic 
framework and relate it to anonymous processes of capital 
realisation within the economic system" (1984:354). 
Lukacs attempts to clarify the relationship between the economic 
system based on exchange value on the one hand, and the manner in 
which the life-world is "deformed" by this system on the other 
hand (Habermas 1984:355). Habermas states that for Lukacs, 
"in the structure of the commodity relation [can] be found 
the model of all the forms of objectivity in bourgeois 
society, together with all the form (sic) of subjectivity 
corresponding to them" (Lukacs cited in Habermas 1984:355) 
Lukacs uses the phrase "form of objectivity", in a similar manner 
to Dilthey, Habermas argues. Here, "form of objectivity" means 
the form of thought or existence which has developed historically 
and "characterizes the totality of the stage of development of 
society as a whole" (Lukacs cited in Habermas 1984:355). Lukacs 
views society from an historical perspective as changing forms of 
objectivity. Habermas stresses that, 
"Lukacs, like Horkheimer, holds on to the Hegelian idea that 
in the relation of human beings to one another and to 
nature, (to external as well as to their internal nature), 
reason is objectivated - in however unreasonable a manner" 
(1984:355 emphasis mine) 
Capitalist society is seen to be characterized by a specific 
"form of objectivity" or existence which determines the manner 
in which its members interpret objective nature, interpersonal 
relations and themselves. The form of reason which predominates 
in capitalist society and which is increasingly objectivated is 
instrumental rationality. For Lukacs, the permeation of 
instrumental reason into all spheres of the life context means 
that these realms are reified. Habermas explains that reification 
means, 
"the assimilation of social relations and subjective 
experiences to things, that is to objects that we can 
perceive and manipulate. The three worlds are so lopsidedly 
coordinated that category mistakes are built into our 
understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective 
experiences; we apprehend them under the form of things, as 
entities that belong to the objective world, although they 
are really elements 
individual subjective 
following: because 
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of our common social world or of an 
world. To this must be added the 
understanding and apprehending are 
constitutive for communicative intercourse itself, a 
systematically ingrained misunderstanding of this kind 
affects not only the subjects' forms of thought, but their 
forms of existence as well. It is the life-world itself 
which is reified".(1984:356 emphasis mine) 
Habermas argues that Lukacs develops his concept of reification 
from Marx's analysis of the commodity form encompassing use value 
and exchange value. Lukacs is interested in the manner in which 
social labour occurs in capitalist society. As long as the realm 
of social labour is regulated by traditional norms, individuals 
enter into communicative relations with one another and do so 
intentionally, Habermas argues. But, where the production of 
goods are 
"organised as the production of exchange ~alues and the labor 
power of producers is itself exchanged as a commodity, 
another medium for the co-ordination of action is force: 
Economically relevant action orientations are detatched from 
the lifeworld context and linked to the medium of exchange 
value (or money). To the extent that interactions are no 
longer coordinated through norms and values, but through the 
medium of exchange value, actors have to assume an 
objectivating attitude to one another (and themselves)." 
(Habermas 1984:358 emphasis mine) 
Central to Habermas' interpretation is the thesis that the 
objectivating attitude is universalized in Lukacs' analysis of 
capitalist society. Habermas argues that in this view of 
society, the concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality is 
universalised and practical and moral aesthetic forms of 
rationality are eclipsed. He holds that Lukacs uses the Hegelian 
premise of an ethical totality, understood as the "rationally 
organized life-context" as his standard against which he 
characterises rationalization in Weber's sense, as the 
progressive reification. of the totality. Thus Lukacs 
"implicitly denies Weber's central assertion to the effect 
that the metaphysically conceived unity of reason had fallen 
apart once and for all with the separation of cultural value 
spheres, each with its own inner logic; and that it couldn't 
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be put back together again, not even dialectically." 
(Habermas 1984:357 emphasis in text) 
Habermas rejects this strain of absolute idealism in Lukacs' 
work. He concludes that Lukacs' achievement is that of uniting 
the work of Marx and Weber such that one is able to view the 
"decoupling of the sphere of social labor from the life-world 
context simultaneously under two aspects: as reification and 
rationalization" (Habermas 1984:359) 
4.4.3. Rationalization as Reification in the work of Adorno and 
Horkheimer 
Adorno and Horkheimer detatch the concept of reification from 
the historical context of Capitalist society· of Lukacs' 
perspective. They generalise this concept temporally to cover 
the entire history of the species, Habermas argues. They also 
generalise the concept substantively such that the same logic of 
domination, the logic of the means-ends orientation to action, 
which characterises the concept cognitive-instrumental 
rationality, is 
man's relation 
held to 
to the 
pertain to man's 
external world of 
relation to man, and 
nature. Thus the 
"objectivating attitude" is generalized in this truncated view of 
rationalization understood as reification. This "double 
generalization" of the concept 6f reification means for Habermas 
that the basis of rational discourse, namely communicative action 
and judgement is eclipsed in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Habermas argues that these scholars reduce the concept of 
critical reflection to a form of imitation or what they name 
"mimesis" as the only source of emancipation which is to be found 
in the realms of esoteric art. Habermas says in this regard: 
"the paradox which the critique of instrumental reason is 
entangled, and which .stubbornly resists even the most 
subtle dialectic, consists in-this: Adorno and Horkheimer 
would have to put forward a theory of mimesis, which 
according to their own. ideas, is impossible." ( 1984: 382) 
Adorno and Horkheimer hold a_ position which obviates the 
development of a theory which encompasses the possibility for 
emancipation in the totally reified or administered society, 
Habermas argues. Thus the possibility for critical reflective 
judgement is undermined in their perspective. The very 
possibility of critical theory is abrogated and the discursive 
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redemption of validity claims is eclipsed under the spell of 
instrumental reason or reified consciousness characteristic of 
modern men/women. Habermas holds that this situation which these 
scholars manoeuvre themselves into stems from their teleological 
model of human agency, the philosophy consciousness in which 
their perspeciive moves, and the notion that rationality is an 
"attitude" appended to action. Habermas stresses that for Adorno, 
instrumental reason, as reified consciousness, pertains not only 
to the critique of "identifying" thought but also to the goal 
directed activity of subjects who strive for self-preservation. 
He says that here: 
"thought is in the service of technical mastery over, and 
informed adaptation to, an external nature that is 
objectivated in the behavioural circuit of instrumental 
action. It is instrumental reason that is at the basis of 
reified consciousness. In this way, Horkheimer and Adorno 
anchor the mechanism ·that produces the reification of 
consciousness in the anthropological foundations of the 
history of the species, in a .form of existence of a species 
that has to reproduce itself through labor ••• Instrumental 
reason is set out in concepts of subject-object relations. 
The interpersonal relation between subject and subject which 
is decisive for the model of exchange, has no constitutive 
significance for instrumental reason." (1984:379) 
Horkheimer and Adorno are held to share with the great tradition 
of thought the contemplative stance as a form of theory which is 
"diverted from practice", it aims at the unity between nature and 
the human world in its efforts to "get beyond the break of 
culture with nature" (Habermas 1984:385). Habermas concludes 
that although Adorno attempts to escape the conceptual 
framework of cognitive instrumental rationality through the use 
of the notion of mimesis, the mimetic capacity "counts as the 
sheer opposite of reason, as impulse" (1984:390). Habermas 
argues that the 
"rational core of mimetic achievements 
if we give up the paradigm of 
can be laid open only 
the philosophy of 
consciousness namely, a subject that represents objects and 
toils with them - in favour of a paradigm of linguistic 
philosophy- namely, that of intersubjective understanding or 
communication - and puts the cognitive instrumental aspects 
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of reason in its proper place as part of a more encompassing 
communicative rationality."(1984:390) 
For Habermas this means that a change .is required at the level 
of one's understanding of human agency. He argues for a change 
from goal directed to communicative action and an effort to 
reconstruct the concept of rationality which becomes possible 
with the decentration of men/women's understanding of the world. 
Here the phenomena which need to be explained are no longer only 
the knowledge and mastery of objective nature, but also the 
possibilities for intersubjective understanding and 
communication. Thus the focus of investigation changes from 
cognitive-instrumental to ·communicative rationality. Habermas' 
life's work can be seen as an effort to break out of the confines 
of the one-dimensional concept of instrumental rationality with 
it's means-ends schema and work model of human agency as the 
only form of rationality in modern society. 
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5 CONCLUSION TO THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY IN THE WORK OF 
JURGEN HABERMAS 
5.1 The Concept of Rationality: A General Perspective 
In the preceding chapters, I have approached the concept of 
rationality in Habermas' work from a· particular perspective. On 
the one hand, I have focused upon the impact of Arendt's work on 
that of Habermas. Arendt's reconstruction of the Aristotelian 
concepts of "praxis" .and "poiesis" is central to the concept of 
human agency in the work of Habermas. Habermas, like Arendt, 
distinguishes between action as a making process and action as a 
communicative process. Throughout his work he attempts to relate 
these two aspects of human agency to the concepts of rationality, 
knowledge, and, autonomy. Arendt's reconstruction of Kant's 
concept of reflective judgement is fundamental to Habermas' most 
recent argument for grounding the concept of rationality in 
general. Here Habermas links Arendt's concept of communicative 
judgement, men/women's capacity for saying Yes/No with the 
accompanying reasons, to universal validity claims which are 
recognized and redeemed through dialogue between at least two 
subjects. Another closely related theme which is internal to the 
concept of human agency and which permeates the fabric of 
Habermas' work is Arendt's concept of plurality. Habermas says 
of this concept: 
"plurality concentrates on intersubjectivity of acting in 
concert, where the multiple perspectives of participants 
who occupy inevitably different standpoints, are 
reciprocally connected. The unifying power of 
intersubjectivity preserves the plurality of individual 
perspectives; even in the case of violent repression 
intersubjectivity cannot be replaced by a higher order of 
subjectivity. (1980:128). 
Habermas and Arendt use the concept of plurality to stress the 
intersubjectivity such that the agent revealing character 
disclosure of different 
concept of plurality is 
of 
perspectives is not 
fundamental -to 
overlooked. 
the concept 
The 
of 
intersubjective recognition and consensus formation in Habermas' 
work. I show how Habermas uses the concept of intersubjectivity 
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to clarify his concept of practical rationality in his later work 
and how intersubjective recognition is central to his most recent 
argument for grounding the concept of rationality in general. 
On the other hand, I show how Habermas develops extensive and 
complex critiques of a range of scholars views. Here he moves 
beyond the work of Arendt in his efforts to appropriate and 
re-formulate those aspects of the tradition of occidental 
rationality which he considers to be of importance to a critical 
theory of society. This form of critical theory is orientated 
toward a sustained critique of forms of domination and repression 
in society. The guiding thread of such a critical theory is the 
Enlightenment premise that the faculty of reason is essential to 
the achievement of autonomy, justice, responsibility and 
scientific progress. This premise must be seen within the context 
of the work of the Frankfurt scholars. The Frankfurt School of 
critical theory re-considered the Enlightenment concept of 
reason in the light of the works of Marx, Freud and Weber. In 
their early works they re-considered the bourgeois Enlightenment 
in their critique of the historical and social forces which 
obviated the realisation of autonomy of the historically situated 
subject. They held that the autonomous subject was not the 
isolated Cartesian ego as Kant thought, but the concrete and 
historically situated social subject. Habermas says of this 
work: 
"In the form which it assumed in the Zeitschrift fur 
Sozialforschung, critical theory renewed the affirmative 
moment in its relation to the philosophy of the bourgeois 
epoch. The theory of society had to take from the latter 
the concept of reason, without which it lost its normative 
basis."(1984:231) 
After the horrors of Stalinism, Nazism and what seemed to be the 
total integration of the American populace into a thoroughly 
commodified and administered society, the Enlightenment concept 
of reason was subjected to relentless critique by Adorno and 
Horkheimer. Habermas holds that in the "Dialectic of the 
Enlightenment" (1947) these writers rejected the Enlightenment 
concept of reason and that the possibility of a critical theory 
of society was thereby abrogated (1982:232). He says: 
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"At that time, in 1941, Horkheimer and Adorno-and soon 
Marcuse as well-had lost their historico-philosophical 
faith in the rational potential of bourgeois culture which 
was to be set free in social movements under the pressure 
of developed forces of production. With that, the principal 
"lever" of the theory was also lost. Since that time the 
development of productive forces and critical thinking have 
appeared in the perspective of a cloudy mixture with, and 
assimilation to, their opposite: instrumental reason, 
having become total, embodies itself in totalitarian 
society. With this the classical form of critical theory 
fell apart •••• Adorno consistently renounced any attempt to 
gain back normative foundations. He gave himself over to 
the negativism of a thinking that saw in the solitary 
experience of a self-denying philosophy, going round in its 
own aporias, the only possibility of at least pointing to 
the contents of reason - however powerless - disguised in 
esoteric art".(1982:232) 
One of the important yet implicit themes in Habermas' work is 
that of attempting to free critical theory from this impasse. He 
does not merely "point" towards a concept of reason which implies 
that freedom and enlightenment are only possible in the esoteric 
realm of "autonomous art" but strives to develop a critical 
theory of society which accounts for its normative foundations, 
for its status, by systematically grounding the concept of 
rationality to which it appeals. He does this in three stages. 
First he develops a threefold understanding of human agency via 
the work of Arendt. Here action as a communicative process, 
action as a making process and the communicative formation of 
power are thematic. In his early work, "Theory and Practice" 
(1963 I 1974), Habermas systematically reformulates the concept 
of rationality upon the foundation of human agency. He does this 
by applying the insights gleaned from Arendt's work to a critical 
assessment of the concept of rationality held by Aquinas, 
Machiavelli, More and Hobbes. Then in his later work, 
and Human Interests" (1968 I 1972), he attempts to 
"Knowledge 
ground the 
concept of rationality and the dimensions of human agency 
(communicative action, instrumental action and power) in a 
philosophy of critical reflection. He fuses the concept of 
reflection, in the sense of reflection on the conditions for the 
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possibility of knowledge, with an emancipatory concept of 
reflection. Here the attempt to ground the concept of rationality 
via a "quasi-trancendental" argument, where three knowledge 
constitutive interests mediate between three kinds of science and 
three kinds of human activity, flounders in the labyrinths of the 
philosophy of reflective consciousness. In his recent work, "The 
Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society" (1984), Habermas grounds the concept of rationality in a 
theory of argumentation which links men/women's capacity for 
reflective communicative judgement to universal validity claims. 
Another important theme which is internal to the rationality 
problematic in Habermas' work is the empirical question 
concerning the sense in which the transition from traditional 
society to modern society can be viewed as a process of 
rationalization. I briefly assess some important aspects of these 
three inter-related themes, the concept of rationality in 
relation to human agency, the concept of rationality and its 
grounding, and Habermas' analyses of the rationalization 
processes. 
5.2 The Concept of Rationality In Habermas' Early work. 
Habermas aims at clarifying a communicative dimension of human 
rationality which is overlooked by Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse. I discuss the genesis of this theme in chapter one by 
analysing Habermas' critique of the works of Aquinas, More, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes in relation to the classical tradition of 
politics. Habermas focuses on the concept of society held by 
these scholars. He contrasts their views with a unique 
interpretation of the classical concept of community which is 
informed by the work of Arendt. Central to this interpretation of 
the classical Greek tradition is a particular view of man. 
Habermas and Arendt hold that for the Greeks, man was political 
by nature. Man's political nature was realised in the polis 
through communicative action (praxis), they argue. 
extends this thesis to the level of the concept of 
arguing that practical reason was realised in the 
Habermas 
reason by 
polis. For 
Habermas, practical rationality was achieved in the classical 
community through dialogue in the polis where the laws which 
circumscribed the daily activities of citizens were ratified 
through debate. Practical rationality was orientated toward the 
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prudential understanding of what was 
achieve a "good" and "just" way of 
to be done in order to 
life, he stresses. This 
concept of practical rationality, encompassing an orientation 
towards understanding, morality, critical reflection and 
consensus formation, can be seen as his first attempt to 
introduce a communicative dimension of rationality into social 
theory. 
One of Habermas' goals in his early work was that of 
investigating how and why the classical concept of practical 
reason was eclipsed in modern society. He holds that in the 
transition from community to society, the concept of practical 
rationality was reduced to technical and strategic rationality. 
He reaches this conclusion by arguing that the classical concept 
of practical action in the sense of moral communicative action 
(praxis) was reduced to action understood as a form of making 
(poiesis) and control. For Habermas, Aquinas, Machiavelli, More 
and Hobbes each contributed to this process in their conceptions 
of a rationally ordered society. He comes to the conclusion that 
for Aquinas a rationally ordered society was achieved through 
uncontested rulership. Here the criteria of order were held to be 
the norms of peace, tranquillity and obedience. Thus for Aquinas 
the "rationally" ordered society was based on norms which ensured 
rulership and domination. Habermas comes to a similar conclusion 
in his analysis of the work of Machiavelli, More and Hobbes. He 
rejects these scholars views, since for Habermas a rationally 
ordered society is based on the norms of freedom, equality and 
justice. Thus in this early work Habermas investigates the 
normative foundation of the concept of reason held by Aquinas, 
Machiavelli, More and Hobbes. 
I show how Habermas' argument with regard to Aquinas' work is 
not adequately substantiated. However, a crucial factor with 
regard to the concept of rationality is that Habermas introduces 
a communicative concept of power into the analysis. He hereby 
attempts to show that the concept of rationality held by 
Aquinas, Machiavelli, More and Hobbes was erroneous since 
domination and not freedom was its foundation. Habermas holds 
that in the transition from antiquity to modern society the 
domination of man by man via techniques of control became the 
criteria of a rationality ordered society. He says that, 
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"The real difficulty in the relation of theory to-praxis 
does not arise from the new function of science as 
technological force, but rather from the fact that we are no 
longer able to distinguish between practical and technical 
power. Yet even a civilization that has been rendered 
scientific is not granted dispensation from practical 
questions: therefore a peculiar danger arises when the 
process of scientification transgresses the limit of 
technical questions, without however, departing from the 
level of reflection of a rationality confined to the 
technological horizon. For then no attempt at all is made to 
attain rational consensus on the part of citizens concerned 
with the practical control of their destiny. Its place is 
taken by the attempt to attain technical control over 
history by perfecting the administration of society, an 
attempt which is just as impractical as it is unhistorical. 
When theory was still related to praxis in a genuine sense, 
it conceived of society as a system of action by human 
beings, who communicate through speech and thus must realize 
social intercourse within the context of conscious 
communication •••• a theory which confuses control with action 
is no longer capable of such a perspective. It understands 
society as a nexus of behavioural modes, for which 
rationality is mediated solely by understandini societal 
controls." (1974:255) 
Thus one of the important aspects of Habermas' early attempt to 
link theoretical rationality to practical rationality is the 
distinction between "practical power" (the communicative 
formation of power) and "technical power". Habermas argues that 
practical power is achieved through communicative action and 
consensus formation and that technical power (force) is the 
behaviourist, unreflective application of technical controls. 
This theme is highly suggestive but is not adequately 
substantiated. One could argue that forms of force could be 
ratified through debate. 
Another important thesis which is introduced but not explained 
adequately is that "society was conceived as a system of action" 
(1974:255). The reader is not told by whom society was conceived 
as a system of action such that theoretical reason and practical 
reason ~ere "genuinely" connected. Habermas implies that the 
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classical Greek society was understood as a "system of action". 
One can argue that in his unique interpretation of the classical 
Greek tradition, Habermas pre-supopses that society is a "system 
of action". The system of action which Habermas invokes in this 
early work derives from Hannah Arendt's understanding of action 
as a way of life (vita activa) in the Greek tradition. The 
trichotomous concept of action which Arendt develops in "The 
Human Condition" (1958) is pre-supposed in Habermas' assessment 
of the classical Greek tradition. This is evident from the manner 
in which Habermas uses the concepts communicative action 
("praxis"), work ( "poiesis"), craftsmanship ( "techne") , power 
and force. 
In chapter one I ~how . how Habermas comes to the conclusion 
that Machiavelli, More and Hobbes break through the barrier 
between communicative action and productive action (praxis and 
poiesis). These scholars adopt a model of action which for Arendt 
and Habermas means "acting in the mode of producing" (Arendt 
cited in Habermas 1974:60). Habermas stresses that for 
Machiavelli, More and Hobbes, the actor rationally selects 
specific means, legal techniques and strategies of force, in 
order to achieve an end defined as producing or making an ordered 
society. Rational action then is understood as a form of making, 
and the form of knowledge this entails is that of workmanlike 
skill (techne). Thus the "production" or "work" model of human 
action is central to the concepts of strategic and technical 
rationali~y in these theories of society. Thus the concept of 
rationality in Habermas' early work encompassing: 
1. Practical rationality 
2. Technical rationality 
3. Strategic rationality 
is clarified through a specific view of human agency. This view 
of human agency is based upon a reconstruction of the 
Aristotelian concept-s of "praxis" and "poeisis" understood as 
communicative action and productive action respectively. 
The links between the concept of rationality and the concepts of 
freedom, force, and pow~r in Habermas' early work remain at the 
level of suggestion and do not fulfil the conditions of 
explanation. 
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5.3 Theoretical Rationality and the Cessation of Action 
Habermas holds that theoretical rationality in the classical 
Greek tradition meant contemplation of the rationally ordered 
cosmos. This was achieved when communicative action ceased, he 
argues. Here the soul of man was mimetically brought into accord 
with the rational motion of the cosmos. He says: 
"Through the soul's likening itself to the ordered motion of 
the cosmos, theory enters the conduct of life. In ethos 
theory molds life to its form and is reflected in the 
conduct of those who subject themselves to its discipline. 
This concept of theory and of life in theory has defined 
philosophy since its beginnings. The distinction between 
theory in this traditional sense and theory in the sense of 
critique was the object of one of Max Horkheimer's most 
important studies. Today, a generation later, I should like 
to reexamine (sic) this theme, starting with Husserl's The 
Crisis of the European Sciences, which appea~ed- at about 
the same time as Horkheimer's" (1972:302) 
Habermas re-examined this theme, by distinguishing between 
practical and theoretical rationality on the basis of Arendt's 
distinction between an active way of life (vita activa) and a 
contemplative way of life (vita contemplativa). 
In "Theory and Practice" (1963 ·11974) he used this distinction 
in order to challenge Horkheimer's interpretation of the break 
with the classical tradition of politics. He concluded that 
Horkheimer's view of Machiavelli's theory of society was 
erroneous since theoretical reason as the contemplation of the 
cosmos was only eclipsed in a mechanistically conceived 
universe. This only came to the fore in the work of Hobbes, 
Habermas argued. 
In "Knowledge and Human Interests" 11971), which was published 
eight years after "Theory and Practice", Habermas invoked this 
distinction again in order to refute Schelling and Husserl's call 
for a revival of the classical· conc~pt of theory. He then uses 
this distinction to challenge authors who adhere to the 
"contemplative stance" which is analogous to the concept of 
theoretical reason in the classical Greek tradition in that the 
connection between knowledge, interest and action was disavowed. 
In "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1971), Habermas rejected the 
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"contemplative stance" in the work of Dilthey and Peirce which 
prevented them developing an adequate concept of rational 
reflection such that consensus formation could be accounted for. 
In his most recent assessment of Adorno and Horkheimer's work, 
Habermas says: 
"On the one hand, the theory takes on features of a rather 
traditional "contemplation" that renounces its relations to 
practice; at the same time, it cedes to art the competence 
to represent a reason that is now appealed to only 
indirectly."(1984:367) 
Thus, from his earliest to his most recent work, Habermas invo~es 
the catch phrase "c~:>ntemplative stance" or the "contemplative" 
concept of theoretical reason in his critique of other scholars 
work. Thus the distinction which Arendt makes between a 
contemplative way of life (vita contemplativa) and an active way 
of life (vita activa) is extended to the concept of rationality 
and is systematically used by Habermas in order to refute 
arguments where the concept of theoretical rationality disavows 
the connection between reason and action. 
The important aspect of this theme is that Habermas holds that 
the classical view of theory meant contemplation of the 
rationally ordered cosmos and that contemplation was achieved 
through mimesis or imitation. Habermas does not clarify the 
concept of mimesis. How the classical Greek philosopher brought 
"his soul into accord" with the rationally ordered universe by 
imitation is a mystery which Habermas does not explain. He 
invokes the obscure concept of mimesis in order to argue that the 
notion of a rationally ordered universe was an "objectivistic 
illusion" in antiquity. This does seem to be plausible, but, the 
relationship between the mimetic process itself and the illusion 
of a rationally ordered cosmos is not addressed. Habermas 
immediately proceeds to argue that contemplation in the classical 
Greek tradition was a form of emancipation from the irritating 
influences of man's interest in action. Once again, this highly 
plausible suggestion is not adequately substantiated. Thus 
Habermas' concept of theoretical rationality in the classical 
Greek tradition is based on a tenuous argument. His numerous 
charges against scholars who adhere to the "contemplative" view 
of theoretical reason are then also open to question. The catch 
phrase "contemplative stance" or "contemplative concept" of 
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reason has become a methodological tenet which Habermas invokes 
consistently in his critique of other scholars work. It is also a 
conclusion which is accepted without critique in secondary 
literature on Habermas's work (1). Habermas' extensive use of 
this catch phrase also contradicts his earlier view of the 
"genuine" relation between practical and theoretical rationality 
in the ciassical Greek tradition which was central to his 
introduction of a communicative concept of rationality into 
social theory. 
5.4 The Concept of Rationality in Relation to Human Agency in 
Habermas' Later and Recent works. 
Habermas' second attempt 
understood as the transition 
at articulating social change, 
from traditional to modern society, 
occurs in the complex critique of Marcuse and Weber's work. Here 
the distinction between communicative action and productive 
action is emphasised. This distinction is recast into a modern 
framework encompassing the philosophy of science, the Weberian 
concept of purposive rationality and sociological theory 
stressing roles, norms and sanctions. Habermas names this the 
distinction between work and interaction. He uses the 
work/interaction distinction (represented in ~igure 11 on the 
following page) to introduce a new concept of society and to 
reformulate Weber's concept of rationalization. Habermas holds 
that the "institutional framework" or "socio-cultural life-world" 
of society consists of norms-which guide symbolic interaction. 
This minimal definition of the life-world is further developed 
in his most recent work. 
stresses that subsystems 
economy and the state 
socio-cultural life-world 
In "Towards a Rational Society" he 
of purposive rational action (the 
apparatus) are "embedded" in the 
(Habermas 1971:94). Thus society is 
seen as a system of norms which "guide" interaction. 
Rationalization can then be shown to occur in two dimensions, 
Habermas argues. Namely rationalization from "above" and 
rationalization from "below". Rationalization from below is 
defined as the permeation of subsystems of instrumental and 
strategic action into the institutional framework of society. 
Instrumental and strategic rationality are seen to permeate 
realms such as the organisation of labour, trade, legal systems, 
financial, administrative and educative systems. 
Figure 11: 
Rules of 
Action 
Definition 
Aquisition 
Function of 
Action 
Violition 
of Rules 
Result in 
RATIONALIZATION 
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THE YDRK I INTERACTION DISTINCTION 
INTERACTION 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEW)RK 
Symbolic Interaction 
Social Norms 
Reciprocal Expectations 
about Behaviour 
Role Internalization. 
Maintenance of Institutions 
(confonnity to norms 
on the basis of reciprocal 
expectations and enforcement) 
Punishment via Conventional 
Sanctions: Failure against 
Authority 
EMANCIPATION,INDIVIDUATION; 
EXTENSION OF CCM1UNICATION 
FREE OF IXMINATION 
Source: Adaptation of Table in Habermas (1974:93) 
OORK 
SUBSYSTEMS OF PURPOSIVE-
RATIONAL ACTION 
Instrurrental and 
Strategic Action 
Technical Rules 
Conditional Predictions 
Iqieratives 
Learning skills and 
qualifications 
Problem-solving (goal 
attainment, defined in 
means-ends relations) 
Inefficiency: Failure in 
Reality 
GRa\TH OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES 
EXTENSION OF TECHNICAL 
CONTROL AND~ 
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Rationalization from below thus means that progress in the 
productive forces is accompanied by the permeation of technical 
and scientific forms of control into the various realms of the 
life-world. Rationalization from above means that traditional 
world views lose their legitimacy and are transformed via the 
critique of tradition into secular, scientific modes of 
apprehending the world. This is also accompanied by the potential 
for the emancipation of the individual from dogmatism and for 
communication free from domination, Habermas argues. He calls for 
a clear distinction between the rationalization of communicative 
action and the rationalization of productive action. 
Rationalization of productive action entails an increase in 
instrumental rationality in that efficient, effective and. 
calculable means to achieve ends are increasingly 
institutionalized in the life-world. Habermas holds that 
rationalization at the level of communicative action entails 
unrestricted, public critique of the permeation of instrumental 
rationality into the life-world. This thesis remains at the level 
of suggestion. In "Knowledge and Human Interests", he attempts 
to clarify and extend this thesis at the methodological level of 
analysis by invoking Freud's concept of therapeutic dialogue. He 
fails to explain just what communicative rationality entails at 
the societal level of analysis. One of his aims in the early and 
later work is to show that society is not totally rationalized 
by the permeation of instrumental reason into all spheres of life 
as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse hold. I show how Haberrnas 
refutes this one-dimensional thesis of rationalization in 
Marcuse's work by invoking Arendt's view that communicative 
action is one of the fundamental conditions of life. In contrast 
to the Frankfurt scholars, Habermas consistently holds that 
men/women's claim to reason cannot be silenced. He says that as 
long as people talk to one another with the intention of reaching 
consensus, claims to equality, justice and freedom from 
domination cannot be totally suppressed. I show, amongst other 
things, that Habermas' complex analysis of rationalization from 
above and below is limited to the level of description and that 
he is not able to explain why the change from traditional to 
modern society occurs. 
critique of Marcuse's 
I also show how Habermas bases his 
concept of rationality upon Arendt's 
trichotomous view of a life of action. Habermas comes to the 
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conclusion that Weber, Marcuse and Parsons adopt a subjective 
approach to the concept of rationality in that they see 
rationality as an "attitude" towards action. In his most recent 
work he argues that Adorno and Horkheimer also understand 
rationality as an "attitude" towards action. This notion of 
rationality as an "attitude" toward action is one of the major 
themes which Habermas attempts to obviate in his later works. 
He approaches this complex question by re-thinking or 
re-formulating the Enlightenment scholars' premise that reason 
encompasses the will to achieve autonomy, justice and 
responsibility. The crucial question for Habermas becomes that of 
articulating this will to achieve autonomy, justice and 
responsibility in a non-idealistic .fashion. He opposes the 
Hegelian view of reason dynamically actualizing itself in 
history. This notion of reason is unconvincing in the light of 
the horrors which the peoples of the world, and the German nation 
in particular, have experienced in the twentieth century. 
Another dimension of this question is that of the unprecedented 
progress of the natural sciences, independent of the metaphysics 
of reason. How then is rationality to be understood? Is the 
epigraph of modernity nothing more than the progressive 
permeation of a purposive, value neutral instrumental reason into 
all spheres of life, culminating in the "iron cage" of an 
instrumentally rational world devoid of meaning? Habermas 
rejects this universalization of the means-ends notion of 
rationality which Weber, Adorno and Horkheimer bequest to social 
theory. Here the technical organization of the society is judged 
to entail an increase in purposive rationality for Weber, a 
decrease in rationality for Horkheimer and the eclipse of 
rationality for Adorno. Here women/ men as communicative actors 
are eclipsed by the monological orientation of men/ women the 
tool-makers. Habermas argues that one approach to the concept of 
rationality is via the insights of the Enlightenment thinkers in 
a manner which incorporates the rationality internal to the 
empirical and hermeneutic sciences and clearly locates the limits 
to the forms of rationality central to each form of science. The 
instrumental rationality of the empirical sciences can provide 
cures for cancer one day, can enable women to smile through the 
labour of childbirth through the use of epidural anaesthesia but 
this is achieved through a monological form of abstract language. 
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Men/Women the speakers, communicating in a non-strategic, 
non-violent manner surely cannot be limited to the uniform mode 
of abstract, symbolic language. Thus the dialogic form of 
language usage whereby unique individuals show themselves 
through expression and action need not be eclipsed by the form of 
rationality internal to the empirical- analytic sciences. The 
central premise here is that the instrumental rationality of the 
empirical analytic sciences and practical rationality of the 
historic-hermeneutic sciences are not disavowed as mere 
"manifestations" of absolute reason, as Hegel would have said. 
Habermas rejects the Hegelian concept of universal reason. Thus 
the conce~t of rationality in Habermas work cannot be understood 
as a modern form of Hegelianism. Habermas is not, as scholars 
such as Bubner hold, attempting to develop a comprehensive, all 
inclusive concept of rationality. Bubner claims that Habermas' 
endeavour is that of displaying the "self movement of reason" as 
it traverses the various stages of reflection in "Knowledge and 
Human Interests" (1982:55). He sees Habermas as striving to 
free himself from the 
"tradition of a divided concept of reason. He is seeking to 
construct a dialectical unity, by presenting every theory 
that is distinct from practical reason as a false 
appearance which must be overcome". 
(.Bubner 1982:55 emphasis in text). 
Habermas would call this "epistemological imperialism", which is 
his charge against Hegel. In the discussion of the empirical-
analytic sciences for instance, the concept of instrumental 
rationality is held to be rooted in the pre-scientific realm of 
purposive rational action 
the technical interest to 
and is certainly not held 
work or poiesis). It is related via 
the methodological realm of inquiry 
to be a "false" form of reason. 
Habermas does not view this form of rationality as surface 
"appearance" which must be overcom~ by the "movement" of the 
concept of practical rationality held by the men/women of wisdom. 
The knowledge constitutive interest in emancipation is an 
attempt to relate, but does not eclipse, the forms rationality 
internal to the empirical and hermeneutic sciences. I stress that 
Habermas attempts to clarify the forms of rationality internal 
to the sciences and to indicate their limits. He holds that 
scientific progress depends on instrumental rationality and that 
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the communication between scientists, at the meta-theoretical 
level of analysis, requires communicative rationality for 
consensus formation. Thus one concept of rationality cannot be 
subsumed under the other. Habermas' most recent statement with 
regard to this misconception that he attempts to cede primacy to 
one all inclusive concept of practical rationality is as 
follows: 
"problems can be sorted out in terms of questions having to 
do with truth, justice, or taste. Only at the cost of 
Occidental rationalism itself could we rescind the 
differentiation of reason into those rationality complexes 
to which Kant's three critiques of reason refer. Nothing is 
further from my intention than to make myself an advocate 
of such a regression, to conjure up the substantial unity 
of reason" (1983:235) 
In his most recent work Habermas distinguishes between cognitive-
instrumental, moral-practical and aesthetic rationality. Piaget's 
decentration thesis is invoked to explain how adults are able to 
adopt differentiated and reflective attitudes toward the 
objective, social and subjective "worlds". 
If one approaches the complex concept of communicative 
rationality in Habermas' most recent work from what I name the 
Perspective of Communicative Judgement and Life-world, one is 
able to show how he grounds his concept of communicative 
rationality upon a theory of communicative judgement - what 
Habermas calls "argumentation theory". Here Habermas connects the 
conditions for the validity of utterances to what Arendt calls 
the "standard" of reflective judgement. Namely, the formal 
declaration of "approbation and dis~pprobation", the "Yes/No" 
response of the communicating subject (Arendt 1982:69). Habermas 
stresses that when validity claims are implicitly or explicitly 
raised, the listener ONLY has the choice of accepting or 
rejecting these criticizable claims in the light of reasons held 
by communicating subjects. He distinguishes between taking a 
"Yes/No" position on validity claims and the "Yes/No" response to 
imperatives. For Habermas imperatives are "normatively 
unauthorised demands" and a "Yes/No" on such demands amounts to 
complying with, or refusing to comply with, the will of another" 
(Habermas 1984:38). The four universal validity claims are held 
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to be the universal conditions for the possibility qf 
unconstrained consensus between at least two communicating 
subjects. When the claims to validity are not operative, 
consensus breaks down and the conditions for the possibility of 
understanding and meaning are abrogated. Habermas thus grounds 
his concept of communicative rationality upon a concept of 
reflective judgement deriving from the work of Arendt. where the 
criterion of communicative judgement is its communicability and 
its standard is the formal declaration of approval or disapproval 
with accompanying reasons. The three rationality complexes can 
then be connected to the three attitudes which subjects adopt in 
apprehending their world through the concept of learning, which 
Habermas holds is "interwoven" with grounding. 
In "Knowledge and Human interests" Habermas attempted to ground 
the concept of rationality at the methodological level of 
analysis through the Freudian concept of psychotherapeutic 
dialogue. One of the condition- for the possibility of reflective 
consciousness in the psychotherapeutic dialogue was the Socratic 
question and answering process where the patient said "Yes I No" 
to the interpretation constituted as therapy progressed. 
Habermas was not able to develop this theme at the societal level 
of analysis. He was also criticised for 
of the psychotherapeutic dialogue in 
the asymmetrical nature 
that the patient and 
therapist are not equal partners in the dialogue situation. When 
the Perspective of Communicative Judgement and Life-World are in 
focus, the so called "linguistic turn" in his work can be seen in 
a new light. Habermas no longer attempts to ground the concept of 
rationality in a philosophy of reflective consciousness· but 
rather upon a unique interpretation of reflective judgement 
deriving from the work of Arendt. The "Yes/No" response of the 
patient in therapeutic dialogue is now understood as the "Yes/ 
No" response which ensues between at least two subjects engaged 
in argumentation. Implicit in the therapeutic dialogue situation 
were the Enlightenment ideals of responsibility, freedom and 
equality. These ideals are subsequently incorporated in the 
theory of Universal Pragmatics via the conditions of symmetry and 
reciprocity as the conditions under which the forms of 
argumentation take place. Habermas stresses that the conditions 
of symmetry and reciprocity facilitate "rationally motived" 
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consensus formation in theoretical and practical discourse 
situations. He argues that the subjects behave rationally when 
they exhibit their willingness to expose themselves to criticism 
and learn from mistakes made. There is a basic dilemma here. 
Participants enter into argumentation when the established 
background consensus becomes problematical or is challenged. Yet 
the formal conditions of argumentation stipulate that all 
motives, except the search for truth are suspended. Here Habermas 
pre-supposes the validity of unimpaired intersubjectivity. The 
pre-supposition is made that mutual recognition between 
conflicting parties is a condition for the possibility of 
redemption of validity claims. Yet the conflict may be such that 
that mutual recognition is not possible due to inequalities such 
as wealth, access to power and the differential status positions 
of subjects. The formal conditions of symmetry and reciprocity do 
not simply eliminate these real inequalities.which do pertain to 
the life situations of subjects. Emotional, erotic, access to 
power, status or other factors which participants bring with 
them into the argumentation process cannot be simply "suspended" 
at will or through a formal rule which is stipulated by a 
scholar. The "willingness" of subjects to compromise and be 
"reasonable" rather than dog'matic or "deaf to the argument" in 
the face of a eloquently presented argument may well endanger 
true univer~alism. 
Giddens object to 
Scholars 
fact that 
such as Livesay, Kernberg 
unconscious motives are 
and 
not 
considered in Habermas' recent work which focuses on the rational 
reconstruction of the communicative rationality. The prevalence 
of the narcisstic personality in modern society, who strives for 
recognition at any cost and who is profoundly dependent on the 
admiration of others represents an important factor in the 
formation of intersubjective recognition which Habermas does not 
consider. Livesay says: 
"Not only do_ the narcissist's intense envy of, lack of 
empathy for, and need to exploit others prevent the 
realization of genuine intersubjective understanding and 
frame all social action in desperately strategic terms, but 
they also threaten the accomplishment of decentration that 
Habermas sees as the very hallmark of modernity with a 
recentration of the world in the egocentric perspective of 
the narcissist." (1985:80) 
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His answer would be that psychopathology is accommodated in his 
concept of psychoanalytic critique and does not pertain to the 
rationality of discourse formation. If one accepts this argument, 
one could well ask Habermas whether there are any identifiable 
subjects in modern society who are "normal enough" to enter into 
argumentation and achieve communicative rationality. 
However, the so called "linguistic turn" in·critical theory is 
a misnomer. There is rather, a "turn" from reflective 
consciousness to reflective, communicative judgement. Habermas' 
abstract "linguistic" work over the past fifteen years can be 
seen as an attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the conditions for the possibility of communicative 
Judgement? 
2. How does men/women's capacity for communicative judgement 
develop in the horizontal and vertical directions in the 
self-formative process of mankind? 
By addressing these questions, Habermas attempts, via new means, 
to answer the question which has been thematic from his earliest 
work. Namely, that of clarifying a concept of communicative 
rationality which corresporids to men/women's capacity for 
communicative action. 
Habermas holds that when the concept of rationality is placed 
within a perspective which emphasises communicative action rather 
than action as means to an end, instrumental, practical and 
aesthetic forms of rationality can be accounted for. He argues 
that the rationalization of society then no longer means that 
instrumental rationality permeates the realm of communicative 
action thus transforming the institu~ional frame-work or the 
life-world into subsystems of purposive rational action. The 
point of reference is rather the potential for rationality which 
is rooted in the "validity basis of speech" (Habermas 1984:340). 
He holds that this potential can never be silenced but can be 
"activated depending on the degree of rationalization. of 
knowledge incorporated into world views" (Habermas 1984:340). To 
the extent that actors adopt an objectivating, norm-conformative 
and expressive attitudes toward the objective, social and 
subjective worlds respectively, and there is an increase in 
knowledge through the validation of validity claims raised, and 
an increase in rationality occurs. Thus rationalization can be 
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shown to occur in three dimensions. Namely as the increase in 
cognitive-instrumental, moral practical and aesthetic 
rationality. Here the concept of rationality is 
distinguished from the attitudes which subjects adopt. 
forms of 
clearly 
Habermas uses the concept of communicative rationality and its 
grounding in communicative judgement to refute Adorno, Horkheimer 
and Lukacs' view of rationalization as reification. He 
concludes that these writers universalise the objectivating 
attitude and cognitive-instrumental rationality in their analysis 
of modern society. This stems from their adherence to the work 
model of human action where means-ends form of rationality is 
thematic. The communicative model of human action is not 
considered by these scholars. Horkheimer is shown to hold a 
concept of understanding where the subject acts according to 
technical imperatives. Subjects thus act on the basis of a form 
of rationality which for Habermas is an arbitrary reaction to the 
will of another. Habermas thus rejects Horkheimer's concept of 
understanding by invoking the "rational core" of his concept of 
communicative rationality. Namely the "Yes/No" response of the 
communicative men/women capable of reflective judgement. Habermas 
similarly invokes this fundamental aspect of his concept of 
communicative rationality to stress that understating and meaning 
are united through the interpreter's judgement of the validity 
claims raised by the actors of a alien community. This "rational 
core" of Habermas' concept of communicative rationality has 
become a second methodological tenet which Habermas consistently 
invokes in his critique of other scholars work. It is the key to 
his critique of the works of Parsons, Mead, Durkheim, Luhmann, 
the Frankfurt scholars, Foucault, Battaille, Lyotard and a host 
of other writers in his most recent work. Thus what I have named 
the Perspective of Communicative Judgement and Life-world is one 
way of coming to grips with the complex concept of communicative 
rationality in Habermas' work. In the final analysis, Habermas 
re-reformulates the Enlightenment concept of rationality through 
an integration of the work of Arendt with that of Weber, Piaget 
and Schutz. Central to the concept of rationality in Habermas' 
work are the reformulation of the Aristotelian concepts of 
praxis and "poiesis", the reformulation of the Kantian concept of 
judgement, the concept of the life-world and the decentration 
thesis of Piaget. 
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Notes To Introduction 
1. Habermas' major works can be roughly divided in to the early, 
later and recent periods. 
Early Works completed between 1960 and 1967 
"Toward i Rational Society" 
written in the 1960's 
(1971) a collection of essays 
"Theory and Practice" (1974) First published in 1963. 
Later Works completed between 1968 and 1979 
"Knowledge and Human Interests" 
in 1968. 
"Legitimation Crisis" (1976) 
(1972) First published in 
"Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979) 
Recent works completed after 1980 
"The Theory of Communicative Action.vol 1: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society" (1984(a)). 
"The Theory of Communicative Action.vol 2: The Critique of 
Functionalist Reason" (1987). 
"The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity" (1987). 
See note 1 in Notes to Chapter 
secondary literature with regard 
from the work of Arendt. 
1 for a brief overview of the 
to the perspective gleaned 
2. Honneth, Knodler-Bunte and Widmann recently interviewed 
Habermas inquiring into his intellectual development and the 
motivation behind his work. Habermas consistently invoked the 
study on the Jewish philosophers in response to the 
interviewers questions. He emphasised the "rupture which 
still gapes" twenty five years after this work was first 
published. I regard this response as providing enough 
evidence to cast aside my usual caution when it comes to 
making connections between a scholar's work and the 
"psychological/biographical" factors which are known about a 
scholar. Habermas clearly indicates that these connections are 
pertinent to his endeavour. , 
See Habermas (1986:1;36;38;68;74;75.) 
The experience of fascism certainly had an important effect 
on the work of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school 
and the younger critical theorists who developed their work in 
this tradition. I reject Connerton's strong thesis that 
fascism totally determined the contours of their view of 
society. See Connerton (1980) 
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3. Martin Jay (1973), David Held (1980), Judith Marcus and Zoltan 
Tar (1984), present three interpretations of what has come to 
be named the "Frankfurt School" of critical theory. Tar 
agrees with Lubasz's view that Jay's study is not a history of 
the school but rather a descriptive "chronicle of 
reminiscences and tends to ignore the real social and 
historical forces which shape the fate of the school and ••• its 
place in European intellectual history" (1984:17). 
Habermas' interpretation of the demise of its programs in 
1941 confirms this interpretation of Jay's work. 
See Habermas (1984 (c):64) 
Jay argues that the "school" ceased to exist due to financial 
problems. Lubasz documents the considerable budget of 100, 000 
dollars a year which was allocated to research during a 
period of economic depression. Tar argues that an accurate 
history of the institute has not been written as yet. 
4. Scholars associated with the Institute of Social research, 
established by Hermann Weil in 1923, and contributing to the 
critical theory of society are: Erich Fromm, Franz Neumann, 
Otto Kirchheimer, Henryk Grossmann, Arkadji, Gurland and Franz 
Neumann. Walter Benjamin was always an "outsider" due to 
Adorne's view of his "wide eyed empiricism" and "questionable 
association" (in Adorne's view that is) with the work of 
Brecht. Adorno benefited greatly from Benjamin's work as is 
documented by scholars such as Susan Buck-Mors. 
See Buck-Mors (1972) "Origin of Negative Dialects: Theodor 
Adorno Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt School" 
See Ronald Taylor (ed) "Aesthetics and Politics: Debates 
Between Bloch, Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno" 
(1977:105;127-150), for the primary sources on the 
relationship between Benjamin and Adorno and resulting in the 
suppression and dilution of Benjamin's the work on Baudelaire. 
Benjamin's theses on the philosophy of history were edited 
and published fifteen years after they were written. Shortly 
before Benjamin committed suicide, they were given to Adorno. 
Hannah Arendt was responsible for ensuring that these crucial 
works, which had a major impact upon critical theory, were 
edited and made public. 
See Elizabeth Young Bruehl (1982:166-168). 
Notes to Chapter 1 
1. Richard Bernstein (1976:259 note21) notes that Habermas 
acknowledges his debt to Arendt with regard to the distinction 
between "techne" and "praxis" in the work of Aristotle. He 
says that Arendt and Habermas attempt to unravel conceptual 
confusions which occur in the transition from antiquity to 
modernity, but he does not systematically analyze this 
problematic. He extracts aspects of Habermas' critique and 
·compares these with other aspects drawn from "Dogmatism, 
Reason, and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in Our Scientific 
Civilization" (Habermas 1974:253). Bernstein presents these 
aspects to the reader in fragmentary form drawing from related 
but different arguments. The specific relationship between 
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the work of Habermas and that of Arendt is not dealt with. 
Bernstein leaves out more than -half of Habermas' critique of 
the classical tradition of politics in relation to modern 
social philosophy. Namely the transition from the Classical 
period through the Medieval period to the break with tradition 
where the works of Aquinas, Machiavelli and More are 
discussed. 
Richard Brenstein (1983) develops a detailed comparison 
between Arendt, Habermas, Gadamer, and Rorty, in a general 
sense insofar as their work is seen to be converging toward a 
theory of rationality. Similarities and differences are drawn 
between the key concepts descriptively. Bernstein's aim is to 
compare the four theorists in a broad external way without 
exploring the internal relationships which certainly is of 
paramount importance with regard to Habermas who 
self-consciously draws from the insights of Arendt and 
Gadamer. 
Seyla Benhabib (1986) is aware of the importance of Arendt's 
concepts in Habermas' work. She writes in a manner which not 
only indicates the integration of this domain into her 
theoretical horizon, but relies heavily on Arendt's concepts 
of plurality, interpretative indeterminacy, notion of 
subjectivity and the praxis, techne, poiesis distinctions in 
her critique of Hegel, Marx and the Critical Theorists 
including Habermas. Arendt is relegated to a footnote. 
David Held (1980) accepts the conclusions of Habermas' early 
version of the public sphere and then focuses on issues raised 
in "Technology and Science a~ Ideology" which incorporate the 
insights gained in "Theory and Practice." The derivation of 
the basic distinctions between purposive rational action and 
communicative action is hence not dealt with. The work of 
Arendt is not mentioned. 
Thomas McCarthy (1978) describes the variations in Greek 
terminology pertaining to this domain and then proceeds in a 
manner similar to Bernstein in that he draws from later essays 
without addressing the derivation of Habermas' basic concept 
of action (praxis) and its relation to the concept of 
rationality. Arendt is not mentioned in his extensive study of 
Habermas' work. 
John Thompson (1982), (1983) briefly mentions Habermas' 
conclusions with regard to the critique of Hobbes' conception 
of political science in relation to the Classical Doctrine of 
Politics, but does not discuss the derivation of these 
conclusions. 
Alex Honneth (1982) discusses the importance of Arendt's work 
to the concept of action. He misunderstands her basic concepts 
in his attempt to reformulate the concept of praxis. 
Notes to Chapter 1 
Wellmer (1971), like 
Arendt's concepts to 
from Arendt's work 
Habermas' concepts 
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Benhabib, is aware of 
the work of Habermas. 
but does not discuss 
in relation to the 
the importance of 
He similarly draws 
the derivation of 
work of Arendt. 
The following scholars do not deal with this aspect of 
Habermas' work at all: Whitebook (1979); Schroyer (1973); 
Heller (1982); Hesse (1982); Lukes (1982); Misgeld (1976); 
Geuss (1981); Giddens (1985) (1976 (a)) (1976 (b) (1982). 
O'Neill (1972) develops a phenomenological critical theory 
which he notes is "in the spirit" of Arendt's work. A large 
group of scholars embrace O'Neill's approach but an assessment 
of Habermas' work in this regard is not made. 
Sensat (1979) is one of the few scholars who does not simply 
equate Habermas' concept of praxis with that of Aristotle. 
Sensat realizes that a communicative or linguistic dimension 
is emphasised by Habermas which does not come to the fore in 
Aristotle's works. 
Jay (1985 (a)) develops an historico-pohilosophical assessment 
Arendt's work. He notes Habermas' interest in her 
communicative concept of praxis, but does not analyse this 
aspect of Habermas' work. . 
Jay holds that Arendt refuses~ to criticise Heidegger. This is 
erroneous since she consistently develops critiques of 
totalitarian arguments. She holds that Heidegger's work is a 
prime example of totalitarian reasoning. Her critique of the 
concept of necessity as internal to these forms of logic is 
pervasive. As Bernstein says, "In almost everything that 
Arendt wrote she was carrying on a battle against all forms of 
totalizing and necessaritarian arguments, whether they have 
their roots in Hegelian, Marxist, Weberian, or the new, 
cooler, technocratic modes of thought" (1983:211). 
2. See Habermas (1971:286 note 4); (1977); (1980) (1983:note 18: 
410; note 15:423); (1983:18 note 410; 15 note 425); (1983:269) 
3. I briefly interpret Arendt's perspective by following 
Gadamer's notion that statements can be seen as answers to 
questions. I rely on Arendt's public addresses which Young 
Bruehl (1984) has transcribed and short notes which Arendt 
writes explaining her methodology. I attempt to obviate the 
prevalent misconception that Arendt's work is nothing but 
"Hellenic nostalgia". This certainly appears to be the case 
if one extracts, as I do, parts of her argument and focuses on 
the details of one aspect such as the transition from 
"community" to "society" without placing this in the context 
of her project as a whole. O'Sullivan (1976) dismisses 
Arendt's work as "Neo-Aristotelianism" and "Hellenic 
Nostalgia". 
Knauer (1985) echos this conclusion. He seems to have 
misunderstood Arendt's view of praxis. 
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4. For Arendt, the central dimension of totalitarianism is the 
"denial of the spatial and temporal requirements of freedom" 
(Arendt cited Young Bruehl 1984:253) 
See Bruno Bettelheim "The Informed Heart" (1951) for an in 
depth analysis of depersonalization in the concentration camps 
of Dauchau and Buchenwald where he was incarcerated for a year 
prior to the termination of the war. He is in agreement with 
Arendt on this point. He is in agreement with her analysis of 
Eichmann as an example of a man who's capacity for 
communicative reason and judgement had atrophied. Bettelheim 
later devoted his energies toward the essential features in 
the establishment of meaning as it develops through the 
child's exposure to fairy tails. See "The Uses Of Enchaniment, 
The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tails" (1976) 
5. Bernstein (1983) in his discussion of Habermas, Gadamer Rorty 
and Arendt on the theory of rationality, reminds the reader 
"that we must not forget how deeply she was affected by the 
charismatic influence of Heidegger" (1983:179). I do not see 
how one can understand Arendt's political theory and its 
"movement" toward a "theory of rationality", unless one 
clearly distinguishes her critique of Heidegger's 
existentialism from the new political theory she worked 
towards with Jaspers. Arendt sees Heidegger as the 
philosopher who turned away from the question of men as acting 
beings through his concept of historicity. Habermas and 
Marcuse hold similar views on the concept of historicity in 
the work of Heidegger. 
See Habermas (1981:53-61); Marcuse (1960). 
Arendt's critique of Heidegger's existentialism is contained 
in two essays. The first, ftWhat is Existence Philosophy?" 
(1926) has not been translated into English. I rely heavily on 
Young Bruehl's (1984:219) translation of parts of this paper 
in my understanding of Arendt's work. 
See Young Bruehl (1984:302-308) for Arendt's critique of 
Heidegger's notion of historicity - Arendt sees Heidegger's 
work as: 
!."Egotistical and grandiose - making Man what God was 
earlier ontology". (Arendt cited Young 
1984:218-219) 
in 
Bruehl 
2. Deceptive: "Heidegger's ontology hides a rigid 
functionalism in which Man appears only as a conglomerate 
of modes of being." (Arendt cited Young Bruehl 1984:218) 
3."Rigidly systematic and most important contrary to the 
tradition of freedom and concern for humanity which Arendt 
admired in Kant and in the early ideals of the French 
revolution." (Young Bruehl 1984:218-219) 
Arendt holds that the existentialism of Jaspers, which was 
largely influenced by Max Weber's work, is in accord with 
her own work. Arendt's work is: 
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1. Based upon an understanding of language as the medium 
through which communicative action and the communicative 
formation of power occurs. Habermas develops this insight 
of Arendt. 
2. Orientated toward the development of a new concept of 
"subjectivity" which explicitly rejects the prevalent 
notions of subjectivity entailing Man as the universal 
subject of history. Habermas embraces Arendt's view of 
intersubjectivity and points out that a higher order of 
subjectivity is not attainable. (Habermas 1980:128) 
3. Arendt self-consciously draws on the work of Kant who never 
takes the distinctions between ruler/ruled, human 
singularity/plurality and or those who act and those who 
obey for granted. Kant sees all men as capable of action 
and judgment. Arendt's thesis that all men are capable of 
judgement is central to Habermas' most recent concept of 
communicative rationality as I show in chapter four. 
Therefore, Bernstein's" reminder" is unwittingly misleading. 
His "historical Interlude" which aims at clarifying the 
"intellectual traditions and experiences that have shaped" the 
thinking of Arendt, Gadamer, .Habermas and Rorty, is thus 
incomplete and could lead to a misunderstanding of Arendt's 
position (Bernstein1983:176). 
6. This clearly comes to the fore in his debates with critics 
such as_Anthony Giddens, Steven Lukes and Mary Hesse. Giddens 
has difficulty in understanding the distinctions which 
Habermas makes between the concepts, work, communicative 
action and power in his discussion of communicative 
rationality. Habermas invokes Arendt's concept of power in 
his answer to Giddens. See note 15. 
7. In Aristotle's primary works the issue becomes more complex 
in that he does not simply define his concepts but develops 
them through a comparison of the_ range of possibilities by 
what can be named "genetic" and "analytic" procedures. The 
"genetic" approach characterises the first and book of the 
"Politics". Here Aristotle discusses the genesis of the polis 
in detail. For Aristotle, the polis develops "by nature" from 
the "natural" association between man and wife, through the 
"true nature of the family "through the village to the 
ultimate end of man's "nature", the polis. The guiding thread 
is that "nature always aims at bringing out the best" 
(Aristotle 1958:5:1253a). The analytic discussions entail the 
detailed division of a phenomenon into its parts and the 
relation between the elements is considered in a functional 
manner. Here the polis is discussed in terms of the citizen 
and his functions relative to the state, the classes of 
people, and forms of government. See Book 111 of the 
"Politics" (Aristotle 1958:95-137) 
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8. See for example Ernest Barker (1981) "He [Aristotle], always 
regards the slave as being possessed of the semi-rational part 
of the soul, •.•• the slave is therefore a creature possessed of 
desire - of will, and spirit and appetite. The rule of reason 
over desire is only the political rule of a statesman over 
his fellows." (1958:365 ) 
For Hegel, rationality is the essence of the ethical community 
which he strives for through the concept of labour which 
dialectically overcomes natural desire. 
9 See for example the work of Veach. H. (1974) and the source 
which he uses extensively, Ross. w. (1956) 
10.The only other modern theorists [as 
ascertain] beside Arendt and Habermas 
far as I 
who read 
am able to 
the thesis -
man is by nature a political being ("zoon politikon") in this 
manner are David Frisby and Derek Sayer in their study of the 
concept society in: "Society" (1986). Their interpretation of 
association in Hegel's Jena Philosophy seems to me to stem 
directly from that of Habermas which is a "linguistic" reading 
of Hegel's early work and certainly unique in its orientation. 
I thus hold that Frisby and Sayer present Habermas and 
Arendt's understanding of "political association" in 
Aristotle's theory. 
11.This is the basis upon which Benhabib (1984:46-223) builds her 
critique of Hegel, Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer through what 
she calls the philosophy of the subject where the subject of 
history becomes an abstraction "Mankind". 
She says that: 
"History {for Hegel} can b~ 
collective singular subject 
subsequently "re-appropriates 
(Benhabib 1984:47). 
viewed as the activity of a 
that exteriorizes itself and 
what it has exteriorized". 
Benhabib notes her debt to Arendt, but Arendt's work is not 
thematic. 
12.I realize that this sounds as though Arendt focuses upon the 
early Marx of the philosophical and economic manuscripts but 
this is misleading. Arendt develops a critique of Marx of the 
Grundrisse as well as the author of Capital. She also deals 
with the labour movements and the labour theory of value. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to discuss this aspect of 
her work. For an interesting application of the insights of 
Arendt's critique, See Benhabib (1986). Based upon Arendt's 
distinction between work and labour, Benhabib, speaks of the 
"work model of action" and its inadequacy in Marx's early and 
late works. Why is this model of action inadequate? Because, 
Benhabib answers, it is not able to capture the plurality of 
human intersubjectivity internal to communicative action, 
which in fact is Arendt's bequest to critical theory and the 
basis of her critique of Marx. Benhabib's argument is far 
more sophisticated than that of Arendt in that she emphasises 
the expressivist model of human agency as clarified by Charles 
Taylor in his study of Hegel. Benhabib moves beyond this model 
by applying Arendt's insights to Marx's categories and comes 
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to the same conclusions as Arendt. I emphasise Arendt's basic 
concepts as I aim to show how they are used by Habermas. 
14.Arendt points out that the domination of other beings through 
the institutions of slavery and the household is legitimated 
on the grounds of necessity. The polis is not a figment of 
Aristotle's imagination but it is an historical "fact" that 
the polis was institutionalised after the destruction of all 
institutions grounded upon kinship. 
See Arendt (1958:25); See R. Graves (1981:12, 29, 46) "Greek 
Myths". The official religion of the Greek city-state was that 
of Homer and the Olympian Gods. The older religion of the 
household and the family was seen to be inferior by Greeks of 
Aristotle's time. Hestia, the goddess of the city hearth, 
ceded her place in the assembly of twelve Olympian Gods to 
Dionysos. She maintained her "glory" or positive evaluation 
on condition that she abstained from all wars, disputes or 
public deliberation. She was then sanctified as the Goddess of 
peace and tranquillity. 
15.Habermas retains this insight in his most recent work. His 
most recent statement with regard to the concept of power is 
that he is attempting to integrate Arendt's communicative 
concept of power with the concepts of power held by Talcott 
Parsons and Max Weber. He aims at distinguishing between the 
communicative generation of power and the institutionalization 
of illegitimate forms of power which he names force. He says: 
"I am inclined to agree with Hannah Arendt in regarding 
communicatively shared convictions as the source of legitimate 
power ••• if one . introduces the concept of force as an 
alternative to the action-co-ordinating mechanism of reaching 
understanding, and power as the product of action oriented 
toward reaching understanding, one gains the advantage of 
being able to grasp forms of indirectly exercised force that 
predominate today." (Habermas 1982:269) 
This citation derives from Habermas' response to his critics 
Giddens, Lukes and Hesse who are not aware of the impact of 
Arendt's concepts upon Habermas' work. This orientation is 
discernible in the early critique of Machiavelli's work and 
has direct baring on the concept of rationality as I point out 
in the analysis. The relationship between Habermas' concept of 
rationality and the concepts of force and power has not been 
assessed in the secondary literature as far as I am aware. 
16.See note 12. Where Benhabib is mentioned with regard to the 
"work model of action" 
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1. I rely on the work of Max Weber (1971;1974;1978), Seyla 
Benhabib (1981) and Roger Brubaker (1984) in the depiction of 
Weber's work. 
Commentaries on the concept "rationalization processes" in 
Habermas' early work, invoke the work of Lukacs as the link 
between the Critical Theorists (Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse) and the reception of Weber's work. 
See Benhabib(1986:182); Mc earthy 1978:19); Wellmer (1977:245) 
This reference to Lukacs does not apply to the content of the 
early work of Habermas and Marcuse. Lukacs' notion of 
reification of consciousness is not operative iri this work of 
Habermas although he does indicate that he read Lukacs at the 
age of sixteen. Habermas develops a critique of Lukacs' work 
some ten years after the early work which I deal with in 
chapter two. Habermas directly invokes Weber's concept of 
rationality and attempts to develop his own concept of 
rationality from the perspective dealt with in chapter one. 
Marcuse discusses the formal concept of rationality and it's 
limits, in the two essays: 
i."Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max 
·weber" (1968:201-226). 
ii."From Negative To Positive Thinking: Technological 
Rationality and the logic of Domination"((1964:119-139). 
Lukacs' notion of rationalization as the reification of 
consciousness does not form the basis of the argument at all. 
Marcuse does mention reification but this does not seem to 
have much relation to Lukacs' notion of reification. 
Thus theorists like Benhabib and McCarthy distort the analysis 
in the direction of a simple one-dimensional notion of 
rationalization as reification without placing the the 
specific concepts in context. 
2. In his most recent work,"The Theory of Communicative Action" 
(1984) Habermas does asses Weber's concept of rationality in 
detail.I therefore do not enter into a critique of the early 
work and the Weberian concept of rationality from the 
viewpoint of whether the interpretation is adequate.This would 
entail a vast study in itself,given the numerous distinctions 
Weber makes.Namely the tensions between formal and substantive 
rationality,between "objective" and "subjective" rationality 
depending upon whether Weber focuses upon the observer or 
participant's perspective. My aim is to highlight Habermas' 
early concept of rationality and not develop a detailed 
critique of his interpretation of Weber~In the early work~ 
Habermas outlines Weber's orientation to the concept of 
rationality and assumes that the reader understands the 
abstract terms invoked. 
For Weber the concept rationality is the locus in terms of 
which his vast empirical and philosophical works turn. 
Research into this war~ is extensive and modern sociologists 
are "humbled" by the range and depth of Weber's thought and 
empirical integrity. Therefore any superficial depiction of 
238 
Notes To Chapter 2 
his concept "rationality" is problematical. Weber spent a 
lifetime attempting to clarify what is "specific and peculiar 
about rationalism of Western culture" in relation to the 
Eastern and Ancient concepts of rationality.(Weber 1971:26) 
One of the most extensive and systematic analyses of Weber's 
concept of rationality is that of Rogers Brubaker(1984) "The 
Limits of Rationality". London: Allen and Unwin. For further 
interesting analyses see: 
Levine.D.N.(1981) "Rationality and Freedom:Weber and Beyond" 
Sociological Inquiry 51:1:5-25.Levine presents a much needed 
location of Weber's concept of rationality in relation to the 
philosophy of Hegel and Kant.He clarifies the complex 
connotations covered by the concept.He clearly locates the 
normative dimensions pertaining to the various "spheres of 
life" or institutional orders.He clarifies the subjective and 
objective dimension~ of rationality and the "semantics"of 
reason and freedom in Weber's Work. 
Benhabib.S.(1981) "Rationality and Social Action:Critical 
Reflections on Weber's Methodological Writings".The 
Philosophical Forum XIII:4:365-374.Provides an analysis of 
rational action from a perspective which avoids the reduction 
of Weber's concept of formal rationality to a one~dimensional 
theses so prevalent in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse. 
For a general Systems Theoretical approach which draws on the 
works of Habermas and Luhmann see:Schluchter.W. "The Rise of 
Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History". 
University of California Press. 
For more general accounts of the reception of Weber's work by 
sociologists and philosophers see:Turner and Factor(1979) "Max 
Weber and the Dispute over ·Reason and Value". Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.London. 
3. Benhabib's(1981) interpretation of Weber's ideal type of 
rational action is more extensive and interesting in that she 
carefully presents the internal logic of instrumental and 
formal-value rationality which goes beyond the limited aspects 
which I have isolated. My intent is to distil the 
interpretation which I see the young Habermas as focusing 
upon.A great deal of work is still required in order to come 
to terms with and develop cogent critiques of Weber's 
extensive treatment of the concepts rationality and 
rationalization. 
4. Weber discusses the the revival of Methodism which is one of 
the preconditions for the expansion of industrial development 
in England. He cites Wesley who understands the relationship 
between religion and capitalism as follows: "For religion must 
necessarily produce both industry and frugality,and these 
cannot but produce riches •••• for the Methodists in every place 
grow diligent and frugal:consequently they increase in 
goods.Hence they increase in pride,in anger,in desire of the 
flesh,and desire of the eyes,and pride of life.So, although 
the form of the religion remains,the spirit is swiftly 
vanishing away.Is there no way to prevent this-the continual 
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decay of pure religion? We ought not to prevent people from 
being diligent and frugal;we must exhort all Christians to 
gain all' they can,and to save all they can;that is,in 
effect,to grow rich".(Wesley cited in Weber 1971:175) 
5. It would be a gross misrepresentation of Weber's position to 
then conclude that modern modes of thought and action are 
predominantly "rational".Weber warns that even in the most 
highly rational social order,most action takes place in "a 
state of inarticulate half consciousness or actual 
unconsciousness of its subjective meaning ••• and is governed 
by impulse or habit"(l978:21). Habermas and Marcuse focus on 
the formal concept of rationality. 
6. Weber's famous statement that "Not ideas, but material and 
ideal interests directly govern men's conduct" is located 
within the conception of value orientations in that he 
directly qualifies this statement with 
"Yet, very frequently the world images that have been 
created by "ideas" have,like switchmen,determined the 
track along which action has been pushed by the dynamic 
of interest.From what and for what one wishes to be 
redeemed and let us not forget,could be redeemed,depend 
upon one's image of the world."(Weber 1974:280) 
In a disenchanted world the value orientations are the 
mechanisms whereby individuals create meaning for themselves. 
Thus man is distinguished from a mere event in the endless 
chains of means and ends of the mechanized world.Charismatic 
people and intellectuals are the main bearers or creators of 
new value orientations which invariably clash with the status 
quo,Weber argues. Science for Weber does not provide the 
means for the rational constitution of value 
orientations.Thus, ultimately for Weber, reflection upon the 
social interests which underlie action is subject to the 
individual subjective choice between conflicting "Gods and 
Demons" and is not rationally determinable in the scientific 
sense. 
7. From Freud, Marcuse appropriates the theory of repression 
which is seen in terms of the reality and pleasure principles 
governing human action. Necessary repression occurs when the 
reality principle is accorded priority over the pleasure 
principle such that libidinous drives are channelled into 
socially approved forms of action and civilized existence is 
possible.Surplus repression occurs when additional controls 
are imposed upon the individual through institutions of 
domination deriving from the class specific interests. The 
basic reality principle which governs modern man is the 
"performance principle" which is akin to Weber's notion of the 
work ethic or "rational calling". Surplus repression occurs in 
this context at various levels where the work ethic or 
performance principle is operative. Marcuse calls for the 
adoption of the pleasure principle in daily life and work such 
that pleasure defined largely in terms of eroticism is 
embraced.Thus a new technology which incorporates erotic 
elements is envisaged.Habermas ignores eroticism in Marcuse's 
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critique of Weber and concentrates on the concept of 
repression as a formal and neutral concept.Weber,like 
Marcuse,details the reduction of the sensual in the work ethic 
of modern man. Thus Weber and Marcuse deal with the important 
aspect of sensuality in detail while Habermas ignores it 
completely throughout his assessment of the concept 
rationality. 
8. This highly anthropomorphic interpretation of technological 
development is criticized by Arendt.She would see Gehlen as a 
functionalist thinker searc~ing for the "hidden laws" of 
nature-which operate behind the backs of men in this context. 
Arendt draws on Gehlen's empirical research to corroborate her 
notion that men physically insert themselves in the space of 
appearance. She departs sharply from his biological tenets 
whereby the human capacities are cast into the framework of 
biological necessities which are seen to determine all human 
capacities.These notions seem to be implied in the aspects 
which Habermas has appropriated from Gehlen in a highly 
truncated fashion.An adequate assessment of this metaphysical 
aspect of Habermas' argument would entail detailed 
investigation which is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis.In any case,Habermas makes this point and then does 
not develop it any further. He casts his concept of 
rationality directly into the Arendt paradigm.It seems to me 
that the young Habermas ignores the implications of what.he is 
saying in his haste to refute Marcuse on two different 
levels.Namely the dubious analogy between purposive rational 
action,the history of technology and the structure of the 
human organism and the firmer notion of work devoid of 
anthropomorphism depicted b~ Arendt.Habermas· ignores the 
critique of anthropomorphism in relation to the concept of 
work and modern technology in Arendt's clarification of the 
poies~s/praxis distinction. See "The Human Condition" 
(1958:144-174) 
In his subsequent work, Habermas 
anthropomorphic view of technological 
Knowledge and Human Interests (1968:25-63). 
does refute 
development. 
the 
See 
9. Arendt and Habermas emphasise the AID or means whereby the 
three concepts of man are interrelated.For example they speak 
of labour with the aid of means which substitute for work. I 
merely present one example of the manner in which the concepts 
are interrelated for Arendt."The Human Condition"L1958) is 
structured such that the various concepts are dynamically 
presented.Initially the concepts are stated in abstract form 
and then are shown in their interrelation in the detailed 
analysis of each realm.Most commentaries on Arendt do not 
progress beyond the initial abstract concepts stated in 
isolation.See for example James Knauer(1985),who notes the 
dialectic nature of Arendt's thinking but then paradoxically 
states that she avoids a theory of social justice because she 
, emphasises the discontinuities between her three 
concepts,work,labour and action. How then one may ask 
Knauer,is her work to be characterized as dialectical? 
.. 
.... 
.... 
I 
-
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10.Eight years after the publication of "Towards a Rational 
Society" which I discuss here in detail in order to. capture 
the internal logic of Habermas' critique of Marcuse's concept 
of rationality,Habermas sees a necessary connection between 
the sensuous concept of rationality and the utopian call for a 
new science.The concept of communicative rationality, which is 
excluded from interaction with nature is invoked to _overcome 
Marcuse's utopian position. 
See: Habermas.J. 1978 "Theory and Politics: A Discussion" 
Telos (38:79) 
ll~One way of viewing this notion of "punishment" and its 
relation to the violation of technical rules is through 
Arendt's distinction between cognition and thought which she 
discusses in the chapter on work in the "Human Condition." 
Thought processes are distinguished from cognition for Arendt 
in that thought inspires all great philosophy, art, poetry and 
creative mental processes.It has no definite beginning or end 
and has to be interrupted in order to be remembered and then 
reified or transformed into the spoken and written word. 
Arendt argues that cognition pertains to all and not only the 
intellectual and artistic work processes.She says: 
"like fabrication,it [cognition) is a process with a 
beginning and end, whose usefulness can be tested, and 
which if it produces no results, has failed, like the 
carpenter's workmanship· has failed when he produces a 
two-legged table.Cognitive processes in the sciences are 
basically not different from the function of cognition 
in fabrication; scientific results produced through 
cognition are added to the human artifice like all other 
things."(Arendt1958:171) 
This notion of cognition and its relation to the work process 
and failure is embraced by the young Habermas. The similarity 
between these scholars particularly in the manner in which 
Habermas invokes the concept of "failure" or "lack of success" 
and the means ends schema of work, purposive rational action 
and the empirical and analytical sciences is patent. Arendt's 
distinction between cognition and thought is also suggestive 
of the mariner in which the empirical-analytic sciences are 
approached by Habermas in "Knowledge and Human Interests" 
12.Critics such as Giddens(1982:149), and Mc Carthy(1978:28) 
misread this aspect of Habermas's work as stating that the 
realms of purposive rational action and interaction are 
mutually exclusive.They then proceed to the notion held by 
theorists such as Misgeld, Connerton, and even Wellmer that 
the forces of production are captured by the concept purposive 
rational action and relations of production by interaction.For 
Habermas this simple equati6n is untenable and requires the 
detailed analysis of the meaning of these terms in the context 
of Marx's work. Habermas reformulates the concepts relations 
and forces of production at the level of social evolution 
which includes the genetic epistemology of Piaget as a link in 
this complex of modes of production as seen by Marx. 
Critical theorists such as Jean Cohen and Seyla Benhabib hold 
that Habermas in this early work which I am analysing, 
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follows Marcuse in his thesis of one-dimensional rationality. 
Namely formal purposive rationality. This is incorrect in the 
light of the impact of Arendt's work on Habermas critique of 
Marcuse's position. 
See Benhabib(1986:228) where she holds that Habermas shares 
the one-dimensional thesis with Marcuse and Adorno. 
See Cohen(1982:82) 
13.The work of Freud on" Civilization and it's Discontents" is 
one of the background influences which is operative in this 
context.Modern anthropologists would take issue with Habermas 
on these points since he equates civilization with the 
relative development of technology as his criterion. For 
Habermas the Bushmen of the Namib would be seen as primitive 
and uncivilized simply because they have not "developed" 
technologically beyond the production of bows and arrows, and 
do not produce a surplus in the production process which is 
unequally distributed. One could argue that the Bushmen are 
one of the few remaining examples of the "most civilised" 
forms of society known, since the inequality inherent in the 
unequal distribution of goods is not operative in their 
society. 
14.The concept legitimation, in conjunction with the concepts of 
force and authority, is a component of Habermas's critique of 
ideology. The manner in which Habermas uses these terms and 
the logic internal to the tradition of Ideologiekritik of the 
Frankfurt School is complex and requires a study in its own 
right. In this early work, Habermas is attempting to deal with 
a number of complex issues· which are not all given equal 
priority. The concept legitimation is one concept which is 
used in a general and vague manner in this early work. The 
concept Ideology may be seen in a very general sense to be 
used by Habermas as a world-view which "stabilizes" or 
legitimates forms and relations of domination. Ideology as a 
form of consciousness which masks social interests and 
presents them as universal. "Real"- self-knowledge, interests 
and needs are masked by ideology, Habermas holds. 
He develops a complex work on legitimation some ten years 
later. I do not develop a critique of this dimension of 
Habermas work. I merely indicate in a rather superficial 
manner the relationship between the concept,of rationality and 
ideology. 
15 He can only mean that the social interests are economic 
interests if he comes to this conclusion. Habermas,in this 
early work employs the term social which when read in context 
implies the "social realm"" of Arendt which is differentiated 
from the political on the basis of economic activities -the 
gigantic "household" as "modern society" where communicative 
action is reduced to mere behaviour in the sense of stimulus 
and repose and the political realm takes on the mantle of 
force. An interesting investigation would be the deciphering 
of Habermas's term "social" in relation to the concepts of 
needs,nature,labour and work. 
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1."Knowledge and Human Interests" is still subjected to detailed 
analyses and critique. Critique of this work is complex and 
diverse. I mention a few areas. The concept of nature held by 
Habermas in this work is a contentious issue. 
See Mc earthy (1978:99-125); Whitebook.J. (1979) 
The concepts of critique and reflection in the Kantian and 
Hegelian senses are held to be confused. 
See Bernstein.R (1976;1985); Bubner.R (1982); Ottmann.H. 
(1982) Gadamer.H.G. (1977:1981); Giddens.A (1976) (a); Held.D. 
(1980) 
The discussion fo the empirical-analytic sciences is seen as 
legitimating an instrumentalist view of knowledge. 
See Mc earthy (1978:99-125); Heller.A (1982); Hesse.M (1982) 
2. The significance of Habermas view of theoretical reason as 
contemplation is not discussed in the secondary literature as 
far as I am aware. The only theorist who does discuss the 
inaugural lecture in detail, where Habermas outlines his 
orientation, is Thomas Mc earthy (1978). Mc earthy invokes 
the array of Gre~k terms in the analysis but does not realise 
the extent to which Habermas deviates from his (Mac Carthy's) 
"conventional" manner of interpreting the classical Greek 
tradition. See note 6. 
Bernstein (1976;1983;1985), briefly mentions the concepts 
"theoria", "doxa", the "Socratic attitude" and related Greek 
terminology in all of his works on Habermas, but does not 
realize the full significance of Habermas' orientation. This 
is a possible reason as to why he does not understand 
Habermas' adherence to both, the theoretical and practical 
reason, and looks for the primacy of practice over theory in 
Habermas' work in vain. Habermas and Arendt accord primacy to 
neither practice or theory. Both concepts are located in their 
respective realms and the relation is shown without one 
standing over and above the other. Habermas sharply criticizes 
Bernstein for according primacy to practical reason in his 
interpretation of Habermas' work. See Habermas (1985) 
(c):196) 
3. Habermas is orientating himself to Edmund 
"The Crisis of the European Sciences 
Phenomenology: An Introduction To 
Philosophy". 
Husserl (1970) 
and Transcendental 
Phenomenological 
4. Here Habermas draws upon the only work of Plato, the Timaeus, 
where he specifically deals with "physical science~. For 
Plato, the material world is ordered in terms of an Eternal 
and Ideal pattern. 
5. Gadamer develops vast investigations into the classical notion 
of practical reason and the process of wise deliberation 
(phronesis) which is central to Aristotle's ethics. The focus 
always falls on the questions surrounding a practical way of 
life. The ethical domain of practical reason has been dealt 
with from Habermas' perspective in chapter one. He argues that 
practical reason in the classical sense is eclipsed and that 
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technical reason prevails in modernity. His conclusions are 
similar in many ways to those of Gadamer. 
See Gadamer (1981) "Reason in the Age of Science", where he 
develops extensive analyses of modern technical reason. He 
echos Arendt in her concern that in modernity, scientists, 
whose professional communicative realm is that of abstract 
symbolic language, are eulogised and become the major 
spokesman of society and its requirements. 
6. In his extensive assessment of Habermas' work, Mc earthy holds 
that the extent to which the contemplative life can be 
realised "depended on the proper ordering of the polis" 
(1978:2). He is thus unaware of the significance of Habermas' 
notion of contemplation in relation to the order of the polis 
and communicative action which is defined in contrast to the 
contemplative stance. 
This basic difference in orientation between Habermas and 
Gadamer lies at the heart of the disputes between Habermas and 
Gadamer on the nature of reflection and rationality. Gadamer 
is correct in saying of Habermas that he "is obviously 
animated not only by language but by work and action; 
hermeneutical reflection must pass into a criticism of 
ideology" (Gadamer 1977:28). 
7. Arendt, like Popper, has no illusions about the so called 
Golden age of Greece. Both scholars draw from the work of 
Pericles for insights into the daily lives of the Greeks as 
opposed to the work of Aristotle or Plato who are seen to 
legitimate totalitarianism. Arendt carefully displays the 
totalitarian aspects of Plato and Aristotle's work: 
i. Where law-making follows the logic of work. 
ii Through an assessment of the Philosopher King where Plato 
presents his Utopian solution to the frailty of human 
affairs. 
iii.Through a detailed assessment of the concept of rulership 
as mastering, arguing that in order to rule, someone must 
obey and hence the communicative formation of freedom is 
abrogated. The concepts of rulership and management 
pervade Aristotle's understanding of the political realm. 
For Aristotle, freedom is acquired through the speechless 
wonder of the philosopher when he contemplates the cosmos 
and brings his soul into accord with the rationality which 
pervades the universe. 
See Hannah Arendt (1958:137-247) "The Human Condition". 
See Karl Popper (1963:44-102) "Plato as Enemy of the Open 
Society" in Thomas Landon Thorson (1963) Plato:Totalitarian or 
Democrat?" New York:Prentice-Hall. 
8. In a recent assessment of Habermas' "knowledge constitutive-
interests", Henning Ottman, clarifies the concept of interest 
in a similar fashion. He points out that the concept interest 
in Habermas' work must be seen in the literal sense of the 
word which means "inter-ease" i.e. the "being-in- between" 
(Ottman 1983:81). Habermas responds to many of the errors in 
Ottman's assessment. He does not refute this point thus 
indicating that this is the manner in which he employs the 
concept. (Habermas 1983:219-283) 
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9. Habermas' admiration for Peirce is palpable in the two 
chapters which deal with his work in detail. This stems from 
Peirce's knowledge not only of the philosophy of Medieval 
Scholasticism, Berkley and Kant, but also from his practical 
knowledge as a physicist. Habermas notes that his friendship 
with Richard Bernstein stems from their mutual interest in the 
work of Peirce. (Habermas 1986:151) 
10.The three kinds of inference central to the logic of inquiry 
as understood by Peirce c~n represented as follows: 
Deduction: (Does not provide new hypotheses.No new knowledge) 
Law-like hypothesis 
Case or initial condition 
Conclusion or prediction 
L 
c 
p------- effect 
"i deduce the prediction from the Law as a result (effect) of 
a case (cause)" (Habermas 1971: 115). 
Abduction: (propels the scientific endeavour forward) 
L 
?--------[c]the creative cognitive process. 
p 
"I derive the case from a result and a law." 
1972:115) 
(Habermas 
Induction: (propels the scientific endeavour forward) 
?--------[L]creative cognitive process 
c 
p 
I infer a "law from th~ case and result."(Habermas 1972:115) 
11. Bernstein (1985:222) holds that Habermas, in contrast to 
Arendt, is not "sensitive to the concept of plurality". 
Benhabib in her most rec,ent work on the foundations of 
critical theory uses Arendt's concept of plurality in her 
attempt to correct this "oversight" in Habermas' concept of 
intersubjectivity (Benhabib 1986:243-260). These critics do 
not realize that the concept of plurality is central to 
Habermas' concept of intersubjectivity and communicative 
rationality. 
12. Richard Palmer (1969) explains that the word hermeneutics 
derives from the Greek verb "hermeneuein" meaning: "to 
interpret." Hermes is the Greek messenger of the Gods whose 
function it is to transform what is "beyond human 
understanding into· a form that human intelligence can grasp" 
(1969:13). Hermeneutics in a very general sense means the 
process of rendering the alien or unfamiliar to 
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understanding. This process is understood in roughly six 
different senses in the history of hermeneutic theory. Palmer 
indicates the history of this endeavour in chronological 
order as: 
i. Hermeneutics oriented to biblical exegesis during 15th and 
16th centuries 
ii As philological methodology in conjunction with 18th 
century rationalism. General rules of interpretation are 
the focus. 
iii. As the science of linguistics and understanding for 
Scleiermacher in the early 19th century. 
iv. As the methodological foundation of the 
historic-hermeneutic sciences. Dilthey (1833-1911) speaks 
of the "Geisteswissenschaften" - as those disciplines which 
are oriented toward the understanding, interpretation and 
meaning of "mans actions, art and writings" (Palmer 
1969:41). For Dilthey, hermeneutics is understood as the 
Critique of Historical Reason of the cultural sciences, 
analogous to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, viewed as a 
critique of the natural sciences. (Palmer 1969:98) 
v. As the Phenomenology of Being and existential 
understanding for Martin Heidegger. Hans-George Gadamer 
subsequently develops Heidegger's ideas in the locus of 
language. 
vi. As the interpretation and recovery of meaning. Freud's 
work on dream analysis is thematic as is the phenomenology 
of the will. The scholar who focuses on the interpretation 
of meaning is is Paul Ricoeur. 
See John B Thompson (1981) who develops an interesting 
analysis and comparison of the work of Habermas and Ricoeur 
in what he names Critical Hermeneutics. 
13. Habermas' interpretation of Dilthey's work is similar in 
many ways to that of Gadamer in "Truth and Method" (1975) 
and is in stark contrast to that of Richard Palmer. Gadamer 
emphasises the "Hegelian" aspects of the philosophy of life 
in Dilthey's work. Life history is understood as the 
objectivations of mind which are re-appropriated in the 
process of understanding. This aspect is also present in 
Habermas' interpretation of Dilthey's work, but he develops 
the methodological level of analysis via a contrast which he 
sets up between the work of Peirce and Dilthey. 
14 See David Held (1980). Held devotes some attention to 
Habermas' interpretation of Dilthey's work, but he does not 
realize the full implications of the notion of subjectivity 
which Habermas develops in this context. Held focuses on the 
explanation I understanding dimensions central to analytic 
philosophy. He emphasises the Gadamer I Habermas debates with 
regard to hermeneutics. 
Mc earthy (1978) briefly summarises aspects from the analysis 
of Dilthey. He focuses on the Gadamer I Wittgenstein aspects 
of interpretation and language. 
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Giddens (1977) focuses upon the Gadamer I Habermas debates. 
Bernstein (1976) Briefly summarises the conclusions of 
"Knowledge and Human Interests" and does not mention 
Dilthey's work at all. 
Misgeld (1976) develops a detailed assessment of the· 
Habermas I Gadamer debates with regard to hermeneutics. 
Most of the other critics merely mention Dilthey in passing 
and do not assess this aspect of Habermas' work. 
See for example: S.Benhabib (1986); P.Connerton (1976); 
R.Geuss (1981); J.Sensat (1979); T.Schroyer (1973); 
J.B.Thompson (1981) and J A.Wellmer (1976). 
15. See Habermas (1971:336 footnote 2.), where Habermas states 
that he focuses upon the work of the mature Dilthey. Habermas 
refers the reader to Gadamer's interpretation of Dilthey's 
methodology. Habermas employs Gadamer's interpretation of the 
Hegelian aspects of Dilthey's work but casts this into his 
own frame of reference which I emphasise. 
16.This must be seen in the context of Dilthey's philosophy of 
life and history. He conceives his project as a "Critique of 
Historical Reason" which is understood to be analogous to 
Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (Schnadelbach 1984:142 ). 
Central to this endeavour is the concept of life. Dilthey is 
interested in the total life context which is understood as a 
reversal of Hegel's concepts of life and spirit. For Dilthey, 
life is not a deficient mode of spirit. "Objective spirit", 
is the philosophical term for reality in Hegel's language. 
History for Dilthey is nacied "objective spirit" and is 
understood as the totality of objectifications of the life 
processes in which the individual is located at a specific 
point in time. Thus the individual researcher is located in 
this total life context (Schnadelbach 1984:142). Dilthey says 
of Hegel's concept of "objective spirit": "the assumptions on 
which Hegel based this concept can no longer be accepted 
today. He constructed communities on the basis of the general 
rational will. Today we have to start from the reality of 
life:in life, the totality of mental connexions is at work. 
Hegel engaged in metaphysical construction: we analyse what is 
given. And present-day analysis of human existence fills us 
all with the feeling of frailty, of the finiteness which 
resides in everything to do with life, even where the the 
highest forms of communal life arise from it. Thus we cannot 
understand objective spirit on the basis of reason, but must 
return to the structural connection of the units of life which 
is continued in communities. And we cannot treat objective 
spirit as an ideal construction; rather we must take as our 
basis its reality in history. We seek to understand this 
reality and to present it in adequate concepts. In this way 
objective spirit is detached from a one-sided foundation in 
universal reason ••• a new concept of it becomes possible, in 
which are embraced language, custom, every sort of form of 
life style of living as family, civil society, state and law." 
(Dilthey cited in Schnadelbach 1984:142) 
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17.This notion of "pure" statements is rejected by scholars 
such as M. Hesse, T.Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend for 
whom theory and data can not be separated in this fashion in 
that data is not independent of the theoretical language in 
question. Hesse holds that theory formation in the natural 
sciences is dependent on interpretation. Habermas agrees with 
her in his recent work, but casts this question into his own 
novel framework of communicative judgement. I focus on this 
framework in chapter four. Habermas also seems to ignore the 
fact that even so called "pure" expressions such as calculus 
are constituted in specific historical periods and notions of 
the universe. The learning process then still occurs through 
communication and interpretation. Whether "pure" statements 
can be completely understood without the mediation of 
communicative and interpretive processes is then debatable. 
18 Gillian Rose (1981) develops an interesting critique of 
Fichte's positing reflection in the context of her study on 
Hegel. She comes to the conclusion that for Fichte, "positing 
is an immediate, underivable, unconditioned, spontaneous act 
which accounts for the possibility of objects. On this account 
however, no determinate object can be posited but only an 
immediate being whose immediacy as a determination is 
illusory, since the absolute act gives itself boundaries and 
hence has none" (Rose 1981:195). She compares the 
sociological theory with Fichtean position and comes up with 
an interesting comparison. She points out that the antinomy of 
action and structure rehearses the Fichtean antinomy of the 
positing ego and the posited non-ego. The non-ego is seen as 
the structure or deed which is at first understood as 
independent of consciousness. The ego is equivalent to the 
action, which has insight into it's own agency and hence is 
the "highest fact of consciousness", it eventually understands 
the structure (non-ego) as its own posit. She notes that this 
abstract formulation results in Hegel's bad infinity and hence 
is illusory. This is a challenge to Habermas' entire lifes 
work and would make an interesting study which is beyond the 
scope of the present work. The Fichtean element of Habermas' 
work certainly requires such an investigation. The nub of the 
matter revolves around the concept of nature since for Fichte, 
nature is a posit of the absolute ego. Habermas does not 
account for nature adequately in his work. 
19.Marx's dialectical materialism develops through his critique 
of philosophical Idealism and the concepts of alienation and 
objectification deriving from this tradition, and its 
subsequent interpretation by Feuerbach and the Young 
Hegelians. Central to Marx's notion of objectification is his 
critique of Hegel's the concepts objectification and 
alienation. For Hegel alienation pertains· to man's state of 
consciousness which is estranged or alienated from the 
phenomenal world. Consciousness emancipates itself from what 
appears to be external and separate through the process of 
re-cognition. Through re-cognising the external as 
projections of conscious- ness, the self is freed from. 
alienation and consciousness returns to itself as Hegel so 
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often says. Objects for Hegel are merely reified forms of 
consciousness. Marx criticises this as the reduction of the 
material and objective world to a mere phantasy of mind, a 
predicate of consciousness. Objectification and alienation 
are then co-terminus. Marx distinguishes between the making of 
objects and the forms of consciousness which pertain to men's 
relationships between men and the relation of men to the 
objects created. See for example "The German ·rdeology" 
(1965:654). For Marx, objectification is a process whereby 
mans potentialities and human capacities are externalized and 
embodied in the object thus facilitating the re~lisation of 
the self. The real or non-alienated life of man is the 
externalization of his potentialities and capacities in the 
material objects and the relationships between men which 
facilitate this realization. The form of objectification 
which fragments and negates this self-realization of man and 
his non-coersive relationships with others is held to be 
"alienated" labour. 
See Avineri (1968) for a detailed discussion of this aspect of 
Marx's work. 
See Benhabib (1968) for a detailed comparison between the 
work of Marx and Hegel on the concepts of externalization and 
objectification. She also deals with the communicative 
dimensions of interaction which Avineri ignores in his 
assessment of the work of Marx and Hegel. 
See the extensive citations in the notes section where 
Habermas provides evidence to back up his thesis that Marx 
employs the concept labour in an equivocal fashion. 
(1972:326-329). 
20.Habermas holds that the self~constitution of the species for 
Marx occurs through the dialect of labour. Wellmer (1971), a 
critical theorist who agrees with much of Habermas' work, 
develops an extensive investigation into this aspect of Marx's 
work. He focuses on the implications of the reduction of the 
concept of interaction to work in terms of the realms of 
freedom and necessity. This is the mode which Hegel adopts in 
criticizing the work of Kant an~ Fichte in his essays on 
natural law as Gillian Rose points out (1981:55). 
Arendt's orientation is similar to that of Wellmer. Wellmer 
refers to Arendt in this regard. The work of Wellmer surpasses 
that of Arendt whose horizon is wider and hence her assessment 
of Marx is limited. Their basic conclusions are similar. 
Namely, that when the category of work is contextualized in 
terms of freedom and necessity, the "scientific Marx", argues 
for freedom from necessity in and of itself. This is the point 
which Habermas stresses. 
21.The extent to which the historico-philosophical dimensions can 
be legitimately extricated from the material investigations is 
an issue which is beyond the scope of this study. Habermas is 
criticized for splitting Marx's concept of praxis into labour 
and interaction by scholars such as Anthony Giddens. 
Habermas' point is that if the concept of praxis is able to 
account for the the dynamics of communication, socialization, 
identity formation and the symbolic reproduction of tradition, 
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then it is adequate to its task. He holds that Marxism, based 
on the concept of praxis as outlined by Marx is rooted in a 
notion of objectification or paradigm of production, which 
entails a form of logic which is not able to deal with these 
issues of communicative action. This is his answer to Giddens 
in "A Reply to My Critics" (Habermas 1982:225) in Thompson and 
Held (ed) 1982 Habermas: Critical Debates.Mac Millan Press 
22.In his empirical analyses, Marx does employ the concept of 
labour as social labour such that human interaction and 
productive activity are articulated, Habermas argues. This is 
captured through the concepts of the relations and forces of 
production respectively. The empirical analyses encompass the 
material or economic base of society and the "superstructuie" 
entailing the institutional framework made up symbolic modes 
of interaction and cultural tradition. Habermas argues that 
Marx is not able to integrate these two domains adequately. 
Habermas points out that Marx develops a dual concept of the 
subject in the two domains respectively. The institutional 
domain of the relations of production is composed of two 
classes of subjects: The capitalists and the proletariat. The 
forces of production on the other hand are held to pertain to 
the species, as a whole. Here Marx speaks of the species as 
the subject of history. In attempting to relate the relations 
of production (institutional level of analysis) to the forces 
of production, Marx is limited by his concept of synthesis 
which is too narrowly conceived since it is based on the 
concept of work and his dual concept of the subject is 
inadequate to its task, Habermas argues. Benhabib (1986) in 
"Critique, Norm and Utopia .A Study in the Foundations of 
Critical Theory", develops a critique of Marx which clearly 
demonstrates this dual voice of Marx. She holds that Marx is 
unable to integrate these dimensions of his work adequately 
because he limits his understanding to what she names the 
work model of action, what Habermas calls the paradigm of 
production. This work model of action and its correlate, the 
philosophy of the subject (capturing the re£lection process) 
is shown to permeate the entire fabric of Marx's work. 
Benhabib's critique of Marx is similar to that of Habermas in 
that it is grounded on the basic distinction between poiesis 
and praxis (deriving from Arendt's work) in terms of which 
Benhabib formulates the "work model of action" and the 
philosophy of the subject. Her analysis is far more extensive 
and systematic than that of Habermas in this specific regard. 
The basic distinction between poiesis and praxis (understood 
as communicative action) is also the ground upon which her 
critique of Hegel, Horkheimer and Adorno rests. 
23.Habermas can be likened to Marx in that he is attempting to 
base his theory of interests on demonstrable human activities. 
Namely: work and interaction. 
As Arendt says of Marx: 
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"Marx is outstanding not because of his materialism, but 
because he is the only political thinker who was consistent 
enough to base his theory· of material interest on a 
demonstrably material human activity,on laboring." (Arendt 
1958:183) 
24. Numerous scholars have reacted in various ways to the manner 
in which Habermas employs the concept of reflection in 
"Knowledge and Human Interests" 
See Richard Bernstein (1976:209, 1985:12). I agree with 
Bernstein who points out that Habermas fuses two logically 
distinct concepts of reflection in "Knowledge and Human 
Interests." (Bernstein 1976:209). 
Henning Ottmann (1982:84) basically agrees with Bernstein's 
view, but he develops an extended argument in which he holds 
that Habermas attempts to use an historically specific notion 
of neuroses which is generalized to the pathologies of 
mankind from time immemorial. He views this as illicit and as 
inadequate to its task of providing the universal conditions 
for emancipation of the species subject it is meant to apply 
to. This creates what Ottoman calls a Praxis problem. I agree 
with Ottoman in this regard. 
Thomas Mc Carthy's (1978:94-213) analysis is the most 
extensive and explores the relations between the concept of 
reflection on numerous levels of analysis dealing with the 
concept of nature and its relation to the knowledge-
constitutive interests. The basic contours of the argument 
are similar to that of Bernstein, except that McCathy 
provides detailed evidence from the Idealist tradition and 
proves that the emancipatory interest is the least well 
substantiated aspect of the theory. 
David Held (1980:323) treats the errors of the two forms of 
critique as a mechanism whereby he introduces Habermas' 
revisions. He discusses the example of psychoanalysis in a 
separate section of his book and points out that the dialogic 
situation is not a symmetrical one and hence inadequate to 
the task it is called upon to perform., 
Albrecht Wellmer (1976:231-263) develops a response close to 
that of Bernstein, then he discusses a general 
epistemological orientation to Marxism and introduces 
Habermas' revisions in a manner which is not critical but in 
agreement Habermas. 
Roslyn Wallace Balogh (1979:237) briefly notes that 
reflection for Habermas is a means to an end which seems to 
me to be far off the mark. She does not say what this end is. 
Balogh holds the model of objectification and 
re-appropriation is adequate to the task of explaining 
alienation. Thus she also eliminates man the communicator 
from her vision. 
Rudiger Bubner (1982:42 ) confuses reflection in the young 
Hegelian sense with that of Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
in general which is beyond the scope of this study. 
Questions surrounding the concept of nature, the legitimacy 
of the instrumental notion of science and the efficacy of the 
emphasis upon neuroses as the modern psychological form of 
alienation are all issues which I am not able to address 
given the limits which I have to impose on this study. 
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1. For Marx the concept mode of production encompasses the 
concepts of the forces and relations of production. Habermas 
reformulates these concepts in terms of his basic distinction 
between communicative and purposive rational action. This 
analysis develops into an extensive integration of recent 
anthropological data with the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. 
See: "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" in 
"Communication and the Evolution of Society"(l979:95-130). 
2. Habermas explains that he is attempting to integrate the 
concepts of power held by Parsons and Weber with that of 
Arendt in order to develop a critical approach to class 
structures in society. His first attempt at integrating these 
three concepts of power is contained in". Philosophical-
Political Profiles" (1983:171-187) In the essay named 
"Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power", Habermas translates 
the three concepts of power held by Parsons, Weber and Arendt 
into the language of rationality. This discussion relies on 
insights developed in the context of the theory of 
communicative competence such that the strategic aspects of 
power formation can be accommodated. The concept of force, as 
noted in chapter three, is used to capture repressive social 
structures and ideology. The concept of strategic action is 
screened out of Arendt's understanding of power and hence is 
rectified through the concept of strategic rationality in 
Habermas' work. Habermas maintains these distinctions in his 
work. He is not consistent in his usage of the concepts of 
power and force. At times he invokes power in the sense 
ind~cated in the address and at other times he speaks of power 
in the sense of repressive force. He has not published his 
theory of class structures and the related concepts of power 
and rationality as yet. 
This understanding of the communicative formation of power and 
the location of praxis in the realm of communicative action is 
the nucleus around which Habermas' extensive and most abstract 
work to date, "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity"(l987) 
revolves. He employs the basic concepts which I outline in 
chapter four to develop extensive critiques of the work of a 
vast array of scholars such as Foulcault, Derrida, Battaile, 
Lyotard, Parsons and Luhmann. I am not able to develop this 
theme within the limits which I have to impose on this study 
since the critique of the work of each of these scholars 
would entail vast studies in their own right. 
3. I rely to some 
(1982:84-156) 
1982:7-77) 
extent on Ronald Beiner's "Interpretive Essay" 
and draw from the "Kant Lectures" (Arendt 
4. Habermas finds in Piaget a kindred spirit in that the latter 
develops his view of learning from a perspective which accords 
priority to action over passive contemplation. I cannot 
develop Piaget's perspective within the limitations which I 
have to impose upon this work. One way of capturing Piaget's 
intent is to view the learning process as a continuous spiral 
with ever widening loops of constructive concepts which enable 
individuals to develop flexible and complex modes of acting 
and communicating in the world. A metaphor suggestive of this 
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process is that of ~invention". The subject as "inventor" 
constructs conceptual structures rather than discovers them 
ready made in his cognitive I interactive faculties. As 
subjects creatively "invent" new ways of doing things, new 
reasons for contested validity claims emerge and can be 
discursively redeemed in the discourse situation. The 
essential feature of a decentered form of perception for 
Habermas and Piaget is that flexibility and novelty can be 
accounted for. 
5. Habermas has been criticized with regard to the ideal speech 
situation. 
See for example Alvin Gouldner "The Dialectic of Ideology and 
Technology"(1976:144) for an incisive critique of this aspect 
of Habermas' work. For Gouldner the ideal speech situation 
generates a new form of stratification. 
Habermas does not accept the critiques of his "ideal speech 
situation" since he holds that the conditions of symmetry and 
reciprocity, "although defective in their details", are 
necessary for the grounding of arguments and hence his concept 
of communicative rationality. 
See the Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society.(1984:25) 
6."Aesthetic rationality" is one of the most contentious concepts 
in Habermas' work. Martin Jay (1985(b)) brings together most 
of Habermas' fragmentary statements in this regard. He 
focuses on the emancipatory potential in autonomous art as 
understood by Adorno and Benjamin. Jay questions the extent to 
which one can speak of aesthetic rationality and learning 
processes in this realm. Habermas' reply is that to the 
extent that art criticism ha$ become an autonomous sphere in 
modernity,as a result of man's decentered perspective of the 
world, one can speak of a form of discursive rationality in 
art. He insists that the realms of aesthetics, science and 
morality are autonomous spheres in modernity. Each sphere 
exhibits a form of rationality which is based on argumentation 
or forms of criticism, learning and the "resista~ce" of 
reality". Habermas wants to strictly exclude aesthetics from 
universal validity claims and the concept of communicative 
rationality which aims at emancipation. Thus the realm of art 
is not seriously considered as the locus of freedom, as Adorno 
thought. Habermas' analysis of aesthetics is limited and he 
admits that this is a "neglected" and poorly developed aspect 
of his work. 
See Habermas (1979) "Conciousness-Raising or Redemptive 
Criticism-The Contemporaneity of Walter Benjamin." New German 
Critique 17:30-59. 
See Habermas (1985) "Questions and "Counterquestions". In 
Bernstein.R. (ed) "Habermas and Modernity" Cambridge:Polity 
Press. - where Habermas is criticized by Berger, Lyotard, 
Huyssen, Benhabib and Jay on this concept of Aesthetic 
Rationality. 
See Jay (1985)(b) Benhabib (1986)(a) 
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7. Habermas is emphasising the constructivist perspective which 
marks Piaget's work. For Piaget, intelligence "begins neither 
with knowledge of the self or of things as such but with 
knowledge of their interaction, and it is by orientating 
itself simultaneously toward the two poles of that interaction 
that intelligence organises the world by organising itself" 
(Piaget 1977:278) 
Piaget represents this process diagrammatically as follows: 
y 
.A 
x 
surrounding universe. 
meeting point between the universe and 
organism 
Piaget employs the expressivist model characteristic of 
Hegel's dialectic to indicate the progress of intelligence 
which "works in the dual direction of externalization and 
internalization and its two poles will be the acquisition of 
physical experience ( Y) and the acquisition of intellectual 
operation itself ( X). This occurs through the dual process 
of accommodation and assimilation. Assimilation means the 
transformation of the external world such as to make it part 
of oneself. This entails the integration of the properties 
characteristic of external objects into the schemata laid down 
by previous activities. Piaget holds that the primitive 
schemata of action such as the sucking, seeing, and grasping 
of the infant are gradually differentiated and raised to a 
higher level as the child matures and develops more complex 
modes of interaction with the environment. If assimilation 
predominated, cognition would encompass a few large and stable 
schema in terms of which the multiplicity of objects would be 
understood. Differentiation would_ be minimal and man would 
not be able to distinguish between a cat and a squirrel for 
example, since they would simply fall under the more general 
category of "four legged animals". Through the process of 
accommodation, differentiation is possible since the existing 
schema are modified and differentiated such that the different 
properties of objects which distinguishs one from another, are 
incorporated in mans intellect. Thus change is accounted for 
through the continual interaction between novelty and 
familiarity which are mediated by adaptation encompassing 
accommodation and assimilation through which schematization 
occurs. If accommodation predominated, the multiplicity of 
schema would be differentiated, and every cat, for example, 
would have its own distinct category. One would not be able to 
develop a form of understanding in which the general class, of 
"feline" would develop. Thus assimilation and accommodation 
are two learning mechanisms which function together 
facilitating the adaptation of the organism to the environment 
through progressive stages of equilibrium( object can be 
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easily assimilated) and disequilibrium (schemata are changed 
through accommodation). This dual process occurs with each 
encounter with the environment in the threefold sense of mans 
interaction with the objective sphere of nature, the social 
sphere of subject-subject relations and the sphere of man's 
relation to himself. This is understood as an active and 
constitutive process named equilibration so that adaptation is 
not understood in mechanistic or naturalist reductionist 
terms. 
See Piaget(1977:832) "E~uilibration Processes in the 
Psychological Development of the Child" in "The Essential 
Piaget" H. E Gruber and J.J.Voneche (ed).London: Routl~dge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Piaget holds that all progress in the sciences is accompanied 
by a "reflexive progress in reason itself, that is by progress 
in the formation of reason itself insofar as it is an internal 
activity"(Piaget 1977:276). It is Piaget the philosopher, who 
confronts the work of Kant, Hegel, Sartre, Levi-Strauss, 
Foulcault, Durkheim and a host of other scholars through his 
extensive body of work on genetic epistemology, that interests 
Habermas. The simplistic caricature of Piaget as the scholar 
of rigid stages of cognitive development devoid_ of a 
dialectical and mediatory perspective so prevalent in modern 
superficial approaches to psychology is certainly not 
Habermas' point of reference. Habermas avoids the term 
constitution and uses Piaget's concept of "construction" in 
his work. 
8. Kohlberg discovers that only a small proportion of the adult 
population studied ever reach the level of postconventional 
morality where universal principles of morality are 
distinguished from the authority of reference persons or 
groups to which the individual may belong. Mankind in general 
is the point of reference and the reflective capacity to adopt 
a universal stance, where subjective values are put aside is 
adopted. 
9. Habermas' early critique of Thomas Aquinas' work is palpable 
here. 
10.Habermas presents a unique interpretation of the work of 
Lukacs, Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno in the first volume of 
"The the theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society"(1984:339-399). This interpretation 
is seen through the lens of his concept communicative action 
and communicative rationality. The decentration thesis, the 
three basic attitudes , the external world of manipulable 
objects, the social world of intersubjective relations and the 
subjective world of the self are some of the major concepts 
employed in this interpretation. The work of these scholars is 
approached in a manner similar to which he approaches the work 
of Freud, Marx, Dilthey and Arendt as I indicate in chapters 
two and three. 
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11.Habermas briefly deals with Adorno and Horkheimer's ~arlier 
works of the 1930's in his second volume of "The Theory of 
Communicative Action: The Critique of the Functionalist 
Reason"(l987:379-383). Here he employs the insights gained 
from the first volume, arguing for a distinction between the 
philosophy of history and the philosophy of consciousness,in 
terms of which reification is understood. 
Notes to Conclusion 
1. See for example Mc earthy (1978:101-102)(1986:vi); 
Sensat (1979:20); Held (1980:310-311); Thompson (1982:6) 
Benhabib (1986:6). 
• 
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